Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 13, 2026

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The Kremlin is doubling down on its demand that Ukraine withdraw from all of Donbas as a precondition for the resumption of negotiations. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on May 13 that Ukrainian forces must cease fire and withdraw from Russian-claimed Ukrainian oblasts (likely referring to Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, which Russia illegally annexed in 2022) as a precondition for further negotiations to end the war.[i] Russian officials have demanded that Ukraine withdraw from Donetsk Oblast in recent weeks as a precondition for negotiations, and Peskov's statement indicates that the Kremlin is officially insisting that Ukraine cede important territory that its forces are currently holding against Russian efforts to seize them before negotiations can begin again.[ii] Anonymous sources familiar with the matter told the Financial Times (FT) on May 13 that Russian President Vladimir Putin plans to impose additional territorial demands in any future ceasefire agreement.[iii] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated May 13 that, despite recent Russian dialogue with the United States, “nothing is happening” in negotiations.[iv]

Russia’s exaggerated territorial ambitions and aggressive territorial demands run completely counter to battlefield reality. Anonymous sources in contact with Putin and additional sources familiar with the matter as well as a Ukrainian intelligence assessment shared with FT indicate that senior Russian commanders have convinced Putin that Russian forces could seize all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts by Fall 2026.[v] ISW is no longer prepared to forecast when Russian forces might seize Donetsk, including the Fortress Belt, since the slowing rate of Russian advances and the challenging nature of the Ukrainian-held terrain in Donetsk makes it unclear that Russia is capable of seizing the territory at all.[vi] ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have only advanced 349.89 square kilometers in Donetsk Oblast since the start of 2026, an advance rate of 2.63 square kilometers per day. Strong Ukrainian fortifications, the area’s challenging human and physical geography, and Ukrainian counterattacks and mid-range strike campaign that are already inhibiting Russian offensive operations across the theater make the prospects for a Russian seizure of the rest of Donetsk dim.[vii] Russian forces first infiltrated into Kostyantynivka (the Fortress Belt's southernmost city) in October 2025 and have failed to make any significant tactical gains in the city over the last six months.[viii] Ukrainian counterattacks in southern Ukraine since early 2026 have also forced Russia to choose between defending against Ukrainian counterattacks and allocating manpower and resources to priority sectors of the frontline, including the Fortress Belt.[ix] Ukraine’s recent successes are accomplishing tactical, operational, and strategic battlespace effects that undermine Putin's narrative that the Ukrainian frontlines are on the verge of collapse.[x] Two people involved in back-channel negotiations over ending the war told the FT that Putin’s ambitions are still to control all the Ukrainian territory between Russia and the Dnipro River, and possibly farther into Kyiv City and the port of Odesa, despite Russia's stalling offensive.[xi] Putin’s thinking thus appears to be further and further removed from battlefield realities, likely resulting in the issuance of orders to the Russian military to make gains that it is not capable of making.

US President Donald Trump said that he has not agreed with Putin that Russia should acquire all of Donetsk and Luhansk. Trump confirmed on May 13 that he had no understanding with Putin that Russia should gain control over the entirety of the Donbas in response to a journalist’s inquiry.[xii]

Russian courts are increasingly leveraging corruption charges as a pretext to nationalize Russia’s largest corporations, likely setting conditions for the broader nationalization of private assets to support state revenues. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on May 12 that Russia's Prosecutor General nationalized Rusagro, Russian billionaire Vadim Moshkovich’s most valuable asset and Russia’s largest agricultural holding, on May 5, 2026.[xiii] Russian authorities arrested Moshkovich on fraud charges in March 2025. Russian independent outlet The Bell co-founder Pyotr Mironenko reported on May 12 that Russia's nationalization of Rusagro illustrates the Kremlin's increasingly forceful efforts to nationalize assets of Russia’s richest individuals and corporations.[xiv]  The Russian Deputy Prosecutor General’s Office reported that the court nationalized Rusagro on the basis that Moshkovich continued to manage the company while he was a senator in the Russian Federation Council, despite the fact that he stepped down from executive roles in his companies.[xv] Mironenko noted that the Prosecutor General has begun filing numerous anti-corruption lawsuits that establish grounds to nationalize assets of businesspeople who have held parliamentary seats.[xvi] Mironenko noted that these cases establish precedents to nationalize the assets of five of the 30 richest Russians, who currently hold or previously held government positions or parliamentary seats. Mironenko reported that the court did not release Moshkovich in exchange for Rusagro‘s nationalization, which differs from previous unspecified cases. Putin held a closed meeting on March 26, 2026, where he pressured Russia’s top businessmen to provide contributions to Russia’s federal budget, in what ISW assessed was conditions-setting to nationalize their assets to support the war effort.[xvii] Russian authorities' seizure of Rusargo indicates that the Kremlin is expanding the grounds for nationalization, placing the assets of Russia’s wealthiest individuals at risk. The court’s refusal to release Moshkovich indicates that the Kremlin may be resorting to increasingly forceful measures to prevent Russia's elite from forming an organized block that can resist Putin’s war policies.

Russian demands for cash reached an all-time high over Victory Day weekend, demonstrating rising societal fears over internet restrictions and tax policy. Russian outlet RBK reported on May 13, citing its own calculations based on Bank of Russia data, that the amount of cash in circulation in Russia increased by 210.5 billion rubles (roughly $2.84 billion) between April 30 and May 11 - over the Victory Day holiday - the highest increase ever recorded since the Bank of Russia started collecting data in 2011.[xviii] RBK noted that this figure is a fivefold year-over-year increase compared to the 41.2-billion-ruble (roughly $555,000) figure from the same period in 2025 and exceeds the previous record high of 133.5 billion rubles (roughly $1.8 billion) in 2020. Raiffeisenbank-Russia Chief Economist Stanislav Murashov told RBK that the increase in bank withdrawals was a consequence of internet restrictions starting on May 5 in advance of the Victory Day holiday - the first time ISW has observed a Russian business source link the internet shutdowns to increased cash demand. Russian businesses and consumers have been increasingly using cash payments due to recent Russian tax laws intended to replenish the Russian federal budget.[xix]  The increasing demand for cash in Russian society indicates rising societal fears over internet restrictions that prevent bank card transactions amidst increasing state surveillance and fiscal policy that incentivizes Russians to use cash more often to evade rising taxes.[xx] The shift to cash payments could increase the size of Russia's grey economy, however, which could worsen the economic situation further by increasing the costs and goods of services without generating the desired tax revenues.[xxi]

Ukrainian forces continue to increase the range and frequency of their long-range drones strikes against Russian oil infrastructure, exploiting overstretched Russian air defenses. Ukrainian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against targets throughout Russia, ranging up to 1,500 kilometers from the international border, on the night of May 12 to 13.[xxii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 13 that Ukrainian forces struck the Tamanneftgaz oil terminal in Volna, Krasnodar Krai, causing fires at the facility.[xxiii] The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) noted that Ukrainian forces struck the loading pier of the Tamanneftgaz oil terminal and the port of Taman — more than 300 kilometers from the frontline.[xxiv] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data for May 13 shows a heat anomaly near Volna. Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi noted that  Tamanneftgaz is one of the key Russian oil terminals on the Black Sea coast and facilitates Russian maritime oil exports, and the port of Taman additionally supports Russian liquified natural gas (LNG), coal, and sulfur exports.[xxv] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the AVT primary oil processing facility at Yaroslavl Oil Refinery in Yaroslavl City (roughly 750 kilometers from the international border) and infrastructure at the Astrakhansky gas processing plant in Astrakhan Oblast (roughly 645 kilometers from the international border), causing fires at both facilities.[xxvi] Yaroslavl Oblast Governor Mikhail Evraev acknowledged that drone debris struck an industrial facility in Yaroslavl City.[xxvii] Astrakhan Oblast Governor Igor Babushkin acknowledged that drone debris struck the Astrakhan gas processing plant and caused a fire.[xxviii] Presidential Commissioner for Sanctions Policy of Ukraine Vladyslav Vlasyuk reported, and geolocated footage confirms, that Ukrainian forces also struck the Nurlino Linear Dispatch and Pumping Station in Ufa, Bashkortostan Republic, 1,500 kilometers from the international border.[xxix] Vlasyuk stated that the station turns over 30 million tons of oil annually and pumps oil from Siberia, Orenburg Oblast, and Kazakhstan. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed on May 12 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian gas infrastructure facility in Orenburg Oblast on the night of May 11 to 12, over 1,500 kilometers from the international border.[xxx]

Continued long-range Ukrainian strikes deep into the Russian rear continue to demonstrate Russia's inability to reliably defend its critical infrastructure. Ukrainian forces have been steadily increasing the range, volume, and intensity of their long-range strike campaigns against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets in Russia and occupied Ukraine’s territories since mid-March 2026. ISW has observed evidence that Ukrainian forces have conducted at least 27 long-range strikes against Russia since May 1. Ukrainian forces have heavily targeted port and oil infrastructure across a massive surface area extending across Moscow and Chelyabinsk cities (approximately 455 and 1,600 kilometers from the international border, respectively); Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast (approximately 1,600 kilometers from the international border); Primorsk and Ust-Luga, Leningrad Oblast (approximately 930 and 860 kilometers from the international border, respectively); and Tuapse and Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai (approximately 235 and 110 kilometers from the international border, respectively).[xxxi] Ukrainian forces will likely continue to intensify and scale their long-range strike campaign.

Russian forces conducted large-scale drone strikes overnight on May 12 and throughout the day on May 13, killing at least six people. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on the morning of May 13 that Russian forces launched 139 drones against Ukraine from 1800 local time on May 12 to 0800 on May 13 and another 753 drones from 0800 to 1830 local time on May 13.[xxxii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed 821 drones, that 56 drones struck at least 13 locations, and that debris fell on 26 locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian drones flew into Ukraine from Belarus and Moldova. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov noted that Russian forces flew Shahed drones five to 10 kilometers along the Belarus-Ukraine border, but that the drones did not enter Belarusian airspace.[xxxiii] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces launched the strike series in waves, killing at least six civilians, particularly targeting western Ukrainian oblasts, including Transcarpathia, Lviv, Volyn, Ivano-Frankivsk, Rivne, Vinnytsia, Chernivtsi, Khmelnytskyi, and Zhytomyr oblasts.[xxxiv] Zelensky stated that Russian strikes killed at least six people and injured dozens. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, energy, and civilian infrastructure in Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Kherson, Odesa, Vinnytsia, Volyn, and Rivne oblasts.[xxxv] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Russian forces had only launched drones against Ukraine as of 1846 local time on May 13, but that Russian forces likely plan to use missiles later into the evening of May 13 after having already exhausted Ukrainian air defenses.[xxxvi] The Ukrainian Air Force announced missile threats to all of Ukraine as of 1900 local time.[xxxvii] Russia's new strike tactic of launching drones over an extended period of time allows Russia to threaten more areas of Ukraine for longer periods of time and disproportionately affect civilian areas.[xxxviii] Russia likely exploited the May 9 to 11 Victory Day ceasefire to set conditions and prepare to be able to launch a massive strike series of this size.

The Russian State Duma passed a bill granting the Russian president powers for extraterritorial military operations to protect Russian citizens abroad, previously introduced on March 10. The Russian State Duma unanimously adopted on May 13 a bill that allows the Russian president to use Russian military forces to protect Russian citizens abroad in the event of their arrest, detention, criminal prosecution, or other legal proceedings in foreign courts.[xxxix] The Russian government submitted the initial bill to the Russian State Duma on March 10.[xl] This legislation sets informational and legal conditions for Russia to justify future military activity abroad under the pretext of protecting Russian citizens once Putin personally signs the bill. The Kremlin has repeatedly claimed that foreign states allegedly oppress Russian speakers and ethnic Russians, including in Moldova, the Baltic States, and Ukraine, to justify Russia’s military interventions, and has made similar claims about the Baltic states persecuting Russian speakers and ethnic Russians.[xli]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is doubling down on its demand that Ukraine withdraw from all of Donbas as a precondition for the resumption of negotiations.
• Russia’s exaggerated territorial ambitions and aggressive territorial demands run completely counter to battlefield reality.
• US President Donald Trump said that he has not agreed with Putin that Russia should acquire all of Donetsk and Luhansk.
• Russian courts are increasingly leveraging corruption charges as a pretext to nationalize Russia’s largest corporations, likely setting conditions for the broader nationalization of private assets to support state revenues.
• Russian demands for cash reached an all-time high over Victory Day weekend, demonstrating rising societal fears over internet restrictions and tax policy.
• Ukrainian forces continue to increase the range and frequency of their long-range drones strikes against Russian oil infrastructure, exploiting overstretched Russian air defenses.
• Russian forces conducted large-scale drone strikes overnight on May 12 and throughout the day on May 13, killing at least six people.
• The Russian State Duma passed a bill granting the Russian president powers for extraterritorial military operations to protect Russian citizens abroad, previously introduced on March 10.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk, Oleksandrivka, and Hulyaipole directions and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text for additional strikes in Russia.

May 7 Ukrainian strikes against the Perm Oil Refinery in Perm Krai reportedly halted production at the facility. Reuters reported on May 13, citing two industry sources, that the May 7 Ukrainian strikes against the Lukoil Perm Oil Refinery in Perm Krai forced the facility to completely halt production.[xlii] The sources stated that repairs could take weeks.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults and infiltration attempts in northern Sumy Oblast on May 13 but did not advance.[xliii]

Russian forces have reportedly reduced their use of Lancet loitering munitions in favor of first-person view (FPV) drones in strikes against Ukrainian artillery. A Ukrainian artillery battalion commander reported on May 13 that Ukrainian forces have not observed Russian forces using Lancet loitering munitions in strikes against Ukrainian artillery in northern Sumy Oblast and that Russian forces are primarily using FPV and fiber-optic drones for such missions.[xliv]

Ukrainian forces continued their short-range strike campaign against the Russian near rear in northern Sumy and Kursk oblasts overnight on May 12 to 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 13 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian troop concentrations near Tetkino, Kursk Oblast (southeast of Glushkovo on the international border) and near Varachyne (on the frontline north of Sumy City).[xlv]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on May 13 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[xlvi]

Ukrainian forces continued their short-range strike campaign against the Russian near rear in northern Kharkiv Oblast overnight on May 12 to 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 13 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian troop concentration near Naumovka, Belgorod Oblast (roughly two kilometers from the international border north of Kharkiv City).[xlvii]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks southeast of Velykyi Burluk toward Kolodyazne on May 13 but did not advance.[xlviii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that under 100 Russian servicemembers of the 122nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are holding 30 positions on the right (east) bank of the Oskil River.[xlix] The source claimed that Russian forces are attacking under constant pressure from Ukrainian drones in the Kupyansk Vuzlovyi-Oskil River-Novoosynove triangle (all east to southeast of Kupyansk).[l]

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on May 13 but did not advance.[li]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in the Slovyansk direction as Russian forces conducted an infiltration mission. Geolocated footage published on May 12 shows Russian forces, reportedly of the 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) shelling a Ukrainian position in southern Nykyforivka (southeast of Slovyansk), indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions or recently advanced in that area.[lii] Geolocated footage published on May 13 shows a Russian servicemember, reportedly of the V Company of the 88th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA), assaulting a Ukrainian position east of Rai-Oleksandrivka (east of Slovyansk) after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[liii]

Russian forces continued to employ drone strikes against Ukrainian logistics. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on May 13 that Russian forces are using Molniya fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) and sleeper drones to interdict Ukrainian logistics in the Lyman direction.[liv]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Geolocated footage published on May 12 shows Russian forces conducting an airstrike on a Ukrainian position in the southern outskirts of Kostyantynivka, indicating that there are likely no Russian positions in the area.[lv]

Russian forces likely infiltrated the southern outskirts of Kostyantynivka rather than establishing contiguous positions. Geolocated footage posted on May 12 shows Russian forces conducting an airstrike on a Ukrainian position in the southern outskirts of Kostyantynivka.[lvi] Russian forces likely would not conduct an area-of-effect airstrike against these positions if Russian personnel were operating nearby, suggesting that Russian forces likely infiltrated around the Ukrainian positions rather than fully seizing the surrounding area as previously assessed.

Russian forces continued to conduct infiltration missions in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Geolocated footage posted on May 9 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in southern Stepanivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka) in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[lvii]

Ukrainian forces continued their short-range strike campaign against the Russian near rear in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area overnight on May 12 to 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 13 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command and observation post near occupied Soledar (roughly five kilometers from the frontline northeast of Kostyantynivka).[lviii]

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations east and southeast of Dobropillya on May 13 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[lix]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on May 13, supported by the deployment of new Russian Gerbera and Molniya drone modifications, as Ukrainian forces reportedly counterattacked in the area.[lx] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on May 13 that Russian forces continue unsuccessful attempts to infiltrate in small groups at night, supported by Russian drone operators who have started to use new Gerbera and Molniya drone modifications.[lxi]

Ukrainian forces continued their short-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in the near rear of the Pokrovsk direction overnight on May 12 to 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 13 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point and troop concentration near occupied Myrne (roughly 11 kilometers from the frontline northeast of Pokrovsk) and a troop concentration near Rivne (on the frontline northeast of Pokrovsk).[lxii]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Novopavlivka direction on May 13 but did not advance.[lxiii]

Order of Battle: Knyaz Veshchy Oleg fixed-wing reconnaissance drone operators of the Russian 8th Separate Unmanned Systems Battalion (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Dnipropetrovsk direction, the first evidence ISW has observed of the existence of this unit.[lxiv]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction, likely facilitated by the recent Ukrainian battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against the Russian near rear near Velyka Novosilka (southeast of Oleksandrivka and roughly 23 kilometers from the frontline). Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are advancing toward Piddubne and Komar (both northeast of Oleksandrivka) and near Oleksandrohrad (east of Oleksandrivka), indicating that Ukrainian forces likely recently advanced south of Andriivka-Klevtsove (northeast of Oleksandrivka), into western Voskresenka (southeast of Oleksandrivka), and into Oleksandrohrad, and that Russian forces likely infiltrated Piddubne rather than seizing the settlement as previously assessed.[lxv] The Ukrainian BAI campaign against Russian logistics hubs, command posts, and ammunition dumps in the Russian near rear near Velyka Novosilka (southeast of Oleksandrivka and roughly 23 kilometers from the frontline) likely enabled these advances by disrupting Russian logistics,  command and control, and troop concentrations in the area.[lxvi]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast overnight on May 12 to 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 13 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian command and observation posts near occupied Staromlynivka (roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline) and occupied Komyshuvakha (roughly 38 kilometers from the frontline).[lxvii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction. Geolocated footage published on May 12 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Pryluky and north of Olenokostyantynivka (both northwest of Hulyaipole).[lxviii] ISW now assesses that Ukrainian positions previously observed near the T-04-01 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highway on April 28 and April 29 are a part of a sustained series of counterattacks in the fortification belt along the Haichur River.[lxix]

Russian forces recently infiltrated in the Hulyaipole direction. Geolocated footage published on May 12 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions west of Pryluky in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[lxx]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on May 13 but did not advance.[lxxi]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 13 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration in occupied Kinski Rozdory (roughly 24 kilometers from the frontline).[lxxii]

Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks east of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Bridge on May 13 but did not advance.[lxxiii]

Ukrainian forces continue their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on May 13 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration in occupied Oleshky (east of Kherson City on the left (eastern) bank of the Dnipro River).[lxxiv]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko stated on May 13 that Belarus will continue preparing its armed forces for possible war and will conduct targeted mobilization of individual units to prepare them for war and maintain combat readiness.[lxxv]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are prov