Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 13, 2026

Assessment as of: 6:15 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 11:30 AM ET

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The United States and Ukraine continue to view the involvement of European officials in future peace negotiations with Russia as necessary. Moscow, however, is willing to let European officials participate in talks only about a new European security architecture –  not about resolving the war in Ukraine – and continues to insist that Europe concede fully to Russia's original 2021 demand to dismantle NATO. Former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner stated on November 12, following his and US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff’s meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Dublin, that Ukraine and Russia agreed to expand the next round of negotiations to include European representatives to address both territorial issues in Ukraine and broader postwar European security arrangements.[i]  Kushner added that the US delegation agreed with Zelensky that the negotiating parties will not finalize any broader European security arrangements without addressing Ukraine's security concerns and will “begin discussing these interconnected issues in parallel.” Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova claimed on November 13, however, that Russian President Vladimir Putin did not discuss the inclusion of European representatives in the next round of negotiations during his meeting with Witkoff and Kushner on November 12.[ii]

Kremlin officials are accepting the idea of European participation in future peace negotiations only as they relate to Russian efforts to dismantle the post-Cold War security architecture in Europe. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on November 13 that Russia can discuss the involvement of Europeans in the talks to end the war in Ukraine only once their “real” intentions and willingness to contribute to the peace process are clear to Russia.[iii] Peskov stated on November 6 that it would be impossible to discuss the future security system in Europe and mutual security guarantees between Russia and Ukraine without Europeans at some stage; he also stated on November 11 that Russia does not envision a format for discussing the war in Ukraine with Europe.[iv] Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov claimed after Kushner and Witkoff's meeting with Putin on November 12 that Moscow hopes that European representatives will agree on the parameters of a new European security architecture, with Ushakov stating that Moscow is ready to begin immediate discussions with US representatives.[v] Ushakov also outlined Russia's key long-standing demands for the creation of a new European security architecture  –  the cessation of NATO expansion, prohibitions on NATO deployments of weapons systems near Russia's borders, and NATO's return to its 1997 configuration  –  the same ultimatums that Russia issued in 2021.[vi] Ushakov added that Moscow wants to add “some fresh considerations” to its list of demands. The Kremlin continues to apply conditionality for European participation in future peace talks on its terms that effectively amount to NATO’s dissolution and is unwilling to allow European states to contribute to efforts to end the war in Ukraine or establish post-war security guarantees for Ukraine.[vii]

Russian officials continue to call for a humanitarian mission in Kostyantynivka, Donetsk Oblast, based on the false parallelism between Kostyantynivka and occupied Oleshky, Kherson Oblast, that the Kremlin is trying to construct. Peskov reiterated on November 13 that Putin's November 12 proposal to Witkoff and Kushner to conduct a humanitarian mission in Kostyantynivka is a very important initiative based on the continuation of recent humanitarian work in occupied Oleshky.[viii] Peskov called on both US and European officials to pressure Ukraine into agreeing to a localized ceasefire in Kostyantynivka to evacuate civilians from the town. Peskov and Ushakov stated that Witkoff and Kushner actively supported such an initiative.[ix] A ceasefire, like the one in Oleshky, is impossible to execute in Kostyantynivka, however, because the actual frontline military situations are not comparable. Russian forces do not control Kostyantynivka. ISW has observed evidence of at least 41 Ukrainian positions in and around Kostyantynivka since September 1, 2026, undermining Putin’s July 3 claim and Russia’s multi-month narrative that Russian forces control the town.[x] Russian forces do fully control Oleshky, a settlement located roughly 3.7 kilometers from the frontline, which meant that both Russian and Ukrainian forces had to agree to halt strikes across the Dnipro River that separates Russian soldiers from Ukrainian soldiers. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is very likely seeking to use a temporary localized ceasefire in Kostyantynivka to set conditions for a military build-up in the area needed to drive northward to Druzhkivka, one of Ukraine’s most heavily fortified cities on the Fortress Belt defense line.

Ukrainian officials continue to report disruptions in SpaceX’s Starshield satellite communications services that are significantly hindering Ukraine’s ability to intercept Russian drones and conduct its intermediate-range strike campaign in occupied Ukraine, despite SpaceX denials. Zelensky stated on November 13 that the in-motion speed restrictions of 161 kilometers per hour (or 100 miles per hour) on Starshield services remain in place along the entire frontline and in Ukraine's occupied territories.[xi] SpaceX told Axios that reports of Starshield restrictions are false and that there has been no change.[xii] A Ukrainian official told Axios that Ukrainian forces have been increasingly experiencing disruptions with Starshield connectivity since November 10, with all Ukrainian missions starting to fail on November 13. Sources in the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ukrainian forces stated on November 13 that restrictions on Starshield connectivity are in place only over Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine but not over Ukrainian-controlled territory.[xiii] It remains unclear whether Starshield restrictions are impeding Ukrainian operations only over occupied Ukrainian territories or across all of Ukraine.

Russia is using seized assets of Western companies operating in Russia to fund its war in Ukraine. Bloomberg reported on November 12 that at least six Western companies operating in Russia, the assets of which the Kremlin effectively seized under the guise of indefinite “temporary management,” have donated around 7.1 billion rubles (roughly $86.86 million) in total to Russian military support charities.[xiv] Bloomberg reported that the Russian military charities used these funds to purchase drones, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), communication systems, and other equipment for Russian forces fighting in Ukraine. Putin’s April 2023 decree authorizes the Russian government to take “temporary management” of any property, securities, or shares belonging to persons associated with countries that Russia designates as “unfriendly” and that purportedly threaten Russian national security or property rights.[xv] ISW has previously assessed that the Kremlin is seizing assets of European companies operating in Russia in an effort to bring temporary fiscal relief amidst mounting costs associated with the war in Ukraine and growing budget deficits.[xvi]

An improvised explosive device (IED) detonated in Moscow City on November 13 and injured a former advisor to former pro-Russian Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov. The Main Investigative Directorate of the Investigative Committee of Russia for Moscow reported on November 13 that a car explosion on Kirovogradskaya Street in Moscow City severely injured Sergei Zavorotny, former adviser to Azarov.[xvii] Zavorotny also worked for the Russian State Duma between 2003 and 2004.[xviii] The US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence identified him as an agent for the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia (SVR), participating in Russian information influence operations.[xix] Russian milbloggers claimed on November 13 that Ukrainian forces are increasingly using assembled IEDs to target Russian military officials in rear areas.[xx] A similar IED explosion killed a Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) colonel in St. Petersburg on November 12.[xxi]

Key Takeaways:

• The United States and Ukraine continue to view the involvement of European officials in future peace negotiations with Russia as necessary. Moscow, however, is willing to let European officials participate in talks only about a new European security architecture – not about resolving the war in Ukraine – and continues to insist that Europe concede fully to Russia's original 2021 demand to dismantle NATO.
• Kremlin officials are accepting the idea of European participation in future peace negotiations only as they relate to Russian efforts to dismantle the post-Cold War security architecture in Europe.
• Russian officials continue to call for a humanitarian mission in Kostyantynivka, Donetsk Oblast, based on the false parallelism between Kostyantynivka and occupied Oleshky, Kherson Oblast, that the Kremlin is trying to construct.
• A ceasefire, like the one in Oleshky, is impossible to execute in Kostyantynivka, however, because the actual frontline military situations are not comparable.
• ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is very likely seeking to use a temporary localized ceasefire in Kostyantynivka to set conditions for a military build-up in the area needed to drive northward to Druzhkivka, one of Ukraine’s most heavily fortified cities on the Fortress Belt defense line.
• Ukrainian officials continue to report disruptions in SpaceX’s Starshield satellite communications services that are significantly hindering Ukraine’s ability to intercept Russian drones and conduct its intermediate-range strike campaign in occupied Ukraine, despite SpaceX denials.
• Russia is using seized assets of Western companies operating in Russia to fund its war in Ukraine.
• An improvised explosive device (IED) detonated in Moscow City on November 13 and injured a former advisor to former pro-Russian Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Slovyansk and south of Novopavlivka.
• Russia launched 117 drones against Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
• Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
• Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprised of 4 subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed Objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazennyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian military-industrial infrastructure. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 13 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone production, warehouse, and maintenance complex in Rostov-on-Don, Rostov Oblast (roughly 200 kilometers from the frontline), overnight on November 12 to 13 with Neptune cruise missiles.[xxii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Russian AeroHit LLC drone service center that repairs and maintains drones and manufactures the Veles first-person view (FPV) drone, as well as the Ionos LLC drone production and storage facility that produces tactical-level strike drones for Russian forces.

Ukrainian forces likely recently struck Russian radar systems in Leningrad Oblast. Ukrainian forces likely recently struck a Russian Nebo-U radar, 40V6 mobile elevating radar mast system, and Sopka-2 radar complex in Leningrad Oblast (roughly 857 kilometers from the international border), according to geolocated photos published on November 13.[xxiii]

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure. Ukrainian forces struck the Volgograd Oil Refinery (roughly 490 kilometers from the frontline), according to geolocated footage published on November 12 showing several large fires at the refinery.[xxiv] A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) source reported that the Ukrainian strikes likely damaged two primary oil refining units, including the plant‘s ELOU-AVT-1 and AVT-6 units, and likely its tank farm as well.[xxv] A different OSINT source reported on November 13 that Ukrainian forces also likely struck the Samara Linear Production-Dispatch Station near Prosvet, Samara Oblast (roughly 945 kilometers from the international border), overnight on November 12 to 13.[xxvi]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed on November 13 that Russian forces continued limited offensive operations north of Sumy City, but ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces advanced.[xxvii]

Russian forces are reportedly intensifying strikes against civilian vehicles along the P-45 Kharkiv City-Okhtyrka highway.  Ukraine’s MoD news outlet ArmyInform reported on November 13 that Russian forces have recently intensified strikes with fiber-optic drones against civilian vehicles along the P-45 Kharkiv City-Okhtyrka highway that runs through northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts, despite the anti-drone nets on the road.[xxviii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission northeast of Kharkiv City, as Ukrainian forces either advanced or maintained positions northwest of Kharkiv City. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position in southeastern Pokalyane (northeast of Kharkiv City), according to geolocated footage published on November 12, after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[xxix] A Ukrainian military source reported on November 12 that Russian forces do not maintain full control of Kozacha Lopan (northwest of Kharkiv City), contrary to Russian claims.^[xxx] The Russian MoD claimed on November 13 that Russian forces seized Kotivka (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xxxi]

Ukrainian forces recently either advanced or maintained positions northeast of Velykyi Burluk. Russian forces struck a Ukrainian position south of Kupyne, according to geolocated footage published on November 12, indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the area, contrary to Russian claims.[xxxii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission south of Kupyansk. Geolocated footage published on November 13 shows Russian servicemembers operating west of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[xxxiii] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 13 that Russian forces advanced west of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi.[xxxiv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast and southeast of Borova on November 12 and 13 but did not advance.[xxxv]

Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements) Note: The Russian command does not appear to have formally abandoned its campaign plan for the Fortress Belt despite the operational defeat of that plan by Ukraine's Operation Vivaldi.

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations northeast and southeast of Lyman but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked southeast of Lyman.[xxxvi]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Slovyansk. A Ukrainian military source reported on November 12 that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Pyskunivka.[xxxvii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

See topline text for reporting on Russian information operations regarding a humanitarian ceasefire in Kostyantynivka.

Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest and west of, as well as within, Kostyantynivka on November 12 and 13 but did not advance.[xxxviii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective:  Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions northeast and southwest of Dobropillya. Geolocated footage published on November 13 shows Russian forces raising flags in western Shylivka (southwest of Dobropillya), after what ISW assesses were infiltration missions.[xxxix] Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian position in western Rubizhne (northeast of Dobropillya), according to geolocated footage published on November 13, after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[xl]

Russian forces reportedly recently conducted a mechanized assault northeast of Dobropillya. A Ukrainian military source reported on November 13 that Russian forces conducted a reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault towards Hruzke (northeast of Dobropillya) involving three tanks, three infantry fighting vehicles, and over 10 light vehicles, taking advantage of foggy conditions.[xli] The source stated that some armored vehicles reached the line of contact while other infantry dismounted several kilometers from the frontline but added that Ukrainian forces successfully repelled the assault.

Russian forces are reportedly deploying more heavy equipment in the Dobropillya direction, as they prioritize offensive operations in the area and seek to take advantage of seasonal weather conditions. A Ukrainian military source reported on November 13 that Russian forces have begun deploying heavy equipment for offensive operations toward Dobropillya itself.[xlii] Ukraine’s 1st Corps Commander Brigadier General Denys Prokopenko and Ukrainian servicemembers operating in the area have reported since mid-September 2026 that Russian forces were preparing to conduct mechanized assaults in the Dobropillya direction in the fall, seeking to exploit seasonal weather patterns that are more conducive to mechanized assaults.[xliii] Russian forces previously deployed tanks with modernized active protection systems — systems that provide kinetic defenses to protect vehicles from incoming drones and projectiles — in the Dobropillya direction in an effort to restore mechanized maneuver.[xliv]  Russian forces have frequently conducted infiltration missions in the Dobropillya direction since early October 2026, in an effort to amass enough Russian infantry to support mechanized assaults in urban terrain by contesting Ukrainian anti-tank positions in a traditional combined arms maneuver.^[xlv] Reduced foliage for concealment prevents Russian forces from maintaining a high rate of infiltration missions into windbreaks and other forested areas, but autumnal weather — such as fog, strong wind, and rain — can allow Russian equipment to advance further into the kill zone and either dismount infantry or attempt to break Ukrainian defensive lines thanks to overall lower visibility and poor drone flight conditions. Russian forces’ accumulation of armored vehicles, significant offensive tempo, and consistently high numbers of casualties in the Dobropillya direction are all indicators that the sector remains a priority for Russian forces.[xlvi]

Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Novopavlivka. A Russian milblogger acknowledged on November 12 that Ukrainian forces have reached the outskirts of Dachne, indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of the settlement.[xlvii] ISW has not observed evidence to indicate Russian presence north of Dachne since April 22, 2026.[xlviii]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on November 13.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on November 12 and 13 but did not advance.[xlix]

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission northwest of Orikhiv. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian position south of Lukyanivske, according to footage published on November 12 and geolocated on November 13, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[l]

Russian forces continue to conduct FPV drone strikes against Ukrainian emergency responders conducting recovery efforts at the site of a November 2 Russian strike against a humanitarian aid site.[li] An official from Ukraine's State Security Service (SBU) reported on November 13 that Russian forces are conducting daily FPV drone strikes against emergency services workers and vehicles conducting recovery efforts at the site of a November 2 Russian strike on a humanitarian aid site in Komyshuvakha (southeast of Zaporizhzhia City), which has so far killed at least 55 people.[lii] The Ukrainian Emergency Services reported on November 12 that Russian forces had conducted two strikes against emergency responders on November 10, damaging two emergency vehicles.[liii]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on November 13.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the number of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[liv]

Russian forces launched 117 drones (including 63 jet-powered drones) against Ukraine overnight on November 12 to 13.[lv]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.