Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 9, 2026

Assessment as of: 8:45 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 12:30 PM ET

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Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited offensive operations across the theater throughout the first day of the May 9 - 11 ceasefire. Both Ukrainian and Russian officials issued competing accusations that the other side violated the ceasefire on May 9.[i] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 9 that there were 51 combat engagements after the ceasefire went into effect.[ii] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck residential infrastructure in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts during the day on May 9.[iii] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused Ukraine of violating the ceasefire 8,970 times, including launching 12 ground attacks, 1,173 artillery, MLRS, and mortar strikes, and 7,151 drone strikes.[iv] The Ukrainian Air Force reported on May 9 that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M missile and 43 Shahed, Gerbera, Italmas, and Parodyia drones against Ukraine after 1800 on May 8, but it is unclear whether these strikes took place before or after the ceasefire went into effect at midnight on May 9.[v] Observed National Aeronautics and Space Administration Fire Information for Resource Management System (NASA FIRMS) signatures from May 8 and 9 and Ukrainian and Russian reporting indicate that there was a reduction in hostilities across the theater, particularly in northern Ukraine, but not a cessation of hostilities.[vi] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that the overall operational tempo across certain areas of the frontline decreased despite persistent tactical combat missions that violated the ceasefire.[vii]  

The ceasefire notably lacked well-defined terms and the only publicly available details of the ceasefire’s terms offered by Ukrainian President Volodmyr Zelensky stated that Ukraine would not strike Moscow’s Red Square during the Kremlin's Victory Day parade – a condition Ukraine adhered to.[viii] The prevalence of mutual accusations and continued localized activity from the early hours of the ceasefire highlights the fact that ceasefires without explicit enforcement mechanisms, credible monitoring, and defined dispute resolution processes are unlikely to hold.[ix] Any durable cessation of hostilities will require both sides to establish clear terms, implement third-party monitoring systems, and withdraw forces from the line of contact to reduce the risk of violations and escalation.[x]

Russian forces used the ceasefire to conduct rotations, reinforcements, redeployments, and logistics throughout the theater, likely to support imminent future offensive operations. Ukrainian military sources reported on May 9 that Russian forces used the ceasefire for regrouping, rotations, logistics, and position fortification in the Kupyansk, Lyman, and Slovyansk directions and in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[xi] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on May 9 that Ukrainian forces observed redeployed elements of the 90th Tank Division (41st Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[xii] ISW first observed reports on May 4 that the 90th Tank Division had redeployed from the Oleksandrivka and Novopavlivka directions, and the reduction of tempo on May 9 may have supported the division’s redeployment.[xiii] The 7th Corps noted that the Russian military command has recently begun establishing command posts in Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) to support Russian attacks toward Rodynske (north of Myrnohrad).[xiv] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on May 9 that the ceasefire is allowing Russian forces to advance and consolidate positions northwest of Lyman in areas where Ukrainian drone activity has previously prevented Russian forces from fortifying these positions.[xv] Russian forces have repeatedly used ceasefires to regroup, conduct rotations, and improve logistics along the frontline.[xvi] Russian forces will likely continue to take advantage of any reduction in operational tempo on May 10 and 11 to further regroup and reinforce positions as to resume reinvigorated offensive operations once the ceasefire period ends.

Russia and Ukraine have not yet conducted the reportedly agreed to prisoner-of-war (POW) swap of 1,000 prisoners each as of May 9. US President Donald Trump, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, and Kremlin Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov announced on May 8 that Ukraine and Russia agreed to the exchange of 1,000 POWs from each side as part of the planned three-day ceasefire. [xvii] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported that a source in the Ukrainian Presidential Administration stated that reports that the Kremlin backed out of the POW swap are untrue and that work on facilitating the exchange is still ongoing as of May 9.[xviii]

Ukrainian defense successes on the battlefield have prevented Russian forces from making significant advances across the theater, depriving Russian President Vladimir Putin of any significant operational successes to celebrate on Victory Day. Putin did not discuss the battlefield situation in Ukraine during Russia's Victory Day celebrations on May 9 and instead simply claimed that Russia's victory is inevitable.[xix] Russian forces have failed to make any operationally significant advances in the last year. Russian forces managed to seize Toretsk in August 2025 after a 14-month campaign, Siversk in a 41-month campaign, and Pokrovsk in January 2026 after a two-year campaign, all of which resulted in high Russian casualties and equipment losses.[xx] Russian forces were unable to capitalize on the seizures of any of these towns to make further operationally significant advances. Russian forces have thus far made minimal progress in their ongoing Spring-Summer 2026 offensive against Ukraine's Fortress Belt. Russian forces first infiltrated into Kostyantynivka (the Fortress Belt's southernmost city) in October 2025 and have since failed to make operationally significant gains over the last six months.[xxi] Ukrainian forces have, by contrast, made their most significant gains on the battlefield in Winter and Spring 2026 since Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024, notably retaking more territory than Russian forces gained in April 2026.[xxii] Ukrainian forces liberated large portions of Kupyansk in November 2025, liberated over 400 square kilometers in southern Ukraine after a series of counterattacks in Winter and Spring 2026, and most recently liberated several settlements in western Zaporizhia Oblast in late April 2026.[xxiii] Ukrainian counterattacks in southern Ukraine have created cascading operational and strategic effects against Russian forces in their ongoing Spring-Summer 2026 offensive against the Fortress Belt, which has forced Russia to choose between defending against Ukrainian counterattacks or allocating manpower and resources to priority sectors of the frontline.[xxiv] Ukraine's intensified mid-range strike campaign against Russian logistics, military equipment, and manpower since early 2026 has also degraded Russian forces' ability to conduct offensive operations across the theater.[xxv] Ukrainian forces have intentionally exacerbated other Russian vulnerabilities over the last year, including through the February 2026 block on Russia's use of Starlink terminals in Ukraine and through Ukraine's operational long-range strike campaign against Russian military and oil infrastructure deep in the Russian rear, which significantly disrupted Russian communications on the frontline and drone operations as well as Russia's oil and gas profits.[xxvi]

Russia's war in Ukraine forced Putin to hold his Victory Day parade on a much smaller scale than in previous years, as Putin cannot reliably defend deep rear areas, including the capital, from Ukrainian drones. The Kremlin held its 2026 Victory Day parade in Moscow City on May 9 in a significantly truncated format, with the parade lasting only 45 minutes, featuring no tanks or other military equipment for the first time since 2007, and hosting only 10 foreign leaders as compared to over 20 in 2025.[xxvii] The parade also notably featured the first-ever participation of North Korean soldiers, who were instrumental in repelling Ukraine's Kursk incursion in Winter and Spring 2025.[xxviii] Russian authorities also revoked foreign media outlets' previously-approved accreditation to attend the parade on May 8, citing the current operational situation, likely referring to the threat of Ukrainian drone strikes.[xxix] Russian sources also claimed that the Kremlin would be airing the parade on a time delay and had prepared content in the event that Ukrainian forces struck the parade.[xxx] Ukrainian forces have steadily increased the range, volume, and intensity of their long-range strike campaign, targeting several major Russian cities, including Moscow and Chelyabinsk, in recent weeks - areas where Putin previously felt safe and comfortable hosting large gatherings.[xxxi] The Kremlin has largely failed to defend against Ukrainian strikes in recent weeks, despite the Kremlin moving air defense assets, and resorted to escalating threats in the days leading up to the parade.[xxxii] The Kremlin's truncated format for such events, that the Kremlin has historically capitalized on, reflects the increasing strain that over four years of war is having on Russia.[xxxiii]

Putin's insistence on holding the Victory Day parade despite the threat of Ukrainian strikes reflects Putin's refusal to accept the realities of the current battlespace. The Kremlin launched increasing threats against Ukraine in the days leading up to Victory Day, including implied threats to launch a high volume of ballistic missiles against Kyiv City if Ukraine conducted strikes that "disrupted" the Victory Day parade in the Red Square.[xxxiv] Putin's demands for a ceasefire for the parade was a deliberate attempt to project a sense of power and control in Russia, while seeking to avoid the embarrassment of potential Ukrainian strikes during such celebrations. Victory Day is Russia’s principal patriotic holiday that commemorates the Soviet Union’s contributions to victory over Nazi Germany in the Second World War (known in Russia as the Great Patriotic War), and Putin's insistence on holding the parade despite the risk of escalation underscores Putin's desperateness to restore Russia to the perceived greatness of the Soviet Union.

Putin used Victory Day to position the war in Ukraine as this generation of Russians' equivalent to the Soviet Union's role in World War II. Putin used his Victory Day speech to reinforce longstanding attempts to posture Russia as the heir of the Soviet Union’s “superpower” status and to position himself as Stalin's successor within that historical lineage.[xxxv] Putin claimed that Soviet successes in the Great Patriotic War inspire the soldiers carrying out Russia's war in Ukraine today and the moral strength, courage and valor, and ability to endure and overcome are the key to Russia's success on the battlefield.[xxxvi] Putin emphasized how Russia's unity is what makes it strong and that the front and rear need to band together to support the war. Putin has long tried to construct false historical parallels between the war in Ukraine with the Soviet Great Patriotic War to rally Russian society behind the war.[xxxvii] Putin's emphasis on how the people of the Soviet Union had to endure hardships for a greater cause, demonstrates how Putin is aware of the growing costs that the domestic Russian populace is feeling as a result of the war as casualties approach one percent of Russia’s total population, Russians increasingly bear the financial cost of the war, and the Kremlin intensifies its censorship and mobile data restrictions. Putin is trying to convince Russians to accept these ever-increasing costs as necessary for defeating a greater evil.

Russian forces continue to suffer increasing casualty rates. Russian opposition outlets Meduza and Mediazona reported on May 9 that data from the Russian Register of Inheritance Cases (RND), Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), Russian court records, and a list of deceased servicemembers indicate that at least 352,000 Russian servicemembers have died since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022 through the end of 2025.[xxxviii] Meduza and Mediazona's updated casualty numbers include servicemembers missing and presumed dead for the first time. Russian courts have declared around 90,000 servicemembers missing and presumed dead through July 2025. The actual number of Russian servicemembers killed in action (KIA) is likely much higher, as Meduza and Mediazona’s figure is very likely a conservative estimate due to reporting limitations. Total Russian casualties (killed and seriously wounded) are reportedly 1.3 million as of February 2026.[xxxix]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited offensive operations across the theater throughout the first day of the May 9 – 11 ceasefire.
• Russian forces used the ceasefire to conduct rotations, reinforcements, redeployments, and logistics throughout the theater, likely to support imminent future offensive operations.
• Russia and Ukraine have not yet conducted the reportedly agreed to prisoner-of-war (POW) swap of 1,000 prisoners each as of May 9.
• Ukrainian defense successes on the battlefield have prevented Russian forces from making significant advances across the theater, depriving Russian President Vladimir Putin of any significant operational successes to celebrate on Victory Day.
• Russia's war in Ukraine forced Putin to hold his Victory Day parade on a much smaller scale than in previous years, as Putin cannot reliably defend deep rear areas, including the capital, from Ukrainian drones.
• Putin's insistence on holding the Victory Day parade despite the threat of Ukrainian strikes reflects Putin's refusal to accept the realities of the current battlespace.
• Putin used Victory Day to position the war in Ukraine as this generation of Russians' equivalent to the Soviet Union's role in World War II.
• Russian forces continue to suffer increasing casualty rates.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and in the Borova direction.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

[Note: The Ukrainian General Staff’s 0800 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0800 on the previous day to 0800 on the current day, and the 2200 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to 2200. ISW is unable to assess whether Russian attacks reported in these SITREPs occurred before the Victory Day ceasefire went into effect on at 0000 May 9. The Ukrainian General Staff’s 1600 SITREP appears to cover battlefield activity from 0000 to 1600, and any reports of Russian ground activity in the Ukrainian General Staff’s May 9, 1600 SITREP are by default an accusation of truce violations.]

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed additional Ukrainian strikes overnight on May 7 to 8 and provided updated battle damage assessments (BDA). The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 8 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone storage depot near Rostov-on-Don, Rostov Oblast.[xl] A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) analyst published satellite imagery on May 9 that shows that a May 7 to 8 Ukrainian drone strike destroyed the main building and partially burned another building at the Radar Research and Development Center in Rostov-on-Don.[xli] The Ukrainian General Staff also confirmed that an April 30 strike damaged a production building at the Sverdlov explosives plant in Dzerzhinsk, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast; that an April 25 strike struck a building at an arsenal of the Russian Main Missile and Artillery Directorate (GRAU) in Kedrovka, Sverdlovsk Oblast (over 1,600 kilometers from the Ukrainian border); and that a strike conducted in May 2026 damaged infrastructure of the Bryansk Chemical Plant in Seltso, Bryansk Oblast.[xlii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on May 9 while Ukrainian forces reportedly counterattacked in the area.[xliii]

Ukrainian forces reportedly continue to maintain a presence in Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on May 8 that Ukrainian forces continue to maintain a presence at unspecified locations in Kursk Oblast.[xliv]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Bryansk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on May 8 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian Tunguska air defense system near Nezevayevka (roughly 30 kilometers from the international border).[xlv]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast. The Ukrainian 2nd Khartiya National Guard Corps reported on May 9 that Ukrainian forces advanced north of Starytsya (northeast of Kharkiv City) in an assault operation in April and May 2026.[xlvi]

Russian forces reportedly violated the ceasefire in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Ukrainian 2nd Khartiya National Guard Corps Spokesperson Volodymyr Dehtyaryov reported on May 9 that Russian forces continued assaults in northern Kharkiv Oblast overnight on May 8 to 9 and on the morning of May 9 during the declared ceasefire and attempted to cross an unspecified river in the area and improve their positions and logistics.[xlvii]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on May 9.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on May 9 but did not advance.[xlviii]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction. Geolocated footage published on May 8, reportedly from May 7, shows Russian forces shelling a Ukrainian position near the O-131307 road northwest of Nadiya (east of Borova), indicating that there are likely no Russian positions near the Ukrainian positions.[xlix]

Ukrainian forces continued their short-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in Russian near rear of the Borova direction. Geolocated footage published on May 9 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian field ammunition depot near occupied Berestove (roughly 16 kilometers from the frontline and northeast of Borova).[l]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 8 that Ukrainian forces struck the Luhansk oil depot in occupied Luhansk City (roughly 150 kilometers from the frontline), fuel and lubricant warehouses near occupied Petropavlivka (roughly 141 kilometers from the frontline) and Novomykilske (roughly 25 kilometers from the frontline), and an unspecified Russian repair unit near Rovenky (roughly 186 kilometers from the frontline).[li] A Ukrainian unmanned systems unit reported on May 9 that Ukrainian forces struck and destroyed a Russian 9T452 transporter-loader vehicle for BM-27 Uragan multiple rocket launcher and two trucks and damaged a command and staff vehicle in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[lii] The unit reported that Ukrainian drone strikes forced Russian forces to begin camouflaging military equipment at a range of at least 30 to 40 kilometers from the frontline and that Ukrainian drone units are now capable of striking targets at that range.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted an infiltration east of Slovyansk as Ukrainian forces reportedly counterattacked.[liii] Geolocated footage published by the Russian Prosvet Rifle Battalion of the 7th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD])) on May 9 shows Russian servicemembers raising flags in eastern, western, and northwestern Kryva Luka (east of Slovyansk) in what ISW assesses to have been an infiltration mission.[liv] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed on May 8 that elements of the Russian 7th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade seized Kryva Luka.[lv]

Russian forces are reportedly intensifying their use of unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and remote mining in the Slovyansk direction. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on May 9 that Russian forces have been attempting to use UGVs for supply and ammunition deliveries, and heavy hexacopter drones to mine Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs).[lvi]

Russian forces conducted an infiltration in northeastern Kostyantynivka as Ukrainian forces reportedly counterattacked in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.[lvii] Geolocated footage published on May 8 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in northeastern Kostyantynivka in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[lviii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southwestern Kostyantynivka.[lix]

The Russian military command has reportedly set a May 30 deadline to reach the outskirts of Kramatorsk as Ukrainian forces continue battlefield air interdiction (BAI) efforts against occupied Bakhmut (roughly 13 kilometers from the frontline east of Kostyantynivka). The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area reported that Ukrainian intelligence indicates that the Russian military command tasked Russian forces with reaching the outskirts of Kramatorsk by May 30, beginning with an attack near Maiske (east of Druzhkivka) and Vyrolyubivka (north of Kostyantynivka).[lx] The spokesperson added that Russian forces intend to redeploy two fresh battalions to the brigade’s area of responsibility (AoR) and have reduced activity in recent days while accumulating heavy equipment. The spokesperson also reported that Ukrainian forces are frequently striking targets in occupied Bakhmut, where Russian forces are accumulating heavy equipment, including a strike against a large depot that destroyed nearly half out of 20 pieces of heavy equipment present.[lxi]

Ukrainian forces reportedly counterattacked in Dobropillya tactical area on May 9.[lxii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on May 9 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces reportedly counterattacked.[lxiii]

Russian forces leveraged vehicle-towed trailers, cars, and motorcycles to increase their mobility in the Pokrovsk direction. An officer of a Ukrainian unit operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on May 9 that Russian forces are actively using vehicle-towed trailers to transport infantry to the frontline in the Pokrovsk direction.[lxiv] The commander reported that Russian forces continued using cars and motorcycles to launch attacks using small assault groups of two to five servicemembers. The commander also reported that Russian forces continued to leverage Molniya fixed-wing strike drones, some of which serve as “mothership” drones that carry first-person view (FPV) drones.

The Russian MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the Novopavlivka direction on May 9.[lxv]

Ukrainian forces continued short-range strikes against Russian military assets in the near rear of the Novopavlivka direction on May 8. The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces reported on May 8 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian communications tower in occupied Oleksiivka (roughly 18 kilometers from the frontline).[lxvi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on May 9 as Ukrainian forces reportedly counterattacked in the area.[lxvii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces conducted an infiltration northwest of Hulyaipole. Geolocated footage published on May 8 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in southern Verkhnya Tersa (northwest of Hulyaipole) in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[lxviii]

Ukrainian forces continued their short-range and mid-range strike campaign against the Russian military assets in the Hulyaipole direction overnight on May 7 to 8. The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on May 8 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian communication nodes in occupied Kinski Rozdory (roughly 21 kilometers from the frontline) and Zelenopil (roughly 43 kilometers from the frontline) overnight.[lxix]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 9 and launched a drone strike against a civilian target.[lxx] Geolocated footage published on May 9 shows drone operators of the Russian ”Group 23“ Detachment striking a civilian vehicle in Zaporizhzhia City, the first evidence ISW has observed of the existence of this unit.[lxxi]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian air defense and communication systems in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast overnight on May 7 to 8. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi posted geolocated footage on May 8 showing Ukrainian forces striking a Russian Tor-M2 air defense system south of occupied Mykhailivka (roughly 19.5 kilometers from the left (eastern) bank of the Dnipro River).[lxxii] Brovdi also reported that Ukrainian forces struck communication towers in Novomykhailivka (roughly 22 kilometers from the frontline) overnight on May 7 to 8.[lxxiii]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks east of Kherson City toward Antonivka on May 9 but did not advance.[lxxiv]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Unmanned Systems Regiment of the 18th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly flying drones over Kherson City, the first evidence ISW has observed of the existence of this unit.[lxxv]

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian radar stations in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 8 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Kasta-2E radar station near Mysove (roughly 230 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of May 7 to 8.[lxxvi]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text for reports of Russian long-range strikes in Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces reportedly fielded an AI-based kinetic drone countermeasure system in unspecified sectors of the frontline in an effort to intercept tactical Russian drones. Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov reported on May 9 that Ukrainian forces have fielded an artificial intelligence (AI)-guided turret that is capable of downing electronic warfare (EW)-resistant fiber-optic drones.[lxxvii] Fedorov reported that elements of a Ukrainian drone brigade have employed the turret in combat and that more than 10 detachments are employing the turrets in unspecified crucial frontline sectors.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.