Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 2, 2026

Assessment as of: 8:45 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 11:00 AM ET

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Russia continued to intensify its long-range strike campaign against Ukraine in October 2026, particularly exploiting jet-powered drones and quasi-cruise missiles to maximize civilian harm. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 2 that Russian forces launched 6,473 long-range Shahed/Geran strike drones against Ukraine in October 2026 and that Ukrainian forces downed 4,859 of the drones, or 75 percent of the total drones launched.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces intercepted roughly 66 percent of all jet-powered Shahed variants and 89 percent of all piston engine-driven Shahed variants.[2] Ukrainian Air Force daily strikes data asserts that Russian forces launched 6,158 drones during October 2026 and that Ukrainian forces intercepted 5,169 drones or around 84 percent of the total drones launched. It is unclear what the reason is for the discrepancy in reporting, although the Ukrainian Air Force also includes Gerbera, Italmas, and Parodiya-type drones in its total drone launch counts. The Ukrainian interception rate of jet-powered drones was nonetheless higher in October 2026 compared to Summer 2026, when the interception rate was around 50 to 60 percent.[3]

Russian forces launched fewer drones in Summer 2026 as the increased effectiveness and lethality of jet-powered drones allowed Russia to maximize damage against key civilian, energy, transportation, and logistical targets with fewer drone launches. Russia was able to exploit the effectiveness of the jet-powered drones and the lack of Ukrainian countermeasures against them to stockpile piston engine-driven and jet-powered drones ahead of its Winter 2026-2027 strike campaign. Jet- powered drones fly at rates of up to 600 kilometers per hour and Ukrainian interceptor drones have historically struggled to intercept them. Ukraine has continued to prioritize the domestic production of jet-powered interceptor drones in recent months to counter Russia’s advantage with jet-powered drones, which may in part explain an increased Ukrainian jet-powered drone interception rate in October 2026.

Russia has also slightly increased its usage of quasi-cruise missiles, including Banderols and Dan-Ts, over the last few months, launching these weapons in 16 strike packages in September and October 2026, 13 in August, and nine in July. The effectiveness of jet-powered drones and Russian quasi-cruise missiles has allowed Russia to conserve ballistic and cruise missiles for hardened, heavily defended, and high-priority targets.[4] Russia has been able to maintain its production rate of ballistic and cruise missiles and is likely stockpiling these missiles to exploit Ukraine’s ongoing shortage of Patriot interceptor missiles and conduct intense future long-range strikes after Russia’s jet-powered drones lose their current advantage.[5]

Russia's increasingly devastating strikes come against the backdrop of Russian President Vladimir Putin's evolving theory of victory that hinges on the effectiveness of Russia's long-range strike campaign to make Ukrainian civilian life untenable and disrupt and isolate the Ukrainian economy from Europe. Ukrainian battlefield successes have disrupted Putin’s theory of victory which rests on the assumption that Russian forces will be able to continue making slow and grinding, but consistent advances on the battlefield longer than the West will support Ukraine.[6] Russian forces have made negative territorial gains over the last two months, while suffering almost 100,000 losses in October and September 2026.[7] These battlefield realities have forced Putin to revise his theory of victory to rely on a coercive long-range drone and missile campaign to compel Ukraine into surrender over the upcoming Winter 2026-2027.[8] Long-range strikes have killed or wounded over 7,500 civilians thus far in 2026 — almost 50 percent higher than all of 2025.[9] Russian forces are leveraging daytime strikes as part of a larger effort to make daily life in Ukraine untenable, inflict significant civilian casualties, and degrade Ukraine’s economy, conducting at least 10 daytime strikes during October 2026.[10] Russian forces notably launched significant daytime strike packages against Ukraine on October 15, 16, and 17 likely to exploit Starshield service disruptions from October 14 to 24, taking advantage of Ukraine’s temporarily weakened ability to intercept jet-powered drones.[11] Russian forces have recently prioritized strikes against Ukrainian shopping centers in another attempt to inflict harm on Ukrainian civilians by striking infrastructure that they rely on for daily life.[12] The Ukrainian Council on Shopping Centers reported on November 2 that air raid warnings in Ukraine forced Ukrainian shopping centers to close for 9.8 working days in October 2026 out of a total of 186.3 working days since 2022.[13] The percentage of air raid alerts during shopping centers’ working hours reached 32.5 percent in October 2026, up from only 12.2 percent in October 2025. Russian forces are also intensifying strikes against western Ukraine and, notably, Ukrainian border crossings with Moldova, Romania, and Poland, likely in a dual effort to intimidate NATO member states and other European countries into abandoning their support for Ukraine and to degrade Ukraine’s border infrastructure and international ground lines of communication (GLOCs) used for external economic and military support.[14]

Russia’s long-range strike campaign against Ukraine continues to be an avenue for Putin to both distract from Russian forces’ diminishing progress on the battlefield and inflict increasing costs on Ukrainian society, as Putin likely assesses that Russian strikes will be able to generate sufficient hardship to weaken Ukrainian resistance and increase political pressure for concessions.[15] Russia’s increasingly large strike packages continue to highlight the critical importance of Western assistance in bolstering Ukraine’s air defense capabilities, with both US-made Patriot air defense systems that can effectively counter Russian ballistic missiles and other forms of air defense, for a diverse, well-equipped air defense umbrella.[16] Ukraine and its partners must prevent the Kremlin from converting technological adaptations, infrastructure damage, and deliberate civilian harm into strategic leverage.

Russian forces conducted a devastating airstrike against Komyshuvakha (southeast of Zaporizhzhia City) on November 2, reportedly killing at least 18 civilians. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces conducted several glide bomb strikes against a school in Komyshuvakha that was acting as a humanitarian aid site.[17] Zelensky stated that Russian forces conducted a double tap strike, dropping an additional nine glide bombs on a shelter where civilians were taking cover. The use of a double tap strike against a known humanitarian aid location underscores Russia's aim to harm civilians.

Poland is taking steps to strengthen security along Poland’s international border with Russia following recent intelligence warnings and an increase in Russian sabotage operations in Europe. The Polish Territorial Defense Forces announced on November 1 that it will create a Border Defense Component to monitor security along Poland's international border with Kaliningrad Oblast, Russia.[18] The Ukrainian Strategic Communications Center reported on November 2 that Polish authorities deployed additional security personnel in response to Polish and allied intelligence warnings of future Russian sabotage operations in the coming days, including possible armed Russian ground attempts to cross the international border.[19]

Likely Ukrainian hackers hacked the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations' mobile app on November 2 following a Russian hack against Ukraine’s air alert system on November 1. Ukraine's Air Alert Service and the Ukrainian Strategic Communications Center reported on November 1 that cyber-attackers interfered with the air alert application and sent out a push notification that warned of an imminent nuclear attack against Ukraine.[20] Ukrainian officials noted that the cyber-attack was ineffective in causing panic among Ukrainian civilians as the message was written in Russian and had an informal tone.[21] Likely Ukrainian hackers conducted a similar hack against the mobile app belonging to the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations, sending out a push notification that warned of nuclear missile launches and encouraging people to stock up on food.[22]

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree ordering private Russian data centers to reserve some of their capacity for government use, likely to exert more control over Russian information systems. Putin signed a decree on November 2 requiring private data centers within Russia to reserve 10 percent of their available space and capacity for potential government use, should the Kremlin request it. Putin authorized private data centers to continue using the reserve space until requested.[23] The decree establishes a sub-commission within the State Commission for Digital Development that can order private data centers to provide this reserved capacity to the government within 24 hours of notice. The decree stipulates that the sub-commission will determine the maximum financial compensation for the use of private capacity, allowing the Russian government to set the price for the data that it is purchasing. The decree also allows the sub-commission, with the ultimate approval of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), to authorize the temporary use of foreign data centers to ensure uninterrupted online services in Russia, further entrenching the Russian security services into Russian data infrastructure and information flows. The decree’s requirements effectively grant the State Commission for Digital Development the authority to interfere with data centers' operations to determine the capabilities the government can extract. The decree’s requirements also indicate that the Russian government likely already has mechanisms necessary to monitor and control the activities of private data centers. The Kremlin has increasingly sought to expand its control over Russian digital information infrastructure, create sovereign digital systems that lack dependence on Western networks, and to further its censorship aims.[24]

Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian data centers are forcing the Kremlin to rapidly invest in strengthening the physical security of its digital infrastructure. A senior executive told Russian business newspaper Vedomosti on November 2 that Russian state telecommunications operator Rostelecom is negotiating the construction of underground data centers with Russian mining company Nornickel, which would cost between 30 and 40 percent more than above-ground data centers.[25] The November 2 decree and Rostelecom plans reflect Russian attempts to ensure digital continuity amid Ukraine's long-range strike campaign against Russian data centers.[26] Putin’s November 2 decree represents an effort to decentralize Russian data infrastructure, including by moving its data to third countries that Ukraine will be unable to strike.

Key Takeaways:

• Russia continued to intensify its long-range strike campaign against Ukraine in October 2026, particularly exploiting jet-powered drones and quasi-cruise missiles to maximize civilian harm.
• Russia's increasingly devastating strikes come against the backdrop of Russian President Vladimir Putin's evolving theory of victory that hinges on the effectiveness of Russia's long-range strike campaign to make Ukrainian civilian life untenable and disrupt and isolate the Ukrainian economy from Europe.
• Russian forces conducted a devastating airstrike against Komyshuvakha (southeast of Zaporizhzhia City) on November 2, reportedly killing at least 18 civilians.
• Poland is taking steps to strengthen security along Poland’s international border with Russia following recent intelligence warnings and an increase in Russian sabotage operations in Europe.
• Likely Ukrainian hackers hacked the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations' mobile app on November 2 following a Russian hack against Ukraine’s air alert system on November 1.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree ordering private Russian data centers to reserve some of their capacity for government use, likely to exert more control over Russian information systems.
• Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian data centers are forcing the Kremlin to rapidly invest in strengthening the physical security of its digital infrastructure.
• Russia launched 193 drones against Ukraine overnight on November 1 to 2 and 332 drones and loitering munitions during the day on November 1. Ukrainian forces likely struck Russian oil infrastructure in Samara Oblast.
• Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces advanced on November 2.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
• Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
• Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprised of 4 subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed Objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazennyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces likely struck Russian oil infrastructure in Samara Oblast. Footage published on November 1 shows flames and smoke plumes at the Samara Linear Production-Dispatch Station near Prosvet, Samara Oblast (roughly 945 kilometers from the international border), following likely Ukrainian strikes.[27] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that the Samara Linear Production-Dispatch Station is the largest oil tank farm in Europe.[28]

Ukrainian long-range strikes are having cascading effects on Russian military capabilities. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 2 that a Russian Su-57 fighter jet exploded at the Akhtubinsk Military Airfield, Astrakhan Oblast, on October 29 during engine start-up.[29] The GUR reported that low-quality fuel in part caused the explosion, as Ukrainian long-range strikes against Russian oil infrastructure have caused aviation fuel shortages and forced Russia to use lower-grade fuel. The GUR noted that Russia is importing JET-A1 aviation fuel from Malaysia to provide fuel for its military aircraft and jet-powered drones.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on November 1 and 2 but did not advance.[30]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Irbis counterbattery radar southwest of Peny, Kursk Oblast (roughly 33 kilometers from the international border) and an electronic warfare system in eastern Belaya (roughly 29 kilometers from the international border), according to geolocated footage published on October 15 and 30 and geolocated on October 31.[31]

Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast and the Velykyi Burluk direction on November 1 and 2 but did not advance.[32]

Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission northwest of Kupyansk. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian servicemember northwest of Kupyansk, according to geolocated footage published on November 1, after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[33]

Russian forces continue to maintain limited positions in northwestern Kupyansk, as they conduct limited infiltration missions throughout the town. A Ukrainian military source reported on November 1 that Russian forces are prioritizing offensive operations in northwestern Kupyansk.[34] Russian infantry personnel reportedly remain scattered throughout Kupyansk and are using large multi-story buildings for cover. The Ukrainian military source stated that Ukrainian forces will likely need to identify and eliminate small pockets of Russian forces throughout Kupyansk in order to fully clear the town.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on November 1 and 2, but did not advance.[35]

Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements) Note: The Russian command does not appear to have formally abandoned its campaign plan for the Fortress Belt despite the operational defeat of that plan by Ukraine's Operation Vivaldi.

Russian forces concentrated attacks east and in the Lyman near Zarichne and Yampolivka on November 1 and 2 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked south of Lyman.[36]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk on November 1 and 2 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked southeast of Slovyansk near Rai-Oleksandrivka.[37]

Russian forces continue conducting their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against Ukrainian logistics in the Kramatorsk direction in an effort to hinder Ukrainian frontline battlefield operations and disrupt logistics. A Ukrainian military source reported on November 1 that Russian forces continue to target Ukrainian logistics into Kramatorsk, causing significant challenges for Ukrainian forces within Kramatorsk.[38] The source stated that the Russian Roy Svarog Detachment of the Russian 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) recently struck Ukrainian positions along the H-20 Slovyansk-Kramatorsk highway, indicating the continued presence of Russian unmanned systems elements conducting this BAI campaign against Ukrainian logistics in the Kramatorsk direction.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission southwest of Druzhkivka. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position southwest of Krasnyi Kut (southwest of Druzhkivka), according to geolocated footage published on November 1, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[39]

Ukrainian forces recently either advanced or maintained positions east of Druzhkivka. A Ukrainian military source reported on November 2 that Ukrainian forces maintain defensive positions in Kurtivka (east of Druzhkivka), contrary to Russian claims.[40]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on November 1 and 2 but did not advance.[41]

Russian forces continue to conduct daily guided aerial bomb strikes (KABs) against settlements west of Pokrovsk and are leveraging favorable weather conditions to move infantry and artillery systems closer to the frontline. The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on November 2 that Russian forces are conducting daily KAB strikes against frontline settlements in the Pokrovsk direction in order to destroy critical infrastructure and “level” these settlements before future offensive operations.[42] The spokesperson also reported that Russian forces are utilizing favorable weather conditions such as fog to transport artillery systems and infantry towards the forward line of contact.

Several milbloggers indicated that Russian forces may be prioritizing Bilozerske (north of Dobropillya) as a tactical objective in the Dobropillya direction. A Russian milblogger claimed on November 2 that Russian forces are attacking towards Bilozerske, while another Russian milblogger claimed on November 1 that Russian forces have advanced on the flanks of Bilozerske and occupy positions in the settlement.^[43] Another Russian milblogger claimed on November 1 that Russian forces conducted several airstrikes against Ukrainian positions near Bilozerske.[44]

Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces)

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on November 1 and 2 but did not advance.[45]

Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions east and southwest of Oleksandrivka. Ukrainian forces shelled Russian positions in southwestern Komar (east of Oleksandrivka) and in central Ternuvate (southwest of Oleksandrivka), according to geolocated footage published on November 1, after what ISW assesses were infiltration missions.[46]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations west and northwest of Hulyaipole on November 1 and 2 but did not advance.[47]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 1 and 2 but did not advance.[48]

The limited ceasefire in occupied Oleshky, which ended on November 1, reportedly enabled over 800 Oleshky residents to evacuate from the settlement and allowed humanitarian aid to reach remaining local residents. US First Lady Melania Trump reported on November 1 that the humanitarian mission in occupied Oleshky was a "success" and enabled the successful delivery of humanitarian aid into the settlement and for over 800 Oleshky residents to evacuate.[49] Both Ukrainian Human Rights Commissioner Dmytro Lubinets and Russian Human Rights Commissioner Yana Lantratova acknowledged that both sides maintained limited ceasefire in Oleshky and reported that it concluded as planned on November 1.[50]

Russian forces are increasing their use of satellite electronic warfare (EW) systems to interfere with Ukrainian Starlink operations. Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Defense Technologies Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on November 2 that Russian forces are increasing the number of specialized EW systems to interfere with Ukrainian intermediate-range drone strikes against occupied Ukraine.[51] Beskrestnov reported that these EW systems cover an area of around 25 square kilometers and that Russian forces have covered almost all important objects in occupied Crimea with these systems and are beginning to use them on the frontline.[52] Beskrestnov noted that these systems use satellite direct-focus antennas with a diameter of roughly one meter that must be within the satellite’s line of sight, making it more difficult for Russian forces to camouflage them.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the number of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[53]

Russian forces launched 364 drones (including 178 jet-powered drones) and 10 S8000 Banderol/Dan-T loitering munitions against Ukraine overnight on November 1 to 2 and during the day on November 2.[54] Russian forces also launched 326 drones (including 55 jet-powered ones) and six S8000 Banderol/Dan-T loitering munitions during the day on November 1.[55]

Russian forces are introducing significant modifications to non-Shahed drone variants, increasing their speed and payload capacity, and extending their range. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 2 that Russian forces have modified the Gerbera drone — which acted primarily as a reconnaissance platform and a decoy drone to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses — into a new strike-focused platform called the Gerbera-2.[56] The GUR reported that the Gerbera-2 features an increased warhead capacity of up to 25 kilograms, indicating that Russian forces likely intend to use the drone as a strike-focused platform rather than a decoy or reconnaissance drone. The GUR reported that the Gerbera-2 features a larger fuel tank that extends its range to up to 1,200 kilometers, which notably extends the drone’s area of application beyond Ukraine. The GUR noted that a Gerbera-2 drone landed on the Baltic Sea coast of Poland in mid-September 2026. Three Ukrainian units separately reported intercepting jet-powered variants of the Russian BM-35 and BM-70 strike drones, which feature higher speeds and extended ranges beyond their original propeller-driven variants.[57] Russian forces have primarily focused their jet-powered drone modifications on Shahed drone variants, and emerging reports of jet-powered BM-35 and BM-70 drones indicate that Russian forces are expanding these modifications to other models in their drone arsenal. Increases in the speed, range, and strike capabilities of drones may enable Russian forces to strike targets beyond Ukrainian territory and indicate their increasing focus on evading Ukraine’s increasingly capable interceptor drones.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.