Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 12, 2026

Assessment as of: 8:00 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 12:15 PM ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

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Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

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Russian President Vladimir Putin and members of the Russian delegation outlined Russia’s steadfast commitment to its original territorial demands of Ukraine and ultimatums to dismantle NATO and the post-Cold War European security architecture following the latest trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi on November 12. Putin remains unwilling to compromise on any of these demands. Putin met with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner on November 12 in Moscow City following the November 10-11 US-Ukrainian-Russian peace talks in Abu Dhabi.[1] Several Russian officials have publicly commented on the negotiations and made various suggestions in recent days about ending the war, but statements from Putin and members of the current Russian negotiating team represent the official Russian negotiating position and clearly demonstrate that the Kremlin remains unwilling to compromise on its original war demands.[2]

Putin is refusing to accept any proposed future demilitarized zone in post-war Ukraine or to abandon his demand that Ukraine hand over the parts of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts that Russian forces have not seized. Putin stated at his meeting with Witkoff and Kushner that Russia considers its state border (which Russian law defines as including the four illegally annexed oblasts) to be the only clear “demarcation line” between Russia and Ukraine.[3] Putin claimed that contested “gray zones” in Ukraine are unclear and that peace talks that discuss such gray zones will not lead to a lasting, stable peace. Putin’s statement implies that he will not accept a demilitarized zone in Ukraine and that he wants to be able to deploy Russian forces along a potential new post-war Russian-Ukrainian border. Putin is also indicating that he will only accept a peace settlement that grants Russia full control over all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Russia enshrined its illegal annexation of these four regions into its constitution in 2022, and 2020 constitutional amendments prohibited actions to alienate any part of Russia’s territory.[4] Russian officials, including Putin, have repeatedly declared that Moscow considers the entirety of the four annexed regions to be part of the Russian Federation even though Russian forces do not fully occupy those regions.[5] Putin’s November 12 statement is consistent with his June 2024 speech to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), in which he called for Ukraine’s withdrawal from the entirety of the four illegally annexed regions, even parts that Russian forces did not — and still do not — occupy.[6] Kremlin officials often cite Putin’s 2024 speech as Russia’s non-negotiable position to end the war.[7]

Putin is also unwilling to cede the territory in northern Ukraine that the Kremlin claims Russian forces have seized but that lies outside of the four illegally annexed oblasts. Putin’s November 12 statement about the state border as a “demarcation line,” coupled with recent statements from members of the Russian negotiating team, demonstrates that Moscow intends to retain its control over areas of northern Ukraine that it considers a necessary “security zone.”[8] Vladimir Medinsky, Russian presidential aide and head of the Russian delegation at Abu Dhabi, stated on November 11 that Russia will not accept any territorial exchanges with Ukraine and will continue to expand its “security zone” in Ukraine (referring to territory in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts).[9] Medinsky and Putin have also publicly stated that any territory on which a Russian soldier sets foot belongs to Russia.[10] The full extent of the areas in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts that Moscow aims to claim remains unclear.

Putin continues to reject all meaningful Western security guarantees for post-war Ukraine. Putin reiterated on November 12 his demands that Western states refrain from deploying troops to Ukraine as part of any post-war security guarantees.[11] Putin stated that the presence of any foreign troops on Ukrainian territory is “absolutely unacceptable” for Russia and would threaten Russian security. Putin reiterated claims that foreign troops would be “legitimate targets” for Russian forces and that their deployment to Ukraine would immediately restart the war.[12] Putin and other Russian officials have rejected Western security guarantees for Ukraine since the European-led Coalition of the Willing began discussing such foreign deployments in March 2025.[13]

Russian negotiators used the Abu Dhabi talks to reassert their 2021 demands of NATO. An informed source told Ukrainian outlet RBC Ukraine on November 11 that Russian negotiators in Abu Dhabi refused to discuss meaningful ceasefires or concessions with Ukraine and insisted on focusing talks on the Kremlin’s December 2021 demands to halt NATO’s eastward expansion; give Russia a veto over military deployments to countries that joined NATO after 1997; refrain from military activity in Ukraine, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia; and refrain from deploying intermediate-range missiles within range of Russian territory.[14] The 2021 ultimatums also demanded that the United States commit to upholding the ban on NATO enlargement and refrain from deploying weapons in Europe. Two sources familiar with the matter told Axios on November 11, however, that Kushner and Witkoff told Russian negotiators that the situation in the world has changed significantly since 2021 and that Russia should draft a new peace proposal that would lay out Russian steps to de-escalate and ensure Russia does not renew aggression against Ukraine and Europe.[15] Russian negotiators’ continued insistence on Putin’s 2021 demands directly contradicts Witkoff and Kushner’s reported position and demonstrates that the Kremlin has no interest in serious negotiations to end its war in Ukraine. Russian negotiators reportedly also falsely claimed that Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 because former US President Joe Biden failed to respond to Putin’s December 2021 ultimatum.[16] US officials, in fact, repeatedly tried to negotiate a de-escalation of tensions between Russia and Ukraine in late 2021 and early 2022. Biden, for example, held a videoconference with Putin in December 2021, and then-US Assistant Secretary of State Wendy Sherman met with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov in January 2022 in an attempt to de-escalate tensions arising from Russia’s military buildup on the Ukrainian border.[17]

Putin invaded Ukraine in 2022 to subdue and subsume Ukraine as part of a larger Kremlin project to restore the Russian Empire and to destroy NATO as a meaningful alliance, as ISW has repeatedly assessed.[18] Putin invaded Ukraine in 2022 because he assessed that the war could achieve both of these goals, not because he perceived a threat from NATO. Putin’s December 2021 ultimatum to NATO, which remains the foundation of Russian demands to Europe, serves this same purpose, and the Kremlin’s continued commitment to the December 2021 demands shows that Moscow has no interest in any meaningful compromise or negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.

Putin is simultaneously doubling down in his efforts to convince US officials to accept Russia’s fictitious frontline. Putin reiterated his false July 3 claim that Russian forces have full control over Kostyantynivka, Donetsk Oblast, in his meeting with Witkoff and Kushner and proposed that Russia and Ukraine could conduct a humanitarian mission in Kostyantynivka as a continuation of recent humanitarian work in occupied Oleshky, Kherson Oblast.[19] Putin proposed inviting international media representatives and Ukrainian and Russian human rights representatives to oversee the evacuation of civilians from Kostyantynivka and to show who actually controls the town. Putin has previously made similar performative offers to call attention to his exaggerated claims about Russian battlefield progress.[20] ISW has observed evidence of at least 41 Ukrainian positions in and around Kostyantynivka since September 1, 2026, however, undermining Russia’s multi-month-long narrative of full control over the town. ISW assesses that Putin is accepting the Russian military’s fictional presentation of the battlefield and likely believes that Russian forces are operating far forward of the real line of contact. Russian state media regularly publishes maps showing the extent of these exaggerated Russian-claimed advances.[21]

Putin likely would seek to use a temporary localized ceasefire in Kostyantynivka to accumulate Russian forces and resources needed to drive northward to Druzhkivka — one of Ukraine’s most heavily fortified cities in the Fortress Belt defense line. Russian forces have notably already been evacuating civilians from the parts of Kostyantynivka they do control, which further suggests that the Kremlin is likely seeking a ceasefire for military rather than humanitarian purposes.[22] Ukrainian and international sources have suggested that Russia used the recent Oleshky ceasefire to accumulate forces and means along the Dnipro River, and there is no reason to believe Russian forces would not behave similarly in a potential Kostyantynivka ceasefire situation.[23]

A ceasefire, like the one in Oleshky, is impossible to execute in Kostyantynivka, however, because the actual frontline military situations are not comparable. Russian forces fully control Oleshky — a settlement located roughly 3.7 kilometers from the frontline, which meant that it was mainly necessary for Russian and Ukrainian forces to agree to stop strikes across the Dnipro River that separates Russian soldiers from Ukrainian soldiers. That ceasefire on strikes allowed the delivery of humanitarian assistance and evacuation of civilians in the Kherson direction. Russian forces, in contrast, do not control Kostyantynivka, but are instead intermingled with Ukrainian forces engaged in active combat. Negotiating, observing, and enforcing a ceasefire in such conditions would be extraordinarily complex if it is even possible.

Ukrainian officials reported a recurrence of in-motion speed restrictions on SpaceX’s Starshield satellite communications network over Ukraine that is significantly hindering Ukraine’s drone interception efforts and intermediate-range strike campaign. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on November 12 that Ukrainian forces have been recording systematic in-motion speed restrictions of 161 kilometers per hour (or 100 miles per hour) on Starshield connectivity over the past “several days.”[24] Ukrainian officials last reported Starshield in-motion speed restrictions between the night of October 13 to 14 and October 23.[25] Zelensky stated that the restrictions are resulting in significant disruptions to Ukraine’s Starshield operations nationwide, including over the frontline and occupied territories. Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Defense Technologies Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on November 12 that Starshield restrictions are negatively affecting Ukrainian helicopter counter-drone operations and Ukrainian jet-powered drone interceptors.[26] Starshield restrictions hinder Ukraine’s ability to intercept Russian piston engine-driven and jet-powered drones due to restrictions on communication transmissions to counter-drone aircraft and jet-powered drone interceptors flying over 100 miles per hour. Russian forces have adapted their drones and strike patterns to increase their effectiveness to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses and maximize civilian harm in an effort to make civilian life in Ukraine untenable and coerce the country into submission.[27] Starshield restrictions further hinder the Ukrainian intermediate-range campaign against Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in occupied Ukraine due to disruptions to Ukrainian drone operators’ ability to maintain connection with their strike drones during certain stages of their flight.[28] Ukrainian forces do not have access to Starshield services over Russia, as SpaceX has geographically restricted Ukraine’s access to just within Ukraine’s international borders.[29]

An improvised explosive device (IED) detonated in St. Petersburg on November 12, reportedly targeting an unidentified colonel serving in the Russian 6th Air and Air Defence Forces Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and the Leningrad Military District [LMD]). The St. Petersburg Investigative Committee reported on November 12 that an IED detonated and killed an unidentified Russian servicemember in the Pushkinsky Raion of St. Petersburg.[30] A source claimed to St. Petersburg online newspaper Fontanka that the IED killed a Russian colonel and that a balloon transported the explosive to Leningrad Oblast, where the perpetrator retrieved it.[31] Russian opposition source Agentstvo and a Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) channel reported that the victim of the explosion may have been the Russian 6th Air and Air Defense Forces Army’s chief navigator Colonel Dmitry Lobodin or the formation’s deputy commander Colonel Andrei Khodykin.[32] It’s unclear, however, if either of the colonels was the true target.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin and members of the Russian delegation outlined Russia’s steadfast commitment to its original territorial demands of Ukraine and ultimatums to dismantle NATO and the post-Cold War European security architecture following the latest trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi on November 12. Putin remains unwilling to compromise on any of these demands.
• Putin is refusing to accept any proposed future demilitarized zone in post-war Ukraine or to abandon his demand that Ukraine hand over the parts of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts that Russian forces have not seized.
• Putin is also unwilling to cede the territory in northern Ukraine that the Kremlin claims Russian forces have seized but that lies outside of the four illegally annexed oblasts.
• Putin continues to reject all meaningful Western security guarantees for post-war Ukraine.
• Russian negotiators used the Abu Dhabi talks to reassert their 2021 demands of NATO.
• Putin is simultaneously doubling down in his efforts to convince US officials to accept Russia’s fictitious frontline.
• A ceasefire like the one in Oleshky is impossible to execute in Kostyantynivka, however, because the actual frontline military situations are not comparable.
• Ukrainian officials reported a recurrence of in-motion speed restrictions on SpaceX’s Starshield satellite communications network over Ukraine that is significantly hindering Ukraine’s drone interception efforts and intermediate-range strike campaign.
• An improvised explosive device (IED) detonated in St. Petersburg on November 12, reportedly targeting an unidentified colonel serving in the Russian 6th Air and Air Defence Forces Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and the Leningrad Military District [LMD]).
• Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces advanced on November 12.
• Russia launched 123 drones at Ukraine overnight and 124 drones during the day.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
• Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
• Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprised of 4 subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed Objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazennyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed recent strikes against five major Russian oil refineries and provided updated battlefield damage assessments (BDA). The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on November 12 that Ukrainian forces struck five of the most significant oil refineries in Russia, including the Omsk, Kirishi, Ryazan, Nizhny Novgorod, and Yaroslavl oil refineries (all between 461 and 2,450 kilometers from the international border) between October 30 and November 11.[33] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces also recently struck the smaller Novokuibyshevsk (roughly 787 kilometers from the international border) and Saratov (about 460 kilometers from the international border) oil refineries.[34] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that the Ukrainian strike against the Kirishinefteorgsintez oil refinery in Kirishi, Leningrad Oblast overnight on November 8 to 9 damaged the facility’s atmospheric tubular oil refining unit, the ELOU primary refining unit, and two cooling units.[35] The Ukrainian strike against the Saratov Oil Refinery overnight on November 6 to 7 damaged the plant’s only primary oil refining unit, two fuel hydrotreating units, pipelines, and a 10,000 cubic meter storage tank.[36] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that the Saratov refinery has a capacity of about 7 million tons of oil per year and that strikes forced the plant to halt operations.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian milbloggers and a source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed on November 12 that Russian forces continued offensive operations north and east of Sumy City, but ISW has not observed evidence to assess that Russian forces advanced.[37]

Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission north of Kharkiv City. A source reporting on the Russian Northern GoF reported on November 12 that Russian forces have begun to consolidate positions in Hoptivka (north of Kharkiv City), indicating that Russian forces have likely already infiltrated throughout the settlement.[38]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on November 12. 

Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

A Russian milblogger and a source reporting on the Russian Western GoF claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations north and northwest of Kupyansk on November 11 and 12, but ISW has not observed evidence to assess that Russian forces advanced.[39]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets suggested on November 12 that some elements of the 67th Motorized Rifle Division (25^th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) may be operating in the Kupyansk direction under the operational command of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, Moscow Military District [MMD]).[40] ISW last observed elements of the 67th Motorized Rifle Division operating in the Lyman direction on October 7, 2026.[41]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast and east of Borova on November 11 or 12 but did not advance.[42]

Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements) Note: The Russian command does not appear to have formally abandoned its campaign plan for the Fortress Belt despite the operational defeat of that plan by Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi.

Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Lyman and conducted infiltration missions northeast and southeast of Lyman. Ukrainian forces still maintain operational initiative in this area, despite Russian tactical movements. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on November 12 that Russian forces maintain positions in the fields between Novolyubivka (northeast of Lyman) and Yampolivka (south of Novolyubivka) on the right (western) bank of the Zherebets River.[43] Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces are fighting small Russian infantry groups in Myrne (just west of Yampolivka), indicating that Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions into Myrne. Mashovets also reported that small Russian infantry groups are operating on the southern and northern outskirts of Dibrova.[44] Mashovets assessed that Ukrainian forces maintain the operational initiative in the Lyman direction and have almost managed to completely eliminate the threat of Russian assaults from the north and northwest of Lyman.[45] 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations east of Slovyansk on November 12 but did not advance.[46]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission southwest of Druzhkivka. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian-occupied building in eastern Novohryhorivka (southwest of Druzhkivka), according to geolocated footage published on November 11, after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[47]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on November 11 and 12 but did not advance.[48]

Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of Novopavlivka on November 11 and 12 but did not advance.[49]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Oleksandrivka direction on November 12.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on November 11 and 12 but did not advance.[50]

Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian 7th Corps reported on November 12 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian launch site for Molniya-type strike drones in occupied Hulyaipole.[51]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 11 and 12 but did not advance.[52]

Russian forces are increasing the number of glide bomb strikes they conduct in the Orikhiv direction, likely in preparation for future offensive operations. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Orikhiv direction reported on November 12 that Russian forces are conducting 12 to 30 guided aerial glide bomb (KAB) strikes daily against Ukrainian positions in the Orikhiv direction.[53]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on November 12.

Russian forces continue to hunt civilians using human safari tactics in Kherson City. Geolocated footage published on November 12 shows a drone operator of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division striking a civilian woman driving a car in Kherson City.[54] Russian forces in the Kherson direction have long employed human safari tactics, in which Russian drone operators purposefully hunt civilians as part of the broader effort to institutionalize intentional civilian harm as a tool of war.[55]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the number of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[56]

Russian forces launched an unspecified number of ballistic missiles, 123 drones (including 73 jet-powered drones) and S8000 Banderol/Dan-T loitering munitions against Ukraine overnight on November 11 to 12 and 124 drones (including 66 jet-powered drones) during the day on November 12.[57]

Russian forces continue to adapt their strike tactics to increase the effectiveness of their jet-powered drones in order to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses. Ukrainian Presidential Advisor on Defense Technologies Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on November 12 that Russian forces recently adopted a tactic that involves turning off jet-powered drone engines immediately prior to the drone’s impact.[58] Beskrestnov stated that the jet engine provides the drone with sufficient acceleration and momentum, allowing the drone to conduct the final stage of the flight in silence. Beskrestnov stated that Ukrainian forces have additionally observed Russian drones flying at extremely low altitudes to avoid Ukrainian radar detection. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on November 10 that Russian forces conducted drone strikes against Kharkiv Oblast overnight on November 9 to 10 with this tactic.[59] Shutting down the engine allows Russian drones to reduce their acoustic signature and approach their targets with more stealth. This may allow Russian drones to bypass certain acoustic detection sensors and reduce the reaction and detection time for some Ukrainian air defenses, such as mobile fire groups that are not equipped with radar systems or electro-optical and infrared sensors.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Russian security services continue efforts to destabilize NATO and EU states bordering Russia through attempts to smuggle migrants across Russian and Belarusian borders. Independent Russian investigative publication The Insider reported on November 9 that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) coordinates with a Moscow-based company and Belarusian border guards to smuggle migrants to the Belarusian border with Latvia.[60] Russia and Belarus have engaged in acts of aggression against EU and NATO states by systematically attempting to smuggle migrants across their land borders, including those with Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia.[61]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.