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May 23, 2026
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 23, 2026
Data Cutoff: 12:15 PM ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
For more information on ISW’s map methodology, please view our statement here.
Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a mechanized counterattack in the Borova direction, possibly penetrating up to five kilometers into the Russian defenses. Geolocated footage published on May 22 shows Russian forces striking at least one Ukrainian armored vehicle north of Nove (southeast of Borova).[1] A Russian milblogger claimed that the footage shows a part of the Ukrainian mechanized assault, which reportedly involved at least 15 armored vehicles near Maliivka, Lozove, and Vovchyi Yar (all southeast of Borova).[2] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on May 23 that footage released by Russian military sources suggests that Ukrainian vehicles may have penetrated up to five kilometers into Russian-controlled territory before Russian forces struck the Ukrainian vehicles.[3] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked the forward positions of the Russian 20th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]), including its 3rd and 144th motorized rifle divisions, while Russian forces were regrouping in the area.[4] Russian milbloggers acknowledged that Ukrainian forces operate in Andriivka, Ridkodub, Vovchyi Yar, and southwestern Karpivka (all southeast of Borova).[5] A Russian milblogger claimed on May 21 that Russian officials’ exaggerated claims of success in Kupyansk are allowing Ukrainian forces to exploit weak points in Russia's defensive line that the Russian military command has neglected.[6] Russian milbloggers assessed that Russian forces may struggle to prevent further Ukrainian advances south of Borova.[7]
Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign continues to exploit degraded and overstretched Russian air defenses, targeting Russian oil infrastructure and military assets on the night of May 22 to 23. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Metafrax Chemicals plant in Perm Krai – more than 1,700 kilometers from the frontline – forcing the facility to stop production.[8] Zelensky stated that Metafrax Chemicals is an important part of the Russian chemical industry and supplies products to Russia’s military-industrial complex. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Sheskharis oil terminal and Grushova oil depot in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai (approximately 340 kilometers from the frontline), causing fires at both facilities.[9] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Sheskharis is one of the largest Russian oil terminals on the Black Sea and is part of the Transneft pipeline network with a throughput capacity of up to 75 million tons of oil per year, and has a tank farm with a volume of about 1.28 million cubic meters. The Ukrainian General Staff also noted that the Grushova oil terminal is a key part of the Sheskharis complex and one of the largest oil depots in southern Russia with a carrying capacity of around 1.2 to 1.4 million cubic meters. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian shadow fleet crude oil tanker, Chrysalis, in the Black Sea. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Project 1239 hoverborne guided-missile corvette and a Kalibr cruise missile-equipped Project 11356 frigate Admiral Essen at the Novorossiysk Naval Base.[10] Ukraine has been engaged in a concerted campaign against Russian air defense assets (SEAD/DEAD) in occupied Crimea, which is further enabling Ukrainian forces to exploit degraded and overstretched Russian air defenses to strike Russian oil infrastructure and military targets in occupied Crimea and southwestern Russia.[11] Ukraine’s continuous strikes on the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) vessels demonstrate that Ukrainian drones continue to pose a significant threat to the BSF even after the Russian military command withdrew several vessels from BSF headquarters in occupied Sevastopol to Novorossiysk to protect them from Ukrainian strikes.[12]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia is preparing a combined strike against Kyiv City that could include Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs). Zelensky stated on May 23 that Ukrainian intelligence, including data from US and European partners, indicates that Russia is preparing a strike using the Oreshnik system.[13] Zelensky stated that intelligence suggests that Russia is preparing a combined missile and drone strike against Ukraine, including Kyiv City, with various types of weapons and possibly medium-range systems. Zelensky warned that there would be an elevated strike risk starting on the night of May 23. Russia previously launched Oreshniks against Dnipro City in November 2024 and Lviv City in early 2026.[14] The Kremlin previously threatened to strike "decision-making" centers in Kyiv City if Ukrainian forces conducted strikes against Russia’s Victory Day celebrations in Moscow City on May 9, which Ukraine did not target.[15] Russia regularly targets Kyiv City with missiles and drones, including launching a massive strike against the city just days after the Victory Day ceasefire.[16]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a mechanized counterattack in the Borova direction, possibly penetrating up to five kilometers into the Russian defenses.
- Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign continues to exploit degraded and overstretched Russian air defenses, targeting Russian oil infrastructure and military assets on the night of May 22 to 23.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Russia is preparing a combined strike against Kyiv City that could include Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs).
- Ukrainian forces advanced in the Borova and Hulyaipole direction.
- Russian forces launched 124 drones toward Ukraine overnight.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
See topline text.
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the northern Sumy Oblast. Geolocated footage published on May 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces likely cleared Ryasne (southeast of Sumy City) and the surrounding area after a Russian mechanized assault on May 3.[17]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on May 23 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[18]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on May 23.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continue limited ground attacks and recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Kupyansk direction.[19] Geolocated footage posted on May 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in central Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[20]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.
See topline text for reports on Ukrainian advances in the Borova direction.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on May 23 but did not advance, and Ukrainian forces reportedly continued to counterattack in the area.[21]
Russian forces are hesitating to use artillery and armored vehicles in the Lyman direction due to successful Ukrainian battlefield air interdiction (BAI) efforts and counterattacks. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on May 23 that Russian forces are bringing artillery and armored vehicles closer to the frontline but are reluctant to use them for fear of Ukrainian drone strikes.[22] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger similarly claimed that Russian small groups are struggling to establish positions in the Lyman direction due to Ukrainian drone strikes and frequent counterattacks.[23]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka and Dobropillya tactical areas on May 23 but did not advance.[24]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on May 23 but did not advance.[25]
Russian forces are accumulating artillery systems in and near Pokrovsk. A spokesperson of the Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Corps stated May 23 that Russian forces are accumulating artillery systems in the residential areas of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[26] The spokesperson reported that Ukrainian forces detect and strike these Russian artillery positions. The spokesperson reported that Russian forces have intensified assaults against Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), likely in an effort to establish drone pilot crew positions in the settlement and reduce the Ukrainian kill zone in the area.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions on May 23 but did not advance.[27]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and logistics in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported May 23 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot in occupied Prechystivka (roughly 40 kilometers from the frontline).[28] Geolocated footage published on May 22 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian truck with a first-person view drone north of Buhas (roughly 70 kilometers from the frontline) and along northeast of Dolia (roughly 70 kilometers from the frontline) along the H-20 Mariupol-Donetsk City highway.[29] Geolocated footage published on May 22 shows a burning Russian forces truck northeast of Pryvilne (roughly 90 kilometers from the frontline) along the H-20 Mariupol-Donetsk City highway after a reported Ukrainian strike.[30]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction as Russian forces infiltrated in the area. Geolocated footage published on May 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in northern and central Dobropillya (northwest of Hulyaipole) and in central Zaliznychne (east of Hulyaipole).[31] Additional geolocated footage published on May 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in central Vozdvyzhivka and northeast of the settlement after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[32]
Ukrainian forces continue to counterattack in western Zaporizhia Oblast as Russian forces continue limited ground attacks in the area.[33] Russian milbloggers claimed that the situation remains difficult for Russian forces west of Orikhiv amidst ongoing Ukrainian counterattacks.[34] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces recently used armored vehicles to attack near Plavni (west of Orikhiv) and toward Kamyanske (southwest of Orikhiv).[35] ISW recently observed geolocated footage indicating that Ukrainian forces may have advanced further south toward Kamyanske, but could not independently reproduce the geolocation and has therefore opted not to make any map edits from the geolocation.
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast on the night of May 22 to 23. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian communication hub in occupied Smile (roughly 35 kilometers from the frontline) and a technical equipment support warehouse in occupied Forlivske, Zaporizhia Oblast (possibly referring to occupied Forlivske, Donetsk Oblast near the Ukraine-Russia international border).[36]
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on May 23 but did not advance.[37]
Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Kherson Oblast. Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) posted footage on May 23 of Ukrainian forces striking a Russian drone control point in occupied Oleshky (east of Kherson City).[38]
A Russian servicemember claimed that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian target with a Buratino first-person view (FPV) drone at a distance of 85 kilometers in Kherson Oblast.[39]
Ukrainian strikes against occupied Crimea continue to degrade Russian logistics. Russian occupation authorities closed on May 23 the Dzhankoi train station in occupied Crimea to passengers for unspecified reasons.[40] The Crimea-based Telegram channel Crimean Wind reported four explosions in Dzhankoi overnight.[41] Ukrainian forces have been increasingly striking Russian logistics in rear areas, particularly with mid-range drones, which are likely inhibiting Russian logistics.
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukraine from May 22 to May 23. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 124 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[42] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 102 drones, that 12 drones struck nine locations, and that debris fell on five locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian and administrative infrastructure in Poltava and Sumy oblasts.[43]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://t.me/operationall_space/11627; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2057951308842197472
[2] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2057951308842197472 ; https://t.me/operationall_space/11627
[3] https://t.me/rybar/80522
[4] https://t.me/yurasumy/27938; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/72434; https://t.me/rybar/80522; https://t.me/operationall_space/11627
[5] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/72434; https://t.me/rybar/80508
[6] https://t.me/apwagner/61045
[7] https://t.me/yurasumy/27938; https://t.me/apwagner/61045
[8] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19179; https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/sogodni-bula-horosha-nasha-dalekobijna-sankciya-proti-rosiyi-104561
[9] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39022
[10] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2394; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-7-2026/
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-9-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-26-2026/;
[12] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/special-edition-campaign-assessment-ukraines-strike-campaign-against-crimea/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_4-14/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_23-11/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-15-2025/
[13] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/19183 ;https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2058212839869890718?s=20;
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-21-2024/
[15] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-9-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-7-2026/
[16] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-8-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-7-2026/
[17] https://x.com/johnspectator/status/2058150205220880822; https://t.me/The_Wrong_Side/29251; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11834; https://www.instagram.com/reel/DX68wfbirVq
[18] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38983; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38987 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20729; https://t.me/severnnyi/8113; https://t.me/dva_majors/93372; https://t.me/wargonzo/34370
[19] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38983 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38987 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20729 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/93372 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/34370
[20] https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2058186951467880866; https://t.me/svarog_usf/939
[21] https://t.me/rybar/80522 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/34370 ; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/35153 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39023 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38987 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20729 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38983
[22] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/23/starayemos-vbyvaty-na-pidstupah-do-liniyi-bojovogo-zitknennya-malo-hto-z-rosiyan-bachyt-nashi-pozycziyi-na-lymanshhyni/; https://youtu.be/AT1tNZKtXls?t=1491
[23] https://t.me/rybar/80508
[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38983 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38987 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39023 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/93372 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/34370
[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38983; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38987; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39023; https://t.me/dva_majors/93372; https://t.me/wargonzo/34370
[26] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/05/23/vorog-zavodyt-svoyu-artyleriyu-do-pokrovska-ta-myrnogradu/; https://youtu.be/AT1tNZKtXls?t=631
[27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38983; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38987; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39023 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14062
[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39022
[29] https://t.co/xFz7IU3AIW; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2057834865756954826; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2057831498653508019; https://x.com/RALee85/status/2057793014932623818
[30] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2058049797731569761; https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/2058005966516277298
[31] https://t.me/burpobeda/19171; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2058160411799617866; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2058160559938289889; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2058167913035464904 ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2058113260763947174; https://t.me/NO_NAME_GROUP1w9/432
[32] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11988; https://t.me/polk_210/6572; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2058154122285654461; https://t.me/voin_dv/19604; https://x.com/juss_men/status/2058174988281086371
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39023 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/14062
[34] https://t.me/rybar/80524 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/93372
[35] https://t.me/rybar/80524
[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/39022
[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38983 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/38987
[38] https://x.com/414magyarbirds/status/2058168505334133216
[39] https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/27505833
[40] https://t.me/tass_agency/377185;
[41] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/99747
[42] https://t.me/kpszsu/62474
[43] https://pol dot gp.gov.ua/ua/news.html?_m=publications&_c=view&_t=rec&id=421190 ; https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/42945
















