19 hours ago

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 17, 2026

Assessment as of: 7:45 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 1:15 PM ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW’s map methodology, please view our statement here.

Ukrainian forces struck the Kerch Strait Bridge on the night of November 17 for the second consecutive day, completely collapsing the automobile sections and damaging the railway section of the bridge. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on November 17 that Ukrainian forces used cruise missile-type Palianytsia drones to strike the road section of the Kerch Strait Bridge and Neptune cruise missiles, Ruta missiles, and FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles to strike the railway section of the bridge.[1] Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed the bridge’s metal arch that supported its automobile span and noted that previous Ukrainian strikes damaged the railway section of the bridge.[2] Geolocated images published on November 17 show the damaged railway section and the collapsed span of the road section.[3] Russian Crimean occupation officials confirmed Ukraine’s strike against the bridge on the night of November 16 to 17.[4] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces used nearly 20 missiles and over 150 drones flying at low altitudes to strike the bridge’s automobile span.[5] A local Crimean-based Telegram channel claimed that the collapse of the arch blocked the only deep-water passage in the Kerch Strait and noted that large merchant and military vessels can no longer pass through the strait.[6] Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin held a government commission meeting on November 17 to assess the damage and begin reconstruction.[7] The Russian Ministry of Transport suspended rail and road traffic along the Kerch Strait Bridge following the Ukrainian strikes on November 17 and later resumed traffic along one railway track.[8] Occupied Crimea Head Sergey Aksyonov claimed that authorities resumed railway service between occupied Crimea and Taman, Krasnodar Krai and that passengers without vehicles can use the ferry service.[9] Ukrainian forces have directly struck the Kerch Strait Bridge in October 2022, July 2023, June 2025, and most recently on the night of November 15 and 16 — a notable intensification of precise Ukrainian strikes against a major Russian ground line of communication (GLOC) over the past two days.[10]

Ukrainian strikes destroying the automobile span of the Kerch Strait Bridge are a result of Ukraine’s mature operational planning, a systematic suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaign, and the effective application of technological innovations to precisely target vulnerable sections of the bridge. Zelensky stated that the November 17 destruction of the Kerch Strait Bridge was the seventh stage of a Ukrainian operation conducted over several weeks.[11] Zelensky added that the operation included drone and missile strikes against Russian air defense systems, radars, electronic warfare equipment, and other systems defending the area to enable the final strikes on the bridge. Ukrainian forces have been conducting a systematic SEAD/DEAD campaign in occupied Crimea and southern Ukraine and in Rostov Oblast and Krasnodar Krai, including strikes against surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers, Russian mobile fire groups, and radar systems, degrading Russian air defense capabilities.[12] The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Russian forces intercepted 4,305 Ukrainian drones and 16 Flamingo cruise missiles within a 48-hour span since approximately noon on November 15 across Russia and occupied Ukraine, including occupied Crimea, compared to the daily average of 882 drones between November 7 and 13.[13] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces used several hundred standard drones to overwhelm Russian SAM systems, followed by missile strikes, achieving precise synchronization and conducting the strikes in four to five minute-intervals.[14] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces struck the bridge with more than 10 Flamingo missiles and an unspecified but large number of drones.[15] Ukrainian forces were able to gradually degrade Russian air defenses over several months and then overwhelm the remaining air defenses using a concentrated salvo of cost-effective drones, creating a corridor for Ukrainian cruise missiles and jet-powered drones to approach the bridge from several directions.

Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces maintained communications with the Flamingo missile until the moment before impact, and footage of the strike shows Ukrainian forces maintaining a live camera feed and operator control over the Flamingo missile close to the Kerch Strait Bridge.[16] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported that USF elements operated signal repeaters that facilitated the final missile strike on the bridge, and a Ukrainian officer told The Times that Ukrainian forces conducted the strikes without SpaceX’s satellite internet network and instead relied on drones to relay radio signals to Ukrainian missiles.[17] Ukrainian and Russian forces have extensively used radio relay technology to extend radio connection ranges to receive live video feed from strike drones and maintain continuous operator control, allowing them to conduct increasingly precise strikes. Large bridges present a very challenging target for long-range strikes due to their high structural resilience, as illustrated by the difficulties Ukrainian forces faced in damaging the Antonivskyi Bridge in Kherson Oblast using High Mobility Artillery Rocket System multiple launch rocket system (HIMARS MLRS) strikes in Summer 2022 before retreating Russian forces collapsed the bridge in November 2022.[18] Ukrainian forces' ability to maintain live operator control, facilitated by the signal repeaters, allowed them to target weight-carrying sections of the Kerch Strait Bridge using missiles and cruise missile-type drones at over 250 kilometers from the frontline, delivering high-explosive payloads to structurally vulnerable points of the bridge with high precision. Ukrainian strikes against the Kerch Strait Bridge demonstrate Ukraine's effective deployment of technological adaptations coupled with mature operational planning, inter-agency cooperation, and precise coordination to achieve a strategically significant objective. They have denied Russian forces the use of an important ground line of communication (GLOC) into occupied Crimea.

Russian milbloggers criticized Russian air defense capabilities and highlighted systemic vulnerabilities within the Russian air defense command structure following Ukraine’s November 16 and 17 Kerch Strait Bridge strikes. One Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian strikes against the Kerch Strait Bridge demonstrate the lack of a unified, nationwide Russian air defense command-and-control system and noted that the Russian military command relies on a fragmented array of military personnel, law enforcement, and regional authorities to defend Russian airspace across a vast geographic area.[19] The milblogger noted on November 16 that there are significant supply and technology disparities among Russian air defense groups in adjacent Russian oblasts.[20] Another milblogger claimed on November 16 that Russian forces failed to prioritize air defenses surrounding the Kerch Strait Bridge and added that Russian forces should aim to intercept Ukrainian air vehicles roughly 500 kilometers from the bridge, as Ukrainian forces continue to exploit gaps in Russia‘s air defense coverage.[21] A third milblogger claimed on November 17 that the Russian military command has prioritized the battlefield situation on the ground over the protection of the Russian airspace.[22] The milblogger noted that Russia lacks a single nationwide authority that can be responsible for protecting the Russian rear. The milblogger claimed that Russia is capable of establishing a rear-area air defense network but lacks the institutional organization within the Russian military necessary to achieve effective air defense.

The November 17 Kerch Strait Bridge strikes will force the Russian forces to rely on the GLOC between occupied Kherson Oblast and Crimea, complicating Russian logistic supplies. The Kerch Strait Bridge is a critical node along one of Russia's two GLOCs supporting Russia's southern force grouping, with the other route passing along the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway through occupied Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. The Kerch Strait Bridge has served as a critical logistical route for the transit of food, goods, and fuel into Crimea from Krasnodar Krai. Ukrainian strikes against the bridge have compelled Russian forces to reduce their military logistics transport across the bridge (heavy trucks were banned from the bridge as of November 1), but the bridge has remained essential for Russia's continued occupation of Crimea.[23] The destruction of the bridge severs an important GLOC for Russian forces based in Crimea and will complicate their ability to maintain their occupation of and basing within the peninsula. The destruction of the bridge will also force the Russian military to expand its reliance on overland transport via the M-14 and M-18 (Kharkiv City to occupied Yalta highway) highways.[24] Kherson Occupation Governor Vladimir Saldo claimed that the Russian Ministry of Defense is strengthening security measures along the land route between occupied Crimea and Kherson Oblast.[25]

But Ukrainian forces, in fact, reportedly struck the highway that runs between Rostov Oblast and occupied Crimea on the same night as they destroyed the Kerch Strait automobile bridge. Rostov Oblast Governor Yury Slyusar claimed on November 17 that Ukrainian forces struck a section of the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway (which Russian occupation officials denote as the R-280 highway) in Neklinovskyi Raion, near a bridge over the Mius River. Ukrainian forces previously struck the bridge over the Mius River on the night of November 7 to 8.[26]

Russian long-range strikes heavily targeted bridges in Kyiv City and Zaporizhzhia City on November 16 and overnight on November 16 to 17 as Russian forces continue efforts to target Ukraine’s transportation infrastructure and disrupt its economy and daily civilian life. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that four Russian ballistic missiles struck Kyiv City's Southern Bridge, and three ballistic missiles struck the Northern Bridge.[27] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces launched around 30 ballistic missiles to target both bridges.[28] Russian forces also struck the Preobrazhensky Bridge in Zaporizhzhia City, reportedly using a Geran-4 strike drone, according to geolocated footage published on November 16.[29] Russian forces have repeatedly struck Kyiv City’s Northern and Southern bridges throughout October and November 2026, resulting in severe disruptions to civilian transportation and logistics across the Dnipro River as Russian forces continue attempts to physically split Kyiv City.[30] The drone strikes against Ukrainian bridges across the Dnipro River are part of a wider ongoing Russian long-range strike campaign to degrade Ukraine’s economy and to make life in major Ukrainian cities difficult in an effort to force Ukraine to capitulate ahead of the Winter 2026-2027.[31]

Russian officials continue to explicitly reject US proposals for post-war NATO security architecture and European participation in peace negotiations. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on November 17 that it is “categorically unacceptable” for Ukraine to receive NATO membership and added that there is no talk about European participation in future peace negotiations.[32] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on November 17 that European officials are attempting to “squeeze” into peace negotiations in order to build a European security architecture directed against Russia.[33] Lavrov characterized the proposed European security architecture as an attempt to contain Russia’s global influence and emphasized that Russia remains committed to its original 2021 ultimatums. Ryabkov’s November 17 statements directly contradict proposals that US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner have advocated for.[34] Kremlin officials have intensified their refusal to include European representatives at peace negotiations, despite recent US calls to include European delegations in the upcoming multilateral peace negotiations.[35]

Several Russian drones violated Moldovan airspace, including flying over the Moldovan capital, Chisinau, on the evening of November 17.[36] Moldovan President Maia Sandu reported that several Russian drones violated Moldovan airspace and that one drone flew directly over Chisinau.[37] The Moldovan Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that seven drones violated Moldovan airspace, five of which crashed near Cheltuitori, Pohorniceni, Pogrebeni, Cuhurestii de Jos, and Baxani.[38] The Moldovan MoD noted a possible sixth drone crash in Ocnița Raion, and a seventh drone disappearing from radar near Leova, toward the Romanian border. The Moldovan MoD also reported that a Geran-2 drone initially entered Moldovan airspace from Hrebenyky, Odesa Oblast toward Tiraspol, Transnistria (the pro-Russian parastate in eastern Moldova) and exited Moldovan airspace toward Slovyanoserbka, Odesa Oblast while another drone flew from the direction of Velykoploske, Odesa Oblast toward Malaiesti, Transnistria.[39] Russian drones have repeatedly violated Moldovan and Romanian airspaces, including most recently on the evening of October 31, as part of the Kremlin attempts to normalize increasingly frequent and intense Russian drone incursions into European airspace amidst Russia’s long-range strikes against western Ukraine.[40]

Key Takeaways:

  • Ukrainian forces struck the Kerch Strait Bridge on the night of November 17 for the second consecutive day, completely collapsing the automobile sections and damaging the railway section of the bridge.
  • Ukrainian strikes destroying the automobile span of the Kerch Strait Bridge are a result of Ukraine’s mature operational planning, a systematic suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaign, and the effective application of technological innovations to precisely target vulnerable sections of the bridge.
  • Russian milbloggers criticized Russian air defense capabilities and highlighted systemic vulnerabilities within the Russian air defense command structure following Ukraine’s November 16 and 17 Kerch Strait Bridge strikes.
  • The November 17 Kerch Strait Bridge strikes will force the Russian forces to rely on the GLOC between occupied Kherson Oblast and Crimea, complicating Russian logistic supplies.
  • But Ukrainian forces, in fact, reportedly struck the highway that runs between Rostov Oblast and occupied Crimea on the same night as they destroyed the Kerch Strait automobile bridge.
  • Russian long-range strikes heavily targeted bridges in Kyiv City and Zaporizhzhia City on November 16 and overnight on November 16 to 17 as Russian forces continue efforts to target Ukraine’s transportation infrastructure and disrupt its economy and daily civilian life.
  • Russian officials continue to explicitly reject US proposals for post-war NATO security architecture and European participation in peace negotiations.
  • Several Russian drones violated Moldovan airspace, including flying over the Moldovan capital, Chisinau, on the evening of November 17.
  • Ukrainian forces struck a petrochemical complex and an oil refinery in the Bashkortostan Republic on the night of November 16 to 17. Russian forces launched an unspecified number of ballistic and cruise missiles and 306 drones and loitering munitions, including 92 jet-powered drones, against Ukraine on the night of November 16 to 17.
  • Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces advanced on November 17.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
  • Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprised of 4 subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed Objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazennyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian petrochemical complex and an oil refinery in the Bashkortostan Republic on the night of November 16 to 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat Petrochemical Complex in Salavat, Bashkortostan Republic (roughly 1,300 kilometers from the frontline) overnight on November 16 to 17.[41] Ukrainian officials noted that the Salavat Petrochemical Complex is one of Russia’s largest oil refining and petrochemical complexes with a processing capacity of about 10 million tons of oil per year. It produces automobile gasoline, diesel fuel, fuel oil, bitumen, polyethylene, and other petrochemical products.[42] Geolocated footage posted on November 16 shows fire at the refinery following the strike.[43] The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces reported on November 17 that Ukrainian forces also struck the Bashneft-Ufaneftekhim Oil Refinery in Ufa, Bashkortostan Republic (roughly 1,350 kilometers from the international border) which processes 10 million tons of oil per year and is part of the Ufa complex with a total capacity of 23.5 million tons per year.[44] Bashkortostan Republic emergency officials acknowledged drone strikes against industrial zones in Salavat and Ufa on November 17 but claimed that all plants were operating normally without critical damage.[45] Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak instructed Russian oil companies to increase the production of lower-grade gasoline and continue importing gasoline amid Ukraine’s continued strike campaign against Russian oil refineries.[46]

Ukrainian forces continued their suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses campaign in Bryansk Oblast and Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck six Russian short-range radar stations and two tactical electronic warfare (EW) stations in Bryansk Oblast and one EW station near Priazovskiy, Krasnodar Krai (roughly 280 kilometers from the international border) on November 16 or on the night of November 16 and 17.[47]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on November 16 and 17 but did not advance.[48]

Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on November 16 and 17 but did not advance.[49]

Russian milbloggers and a source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on November 16 and 17 that Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction, but ISW did not observe evidence that Russian forces advanced.[50]

Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Several Russian milbloggers, a source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF), and a source reporting on the Russian Western GoF claimed on November 17 that Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction, but ISW did not observe evidence that Russian forces advanced.[51] Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on November 17 that Russian forces have decreased the size of their infiltration groups operating northwest of Kupyansk from six people to individual servicemembers because of personnel losses.[52]

A source reporting on the Russian Western GoF claimed on November 17 that Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast and east of Borova, but ISW did not observe evidence that Russian forces advanced, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Borova.[53]

 

Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements) Note: The Russian command does not appear to have formally abandoned its campaign plan for the Fortress Belt despite the operational defeat of that plan by Ukraine's Operation Vivaldi.

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast and southeast of Lyman on November 16 and 17 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked southeast of Lyman.[54]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Slovyansk and southeast of Kramatorsk on November 16 and 17 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Slovyansk.[55]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka direction on November 16 and 17 but did not advance.[56]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on November 16 and 17 but did not advance.[57]

Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces) 

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on November 17.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to make heavily aggrandized claims of Russian advances southwest of Oleksandrivka as part of its cognitive warfare effort aimed at portraying Russian advances as sweeping and pervasive. The Russian MoD claimed on November 17 that elements of the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces seized Zalyvne.[58] A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 36th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) with the seizure of Zalyvne.[59]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)

Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest and west of Hulyaipole on November 16 and 17 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[60]

Ukrainian authorities completed search and rescue operations at a humanitarian aid site in Komyshuvakha (southeast of Zaporizhzhia City) following Russia's November 2 airstrike that killed 72 people. Ukraine's Interior Minister Ivan Vyhivskyi reported on November 16 that Russian airstrikes killed 72 people, that four people are still missing, and that four others remain in the hospital.[61] Vyhivskyi stated that Russian forces conducted 11 airstrikes against Komyshuvakha, including nine directly against the site of the rescue operations, following Russia’s November 2 airstrikes.

Russian forces continue to employ “human safari” tactics to purposefully hunt civilians in Kherson Oblast. Kherson Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Prokudin reported on November 16 that Russian forces conducted a first-person view (FPV) drone strike against a civilian driving a vehicle near Sadove (northeast of Kherson City), killing the person.[62] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are using human safari tactics as part of the broader Russian effort to institutionalize intentional civilian harm as a tool of war.[63]

See topline text for further reporting on Ukrainian strikes against the Kerch Strait Bridge.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the number of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[64]

Russian forces launched an unspecified number of ballistic and cruise missiles and 306 drones and loitering munitions, including 92 jet-powered drones, against Ukraine on the night of November 16 to 17.[65]

Russian strikes continue heavily targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Ukraine’s largest energy company DTEK reported that Russian strikes on the morning of November 17 left 700,000 families without electricity in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[66] Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported on November 17 that Russian strikes also caused power outages in Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Rivne, Sumy, Chernihiv, and Chernivtsi oblasts, and forced regional authorities in Kirovohrad, Poltava, and Sumy oblasts to introduce additional emergency power outages.[67] DTEK CEO Maksym Tymchenko reported on November 16 that the scale and power of Russian strikes against Ukraine's energy sector have “virtually doubled.”[68] Tymchenko noted that while the situation is largely similar to Winter 2025-2026, the scale and variety of Russian strike weapons have significantly increased.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 


[1] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2122623023488393517?s=20

[2] https://t.me/SBUkr/19093

[3] https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2122563250802114937; https://x.com/414magyarbirds/status/2122633030753775737; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2122314715456061695; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/2122564354520289737; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/34773; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2122563010690711675; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2122563250802114937; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2122567327707451570; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2122556224202010973; https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/2122589693254438913; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2122565489780212007

[4] https://t.me/Aksenov82/10189 ; https://t.me/razvozhaev/25165

[5] https://t.me/arx_spn/31990

[6] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/112863

[7] https://t.me/Mintrans_Russia/12103

[8] https://t.me/Mintrans_Russia/12101; https://t.me/Mintrans_Russia/12102

[9] https://t.me/Aksenov82/10191

[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_10-25/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_17-15/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-3-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2026/

[11] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2122623026181079135

[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2026/; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42805; https://t.me/DIUkraine/9587; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5-2026/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v_hgVy3tUZM ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/11/16/znyshhennya-rls-abo-ppo-lyshe-predtecha-do-urazhennya-bilsh-vazhlyvyh-obyektiv-u-vms-prokomentuvaly-udary-po-krymu/

[13] https://t.me/mod_russia_en/30650; https://t.me/mod_russia_en/30633; https://t.me/mod_russia_en/30591

[14] https://t.me/rusengineer/10812

[15] https://t.me/rybar/84735

[16] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2122623023488393517?a=fGcgMAn4j20_RTir5tY&s=20

[17] https://t.me/usf_army/2638; https://www.thetimes.com/world/russia-ukraine-war/article/ukraine-strike-kerch-bridge-crimea-putin-trump-xi-qms7b9lp9?t=1794949861401

[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_11-25/; https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/11/world/europe/kherson-bridge-russia-ukraine-war.html

[19] https://t.me/dva_majors/102119

[20] https://t.me/dva_majors/102119

[21] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/77839

 

[22] https://t.me/chadayevru/5290

[23] https://t.me/kryuchkovoleg/1475; https://t.me/KotNaMirotvorze/22769

[24]

[25] https://t.me/dva_majors/102154

[26] https://t.me/Yuri_Slusar/7935 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-8-2026/

[27] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21849 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2122646998880768435?a=DuIadD2cayG0NNNUci0&s=20

[28] https://t.me/bomber_fighter/27201

[29] https://x.com/KosoWrldwide/status/2122271667384696906?a=EGmU8hyNhWq0ABfFpck&s=20; https://x.com/0angrygrizzly0/status/2122277045506072923?a=rt3kuqwon6472F7xlEI&s=20

[30] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-22-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2026/

[31] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-26-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2026/

[32] https://t.me/tass_agency/406120; https://t.me/tass_agency/406121 ; https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1129519 ; https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1129527

[33] https://mid dot ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/2164490/ ; https://mid dot ru/ru/press_service/minister_speeches/2164490/ ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/96403

[34] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-11-2026/

[35] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-26-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-28-2026/

[36] https://x.com/sandumaiamd/status/2122726253463753010?s=20

[37] https://x.com/sandumaiamd/status/2122726253463753010?a=zJOAQ4wWfeyCmc87txU&s=20

[38] https://www dot army.md/ro/comunicate-de-presa/informeaza-39

[39] https://www.army dot md/ro/comunicate-de-presa/informeaza-38

[40] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/defense-of-europe/the-russian-military-campaign-against-europe-current-objectives-and-efforts/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-16-2026/

[41] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42927

[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42927 ; https://t.me/ministry_of_defense_ua/16579

[43] https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2122537628134183018 ; https://t.me/supernova_plus/63103

[44] https://t.me/usf_army/2639

[45] https://t.me/goskomitet_rb_po_chs/30368

[46] http://government dot ru/news/60474/

[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42929

[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42922 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9956 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/102130

[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42924 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42922 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/38441 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9956 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/102130

[50] https://t.me/severnnyi/9956 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/102130 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/38441

[51] https://t.me/wargonzo/38441 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/102130 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/9956 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/20377

[52] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/11/17/%c2%abpersonazhi-namagayutsya-propovzty-stvoryuvaty-yakis-yunity%c2%bb%c2%a0%e2%80%94-bilya-kup%e2%80%99yanska-rosiyany-atakuyut-%c2%abz%c2%a0neochikuvanogo-kuta%c2%bb/ ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v_hgVy3tUZM

[53] https://t.me/grvZapad/20377

[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42924; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42922; https://t.me/wargonzo/38441; https://t.me/grvZapad/20377; https://t.me/dva_majors/102130

[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42924; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42922; https://t.me/wargonzo/38441

[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42924; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42922; https://t.me/wargonzo/38441

[57] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42924; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42922; https://t.me/wargonzo/38441; https://t.me/dva_majors/102130

[58] https://t.me/mod_russia/69079

[59] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/50077

[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42924 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42922 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/38441 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/22083

[61] https://t.me/I_Vyhivskyi/532 ; https://suspilne dot media/Zaporizhzhia/1443285-rosiani-udarili-kabami-po-skoli-u-komisuvasi-de-rozdavali-gumanitarnu-dopomogu-18-zaginuli-sonajmense-5-poraneni/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-2-2026/

[62] https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/16451

[63] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-fpv-drone-campaign-in-ukraine-institutionalizes-intentional-civilian-harm-as-a-tool-of-war/

[64] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/

[65] https://t.me/kpszsu/96916

[66] https://t.me/dtek_ua/4854

[67] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/5648; https://suspilne dot media/1453934-vidnovlenna-dovoditsa-pocinati-znovu-rf-povtorno-poskodila-energoobekti-ukraini/

[68] https://www.bbc dot com/ukrainian/articles/cmn4kxln1j1go

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