Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 14, 2026

Assessment as of: 6:45 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 1:00 PM ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW’s map methodology, please view our statement here.

US proposals for Ukraine’s possible NATO membership are implicit rejections of Russian demands to stop NATO expansion and reform the European security architecture. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on November 14 that the US delegation at the November 10-11 peace talks in Abu Dhabi proposed that Ukraine gain NATO membership in exchange for a Ukrainian withdrawal from the entirety of the Donbas region.[1] Zelensky stated that he would hold a referendum to allow Ukrainian society to vote on any future war termination stipulations should the United States and NATO support such proposals. The Kremlin has long rejected the prospect of Ukrainian membership in NATO, demanding that post-war Ukraine reject its constitutional aspirations to join the alliance and accept a neutral status.[2]

Moscow not only remains committed to its original 2021 ultimatums to the United States and NATO but is also reportedly expanding its demands in order to completely dismantle the post-Cold War security architecture in Europe. The New York Times reported on November 13 that it obtained a copy of an unofficial “non-paper” of demands that the Russian delegation circulated during the Abu Dhabi talks that represents Russia’s opening negotiating position, according to two sources involved in the talks.[3] German outlet BILD similarly reported on November 13 that Russian intermediaries presented a series of unofficial demands related to Ukraine, Europe, and NATO to European representatives in Abu Dhabi, and some of the Russian demands from the New York Times article align with those that BILD reported.[4]

The Russian non-paper repeated many of Russia’s 2021 demands of the United States and NATO, calling for the alliance to pull back its forces and bases from all states that have joined since 1997, to cease expansion, and to refrain from any military activity in Eastern Europe.[5] The non-paper also repeated Kremlin demands that NATO refrain from any military activity in Ukraine and that the West not provide Ukraine with any weapons or military equipment. Ukraine’s partners have discussed the deployment of foreign troops and the strengthening of the Ukrainian military as part of security guarantees for post-war Ukraine, and Russian demands in the non-paper are part of Moscow’s long-standing rejection of any meaningful security guarantees for Ukraine.[6]

The non-paper also included new Russian demands beyond those the Kremlin has laid out since 2021. The document reportedly called for France and the United Kingdom to refrain from using their nuclear weapons to protect other European states.[7] The document also states that the Kremlin would approve of Ukraine’s membership in the EU but would not permit Ukraine to participate in the bloc’s common defense policy. These new demands are likely in response to US efforts to push Europe to take on more of its own defensive requirements and discussions about extending the French nuclear umbrella to eastern NATO states.[8]

Russian President Vladimir Putin is committed to his original war aim of destroying NATO in order to reassert Russia’s control over its perceived sphere of influence in Europe and beyond. The New York Times, citing sources involved in the Abu Dhabi talks, reported that Russian officials in Abu Dhabi made clear that Moscow sees the Cold War-era divide between NATO and the USSR-led Warsaw Pact as a model for the future of Europe, arguing that American and Soviet spheres of influence and clear bilateral understandings after the Second World War reduced the risk of conflict.[9] The Russian non-paper reportedly called for NATO states to refrain from any military activity not only in Eastern Europe but also in the South Caucasus and Central Asia — essentially preventing any Western activity in former Soviet states. ISW continues to assess that Putin invaded Ukraine in 2022 not because he believed that NATO threatened Russia, but rather because he wanted to reassert control over former Soviet states and reestablish Russia as a great power.[10]

The United States continues to call for the inclusion of European delegations in upcoming multilateral negotiations on the war in Ukraine. White House Principal Deputy Press Secretary Anna Kelly stated on November 13 that the US delegation at the recent trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi ensured that Europe will be included in future peace talks.[11] Bloomberg reported on November 13, citing a senior European official, that European officials designated the national security advisers from Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Poland and a representative of the EU to represent Europe in any future technical-level talks.[12] The source reported that Europe has not yet designated any European leaders to represent Europe in talks. US President Donald Trump will meet Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping at the November 18-19 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Meeting in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to discuss nuclear weapons proliferation and the situation in Iran but will likely not discuss the war in Ukraine, according to White House Assistant Press Secretary Olivia Wales.[13]

The temporary localized ceasefire in Kostyantynivka that the Kremlin is requesting would likely facilitate Russia’s reinforcement of the southern flank of the Fortress Belt — allowing Russian forces to set conditions for renewed efforts to seize Kostyantynivka and Dobropillya. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky responded on November 14 to Kremlin proposals for a humanitarian ceasefire in Kostyantynivka similar to the ceasefire in and near occupied Oleshky, Kherson Oblast in late October 2026.[14] Zelensky stated that Moscow would use a Kostyantynivka ceasefire to force Ukrainian forces to leave the town, allowing Russian forces to seize it and then to advance toward Kramatorsk and Slovyansk. Zelensky, citing satellite imagery, reported that Russian forces used the Oleshky ceasefire to bring up weapons and fortify positions in the area. His comments are consistent with other recent Ukrainian statements.[15] Zelensky added that Ukrainian officials have provided the United States with a list of seven or eight unspecified occupied settlements that would benefit from a humanitarian ceasefire, but that the Kremlin has rejected these alternatives. ISW continues to assess that Russian proposals for a ceasefire in Kostyantynivka are part of efforts to convince the United States to accept as real Russia’s fictitious presentation of the frontline situation and that Russian forces would use a localized ceasefire in and near Kostyantynivka to accumulate forces and resources in the area.[16]

The Oleshky ceasefire covered the wider Kherson direction in order to facilitate the safe evacuation of civilians, and a future ceasefire for Kostyantynivka would likely have to include nearby areas as well, given the intermingling of Russian and Ukrainian forces in this sector and the long ranges of tactical drones.[17] Russian forces have struggled to consolidate infiltrated positions within Kostyantynivka and to seize the city, despite official Russian claims that Russian forces have controlled the city since July 2026.[18] Russian forces have also been unable to seize Dobropillya despite Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claims that Russian forces encircled and then seized the town.[19] The Russian military command likely intends to use a localized ceasefire in the wider Kostyantynivka area to reinforce its positions in the area and then intensify attempts to seize the Fortress Belt from the south and southwest.

Recent Russian mechanized assaults and the relatively high tempo of Russian attacks in the Kostyantynivka and Dobropillya directions on the southern flank of Ukraine’s Fortress Belt demonstrate the Russian military command’s prioritization of this sector of the frontline. A Ukrainian military source and an open-source intelligence (OSINT) channel reported that Russian forces conducted a reduced company-sized mechanized assault towards Hruzke (northeast of Dobropillya) involving three tanks, three infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and over 10 light vehicles on November 13.[20] The commander of a Ukrainian regiment operating in the Dobropillya direction stated on November 14 that Ukrainian forces destroyed seven unspecified vehicles and three all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and wounded or killed 30 Russian servicemembers when repelling a recent Russian mechanized assault in the Dobropillya direction, possibly referring to the mechanized assault toward Hruzke.[21] Geolocated footage published on November 11 shows Russian forces conducting a mechanized assault towards Druzhkivka with several IFVs and light vehicles.[22]

A Ukrainian military source reported on November 13 that Russian forces began deploying heavy equipment toward Dobropillya itself, and Ukrainian servicemembers operating in the area, including the commander of Ukraine’s 1st Azov Corps, Brigadier General Denys Prokopenko, have reported since mid-September 2026 that Russian forces were preparing to conduct mechanized assaults in this direction in the fall.[23] Russian forces are attempting to leverage autumnal weather conditions such as fog, strong wind, and rain that inhibit the effectiveness of Ukrainian reconnaissance and strike drones to advance further into the kill zone and either dismount infantry or attempt to break Ukrainian defensive lines. Geolocated footage of the November 11 mechanized assault toward Druzhkivka shows that Ukrainian forces destroyed several Russian IFVs near Nova Poltavka (southwest of Kostyantynivka, approximately 10 kilometers in the Russian near rear).[24] Ukraine’s ability to repel Russian mechanized assaults before the vehicles can reach the frontline illustrates the depth of the kill zone in this area. Russian forces could use a temporary ceasefire in the wider Kostyantynivka direction to safely move heavy equipment closer to the frontline without the threat of Ukrainian drone strikes.

Data from the Ukrainian General Staff shows that Russian forces are prioritizing attacks in the Dobropillya and Kostyantynivka direction. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted 47 attacks in the Dobropillya direction (which the Ukrainian General Staff calls the Pokrovsk direction) on November 13 and 14, the largest number of assaults in the Dobropillya direction since November 1.[25] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces attacked 11 times in the Kostyantynivka direction on November 13 and 14. The number of Russian attacks in the Dobropillya and Kostyantynivka directions combined accounts for 80 percent of all Russian offensive activity against Ukraine’s Fortress Belt since the beginning of October 2026, indicating the importance of these directions for the Russian military command.[26]

Ukrainian officials reported the sixth day of speed restrictions on SpaceX’s Starshield satellite network over parts of Ukraine, inhibiting Ukraine’s ability to effectively defend against the jet-powered drones that Russian forces launch from occupied Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on November 13 that Ukrainian forces continue to experience speed restrictions when using Starshield over occupied Ukraine.[27] Zelensky stated that the Ukrainian MoD spoke to SpaceX representatives, who reportedly said that there were no restrictions in place. Zelensky noted that the responsibility for the decision to restrict Ukraine’s ability to fully use Starshield is unclear. Zelensky called attention to the fact that restrictions over occupied Ukraine insinuate that Russian-occupied Ukraine is not Ukrainian territory, as Ukraine has never had access to Starshield over the Russian Federation. Zelensky stated that the restrictions significantly hinder Ukrainian forces’ ability to intercept Russian jet-powered drones earlier in their flight paths — reducing the time and space Ukrainian forces have to down the drones as they fly over eastern Ukraine and before they reach their targets. Russian forces have maintained long-range drone storage, preparation, and launch sites in occupied Donetsk City and Hvardiiske, Crimea, which Ukrainian forces have repeatedly struck.[28] The Starshield restrictions, if left in place, will continue to enable Russia’s devastating and deadly Winter 2026-2027 strike campaign.

Key Takeaways:

• US proposals for Ukraine’s possible NATO membership are implicit rejections of Russian demands to stop NATO expansion and reform the European security architecture.
• Moscow not only remains committed to its original 2021 ultimatums to the United States and NATO but is also reportedly expanding its demands in order to completely dismantle the post-Cold War security architecture in Europe.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin is committed to his original war aim of destroying NATO in order to reassert Russia’s control over its perceived sphere of influence in Europe and beyond.
• The United States continues to call for the inclusion of European delegations in upcoming multilateral negotiations on the war in Ukraine.
• The temporary localized ceasefire in Kostyantynivka that the Kremlin is requesting would likely facilitate Russia’s reinforcement of the southern flank of the Fortress Belt — allowing Russian forces to set conditions for renewed efforts to seize Kostyantynivka and Dobropillya.
• Recent Russian mechanized assaults and the relatively high tempo of Russian attacks in the Kostyantynivka and Dobropillya directions on the southern flank of Ukraine’s Fortress Belt demonstrate the Russian military command’s prioritization of this sector of the frontline.
• Ukrainian officials reported the sixth day of speed restrictions on SpaceX’s Starshield satellite network over parts of Ukraine, inhibiting Ukraine’s ability to effectively defend against the jet-powered drones that Russian forces launch from occupied Ukraine.
• Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Lyman, and east of Slovyansk. Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Novopavlivka and east of Oleksandrivka.
• Russia launched 96 drones at Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
• Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
• Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprised of 4 subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed Objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazennyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed a recent Ukrainian strike against Russian oil infrastructure in Samara Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on November 14 that Ukrainian forces struck the Samara Linear Production and Dispatch Station near Prosvet, Samara Oblast (roughly 945 kilometers from the international border) overnight on November 13.[29] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that the facility processes and mixes oil from Tatarstan, western Siberia, and other Russian oil-producing regions into the Urals oil mixture that accounts for more than half of all Russian oil exports.

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military aviation infrastructure. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 14 that Ukrainian forces struck an aircraft servicing hangar, an aviation fuel tank, and a central command and dispatch post at the Lipetsk-2 Air Base near Lipetsk City, Lipetsk Oblast (roughly 283 kilometers from the international border) on November 13.[30]

An OSINT source provided updated battlefield damage assessments of a recent Ukrainian strike against the Volgograd Oil Refinery. The OSINT source reported on November 14 that Ukrainian strikes against the Volgograd Oil Refinery (roughly 490 kilometers from the frontline) overnight on November 12 to 13 caused a 3,500-square-meter fire and damaged the plant’s AVT-5, AVT-6, AVT-1, and AVT-3 primary processing units as well as the plant’s hydrotreating and delayed coking plants, lubricant and polymer production facilities, and six oil storage tanks.^[31]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

A Russian milblogger and a source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed on November 14 that Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast, but ISW has not observed evidence to assess that they advanced.[32]

Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on November 13 and 14 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Kharkiv City.[33]

Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk and Borova directions on November 13 and 14 but did not advance.[34]

Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements) Note: The Russian command does not appear to have formally abandoned its campaign plan for the Fortress Belt despite the operational defeat of that plan by Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi.

Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Lyman. Ukrainian forces shelled a Russian position in western Zarichne, according to geolocated footage published on November 13, indicating that Russian forces recently advanced in the area.[35]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces recently advanced east of Slovyansk. Ukrainian forces shelled a Russian position north of Rai-Oleksandrivka, according to geolocated footage published on November 13, indicating that Russian forces recently advanced in the area.[36]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

See topline text for further reporting on Russian forces’ prioritization of advancing on the Fortress Belt from the south and Russian mechanized assaults towards Druzhkivka.

Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest and west of and within Kostyantynivka on November 12 and 13 but did not advance.[37]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)

See topline text for further reporting on Russian forces’ prioritization of encircling the Fortress Belt from the southwest and Russian mechanized assaults near Dobropillya.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on November 13 to 14 but did not advance.[38]

Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Novopavlivka as Russian forces conducted limited infiltration missions northeast of the town. A Ukrainian regiment operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported on November 13 that Ukrainian forces conducted a three-week clearing operation within and south of Filiya (south of Novopavlivka).[39] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on November 14 that Russian forces conducted infiltration missions from Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka) westward, along both banks of the Solena River, and reached the area near Novomykolaivka and Muravka (both southwest of Novoserhiivka).[40] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces blocked and halted Russian infiltration missions near Bilyakivka (west of Novomykolaivka), indicating that Russian forces do not control Bilyakivka and Marivka (northwest of Bilyakivka), contrary to Russian claims.

Ukrainian forces made tactically significant advances along the Mokri Yaly River east of Oleksandrivka. Mashovets reported that the Ukrainian bridgehead along the east (right) bank of the Mokri Yaly River extends from the river’s confluence with the Vovcha River to the area east of Vesele (east of Oleksandrivka), indicating that Ukrainian forces advanced east of Vesele and north of Perebudova (north of Vesele).[41] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces advanced to within one kilometer of the southern outskirts of Vesele. Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces cleared Perebudova, Komar (just south of Perebudova), and Fedorivka (south of Komar), and a Russian milblogger confirmed on November 14 that Ukrainian forces cleared Komar and maintain positions north of Perebudova.[42] Mashovets reported that Russian forces continue to hold positions in the forest northeast of Komar and that Russian forces control only two settlements in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast — Dachne (south of Novopavlivka) and Novomykolaivka (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[43]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)

The Russian MoD continues to make aggrandized claims of Russian advances northwest of Hulyaipole. The Russian MoD claimed on November 14 that elements of the Russian Eastern GoF seized Tersyanka (northwest of Hulyaipole and roughly 21 kilometers from the furthest extent of assessed Russian advances).[44] Russian milbloggers credited elements of the Russian 36th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) with the claimed seizure of Tersyanka.[45]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 13 and 14 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked southeast of Orikhiv.[46]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on November 14.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the number of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[47]

Russian forces launched 96 drones, including 61 jet-powered drones, against Ukraine overnight on November 13 to 14.[48]

Russian strikes in 2026 have accounted for 63 percent of the total amount of Ukraine’s rolling stock destroyed since 2022. Ukrainian Minister of Infrastructure Mykola Kalashnyk reported on November 13 to the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) that Russian forces have destroyed 630 Ukrainian locomotives since the beginning of the full-scale invasion in 2022, including 400 locomotives in 2026 alone.[49]

Russian forces are introducing a ground-launched variant of the Dan-T loitering munition. Several Russian milbloggers posted footage on November 13 and 14 showing Russian forces launching a Dan-T loitering munition from a ground launcher, rather than conducting an air launch from Orion unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) or Mi-28 helicopters.[50] Several prominent Russian milbloggers noted that the ability to conduct ground-based launches of the Dan-T loitering munition may make launches more difficult to detect, shorten Ukraine’s reaction time, obscure launch direction, and increase the scale of simultaneous launches, but that ground launches also shorten the munitions’ maximum range compared to an air launch.[51]

Russian forces’ intensified strikes against bridges in Kyiv City may be part of Russia’s continued goal of breaking the city’s power grid into two halves across the Dnipro River. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on November 14 that Russian forces have intensified strikes against Kyiv City’s Northern, Southern, and Paton bridges since September 2026, aiming to disrupt both civilian traffic and logistics, but also to degrade Ukraine’s main critical infrastructure arteries.[52] Russian forces are attempting to exploit the configuration of Ukraine’s power grid with the aim of creating pockets of energy isolation to prevent Ukrainian officials from effectively distributing electricity throughout the city.[53] Russian strikes during its Winter 2025-2026 long-range strike campaign partially served to divide power availability between the right (western) and left (eastern) banks of the Dnipro River.[54]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.