2 days ago

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 15, 2026

Assessment as of 7:00 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 11:30 AM ET

 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW’s map methodology, please view our statement here.

 

Russian forces are capitalizing on ongoing restrictions on the speed at which Starshield-equipped drones can operate to strike Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on November 15 that Russian forces capitalized on ongoing Starshield speed restrictions to strike Ukrainian electrical substations in Zaporizhia, Sumy, Odesa, Zhytomyr, Kirovohrad, Donetsk and Kyiv oblasts overnight on November 14 to 15 and on the morning of November 15 with Shahed-type jet-powered drones.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported on November 15 that Russian forces launched 132 Shahed-type drones (including 78 jet-powered ones), Gerbera-type strike drones, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Oryol, and Kursk cities; Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[2] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes overnight on November 14 to 15 caused power outages in Odesa, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Chernihiv oblasts.[3]

Zelensky reported that Ukrainian forces' jet-powered drone interceptors, such as the Bars type interceptor, continue to lose contact with operators at speeds over 161 kilometers per hour (around 100 miles per hour) and therefore cannot intercept Russian jet-powered drones that fly at significantly higher speeds.[4] Zelensky reported on November 13 that the specific geographic configuration of these speed restrictions affects Ukrainian forces’ ability to intercept Russian jet-powered drones earlier in their flight paths over occupied eastern Ukraine, thus allowing Russian forces to use more advantageous flight paths and expanding their opportunities to conduct strikes.[5]

Russian forces frequently use long-range drone launch sites in occupied Donetsk City and Hvardiiske, Crimea, to conduct strikes against Ukraine, including overnight on November 14 to 15.[6] Russian forces may therefore be able to conduct more effective strikes from these sites and others against urban centers in Ukraine’s south and east — such as Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, and Pavlohrad cities (which are roughly 25, 110, and 130 kilometers from the frontline, respectively) — as long as Ukrainian forces cannot use jet-powered interceptor drones over occupied territory. Ongoing Starshield speed restrictions will likely place significantly more strain on other elements of Ukraine’s air defense system — such as fighter jets, automated and manned machine gun turrets, and man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) — as Ukrainian forces will need to compensate with these capabilities, while certain Ukrainian jet-powered drone interceptor systems are ineffective in certain areas.[7]

Ukrainian strikes against Russian petrochemical infrastructure, military-industrial facilities, and missile production and launch sites overnight on November 14 to 15 advanced three key lines of effort within Ukraine’s ongoing counterforce strike campaign. Ukrainian officials reported on November 15 that Ukrainian forces struck the Nizhnekamskneftekhim petrochemical complex and the ELOU-AVT-7 primary processing unit at the nearby TAIF-NK oil refinery (both roughly 1,120 kilometers from the international border) in Nizhnekamsk, Republic of Tatarstan, causing fires at both facilities.[8] Geolocated footage published on November 15 shows several large fires at the Nizhnekamskneftekhim petrochemical complex after Ukrainian strikes.[9] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that the complex in Nizhnekamsk specifically produces synthetic rubbers and plastics critical to the production of Russian military vehicles, aircraft, and binding agents used in solid rocket fuel for Russian Iskander ballistic missiles, while the TAIF-NK oil refinery produces both fuel and raw materials for Russian forces.[10] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Monolit military-industrial complex in Trubchevsk, Bryansk Oblast (roughly 25 kilometers from the international border), which produces specialized components for Russian military aircraft. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Akhtubinsk airfield in Astrakhan Oblast (roughly 615 kilometers from the frontline) overnight on November 14 to 15, causing a powerful secondary detonation at a guided glide bomb depot.[11] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces additionally struck a PRV-13 mobile radio altimeter and a long-range drone preparation and launch facility in Tsymbulova, Oryol Oblast, following similar Ukrainian strikes against the Lipetsk-2 airfield and other long-range drone preparation and launch sites.[12]

The Ukrainian strikes against the Nizhnekamsk petrochemical complex and TAIF-NK oil refinery are part of two distinct but complementary efforts: to degrade Russia's ability to fund the war effort through oil exports and to hinder Russia’s ability to supply its own forces with fuel and petrochemical products like synthetic rubbers and plastics used in almost all military equipment.[13] Ukrainian forces’ strike against the Monolit military-industrial complex, Akhtubinsk airfield, and Tsymbulova droneport (roughly 173 kilometers from the international border) is part of a third effort to degrade Russian aviation and missile launch capabilities. Ukrainian forces’ ability to successfully conduct strikes to degrade Russian petrochemical, military-industrial, and missile production and launch capabilities is integral to Ukraine’s ability to mitigate the effects of Russia’s increasingly deadly and destructive long-range strike campaign.

Ukraine’s counterforce strike campaign is designed to degrade Russia’s ability to conduct its own long-range strike campaign against Ukraine and is necessary to offset Ukraine's weakened air defense and interception capabilities. Russian forces are continuing to conduct a deadly and destructive long-range drone and missile strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure and urban centers.[14] Ukrainian forces’ overnight strikes illustrate a continuing and growing pattern of strikes against Russian missile production facilities, launch sites, and strike platforms themselves.[15] Russian forces frequently conduct glide bomb strikes against residential infrastructure in Ukrainian frontline cities and settlements, which can be extremely deadly.[16] Ukrainian officials stated on November 15 that Russian forces struck Zaporizhzhia City with at least 12 glide bombs overnight alone on November 14 to 15.[17] It is notable that Ukrainian forces also chose to strike the Monolit plant in Bryansk Oblast that reportedly produces components for Russian helicopters, which Russian forces use to launch Dan-T and Banderol loitering munitions, as well as various other guided and unguided munitions.[18] Ukrainian forces' continuing counterforce strike campaign against Russian petrochemical infrastructure, military-industrial sites, and missile production and launch facilities is likely meant to offset the current limitations of Ukraine’s air defense capabilities. Ukrainian forces face a limited number of options in addressing the Russian jet-powered drone as well as cruise and ballistic missile threat, as Ukrainian air defense stockpiles continue to dwindle amidst a global interceptor shortage.[19]

Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil infrastructure are generating secondary effects within Russia's domestic fuel supply, prompting Russian authorities to reimpose some limited fuel-sale restrictions for fear of fuel runs in the wake of the strikes. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on November 15 that Russian officials began reinstating fuel sale restrictions at Rosneft gas stations on November 9 and that similar restrictions were also recently implemented in Transbaikal Krai and Krasnoyarsk Krai and Karelia, Buryatia, Novosibirsk, Arkhangelsk and Penza oblasts.[20] Reuters reported on November 10 that Ukrainian strikes during the week of November 8 to 15 disrupted operations at nine of Russia's 35 largest oil refineries and reduced Russian oil-processing volumes by roughly 30 percent to 200,000 tons per day.[21] The International Energy Agency (IEA) reported that damage to Russian secondary processing units may take six to eight months to repair.[22] A prominent Russian milblogger acknowledged on November 15 that the effects of Ukrainian strikes on Russian fuel infrastructure may become increasingly visible as the Ukrainian campaign continues.[23] The milblogger noted that Russian regional authorities in Zabaykalsky Krai, the Republic of Karelia, Leningrad Oblast, the Republic of Buryatia, and Krasnoyarsk Krai have responded to increased Ukrainian strikes by introducing fuel-purchase limits of 30 to 50 liters and restrictions on fuel canister sales. The milblogger claimed that Russian regional authorities justified the measures as necessary to stabilize Russia’s domestic fuel supply and mitigate fears of a potential fuel run. Russian regional officials in Nizhny Novgorod notably instituted fuel sale restrictions immediately following a Ukrainian strike against the Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez Oil Refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, on November 1.[24] Russian officials’ decision to institute fuel sale restrictions in these cases indicates their concerns that residents may respond to the strikes with a fuel run and surge in demand rather than suggesting that the strikes will cause an immediate fuel shortage. Reuters reported on November 9 that Russian authorities introduced similar restrictions in Nizhny Novogorod, Arkhangelsk and Penza oblasts following Ukrainian strikes.[25] The reintroduction of fuel sale restrictions indicates that Ukrainian strikes are generating significant secondary effects and may again lead to widespread disruptions in the Russian petrochemical sector similar to disruptions in Summer 2026.[26]

Ukrainian forces conducted strikes against Russian transport infrastructure in southwestern Russia as part of their strike campaign to disrupt Russian frontline logistics. Rostov Oblast Governor Yury Slyusar claimed on November 15 that Ukrainian forces struck an electrical substation in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast (roughly 165 kilometers from the frontline), which powers rail infrastructure in the area, causing the suspension of local railway traffic.[27] Slyusar claimed that Ukrainian forces also struck a bridge on the R-280 highway between Rostov-on-Don and the Ukrainian border in Neklinovsky Raion in western Rostov Oblast, blocking traffic across the overpass. A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) analysis channel reported on November 15 that Ukrainian forces have struck at least six bridges in Rostov Oblast and occupied Novoazovsk Raion of Donetsk Oblast since mid-October 2026.[28]

Transport infrastructure in Rostov Oblast, and the R-280 highway in particular (which, together with the M-14 highway that Russian occupation officials denote as part of the R-280 highway and the M-18 highway that connects Russia with occupied Crimea), is a key logistical route for Russian units across the frontline, particularly in the areas of responsibility (AoRs) of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr groupings of forces (GoFs) in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts.[29] Ukrainian forces extensively target this infrastructure in conjunction with the intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics across occupied Ukraine to inhibit Russian troop and supply movement towards the frontline and to catalyze Ukrainian battlefield successes. The recent Ukrainian advances along the Mokri Yaly River in the Oleksandrivka direction towards Velyka Novosilka, Donetsk Oblast, if continued, may bring a key Russian supply route running from occupied Donetsk City towards Zaporizhia Oblast into the range of Ukrainian short-range strike assets, which, in tandem with the intermediate-range strike campaign, would further degrade Russia’s ability to supply its formations operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.

Russian milbloggers continue to criticize the pervasive culture of lying within the Russian military that has created the fictitious frontline trace that the Kremlin is attempting to persuade the West to accept as the basis for ceasefires and negotiations in Ukraine. A Russian milblogger claimed on November 14 that Russian forces continue to exaggerate their territorial gains on the battlefield by falsely portraying limited assault and reconnaissance operations as Russian settlement seizures across different sectors of the frontline.[30] The milblogger stated that the Russian military command incentivizes Russian commanders to overstate battlefield successes and distort reality in their reports to advance their careers. Russian milbloggers have coined the expression “beautiful reports" to refer to the pervasive culture of lying within the Russian military.[31] The milblogger claimed that the initial distorted reports become increasingly exaggerated and amplified as they move up the chain of Russian military command and create a disconnect between battlefield realities and Russian military leadership’s assessment of the battlefield situation.[32] The milblogger claimed that Russian officials have announced the seizure of the same settlements multiple times, while never acknowledging Ukrainian counterattacks. Senior Russian military officials likely have an obscured understanding of the frontline and the extent of Russian control across contested areas of the front based on Russian commanders’ exaggerated claims. Senior Russian political and military officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov, have repeatedly weaponized “beautiful reports” to advance the Russian cognitive warfare effort that aims to force the United States, Ukraine, and the West into accepting Russia's maximalist territorial demands and distorted understanding of the frontline, most recently in United States-Ukraine-Russia trilateral negotiations in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (UAE) on November 10 and 11.[33]

Estonia announced on November 15 that it will close its border with Russia in response to a recently attempted Russian arson attack. Estonian officials reported on November 15 that Estonia detained eight individuals following an arson attempt against an Estonian drone manufacturer on November 14.[34] Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal attributed the attempted arson to the Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate (GRU).[35] Estonian officials announced on November 15 that Estonia will close its border crossings with Russia in response on December 1.[36] The Kremlin has been increasingly conducting arson attacks against European defense industrial base (DIB) targets producing material for both European militaries and Ukraine.[37] These arson attacks are aimed at both intimidating Europe into ceasing aid to Ukraine and at disrupting the production and transportation of Western aid and military equipment to Ukraine.[38]

Key Takeaways:

  • Russian forces are capitalizing on ongoing restrictions on the speed at which Starshield-equipped drones can operate to strike Ukrainian energy infrastructure.
  • Ukrainian strikes against Russian petrochemical infrastructure, military-industrial facilities, and missile production and launch sites overnight on November 14 to 15 advanced three key lines of effort within Ukraine’s ongoing counterforce strike campaign.
  • Ukraine’s counterforce strike campaign is designed to degrade Russia’s ability to conduct its own long-range strike campaign against Ukraine and is necessary to offset Ukraine's weakened air defense and interception capabilities.
  • Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil infrastructure are generating secondary effects within Russia's domestic fuel supply, prompting Russian authorities to reimpose some limited fuel sale restrictions for fear of fuel runs in the wake of the strikes.
  • Ukrainian forces conducted strikes against Russian transport infrastructure in southwestern Russia as part of their strike campaign to disrupt Russian frontline logistics.
  • Russian milbloggers continue to criticize the pervasive culture of lying within the Russian military that has created the fictitious frontline trace that the Kremlin is attempting to persuade the West to accept as the basis for ceasefires and negotiations in Ukraine.
  • Estonia announced on November 15 that it will close its border with Russia in response to a recently attempted Russian arson attack.
  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Novopavlivka.
  • Russia launched 132 drones against Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

 

  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
  • Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprised of 4 subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed Objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazennyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

 

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline for more information about Ukraine's long-range strike campaign against Russia's long-range strike capabilities and transport infrastructure in southwestern Russia.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

A Russian milblogger claimed on November 15 that Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Sumy City, but ISW did not observe evidence that Russian forces advanced.[39]

Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission northeast of Kharkiv City. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position southeast of Mala Vovcha, according to geolocated footage published on November 15, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[40]

Russian milbloggers claimed on November 15 that Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Velykyi Burluk, but ISW did not observe evidence that Russian forces advanced.[41]

Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission north of Kupyansk. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position on the eastern outskirts of Doroshivka, according to geolocated footage published on November 15, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[42]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on November 15 but did not advance.[43]

Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements) Note: The Russian command does not appear to have formally abandoned its campaign plan for the Fortress Belt despite the operational defeat of that plan by Ukraine's Operation Vivaldi.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northeast and east of Lyman on November 14 and 15 but did not advance.[44]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the southern bank of the Siverskyi Donets River and southeast of Slovyansk on November 14 and 15, while simultaneously continuing an intense battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign in the area.[45] A Ukrainian military source reported on November 14 that Russian forces continue actively targeting Ukrainian logistics, reconnaissance assets, and infantry units in the Slovyansk direction and in eastern Slovyansk.[46] The source stated that several Russian unmanned systems units are partially operating in the Slovyansk direction, including Russia’s elite Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Systems and the 82nd Separate Unmanned Systems Regiment (Unmanned Systems Forces, under the operational control of the 3rd Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District).

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Ukrainian forces continue to maintain their presence and supply their positions in Kostyantynivka. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction stated on November 15 that Ukrainian forces continue to engage Russian forces in the streets of Kostyantynivka and that Ukrainian forces continue to supply their positions in the city.[47]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued intense offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction, accounting for around 40 percent of all combat engagements across the frontline, on November 14 and 15 but did not advance.[48]

Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced further along the northern bank of the Vovcha River south of Novopavlivka. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on November 15 that Russian forces retreated from Filiya (south of Novopavlivka) toward Dachne (southeast of Filiya).[49] A Russian milblogger confirmed on November 15 that Russian forces do not maintain positions northwest of Dachne.[50]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on November 14 and 15 but did not advance.[51]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission northwest of Hulyaipole. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position west of Dobropillya, Zaporizhia Oblast, according to geolocated footage published on November 14, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[52]

A Russian milblogger claimed on November 15 that Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Orikhiv, but ISW did not observe evidence that Russian forces advanced.[53]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on November 15.

Unidentified — possibly Russian — drones struck four commercial vessels in Romanian territorial waters between November 13 and 15. Romanian Prime Minister Luca Niculescu stated on November 15 that unidentified drones struck three commercial vessels near Sulina, Romania.[54] Niculescu reported that Romanian radars also detected aerial targets in the area, prompting the Romanian Air Force to scramble fighter jets twice. The Romanian MoD identified the vessels as the Saint Kitts and Nevis-flagged Marsol bulk carrier, the Greek-flagged Evia Petrol V tanker, and the Saint Kitts and Nevis-flagged Ali Najafov tanker and reported that the drones struck the Evia Petrol V and the Marsol within five nautical miles of Sulina.[55] The strike against the Evia Petrol V marks the first strike against a NATO member state-flagged vessel. Several Russian milbloggers claimed on November 15 that the ships carried cargo bound for Ukraine.[56] Romanian newspaper Ziua de Constanta reported on November 13 that unidentified drones struck the Palau-flagged Larissa 1 cargo ship bound for Ukraine.[57] These recent strikes against vessels bound for Ukraine come against the backdrop of Russia’s strike campaign against vessels in the Black Sea, including within Romanian territorial waters and within the Bulgarian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).[58]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the number of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[59]

See topline for more information about Russia's ongoing long-range strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 


[1] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21839 ; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2121914009225986119

[2] https://t.me/kpszsu/96207

[3]https://t.me/dtek_ua/4837; https://t.me/dtek_ua/4838; https://t.me/odeskaODA/22707; https://www.facebook.com/chernihiv.oblenergo.1998/posts/pfbid02V5konx7tyw6VnEhvh5jXL1i1RRBKCPTX6hBzp4pNe1XFB9ozQAMFCfoVsPYa2zq5l; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/49228

[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2026/; https://suspilne dot media/1452791-nace-ssa-ne-vvazaut-ci-teritorii-ukrainskimi-zelenskij-prokomentuvav-obmezenna-starshield-na-tot/; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/21839; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2121914009225986119

[5] https://suspilne dot media/1452791-nace-ssa-ne-vvazaut-ci-teritorii-ukrainskimi-zelenskij-prokomentuvav-obmezenna-starshield-na-tot/

[6] https://t.me/kpszsu/96207

[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/

[8] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42911; https://t.me/usf_army/2633;

[9]https://x.com/NotWoofers/status/2121803777149997419; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2121853854522409120; https://x.com/NotWoofers/status/2121830552873447444; https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/2121853260210569638

[10] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42911

[11] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42912

[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-14-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2026/

[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-5-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-12-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/cognitive-warfare/eyes-on-the-target-seizing-the-strategic-initiative-against-russia/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-16-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-24-2025/

[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-8-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-21-2025/

[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7-2026/

[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-7-2026/

[17] https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/49226 ; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/69044

[18] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/ukraine-strikes-russian-monolit-plant-involved-in-mi-35m-helicopter-production/

[19] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-4-2026/ ;

[20] https://mod.gov dot ua/news/vid-benzinu-do-naftovih-tankeriv-yak-ukrayinski-udari-poslablyuyut-palivnu-sistemu-ta-naftovi-dohodi-rosiyi

[21] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/fuel-shortages-return-russian-regions-after-ukrainian-refinery-attacks-2026-11-09/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-14-2026/

[22] https://www.iea.org/commentaries/russian-refining-sector-struggles-amid-intensifying-ukrainian-attacks

[23] https://t.me/dva_majors/102042

[24] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2026/; https://nnews.nnov dot ru/posts/111285-prinyaty-mery-dlya-stabilnoy-raboty-azs

[25] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/fuel-shortages-return-russian-regions-after-ukrainian-refinery-attacks-2026-11-09/

[26] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-19-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-10-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-10-2026/

[27] https://t.me/Yuri_Slusar/7919

[28] https://t.me/oko_gora/21263

[29] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-intermediate-range-strike-campaign-and-new-mechanized-attacks-herald-the-start-of-a-new-phase-of-the-war/

[30] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/77760

[31] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-sept-16-2023/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_7/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-26-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-27-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-9-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-28-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-21-2026/

[32] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/77760

[33] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-12-2026/

[34] https://news.err dot ee/1610196722/8-detained-after-gru-linked-arson-at-estonian-drone-company-threod-systems

[35] https://x.com/KristenMichalPM/status/2121953517602537652?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw

[36] https://vm dot ee/en/news/foreign-minister-tsahkna-estonia-close-road-border-crossings-russia

[37] https://understandingwar.org/research/defense-of-europe/the-russian-military-campaign-against-europe-defining-the-threat/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-18-2026/

[38] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/defense-of-europe/the-russian-military-campaign-against-europe-defining-the-threat/

[39] https://t.me/wargonzo/38387

[40] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13457 ; https://t.me/kharkivnapriamok/5252

[41] https://t.me/wargonzo/38387 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/49969

[42] https://t.me/Osintpen/3815; https://t.me/kcaebirds/4046

[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42908 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/20362

[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42908; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42906; https://t.me/wargonzo/38387; https://t.me/grvZapad/20362; https://t.me/muchnoyjugend88/14548

[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42908; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42908; https://t.me/muchnoyjugend88/14547; https://t.me/wargonzo/38387

[46] https://t.me/muchnoyjugend88/14547

[47] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1453225-velicezne-strategicne-znacenna-oficer-100-ombr-pro-situaciu-v-kostantinivci-ta-rol-mista-v-oboroni-doneccini/

[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42906; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42908; https://t.me/wargonzo/38387; https://t.me/motopatriot78/57403

[49] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3711

[50] https://t.me/motopatriot78/57412

[51] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42908; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42906

[52] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1880481539982615 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/13460

[53] https://t.me/wargonzo/38387

[54] https://x.com/LucaNiculescu/status/2121923799415189827

[55] https://www.facebook.com/mapn.ro/posts/1662399092591875?ref=embed_post

[56] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/77784 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/102055

[57] https://www.ziuaconstanta dot ro/stiri/actualitate/alerta-pe-marea-neagra-in-apropiere-de-sfantu-gheorghe-o-nava-a-fost-lovita-de-o-drona-960427.html

[58] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-28-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-13-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-6-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-22-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-29-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-13-2026/

[59] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-11/ukraine-stops-reporting-russia-missile-data-as-defenses-struggle?srnd=homepage-americas; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/

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