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Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 16, 2026
Data Cutoff: 12:00 PM ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
For more information on ISW’s map methodology, please view our statement here.
Ukrainian forces struck the Kerch Strait Bridge on the night of November 15 and 16, likely as part of Ukraine’s ongoing and systematic strike campaign aimed at denying Russian forces the use of major ground lines of communication (GLOCs) via occupied Crimea. Ukrainian forces struck the Kerch Strait Bridge (roughly 280 kilometers from the frontline) that connects Russia and occupied Crimea, suspending road and railway traffic on the night of November 15 to 16 with fixed wing drones.[1] Several open-source intelligence (OSINT) channels published footage and satellite imagery showing damage to the bridge’s superstructure and the road surface, causing a portion of the bridge’s support arches to lean by approximately 15 degrees.[2] The Russian Ministry of Transport, Crimea occupation head Sergei Aksyonov, and Krasnodar Krai Governor Venyamin Kondratyev all acknowledged on November 16 that Ukrainian drones struck the bridge and forced local authorities to temporarily suspend traffic. [3]Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on November 16 that Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed the Ukrainian strike against the Kerch Strait Bridge and the progress of restoration work with the Russian Minister of Transport.[4] Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin stated later on November 16 that Russian authorities partially reopened the bridge.[5]

The Ukrainian strike against the Kerch Bridge showcases Russia’s inability to defend strategic objects that are critical both for the Russian economy and military logistics. Several Russian milbloggers expressed their frustration at the success of the Ukrainian strike and called on Russian forces to escalate their strikes against Ukraine and strike Ukraine’s decision-making centers, targeting political leadership.[6] One milblogger reported that Ukrainian forces managed to land three hits on the bridge and stated that these hits were too much for a strategic object protected at a high level.[7] Russian milbloggers continue to criticize Russian authorities for their inability to sufficiently protect critical Russian assets like the Kerch Strait Bridge.[8]
Ukraine’s strikes in southern Russia and near the Black and Azov Seas likely supported this strike. Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Second Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk noted that Ukrainian forces can successfully strike Russian military targets in occupied Crimea and the Black Sea largely due to Ukraine’s ongoing suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaign in occupied Crimea.[9] Russia has two main GLOCs into occupied Crimea — the “land bridge” through occupied Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts and the Kerch Strait Bridge, meaning that any disruptions to one of the two will put increased burden on the other.[10]
Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil and petrochemical infrastructure to degrade Russian offensive operations on the frontline. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 16 that Ukrainian forces struck the Ilsky Oil Refinery near Ilsky, Krasnodar Krai (roughly 357 kilometers from the frontline) overnight on November 15 to 16, damaging the plant’s AT-4, AT-5, and AT-6 oil processing units and the plant’s gasoline production system.[11] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the Ilsky Oil Refinery is one of the largest oil refineries in southern Russia, with a processing capacity of about 6.6 million tons of oil per year, and noted that the refinery is particularly important for Russian forces as its location in southern Russia enables the shortest possible fuel deliveries to Russian forward units on the frontline and in occupied Crimea. Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Flash Energy oil depot in Azov, Rostov Oblast (roughly 225 kilometers from the frontline) near Russia’s main logistics hub for the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces (GoF) operating in the Slovyansk direction and Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.[12] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on November 16 that Russian forces intercepted 2,049 Ukrainian drones and four Flamingo cruise missiles between November 15 and 16.[13] The number of drones that the Russian MoD claims the Russian forces have intercepted on a daily basis has notably increased in recent weeks, with the number of claimed interceptions more frequently exceeding one thousand starting in October 2026.[14] ISW is unable to independently assess the validity of this data or reporting, however. The Ukrainian November 15 to 16 strikes against the Ilsky Oil Refinery and the Flash Energy oil depot are a continuation of Ukraine’s efforts to degrade Russia’s ability to both generate oil export revenue to fund its war effort and deliver oil supplies to Russian frontline units.[15]
Ukrainian officials continue to report restrictions on the speed at which Starshield-equipped drones can operate. SpaceX reportedly acknowledged ongoing issues affecting Starshield in Ukraine but described the degraded functionality as a technical issue. Ongoing restrictions against Starshield are allowing Russian forces to continue their devastating strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Ukrainian Charge d'Affaires to the United States Denys Sienik reported on November 16 that Ukrainian forces continue to experience Starshield speed restrictions over occupied Ukraine for the seventh consecutive day.[16] Sienik noted that Ukrainian officials have not yet received a response or clarification from SpaceX on the reasoning for the restrictions. A US journalist reported on November 14, citing Sienik, that SpaceX had told Ukrainian officials that the restrictions are a result of an unspecified technical issue.[17] ISW continues to assess that the specific geographic configuration of these restrictions affects Ukrainian forces’ ability to intercept Russian jet-powered drones over eastern Ukraine, allowing Russian forces an expanded ability to conduct strikes, especially against Ukraine’s east and southeast.[18]
Russia continued to conduct large strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 15-16. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 158 Shahed-type strike drones (including 77 jet-powered ones), Gerbera-type strike drones, and Parodiya-type decoy drones against Ukraine overnight on November 15 to 16.[19] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Ukrainian energy infrastructure in Vinnytsia, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, Odesa, Ternopil, and Cherkasy oblasts, causing significant power supply disruptions.[20] Reuters reported on November 16 that nuclear safety regulators representing 38 countries within the Heads of the European Radiological Protection Competent Authorities (HERNA) and the Heads of the Nordic Radiation Safety Authorities (HORNA) warned about the increasing risk of a nuclear accident in Ukraine this upcoming winter as Russian continuous strikes against the Ukrainian energy grid make it difficult for Ukrainian nuclear plants to keep their nuclear material cool and avoid a release of radioactive material.[21]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian forces struck the Kerch Strait Bridge on the night of November 15 and 16, likely as part of Ukraine's ongoing and systematic strike campaign aimed at denying Russian forces the use of major ground lines of communication (GLOCs) via occupied Crimea.
- The Ukrainian strike against the Kerch Bridge showcases Russia’s inability to defend strategic objects that are critical both for the Russian economy and military logistics.
- Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil and petrochemical infrastructure to degrade Russian offensive operations on the frontline.
- Ukrainian officials continue to report restrictions on the speed at which Starshield-equipped drones can operate. SpaceX reportedly acknowledged ongoing issues affecting Starshield in Ukraine but described the degraded functionality as a technical issue. Ongoing restrictions against Starshield are allowing Russian forces to continue their devastating strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure.
- Russia continued to conduct large strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 15-16.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Sumy City, northeast of Kharkiv City, and west of Orikhiv.
- Russian forces launched 158 drones at Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
- Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
- Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprised of 4 subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed Objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazennyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
- Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
See topline text for further reporting on Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil and petrochemical infrastructure.
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)
Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Sumy City. A Russian milblogger acknowledged on November 16 that Ukrainian forces maintain complete control over Yunakivka.[22]

Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City)
Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Kharkiv City. A Russian milblogger published a map on November 15 acknowledging that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northwestern Vilcha.[23]

A Russian milblogger claimed on November 16 that Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Velykyi Burluk, but ISW has not observed evidence to assess that Russian forces advanced.[24]
Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Several Russian milbloggers and a source reporting on the Russian Western GoF claimed on November 16 that Russian forces continued offensive operations south of Kupyansk and had crossed the Oskil River, but ISW has not observed evidence to assess that Russian forces advanced.[25]
Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on November 16 but did not advance.[26]
Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements)
Note: The Russian command does not appear to have formally abandoned its campaign plan for the Fortress Belt despite the operational defeat of that plan by Ukraine's Operation Vivaldi.
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast and southeast of Lyman on November 15 and 16 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[27] A source reporting on the Russian Western GoF claimed on November 16 that the overall tempo of Russian offensive operations in the Lyman direction has slowed.[28] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are striking Ukrainian combat vehicles, personnel, ground robotic systems, and ground control stations in Raihorodok (southwest of Lyman and between Lyman and Slovyansk) in an effort to interdict Ukrainian logistics in the area.[29]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions east of Slovyansk. Russian forces struck a Ukrainian position southeast of Pyskunivka, according to geolocated footage published on November 15, indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in the area.[30]

Russian forces continue to use AI-altered footage to show alleged Russian advances in the Druzhkivka direction as part of their cognitive warfare effort aimed at generating a perception of sweeping Russian advances. A Russian milblogger published footage on November 15 purporting to show elements of the Russian 3rd Army Corps (under the operational control of the Southern GoF) striking and destroying Ukrainian manpower in Druzhkivka.[31] An open-source intelligence (OSINT) source reported on November 15 that the footage is AI-doctored.[32] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces regularly disseminate AI-altered footage depicting Russian forces conducting operations that favor Russia’s cognitive warfare effort to depict sweeping Russian forces’ advances and effectiveness.[33]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
Russian forces continued offensive operations within and in the vicinity of Kostyantynivka on November 15 and 16 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked west of Kostyantynivka on the western bank of the Kazennyi Torets River.[34] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 16 that the most intense fighting occurred near and within Kostyantynivka between roughly November 9 and 16.[35]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)
Russian forces continued offensive operations south and southwest of Dobropillya on November 15 and 16 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked south of Dobropillya.[36]
Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces)
A Ukrainian military source and a Russian milblogger both claimed that Ukrainian forces continued to counterattack southeast of Novopavlivka on November 15 and 16.[37]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on November 15 and 16 but did not advance. [38]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission northwest of Hulyaipole. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position east of Vozdvyzhivka, according to geolocated footage published on November 15, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[39]
Russian forces struggle to conduct mechanized assaults in the Hulyaipole direction. A Ukrainian commander within a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Hulyaipole direction stated on November 16 that flat, open terrain and localized Ukrainian drone superiority hinder Russian forces’ ability to conduct mechanized assaults in the Hulyaipole direction.[40] The commander stated that Russian armored vehicles must drop Infantry off 10 kilometers or more from the frontline in order to avoid Ukrainian drones. Russian forces generally attempt to conduct more mechanized assaults during the fall and winter periods, however, as seasonal weather patterns favor these mechanized assaults, and while infantry assaults are more difficult given the lack of foliage.[41]

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in Orikhiv, as Ukrainian forces recently advanced west of Orikhiv. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian-occupied building in Orikhiv, according to geolocated footage published on November 11 and geolocated on November 15, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[42] A Ukrainian military observer separately reported on November 16 that Ukrainian forces maintain full control over Novoandriivka (west of Orikhiv), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[43]
Russian forces continued their strike campaign against bridges in Zaporizhzhia City, likely in an effort to disrupt Ukrainian military logistics to the Orikhiv direction and southern Donetsk Oblast and interfere with civilian life in the city.[44] Russian forces struck the Preobrazhenskyi Bridge in Zaporizhzhia City on November 16, according to geolocated footage published on November 16.[45]

See topline text for further reporting on Ukrainian forces' strike against the Kerch Strait Bridge.
Likely Russian unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) struck and sank a commercial vessel in Bulgaria’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) on November 16. The Bulgarian Transportation Ministry reported on November 16 that Somalian-flagged bulk carrier Betul 8 sank approximately 40 nautical miles southeast of Cape Kaliakra within Bulgaria’s EEZ while carrying grain reportedly from Romania to Egypt.[46] Crewmembers of the Betul 8 told Bulgarian outlet Maritime.bg on November 16 that two unidentified USVs struck the Betul 8 and shared footage of USVs near the ship during the attack and the ship listing before sinking.[47] Russian forces have previously conducted similar strikes against vessels, including in both Bulgaria and Romania’s EEZ.[48]
See topline text for further reporting on Ukrainian strikes against the Kerch Strait Bridge.
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the number of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[49]
See topline text for further reporting on Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://x.com/StratcomCentre/status/2122324841965486579?s=20
[2]https://t.me/absolutely_reliable/264; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/39527; https://x.com/NotWoofers/status/2122311686791274541; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/2122310567717167520; https://t.me/DniproOfficial/8385; https://t.me/DniproOfficial/8389; https://t.me/rentv_news/229362
[3] https://www.interfax dot ru/russia/1129267; https://t.me/Aksenov82/10187; https://t.me/Mintrans_Russia/12091
[4] https://tass dot ru/politika/28323205
[5] https://crimea-news dot com/society/2026/11/16/2123230.html
[6]https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/77817; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/77826; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/26920; https://t.me/bomber_fighter/27195; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/16257 ; https://t.me/bomber_fighter/27197
[7] https://t.me/bomber_fighter/27197
[8] https://t.me/bomber_fighter/27197 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/103684 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/91517
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-5-2026/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v_hgVy3tUZM ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/11/16/znyshhennya-rls-abo-ppo-lyshe-predtecha-do-urazhennya-bilsh-vazhlyvyh-obyektiv-u-vms-prokomentuvaly-udary-po-krymu/
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-21-2026/
[11] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42919; https://t.me/usf_army/2636
[12] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42918; https://t.me/ukr_sof/3619; https://t.me/ministry_of_defense_ua/16572;
[13] https://ria dot ru/20261116/pvo-2131817638.html
[14] https://t.me/mod_russia/68974 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/68643; https://t.me/mod_russia/68619 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/67489
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-12-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/cognitive-warfare/eyes-on-the-target-seizing-the-strategic-initiative-against-russia/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-24-2025/
[16] https://x.com/DenysSienik/status/2122345388699013490?s=48
[17] https://x.com/nickschifrin/status/2121708881806323812?s=46
[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-15-2026/
[19] https://t.me/kpszsu/96507
[20] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/33367; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/29737; https://t.me/energyofukraine/8324; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/39328; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/29743 ; https://t.me/Ukrenergo/5645; https://www.facebook.com/ZabolotNAtalia/posts/pfbid02ZpCeDVQdp7SNWf2ibCWBWELDmGzwUKDnEuLmB4LJWhs53ghpft2FkUTPWKfSnnN1l; https://t.me/odeskaODA/22720; https://www.facebook.com/dtekoem/posts/pfbid02nXUjXhd9EoDaT15DBDN68iQAQHCnEHJg2q6CUPwR9ZQAnbKGm4kJzr1iE7oQ26isl?rdid=C4Zcdml0EXzlC1xj#; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/33406; https://t.me/cherkaskaODA/25646; https://t.me/cherkaskaODA/25647
[21] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/risk-nuclear-accident-ukraine-increasing-this-winter-atomic-safety-regulators-2026-11-16/
[22] https://t.me/motopatriot78/57440
[23] https://t.me/motopatriot78/57416
[24] https://t.me/wargonzo/38411
[25] https://t.me/wargonzo/38411 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/102074 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/20369
[26] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42915 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/20369
[27]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42915 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42913 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/38411 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/20369 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/50009
[28] https://t.me/grvZapad/20369
[29] https://t.me/epoddubny/29979 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/50009 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/102074
[30] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2122110981438648692?a=5Qv8Hy2OWB8qixNIEiI&s=20; https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2122110984173351052?a=VMczBk1Jnp3QoSOteC0&s=20; https://t.me/specnazahmat/2503; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13465
[31] https://t.me/verumreactor/43537
[32] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2121974366355210537
[33] https://understandingwar.org/research/geospatial-intelligence/russia-is-integrating-ai-models-into-its-cognitive-warfare-campaign-against-ukraine/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-21-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2026/; https://understandingwar [dot] org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2026/;
[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42915 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42913 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/57431
[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42921
[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42915 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42913 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/38411 ; https://t.me/rybar/84699 ; https://t.me/rybar/84704 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/102074
[37] https://t.me/muchnoyjugend88/14553; https://t.me/motopatriot78/57422
[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42913; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42915
[39] https://x.com/juss_men/status/2122111539545067769; https://www.facebook.com/reel/2020631822181137
[40] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/11/16/yim-duzhe-duzhe-vazhko-doyihaty-shhob-vysadyty-pihotu-poblyzu-gulyajpolya-rosiyany-plentayutsya-v-ataku-po-10-kilometriv/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ScdUZNkwcYc
[41] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_21-10/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-8-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_11-11/
[42] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13461; https://www.instagram.com/p/DfklcPbh4hX/
[43] https://t.me/muchnoyjugend88/14555
[44] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-20-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-10-2026/
[45] https://x.com/0angrygrizzly0/status/2122277045506072923?a=0kHEMcDu6eQfnzim5f8&s=20 ; https://x.com/KosoWrldwide/status/2122271667384696906
[46] https://apnews.com/article/bulgaria-romania-black-sea-cargo-ship-betul-9dd38253281fb1889e39ec7a9a57f9e5
[47] https://www.maritime dot bg/158276/
[48] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-28-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-15-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-13-2026/
[49] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/