Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 11, 2026

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Senior Kremlin officials explicitly and emphatically articulated Moscow’s persistent demands for complete Ukrainian capitulation and territorial concessions that extend far beyond Donbas. Vladimir Medinsky, Russian presidential aide and head of the Russian delegation at Abu Dhabi, told Russian media outlets on November 11 that Russia will capture "every inch of [Russia's] land one way or another."[1] Medinsky also asserted that “wherever a Russian soldier has set foot belongs to Russia” — mirroring Russian President Vladimir Putin's statement from June 2025.[2] Medinsky added that Russia will not accept any territorial exchanges with Ukraine and will continue to expand its "security zone" in Ukraine (very likely referring to territory in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts that Russian officials claim are part of a "buffer zone.").[3] Medinsky's statements demonstrate the Kremlin's territorial ambitions beyond the five illegally annexed regions in Ukraine (Crimea and Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts) and unwillingness to engage in compromises or exchanges of territory to end the war.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov similarly stated on November 11 that Russia will pursue a "course" that fulfills the demands Putin laid out in his June 2024 speech to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).[4] That speech required a Ukrainian withdrawal from the entirety of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, including areas that Russian forces have never occupied; Ukraine's demilitarization and “denazification” (the replacement of the current Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian one); and Ukraine's abandonment of its NATO aspirations.^[5] Kremlin officials have frequently claimed that the Ukrainian withdrawal from all of Donetsk Oblast is a necessary but insufficient condition for a peace settlement, and Putin and other high-ranking Kremlin officials have often reiterated Russia's commitment to Putin's June 2024 demands.[6] Ukrainian forces maintain control over 0.38 percent of Luhansk Oblast, 20.12 percent of Donetsk Oblast, 24.42 percent of Zaporizhia Oblast, and 30.11 percent of Kherson Oblast, but Putin continues to demand territory that his forces have been unable to seize.[7]

Russian officials used the Abu Dhabi talks to try to persuade US and Ukrainian officials to accept Russia’s carefully crafted fictional version of the frontline. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on November 10 that Russian military and intelligence officials falsely claimed to the US and Ukrainian delegations in Abu Dhabi that Russian forces control half of the part of Donbas that Ukrainian forces, in reality, still control.[8] The Kremlin has long made exaggerated and grossly inaccurate claims of Russian battlefield successes.[9] The Russian MoD, in fact, regularly claims a frontline trace that does not correspond with reality at all. The Russian MoD falsely claimed the seizure of Dobropillya and Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka on October 16, for example, when Russian forces held neither settlement.[10] Putin claimed on July 3 that Russian forces had seized Kostyantynivka — a town that Russian forces have still not seized over four months later.[11] The Russian MoD repeatedly falsely claimed that Russian forces encircled Ukrainian troops in northern Kharkiv Oblast in September and October 2026.[12] Russian state media regularly publishes maps showing the fictional Russian line of claimed advances.

The Kremlin will likely continue to make false claims of advances all along the frontline in an effort to establish its fictional frontline as the basis of future negotiations on territorial issues. Russian officials often claim that peace talks need to take into consideration the "realities on the ground," and the Kremlin is trying to push its own reality onto US, Ukrainian, and other negotiators. The Kremlin will very likely increase its claimed advances throughout Winter 2026-2027 and into Spring 2027 far beyond territories its troops can take or hold. Putin likely hopes that a devastating wintertime Russian long-range strike campaign against Ukraine will break Ukraine's will to continue to fight and degrade Western support for Ukraine, allowing him to insist on his claimed line of advance as the starting point of any talks about a final settlement of the war.

Ukrainian and US officials in Abu Dhabi reportedly rejected Russian officials’ false claims about the battlefield, and ample evidence of Ukrainian successes in 2026 directly undermines Russia’s false narrative. Zelensky stated on November 11 that US negotiators confirmed Ukraine's assessment of the battlefield situation — rejecting the false Russian claim that Russian forces control half of the Ukrainian-controlled territory in Donbas.[13] Russian forces have, in fact, lost the initiative and much of their offensive capabilities in several sectors of the theater throughout 2026. Russian forces have suffered a net loss of territory in four of the last eight months since the previous round of US-Ukrainian-Russian talks in February 2026, while simultaneously suffering increasingly high casualties.[14] Ukrainian forces have conducted several successful counteroffensive operations throughout 2026 in the Lyman, Oleksandrivka, and Kupyansk directions, liberating over 1,000 square kilometers of territory. Successful Ukrainian counteroffensive operations have entirely disrupted the Russian plan to seize Donetsk Oblast and created cascading effects across other sectors of the frontline, as the Russian military command had to make difficult decisions about the allocation of manpower and resources between sectors.^[15] There is no basis to assess that Russian forces will be able to take the rest of Donetsk Oblast in any short period of time, as Putin continues to claim that they will, or even to forecast that Russian forces will ever be able to seize the region by force.^[16]

The Russian and Ukrainian delegations at the Abu Dhabi talks reportedly agreed to a large-scale prisoner of war (POW) exchange. Former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner reported on November 11 that Ukrainian and Russian officials agreed to a large-scale POW exchange but noted that the parties will finalize the numbers on November 12.[17] Zelensky reported on November 11 that the delegations discussed the possibility of each side exchanging 1,000 or 1,500 POWs.[18] Russian First Deputy Chief of Information of the General Staff’s Main Directorate (GRU) Lieutenant General Alexander Zorin stated that an exchange of 1,000 POWs could take place in the next two to three weeks (around November 25 to December 2).[19] Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) Deputy Davyd Arakhamia stated that this POW exchange could be ”one of the biggest, if not the biggest” of the war.[20]

The US delegation will meet with Putin in Moscow City on November 12 to discuss the progress of the talks and the potential involvement of European officials in future negotiations, while the Kremlin continues to explicitly reject the idea of a multilateral format. Kushner stated on November 11 that he and US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff will next travel to Moscow to meet with Putin in an attempt to make further progress on peace talks and to promote the idea of future European participation.[21] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on November 11, however, that Russian officials currently have “no vision” of a negotiations format that includes European representatives —echoing repeated Kremlin statements in recent weeks against European involvement.[22] Kushner noted that the US delegation will also travel to Dublin, Ireland, to meet with Zelensky following the visit to Moscow.[23]

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that Alexander Darchiev, the Russian ambassador to the United States, passed away on November 11 at the age of 66.[24] Darchiev had served as ambassador since March 6, 2025, and led Russian efforts to normalize Russian-US relations.[25]

Key Takeaways:

• Senior Kremlin officials explicitly and emphatically articulated Moscow’s persistent demands for complete Ukrainian capitulation and territorial concessions that extend far beyond Donbas.
• Russian officials used the Abu Dhabi talks to try to persuade US and Ukrainian officials to accept Russia’s carefully crafted fictional version of the frontline.
• The Kremlin will likely continue to make false claims of advances all along the frontline in an effort to establish its fictional frontline as the basis of future negotiations on territorial issues.
• Ukrainian and US officials in Abu Dhabi reportedly rejected Russian officials’ false claims about the battlefield, and ample evidence of Ukrainian successes in 2026 directly undermines Russia’s false narrative.
• The Russian and Ukrainian delegations at the Abu Dhabi talks reportedly agreed to a large-scale prisoner of war (POW) exchange.
• The US delegation will meet with Putin in Moscow City on November 12 to discuss the progress of the talks and the potential involvement of European officials in future negotiations, while the Kremlin continues to explicitly reject the idea of a multilateral format.
• The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that Alexander Darchiev, the Russian ambassador to the United States, passed away on November 11 at the age of 66.
• Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Dobropillya.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian critical infrastructure on the night of November 10 to 11. Russian forces launched 163 drones (including 91 jet-powered drones) and S8000 Banderol/Dan-T loitering munitions and one Kh-59/69 cruise missile against Ukraine overnight on November 10 to 11.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Supporting Effort – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City
• Russian Supporting Effort – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast
• Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast (comprised of 4 subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest via Lyman and Svyatohirsk (assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and elements of the Western Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (assessed Objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest, west of the Kazennyi Torets River (assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces)
• Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces conducted a long-range strike against critical and oil infrastructure in Russia on the night of November 10 to 11. Ukraine's Security Service (SBU) reported that Ukrainian forces struck port, oil refining, and transport infrastructure near the Ust-Luga Port in St. Petersburg (roughly 850 kilometers from the international border).[26] The SBU reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Novatek-Ust-Luga oil export terminal, the Ust-Luga Oil terminal, the Factor JSC terminal, and the Luzhskaya railway station, causing fires and damaging oil tank farms, pumping stations, pipelines, and oil transshipment infrastructure. The SBU reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Project 21631 Buyan-M class Naro-Fominsk corvette of the Russian Baltic Fleet, which carries Kalibr and Onyx cruise missiles. Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko acknowledged on November 11 that Ukrainian drones struck the Ust-Luga Port area and caused fires.[27] Geolocated footage published on November 11 shows large smoke plumes near the Ust-Luga Port.[28]

Russian forces possibly lost up to three helicopters on November 11 during drone interception missions around St. Petersburg. A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) lost three helicopter crews totaling seven personnel overnight on November 10 to 11.[29] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces lost a Mi-8 and a Ka-52 helicopter during counter-drone missions near St. Petersburg.[30] A third Russian milblogger claimed that it is unclear whether the cause of the incidents was a collision, friendly fire, or another factor.[31] ISW has not observed any open-source footage showing the alleged incidents or information confirming the total number of lost helicopters. The SBU reported on November 11 that Ukrainian forces are verifying information regarding the destruction of Russian combat helicopters.[32]

Ukrainian long-range strikes continue to disrupt civilian aviation across Russia. The Russian Federal Air Transport Agency (Rosaviatsia) temporarily suspended operations at 26 airports on the night of November 10 to 11, including at St. Petersburg's Pulkovo Airport.[33] A Russian milblogger noted that a significant number of Ukrainian drones were able to cross over the airspace of several western Russian oblasts.[34]

Ukrainian and Russian sources provided updated battlefield damage assessments (BDA) of recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil and industrial infrastructure. A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) source published satellite imagery captured on October 21 showing damage to a support building and a production facility at the Redkino Research Plant near Redkino, Tver Oblast (roughly 513 kilometers from the international border), following a Ukrainian strike on the night of October 8 to 9.[35] A Russian insider source claimed that Ukraine’s November 8-9 strikes against the Kirishi Oil Refinery in Kirishi, Leningrad Oblast (roughly 794 kilometers from the international border) damaged the refinery’s ELOU-AVT-2 primary processing unit, AT-1 and AT-6 atmospheric distillation units, a mazut processing system, two circular water supply units, and pipelines.[36] A Ukrainian OSINT source published satellite imagery on November 10 showing how Ukraine’s November 6-7 strikes against the Saratov Oil Refinery in Saratov City (about 460 kilometers from the international border) damaged the refinery’s visbreaker, the ELOU-AVT-6 primary processing unit, and a pipeline.^[37] Geolocated footage published on November 11 shows a likely Ukrainian strike against the Omsk Oil Refinery in Omsk City (roughly 2,450 kilometers from the international border).[38]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces (GoF) claimed on November 11 that fighting continued east of Sumy City, but ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces advanced.[39]

Russian Supporting Effort – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations north and northeast of Kharkiv City and in the Velykyi Burluk direction on November 10 and 11 but did not advance.[40]

Russian Supporting Effort – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces are heavily relying on glide bombs to disrupt Ukrainian logistics across the Oskil River south of Kupyansk. The commander of a Ukrainian unmanned systems brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on November 11 that Russian forces are conducting 35 to 40 glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian river crossings daily in an attempt to cut off Ukrainian access to the eastern bank of the Oskil River.[41] The commander added that Russian forces are simultaneously attempting to advance toward Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (southeast of Kupyansk on the eastern bank of the river) to form a bridgehead to cross the Oskil River. Ukrainian forces maintain an extensive presence on the eastern bank of the Oskil River, and Russian strikes against the river crossings are attempts to isolate these positions and disrupt Ukrainian logistics, while the simultaneous assaults towards Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi aim to take advantage of these disruptions.

Russian forces continue to conduct infiltration missions within and west of Kupyansk. A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces continue attempts to infiltrate toward Sobolivka (just west of Kupyansk) and near Kovalivka and Palamarivka (both northwest of Kupyansk).[42] A Ukrainian military source reported that Ukrainian forces spotted Russian infiltration groups operating near the Kupyansk Stadium in northern Kupyansk, but that Russian forces claimed in their official reports that this infiltration mission took place in Sobolivka – likely to make it appear that Russian forces had advanced further west of Kupyansk than they had in reality. The source stated that Russian infiltration groups continue to operate within Kupyansk, constantly changing their location to avoid detection.[43]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast and southeast of Borova on November 10 and 11 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[44]

Russian Main Effort – Capture Ukraine's Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest (Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements) Note: The Russian command does not appear to have formally abandoned its campaign plan for the Fortress Belt despite the operational defeat of that plan by Ukraine's Operation Vivaldi.

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations east and northeast of Lyman on November 10 and 11 but did not advance.[45]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east (Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk on November 10 and 11 but did not advance.[46]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south (Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces concentrated offensive operations west and southwest of Kostyantynivka on November 10 and 11 but did not advance.[47]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest (Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazennyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements)

Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Dobropillya and conducted infiltration missions north and southeast of the town. Russian forces advanced in central Bilytske (southeast of Dobropillya), according to geolocated footage published on November 10.[48] Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions north and southeast of Dobropillya, according to geolocated footage published on November 10 and 11, after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[49]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to make exaggerated claims of Russian advances in the Dobropillya direction. The Russian MoD claimed on November 11 that Russian forces seized Shylivka (southwest of Dobropillya).[50] A Ukrainian military source refuted these claims on November 11, noting that Russian forces have repeatedly carried out attacks in Shylivka but that a Russian presence in the settlement does not constitute control over it.[51]

Russian Supporting Effort – Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on November 11.

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations east and southeast of Oleksandrivka on November 10 and 11 but did not advance.[52]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr grouping of forces)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on November 10 and 11 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[53]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to make aggrandized claims of Russian advances northwest of Hulyaipole. The Russian MoD alleged on November 11 that elements of the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces seized Voskresenka (northwest of Hulyaipole and roughly 27 kilometers from the furthest extent of assessed Russian advances).[54] Russian milbloggers credited elements of the Russian 5th Separate Tank Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) with the claimed seizure of Voskresenka.[55]

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian forces struck a Russian servicemember northeast of Bilohiria (southeast of Orikhiv), according to geolocated footage published on November 10, after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[56]

Russian forces reportedly used the recent humanitarian ceasefire around Oleshky to reclaim positions they had not been able to establish since late 2025. Kherson Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Prokudin reported on November 11 that Russian forces used the ceasefire around Oleshky from October 27 to November 1 to reclaim positions that Ukrainian forces have prevented them from establishing since 2025, including new positions for Russian drone operators.[57] Prokudin stated that Russian forces brought additional weaponry into Oleshky, including drones, artillery, ammunition, and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS).

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Note: The Ukrainian military ceased regularly reporting the number of Russian missiles fired and the number of missiles intercepted as of August 11.[58]

Russian forces launched 163 drones (including 91 jet-powered drones) and S8000 Banderol/Dan-T loitering munitions and one Kh-59/69 cruise missile against Ukraine overnight on November 10 to 11.[59]

Russian forces continued targeting Ukrainian energy and critical infrastructure overnight on November 10 to 11, causing widespread power outages. Ukrainian Prime Minister Serhiy Koretskyi stated on November 11 that Russian forces struck six large power substations in Vinnytsia, Kirovohrad, Zhytomyr and Cherkasy oblasts; power transmission lines in Kirovohrad and Rivne oblasts; and a heating utility facility in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[60] Ukrainian First Deputy Energy Minister Artem Nekrasov stated on November 11 that Russian strikes against energy infrastructure caused power outages in Dnipropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, Zaporizhia, Kyiv, Rivne, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Chernihiv oblasts.[61]

Russian forces are further expanding drone storage infrastructure in occupied Crimea, likely after previous Ukrainian strikes targeted the facilities. A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) channel published satellite imagery captured on November 9 showing that Russian forces are constructing approximately 82 new Geran-type drone storage structures, including 10 hardened shelters, at the Hvardiiske Airbase near Hvardiiske, Crimea.[62] The expansion of hardened drone storage facilities at droneports is likely in response to Ukraine's strikes against Russian drone launch infrastructure.[63]

Russian developers introduced an AI hardware and software platform to improve autonomous drone performance. Russian state-owned unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) producer ZALA claimed on November 11 that it introduced Arsenal, a universal onboard hardware and software drone platform compatible with all ZALA UAVs incorporating edge AI architecture.[64] (Edge AI is the deployment of AI models directly onto local devices to train them using machine learning algorithms, neural networks, and deep learning without reliance on cloud infrastructure.[65]) ZALA claimed that Arsenal enables video and thermal-imaging data processing, autonomous object detection and classification, navigation, guidance, and monitoring flight profile characteristics locally during flight, reducing dependence on real-time communication links and ground control stations. ZALA produces a variety of reconnaissance drones, Lancet loitering munitions, and piston engine-driven and jet-powered BM-35 one-way attack UAVs, and the deployment of edge AI processing capabilities could enable Russian drones to operate autonomously in adverse weather conditions, in communications-denied environments, and at ranges exceeding those of the drone’s radio communication link.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarus participated in a Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Security Council meeting in Moscow City on November 11. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko claimed at the CSTO Security Council that it would be appropriate to strengthen the CSTO’s military potential and claimed that the “militarization of western countries” poses a danger to the CSTO.[66]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.