51 minutes ago

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 18, 2026

Assessment as of: 7:15 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 10:45 AM ET

 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

For more information on ISW’s map methodology, please view our statement here.

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin used the first day of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on November 18 to posture Russia as a great power equal to the PRC and the United States, while attempting to portray the resolution of the war in Ukraine as merely one component within broader Russia-PRC-US relations. Putin claimed on November 18 that Russia is a leading architect of an emerging multipolar world order and positioned the war in Ukraine as a subordinate issue within US-PRC-Russia great-power relations.[1] Putin also emphasized Russia’s growing economic ties with Asia-Pacific states and attempted to posture Russian economic stability, despite significant evidence to the contrary.[2] Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated that Putin and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping discussed the latest round of peace talks in Abu Dhabi and wider efforts to end the war in Ukraine.[3] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Putin and US President Trump could discuss the war in Ukraine during an upcoming bilateral meeting.[4] PRC Politburo Standing Committee Member Cai Qi greeted Putin on the tarmac upon his arrival in Shenzhen, while Xi chose to personally greet Trump — signaling that Russia is a less important partner compared to the United States.[5]

 

Russian long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukraine continue to cause ever-growing civilian casualties amid ongoing Starshield speed restrictions that hinder Ukrainian efforts to defend against such strikes. The UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (UNHCR) reported on November 17 that the total number of Ukrainian civilian casualties in October 2026 increased by 95 percent compared to October 2025, with at least 372 Ukrainian civilians killed and 1,981 injured in October 2026.[6] The UNHCR reported that Russian long-range drone and missile strikes accounted for 55 percent of these casualties and remain the leading cause of all civilian casualties in Ukraine. The UNHCR noted that the number of civilian casualties from Russian glide bomb strikes doubled compared to September 2025, accounting for 18 percent of civilian casualties in October 2026. Russian forces have adapted their drones and strike patterns to increase their effectiveness, penetrate Ukrainian air defenses, and maximize civilian harm.[7] The continued commitment to a deadly strike campaign against Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure demonstrates Moscow’s determination to coerce Ukrainian society into capitulation.[8] Speed restrictions on SpaceX’s Starshield satellite network over parts of Ukraine reportedly continue, hindering Ukrainian efforts to repel Russian long-range strikes and protect the population.[9]

 

Recent Ukrainian strikes against the Kerch Strait Bridge are part of wider Ukrainian efforts to degrade Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) across the theater. The Russian Ministry of Transport claimed on November 18 that Russian authorities suspended automobile traffic across the bridge but noted that the railway portion continues to operate normally following Ukrainian strikes against the bridge on November 16 and 17.[10] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on November 17 that Russian forces will need to respond to the strikes on the Kerch Strait Bridge by rerouting their logistics from the bridge to the highway connecting Rostov-on-Don and occupied Crimea (sections of the M-14 Mariupol-Melitopol and M-18 Melitopol-Simferopol highways that Russian occupation officials denote as the R-280 highway).[11] Another prominent Russian milblogger noted on November 18 that Ukrainian strikes against the Kerch Strait Bridge were part of Ukraine’s systematic strike campaign against Russian bridges that aims to create obstacles along Russia’s primary and alternative GLOCs.[12] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have struck at least four bridges or sections of the GLOC in Russian-occupied southern Ukraine along the coast of the Sea of Azov. The Kerch Strait Bridge has served as a critical Russian logistics route for the transit of food, goods, and fuel into occupied Crimea from Krasnodar Krai.[13] The disruption of traffic along the Kerch Strait Bridge will very likely force Russian forces and occupation authorities to rely more heavily on the overland route north of the Sea of Azov as the primary GLOC. The wider Ukrainian strike campaign against Russian GLOCs aims to inhibit Russian troop and supply movement towards the frontline and to catalyze Ukrainian battlefield successes.[14]

 

 

 

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is emphasizing the alleged success of Russian recruitment efforts despite the declining recruitment rate and rising casualties in order to quell fears among the Russian population about a possible future involuntary call-up. The Russian MoD claimed on November 17 that it has fulfilled 89.3 percent of its planned military recruitment and 98.7 percent of its Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) recruitment for 2026.[15] The Russian MoD is likely trying to frame these alleged figures as evidence that Moscow is achieving its recruiting objectives and does not need to conduct another partial reservist call-up. The Russian MoD numbers are very likely inflated, however, as the Russian military has been experiencing a declining recruitment rate since the beginning of 2026, while the Russian casualty rate has grown.[16] German Institute for International and Security Affairs economist Janis Kluge assessed on October 8, citing data from the Russian Finance Ministry, that around 263,000 people signed MoD contracts in the first nine months of 2026 — a decrease of almost 10 percent compared to 2025 estimates.[17] Kluge assessed that Russian forces recruited around 1,000 people daily between January and September 2026, while the average regional signing bonus increased to around 2.34 million rubles (roughly $28,400) by early September 2026.[18] Data from the Ukrainian General Staff indicates that Russian forces have suffered over 420,000 casualties so far in 2026, with an average of 1,307 losses per day.[19] Russian forces suffered their highest monthly losses of the war thus far in October 2026 and have averaged 2,269 daily casualties thus far in November 2026.[20] The Russian daily casualty rate continues to exceed the daily recruitment rate, and the high financial incentives that Russian authorities have relied upon for voluntary recruitment are failing to bring in enough recruits to replace mounting casualties.

Russian intelligence services reportedly planned but did not execute a sabotage operation in late October or early November that would have blamed Ukraine for conducting an attack from Poland into the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad Oblast in order to undermine Western political support for Ukraine.[21] Polish outlet Rzeczpospolita reported on November 18, citing Polish government and intelligence sources, that Russian-linked personnel disguised as Ukrainian personnel would have conducted an attack from Poland against targets in Kaliningrad Oblast. Rzeczpospolita’s sources stated that Polish intelligence had information about specific targets where the attack was to take place and that Russian decisionmakers anticipated that the operation could result in significant casualties. Rzeczpospolita’s sources stated that Polish intelligence assessed that the goal was to withhold aid to Ukraine. ISW assesses that Moscow is conducting a series of overlapping military campaigns against Europe that are predominantly intended to reduce or eliminate European military and diplomatic support for Ukraine.[22] The planned Russian attack could have advanced this effort by enabling Moscow to accuse NATO of directly supporting Ukrainian attacks on Russian territory or by framing Ukraine as an unpredictable and dangerous partner willing to unilaterally conduct attacks from NATO territory.[23] Moscow also likely intended for the planned attack to exacerbate pre-existing tensions between Poland and Ukraine.

 

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk issued increasingly specific public warnings about a potential Russian attack against Poland or another NATO member state beginning in April 2026 following Polish and allied intelligence about a credible and imminent Russian threat — likely referring to this planned Russian attack. [24] Tusk stated on September 10 that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) gave him a “fairly precise report” on September 8 about possible imminent “events” that could affect Poland.[25] Tusk repeated warnings of a direct and immediate Russian threat to Poland throughout September, October, and November.[26] Rzeczpospolita’s sources stated that Polish intelligence became acutely concerned about a potential imminent Russian operation targeting Poland after observing an influx of Russian intelligence officers into Kaliningrad Oblast in an unspecified period.[27] Polish Coordinator of Special Services Tomasz Siemoniak declined to directly confirm to Rzeczpospolita whether Moscow organized a false flag attack against Poland but stated on-the-record that any Polish actions to defend the Polish border with Kaliningrad Oblast were due to a real threat. Polish and wider European public discussion of US intelligence warnings of a potential Russian attack since September 2026 likely referred to this planned Russian false flag attack.

 

European leaders’ public discussion of a credible Russian threat against Poland and the deployment of additional Polish personnel to the border with Kaliningrad Oblast in early November likely deterred, or at minimum disrupted, Russia’s ability to conduct the planned false flag attack. The Polish government launched a special security operation in response to the Russian threat on November 2 and deployed additional Polish police, military personnel, counter-terrorism personnel, and other uniformed services to the Warmian-Masurian and Podlaskie Polish voivodeships on the Polish border with Kaliningrad Oblast.[28] Polish General Police Headquarters Chief Marek Boron stated on November 2 that Polish authorities launched the security operation in response to warnings from Polish and allied intelligence services of possible sabotage activity on the Polish border with Kaliningrad Oblast during the first half of November[29] Polish border guards observed “disturbing movement” on the Polish border with Kaliningrad Oblast shortly after midnight on November 3, including an unspecified number of individuals with flashlights.[30] Tusk acknowledged the incident on November 3 but stated that he could not confirm with certainty that it was an attempted Russian provocation. Tusk reiterated, however, that Polish authorities received multiple credible intelligence reports about potential Russian provocations against Poland and that he expects Poland to be the target of additional hostile incidents in the immediate future.[31] Polish radio station RMF FM reported on November 12 that Polish police extended its special operation at the Polish border with Kaliningrad Oblast to November 15, and ISW has not collected any reports that Poland extended the operation past November 15.[32] Rzeczpospolita’s sources — including an on-the-record statement from Siemoniak — did not refer to the planned Russian false flag attack as an ongoing threat, and Polish security forces may have successfully disrupted an attempted Russian operation during the November 3 incident or deterred it through public disclosures of a credible Russian threat. NATO and European leaders should continue to publicly discuss credible intelligence threats when possible and conduct concrete countermeasures to deter Russia’s ongoing kinetic campaigns against Europe.

 

Key Takeaways:

  • Russian President Vladimir Putin used the first day of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on November 18 to posture Russia as a great power equal to the PRC and the United States, while attempting to portray the resolution of the war in Ukraine as merely one component within broader Russia-PRC-US relations.
  • Russian long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukraine continue to cause ever-growing civilian casualties amid ongoing Starshield speed restrictions that hinder Ukrainian efforts to defend against such strikes.
  • Recent Ukrainian strikes against the Kerch Strait Bridge are part of wider Ukrainian efforts to degrade Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) across the theater.
  • The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is emphasizing the alleged success of Russian recruitment efforts despite the declining recruitment rate and rising casualties in order to quell fears among the Russian population about a possible future involuntary call-up.
  • Russian intelligence services reportedly planned but did not execute a sabotage operation in late October or early November that would have blamed Ukraine for conducting an attack from Poland into the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad Oblast in order to undermine Western political support for Ukraine.
  • Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk issued increasingly specific public warnings about a potential Russian attack against Poland or another NATO member state beginning in April 2026 following Polish and allied intelligence about a credible and imminent Russian threat — likely referring to this planned Russian attack.
  • European leaders’ public discussion of a credible Russian threat against Poland and the deployment of additional Polish personnel to the border with Kaliningrad Oblast in early November likely deterred, or at minimum disrupted, Russia’s ability to conduct the planned false flag attack.
  • Ukrainian forces recently struck two oil refineries in Krasnodar Krai. Russian forces launched 141 long-range drones (including 73 jet-powered drones) against Ukraine overnight on November 17 to 18.
  • Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces advanced on November 18.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

 

  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
  • Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprised of 4 subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed Objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazennyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

 

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

 

Ukrainian forces recently struck two oil refineries in Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Ilsky and Afipsky oil refineries near Ilsky and Afipsky, Krasnodar Krai (both in Seversky Raion and roughly 357 and 375 kilometers from the frontline, respectively) on November 17 or on the night of November 17 to 18.[33] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces hit oil tanks at the Ilsky Oil Refinery and an oil refining unit at the Afipsky Oil Refinery. The Ukrainian General Staff added that the fuel supply routes from the refineries to Russian forces on the frontline are the shortest of all Russian refineries. The Krasnodar Krai Operational Headquarters claimed on November 18 that debris from Ukrainian strikes caused fires at two unspecified enterprises in Seversky Raion.[34]

The Ukrainian General Staff provided an updated battlefield damage assessment about a recent Ukrainian strike against a Russian aircraft repair plant in Novgorod Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the November 10 Ukrainian strike against the Russian 123rd Aircraft Repair Plant in Staraya Russa, Novgorod Oblast (roughly 640 kilometers from the international border) damaged three military transport aircraft, including one severely damaged Il-76 transport aircraft.[35]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

 

ISW recently collected a report suggesting that Ukrainian forces maintain positions southwest of Glushkovo, Kursk Oblast, but this report does not indicate a renewed Ukrainian operation into Kursk Oblast. A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed on November 18 that Ukrainian forces seized Novyi Put, Kursk Oblast (less than one kilometer from the international border).[36] ISW is unable to confirm the report at this time. Russian and Ukrainian forces both regularly conduct limited cross-border infiltration missions in this area of the Russian-Ukrainian border.[37]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City)

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on November 17 and 18 but did not advance.[38] A source reporting on the Russian Northern GoF claimed on November 18 that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northwestern Vilcha (northeast of Kharkiv City).[39]

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on November 18 and 19 but did not advance.[40]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

 

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in Kupyansk, while Ukrainian forces counterattacked southeast of Kupyansk. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position in northern Kupyansk, according to geolocated footage published on November 17, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[41] A source reporting on the Russian Western GoF claimed on November 18 that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[42] The source also noted that intensified Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian logistics near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (southeast of Kupyansk) have made it more difficult for Russian forces to consolidate positions in the area.

 

 

A Russian milblogger claimed on November 17 that Russian forces are employing more fiber-optic Molniya–2–type drones in the Kupyansk direction.[43]

 

The source reporting on the Russian Western GoF claimed on November 18 that Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast of Borova, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Borova.[44]

 

Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements) Note: The Russian command does not appear to have formally abandoned its campaign plan for the Fortress Belt despite the operational defeat of that plan by Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi.

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast and southeast of Lyman and towards the town itself on November 17 and 18 but did not advance.[45]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

 

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Slovyansk and southeast of Kramatorsk on November 18 but did not advance.[46]

 

Russian forces are leveraging poor weather conditions to conduct larger assaults toward Slovyansk. A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on November 18 that Russian forces are leveraging poor weather conditions to conduct relatively larger assaults toward Slovyansk, including occasionally with armor and motorized vehicles.[47] The servicemember noted that Russian forces are prioritizing advances to Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk) to begin infiltrations into Slovyansk itself and to force Ukrainian forces into urban combat. Russian forces likely find urban settings, with basements and ruined buildings, to be more conducive to their infiltration tactics than open fields that lack cover and concealment.

 

Ukrainian forces struck a roadway bridge over the Siverskyi Donets River in Stanytsia Luhanska, Luhansk Oblast (approximately 115 kilometers from the frontline) on November 17 or overnight on November 17 to 18.[48] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian forces use the bridge to transport ammunition, fuel, and equipment to the frontline.[49] There are several roadway bridges from Stanytsia Luhanska across the Siverskyi Donets River, and the Ukrainian General Staff did not specify which bridge Ukrainian forces hit. The roadway bridge over the Siverskyi Donets River along the P-22 highway collapsed before February 2022, according to satellite imagery, however, suggesting that Ukrainian forces struck one of the bridges to the west of the collapsed bridge.[50]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

 

Russian forces conducted infiltration missions within and west of Kostyantynivka. Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions in northern and central Kostyantynivka and in central Mykolaipillya (west of Kostyantynivka), according to geolocated footage published on November 17 and 18, after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[51]

 

Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Kostyantynivka. A Ukrainian military source reported on November 18 that Ukrainian forces maintain infantry and drone operator positions within Kostyantynivka.[52]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)

 

Russian milbloggers continue to exaggerate Russian advances in the Dobropillya area. A Russian milblogger claimed on November 18 that Russian forces seized Rohanske (northeast of Dobropillya and southwest of Kramatorsk).[53] Rohanske is about 10 kilometers from the closest assessed Russian infiltration area and about 13 kilometers from the closest assessed Russian advance.

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces)

 

Recent Ukrainian advances southeast of Novopavlivka may degrade Russian logistics in the area.[54] A Ukrainian military source reported on November 18 that future Ukrainian advances near Dachne (southeast of Novopavlivka) could cause problems for Russian logistics and troop movements in the area.[55]

 

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations southwest of Oleksandrivka on November 17 and 18 but did not advance.[56]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)

 

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations northwest of Hulyaipole on November 18 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[57]

 

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 41st Unmanned Systems Brigade (Russian Eastern GoF) are reportedly operating in the Hulyaipole direction.[58] This is the first time ISW has observed evidence of this unit operating in Ukraine.

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 17 and 18 but did not make confirmed advances as Ukrainian forces counterattacked southeast of Orikhiv.[59] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 18 that Russian forces advanced northeast of Kamyanske (southwest of Orikhiv).[60]

 

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on November 18.

 

See topline text for reports of continued impacts of Ukraine’s strikes against the Kerch Strait Bridge on Russian logistics in Russian-occupied southern Ukraine.

 

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

 

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the number of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[61]

 

Russian forces launched 141 long-range drones (including 73 jet-powered drones) against Ukraine overnight on November 17 to 18.[62]

 

Russian forces conducted a double-tap strike against a residential area in Odesa City on November 18. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces conducted a second Shahed-type long-range drone strike against emergency workers responding to a previous Russian strike against a residential area in Odesa City on November 18.[63]

 

Russian forces are conducting tests of the Geran-6 small cruise missile. Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) Deputy Fedir Venislavskyi stated on November 18, citing Ukrainian intelligence, that Russian forces are testing Geran-6 drone-missiles.[64] Venislavskyi stated that the Geran-6 has a maximum speed of 1,000 kilometers per hour and carries a “fairly large” warhead. A Ukrainian open-source intelligence source previously reported that the Geran-6 would have the ability to fly along a ballistic trajectory and have two variants with either a 300- or 600-kilogram warhead.[65] The source stated that Russian authorities have scheduled the full-scale production of the Geran-6 to start in mid-2028, with the first possible deployment as soon as June 2027.

 

 

See topline text for reports about the increase in civilian casualties in Ukraine from Russia’s strike campaign.

 

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

 

Nothing significant to report.

 

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 


[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/81286

[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2026/

[3] https://t.me/tass_agency/406406 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/28331827

[4] https://t.me/tass_agency/406346 ; https://tass dot ru/politika/28330677

[5] https://www.bbc.com/news/live/cw99e0n0lpnnt?post=asset%3A8abcd8dd-ca52-40d4-a325-fd8bd5713e99#post ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q1Gbi1bu6-I

[6] https://ukraine.ohchr dot org/en/Protection-of-Civilians-in-Armed-Conflict-October-2026

[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2026/

[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2026/;

[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-13-2026/; https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/shorazu-rosiya-obiraye-novu-eskalaciyu-tozh-ukrayinski-raket-107369

[10] https://t.me/Mintrans_Russia/12124

[11] https://t.me/rybar/84736

[12] https://t.me/dva_majors/102191

[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2026/

[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/

[15] https://t.me/mod_russia/69096;

[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-14-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-20-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-14-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2026/

[17] https://janiskluge.substack.com/p/the-perils-of-privatized-coercion

[18] https://armyinform.com dot ua/en/2026/11/17/the-russian-army-is-losing-its-willing-recruits-why-money-no-longer-guarantees-new-recruits-for-the-kremlin/

[19] [Data taken from the Ukrainian General Staff 0800 sitrep between January 1, 2026, and November 18, 2026] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42932 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42924 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/33266

[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-8-2026/

[21] https://www.rp dot pl/konflikty-zbrojne/art45490041-prowokacja-z-duza-liczba-ofiar-i-zrzuceniem-winy-na-ukraine-ustalilismy-co-powstrzymalo-rosje

[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/defense-of-europe/the-russian-military-campaign-against-europe-current-objectives-and-efforts/

[23] https://understandingwar.org/research/defense-of-europe/the-russian-military-campaign-against-europe-current-objectives-and-efforts/

[24] https://www.ft.com/content/1a5a2502-a45a-40c1-af6f-b30ecc34bacb?syn-25a6b1a6=1; https://x dot com/donaldtusk/status/2093648423522124282?s=20; https://apnews.com/article/lithuania-baltics-poland-russia-attack-infrastructure-nato-fb3d17fac66f23568cd3cd27264a4c75; https://www.politico dot eu/article/poland-prime-minister-donald-tusk-warns-of-further-attacks-after-direct-threat-averted-polish-ukrainian-border/

[25] https://www.politico dot eu/article/poland-prime-minister-donald-tusk-warns-of-further-attacks-after-direct-threat-averted-polish-ukrainian-border/

[26] https://www.lrt dot lt/naujienos/pasaulyje/6/3051117/tuskas-rusijos-atakos-intensyves-ir-gali-paveikti-lenkija; https://tvpworld dot com/95972319/polands-tusk-russia-could-escalate-hybrid-attacks-before-christmas; https://apnews.com/article/poland-kaliningrad-border-7fa8573c57627a7a2b3475ab44c5eddd

[27] https://www.rp dot pl/konflikty-zbrojne/art45490041-prowokacja-z-duza-liczba-ofiar-i-zrzuceniem-winy-na-ukraine-ustalilismy-co-powstrzymalo-rosje

[28] https://united24media dot com/war-in-ukraine/poland-launches-special-operation-on-kaliningrad-border-24012; https://tvpworld dot com/96261985/kaliningrad-polish-police-chief-warns-of-sabotage-threat; https://apnews.com/article/poland-kaliningrad-border-7fa8573c57627a7a2b3475ab44c5eddd; https://www.rmf24 dot pl/fakty/polska/news-operacja-specjalna-sluzb-mundurowych-przy-granicy-szef-kgp-u,nIdn,1024387

[29] https://united24media dot com/war-in-ukraine/poland-launches-special-operation-on-kaliningrad-border-24012

[30] https://apnews.com/article/poland-kaliningrad-border-7fa8573c57627a7a2b3475ab44c5eddd; https://www.lemonde.fr/international/live/2026/11/09/en-direct-guerre-en-ukraine-marco-rubio-fait-etat-de-progres-pour-l-architecture-de-securite-apres-la-guerre_6803934_3210.html?lmd_medium=lm&lmd_campaign=partager#id-3415696

[31] https://apnews.com/article/poland-kaliningrad-border-7fa8573c57627a7a2b3475ab44c5eddd

[32] https://www.rmf24 dot pl/regiony/olsztyn/news-wzmocnione-patrole-zostana-na-granicy-z-rosja-nieco-dluzej,nIdn,1025837

[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42938

[34] https://t.me/opershtab23/17292

[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42937; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-10-2026/

[36] https://t.me/severnnyi/9967

[37] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-14-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-5-2026/

[38]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42932; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42930; https://t.me/wargonzo/38459; https://t.me/dva_majors/102178

[39] https://t.me/severnnyi/9967

[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42932; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42930; https://t.me/severnnyi/9967; https://t.me/dva_majors/102178

[41] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13484; https://t.me/batallionnnn/1315

[42] https://t.me/grvZapad/20385

[43] https://t.me/red_war_machina/1239

[44] https://t.me/grvZapad/20385

[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42932; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42930; https://t.me/wargonzo/38459; https://t.me/grvZapad/20385; https://t.me/dva_majors/102178;

[46] https://t.me/wargonzo/38459; https://t.me/wargonzo/38459; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/50113

[47] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/11/18/%c2%abmolniyamy-strilyayut-yak%c2%a0z%c2%a0kulemeta%c2%bb%c2%a0%e2%80%94-poblyzu-slov%e2%80%99yanska-rosiyany-shhodnya-vypuskayut-%c2%abbagato-desyatkiv%c2%bb-bpla-litakovogo-typu/

[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42937

[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42937

[50] https://earth.google.com/web/search/Stanytsia+Luhanska,+Luhansk+Oblast,+Ukraine/@48.63561365,39.51178254,31.67170522a,199.13460958d,35y,0h,0t,0r/data=Cj4iJgokCaJIQE6WMzRAEZ5IQE6WMzTAGaB5TsnXbElAIaJ5TsnXbEnAKhAIARIKMjAxNS0wMy0yNRgBQgIIAUICCABKDQj___________8BEAA

[51] https://x.com/meowqai/status/2122812832442097692; https://t.me/polk_210/7377; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13482; https://www.facebook.com/reel/2917701615271653

[52] https://t.me/muchnoyjugend88/14560

[53] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/77907

[54] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2026/

[55] https://t.me/muchnoyjugend88/14560

[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42932; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42930

[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42932 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/22095

[58] https://t.me/voin_dv/22093 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/22087

[59] https://t.me/wargonzo/38459 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42932 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42930 ; https://t.me/muchnoyjugend88/14560 ;

[60] https://t.me/z_arhiv/34363

[61] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/

[62] https://t.me/kpszsu/97092

[63] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2123025070687723825?a=-Qx_0GU8S3Zkwb6-CA4&s=20 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2123025076345843890?a=jfjOrladhZFr7M7FKVA&s=20; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21872

[64] https://www.rbc dot ua/rus/news/konflikti-ttsk-cherez-busifikatsiyu-praktichno-1794924618.html

[65] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-13-2026/; https://t.me/operinform/60630

 
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