Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 9, 2026

Assessment as of: 9:20 PM ET

Data cutoff: 1:00pm ET on March 9

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Ukrainian forces are successfully counterattacking not only in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions but also in western Zaporizhia Oblast. These counterattacks are generating tactical, operational and strategic effects that may disrupt Russia’s Spring-Summer 2026 offensive campaign plan. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on March 9 that the Russian Dnepr Grouping of Forces (GoF), which includes the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and operates in western Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts, has “virtually halted” advances near Orikhiv and in the area just south of Zaporizhzhia City, west of Orikhiv.[i] Mashovets reported that Ukrainian counterattacks in the Richne-Prymorske direction (both south of Zaporizhzhia City) forced Russian small groups to retreat from northern and central Prymorske. Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces out of Novoyakolivka and northern Lukyanivkse (both southeast of Zaporizhzhia City) and noted that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces south of Pavlivka (just south of Novoyakolivka). Mashovets reported that Russian forces are unsuccessfully attempting to advance near Orikhiv itself, attacking southeast of Orikhiv near Bilohirya and Mala Tokmachka, south of Orikhiv near Robotyne and Danylivka, and west and northwest of Orikhiv toward Mali Shcherbaky in the direction of Novopavlivka without success. Mashovets noted that the counterattacks are forcing elements of the 58th CAA and attached airborne (VDV) elements to repel Ukrainian counterattacks instead of furthering their advances.

ISW observed in February 2026 that Ukrainian forces began limited counterattacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast that have continued into early March, which may have mutually reinforced Ukrainian efforts to counterattack against the Russian 5th CAA (Eastern Military District [EMD]) in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast and Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[ii] Mashovets reported on February 11 that Ukrainian forces began to counterattack near Lukyanivske after Russian forces had advanced 1.5 kilometers near Lukyanivkse and Prymorske.[iii] Ukrainian forces began to counterattack in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast and southern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and retake lost territory in late January — just before Ukrainian forces increased offensive activity in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[iv] Ukrainian forces reportedly continued to pressure Russian forces in the area south of Zaporizhzhia City, and reports from Russian and Ukrainian sources indicated that Ukrainian forces increased ground and drone activity in the area in mid- to late- February.[v] Mashovets reported on March 9 that the Russian command has maintained the same number of troops and composition of forces in the area, even after the Ukrainian counterattacks.[vi]  Ukrainian forces‘ dual tactical efforts to halt and push back Russian gains are synergizing with each other and forcing Russian troops in Zaporizhia Oblast to contend with counterattacks in both the 58th CAA’s and the 5th CAA’s areas of responsibility (AoR) simultaneously.

The Russian command likely hoped that Russian advances in the Hulyaipole direction would complement Russian advances near Orikhiv, which would in turn enable Russian forces to advance toward Orikhiv from the east and west and later enable advances toward Zaporizhzhia City itself.[vii] ISW assessed in early December 2025 that the 5th CAA’s tactical breakthrough north and northeast of Hulyaipole could enable Russian forces to achieve operational successes in both the Hulyaipole and Orikhiv directions.[viii] The Russian military command indicated on December 29 that it intended to join the Orikhiv and Hulyaipole directions in order to advance on Zaporizhzhia City.[ix] The commander of a Ukrainian regiment involved in the counterattacks in the Hulyaipole direction stated on March 8 that the Russian military command’s plans to seize Hulyaipole are “part of a broader plan” to advance westward in Zaporizhia Oblast.[x] Russian forces began making relatively fast gains in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions in late October and early November 2025.[xi] The Russian military command likely hoped to exploit those advances to enable a Russian assault of Orikhiv from the east and west, which would allow Russian forces to outflank Ukraine’s well-fortified defensive lines in Zaporizhia Oblast that run east to west rather than trying to advance using frontal assaults from the south. Ukraine’s counterattacks in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions in late January greatly complicated Russian plans to advance rapidly to Orikhiv and then Zaporizhzhia City from the east.[xii]  

Russian forces are thus facing a far more difficult battlefield situation in southern Ukraine in early March than they did at the start of 2026.[xiii] Ukrainian forces have tied up Russian forces in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions and Russian forces have had to rapidly adapt to communication and command and control (C2) problems resulting from the February 1 Starlink block.[xiv] Ukraine’s counterattacks have prevented Russian forces from fortifying the positions that they advanced to in the fall of 2025. Ukrainian force’s success resulted in part from the fact that Russian forces did not follow up advances made through Russian infiltration tactics by consolidating their newly-held positions.[xv] Infiltration tactics rely on the Russian infantry to infiltrate into Ukrainian rear areas, accumulate, and consolidate in the new frontline positions, but Russian forces appear to have tried to continue their advances without adequately consolidating, thereby enabling Ukrainian counterattacks. Ukrainian forces' ability to take advantage of these Russian mistakes has likely deprived Russian forces of the starting offensive positions from which they intend to launch a summer offensive with the unrealistic goal of reaching Zaporizhzhia city.

The counterattacks in southern Ukraine are also having strategic effects in other parts of the theater. Mashovets assessed on March 9 that the Dnepr GoF may have to pull elements from Kherson Oblast to help Russian forces in western Zaporizhia Oblast contend with the Ukrainian counterattacks.[xvi] Mashovets noted that it will likely be difficult to pull forces away from the Kherson direction as the Russian command has previously redeployed Dnepr GoF VDV and assault elements to other areas of the theater, including to the Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka directions in Donetsk Oblast. The Russian military command recently redeployed elements to the neighboring Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions and would likely struggle to further reinforce Russian elements in the western Zaporizhia direction without denuding Kherson.[xvii] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 9 that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) from Sumy Oblast to Kherson Oblast, which the milblogger claimed then caused a ”critical situation” in the regiment’s previous area of responsibility near Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City), forcing the Russian military command to redeploy most of the regiment back to Sumy Oblast.[xviii] ISW cannot independently verify the report at this time. The Russian command risks vulnerabilities in other areas of the theater should it redeploy forces to the southern part of the theater, moreover, since Russian forces in all directions are struggling to advance and, in Kupyansk in particular, even to hold their ground.

The cascading effects that the Ukrainian counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka, Hulyaipole, and Zaporizhia directions have generated in other sectors of the front show how constrained the Russian force structure in Ukraine really is. ISW has previously observed reports that Russian forces have already had to deploy forces from their operational reserve simply to support ongoing combat operations - likely including in the Kupyansk where Ukraine has conducted a series of successful counterattacks.[xix] ISW also assessed on March 7 that the Russian command likely laterally redeployed elite VDV and naval infantry units from Donetsk Oblast to the southern frontline, likely in order to respond to recent Ukrainian gains in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions.[xx] Russia’s constrained personnel reserves may inhibit Russia’s plans in other areas of the theater, as the Russian command’s decision to redeploy forces from Donetsk Oblast to Zaporizhia Oblast may hinder its anticipated Spring-Summer 2026 offensive against Ukraine’s Fortress Belt.[xxi] The fact that a series of Ukrainian tactical counterattacks are forcing Russia to make operational and strategic level decisions indicates that Russian forces are stretched very thinly even in the run-up to a planned major offensive. The Kremlin will likely need either to abandon or to substantially adjust previous plans for its Spring-Summer 2026 offensive — either in Donetsk Oblast or in Zaporizhia Oblast or both. Russian forces are thus struggling to sustain offensive operations when faced with tactical setbacks — a phenomenon that similarly occurred in November 2025 when Ukrainian attacks in the Dobropillya tactical area strained elements of the 51st CAA (formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) operating in the Pokrovsk and Dobropillya directions.[xxii] The Russian military simply does not have the capacity to overrun Ukrainian defenses that Russian President Vladmir Putin constantly claims.[xxiii]

Ukrainian interceptor drones and personnel with experience downing Shahed drones are helping protect US military infrastructure in the Middle East. The New York Times reported on March 9 that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said that Ukraine recently sent interceptor drones and a team of drone experts to protect US military bases in Jordan.[xxiv] Zelensky stated that another team of Ukrainian experts will go to the Middle East to help unspecified states evaluate their protective measures against Iranian drones. Zelensky reported that Ukraine has received calls from leaders of Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia seeking Ukrainian help to defend against Iranian strikes. Zelensky separately added on March 9 that Ukraine has received 11 requests so far from Middle Eastern and European states and the United States for Ukrainian support.[xxv] The ongoing Iranian strikes against Middle Eastern states present an opportunity for Ukraine's Middle Eastern partners to invest in the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) to enable Ukraine to scale up its interceptor drone and other defense capacity for both Ukraine and its partners.

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to support the Iranian regime while predictably taking advantage of the conflict in the Middle East to engage in energy blackmail. Putin sent a congratulatory note to new Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamanei on March 9.[xxvi] Putin reaffirmed Russia's "unwavering" support for and solidarity with Iran and expressed confidence in Khamanei's ability to "unite the Iranian people in the face of severe trials." Putin held a meeting on March 9 with members of the Russian government and directors of Russian oil and gas companies to discuss rising energy prices due to the ongoing conflict in the Middle East.[xxvii] Putin stated that the current high prices are only temporary so Russia should take advantage of the situation now. Putin called on the Kremlin to use additional export revenues to reduce Russia's debt, including to domestic banks. Putin claimed that Russian energy companies have always been stable and stated that Russia will continue to supply oil and gas to its "reliable partners" in the Asia-Pacific region and in Eastern European countries such as  Slovakia and Hungary. Putin called for Russia to divert exports from other European Union (EU) states in order to gain a foothold in other markets. Putin stated that Russia would resume exports to EU states should they “reorient” and pursue cooperation with Russia.

Ukrainian forces have been intensifying their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea over the past month. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a radar station of a Russian S-300 air defense system near occupied Spokynye (roughly 200 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of March 8 to 9.[xxviii] The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported on March 9 that Ukrainian SSO drone strikes destroyed a Russian Oborona-14 radar, Nebo-U radar, and two radars in a radio transparent dome in occupied Yevpatoria (roughly 170 kilometers from the frontline).[xxix] Geolocated footage confirms the SSO strikes against Yevpatoria.[xxx] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone depot in occupied Kherson Oblast on March 7.[xxxi] Geolocated footage confirmed that Ukrainian forces struck a building in Novooleksiivka (roughly 175 kilometers from the frontline just north of the Crimean border).[xxxii] Ukrainian forces have been increasingly striking Russian military infrastructure in occupied Crimea in the past weeks, with Ukrainian officials reporting strikes at least 14 times since February 11.[xxxiii] Ukrainian forces have largely targeted Russian air defense systems, radar systems, drone infrastructure, and ammunition facilities. Ukrainian strikes have likely degraded Russian air defense in the area, allowing subsequent strikes to reach their intended targets.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 9 that the United States asked to postpone the US-Ukrainian-Russian negotiations originally planned for this week due to the ongoing conflict in the Middle East.[xxxiv]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces are successfully counterattacking not only in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions but also in western Zaporizhia Oblast. These counterattacks are generating tactical, operational and strategic effects that may disrupt Russia’s Spring-Summer 2026 offensive campaign plan.
• The Russian command likely hoped that Russian advances in the Hulyaipole direction would complement Russian advances near Orikhiv, which would in turn enable Russian forces to advance toward Orikhiv from the east and west and later enable advances toward Zaporizhzhia City itself.
• Russian forces are thus facing a far more difficult battlefield situation in southern Ukraine in early March than they did at the start of 2026.
• The counterattacks in southern Ukraine are also having strategic effects in other parts of the theater.
• The cascading effects that the Ukrainian counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka, Hulyaipole, and Zaporizhia directions have generated in other sectors of the front show how constrained the Russian force structure in Ukraine really is.
• Ukrainian interceptor drones and personnel with experience downing Shahed drones are helping protect US military infrastructure in the Middle East.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to support the Iranian regime while predictably taking advantage of the conflict in the Middle East to engage in energy blackmail.
• Ukrainian forces have been intensifying their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea over the past month.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, near Hulyaipole, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a chemical plant in Russia. Russian forces launched two missiles and 197 drones against Kharkiv, Kherson, Poltava, Odesa, and Zaporizhia oblasts.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a chemical plant in Russia. Russian opposition source Astra reported on March 9 that Ukrainian forces struck the Acron chemical plant in Veliky Novgorod, Novgorod Oblast.[xxxv] Astra geolocated photos from local residents showing a fire near the plant. Astra noted that the Acron plant makes fertilizers and industrial products, including ammonium nitrate. Novgorod Oblast Governor Aleksander Dronov claimed that Russian forces repelled eight drones on the night of March 8 to 9.[xxxvi]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on March 9 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Sumy City toward Bachivsk, Sukhodil, Kucherivka, Volfyne, and Pavlivka and north of Sumy City toward Nova Sich on March 9.[xxxvii]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on March 9 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, Starytsya, and Lyman and toward Zybyne and north of Kharkiv City toward Vesele on March 8 and 9.[xxxviii]

 A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian offensive in the Kharkiv direction has devolved into a ”daily slaughter” near Vovchansk and south of the settlement with Russian forces advancing only 100 to 300 meters a day.[xxxix]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 11th Tank Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian strongholds in the Kharkiv direction.[xl]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Chuhunivka on March 9 but did not advance.[xli]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 8 shows Russian forces shelling a Ukrainian position in western Podoly (east of Kupyansk), indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[xlii]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Kupyansk toward Kurylivka and south of Kupyansk near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi on March 8 and 9.[xliii] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked within Kupyansk itself.[xliv]

Russian milbloggers continue to complain about Kremlin lies about the Kupyansk direction. A Russian milblogger claimed that Kupyansk remains a "sore subject” but that Russian authorities have decided to portray the situation as “neutral.”[xlv]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration near Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk) on March 8 or the night of March 8 to 9.[xlvi]

Order of Battle: Knyaz Vandal Novgorodsky (KVN) fiber optic first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 7th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 47th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are striking Ukrainian howitzers south of Kurylivka.[xlvii] FPV drone operators of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian howitzers in the Kupyansk direction.[xlviii] Elements of the 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st GTA) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[xlix]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 9 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked south of Borova near Oleksandrivka and  Korovii Yar on March 8 and 9.[l]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 1432nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (1st GTA) are striking Ukrainian unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) near Bohuslavka (north of Borova).[li]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on March 9 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Yarova and Drobysheve and toward Sosnove and Svyatohirsk; north of Lyman near Stavky; east of Slovyansk near Platonivka, Riznykivka, and Zakitne; and southeast of Slovyansk near Nykyforivka on March 8 and 9.[lii]

Russian forces in the Slovyansk direction continue to rely on their manpower advantages and infiltration tactics to attack. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on March 9 that Russian forces have been deploying large numbers of minimally trained and unarmed soldiers to overwhelm Ukrainian forces with Russian forces’ manpower advantage over Ukrainian forces at 10 to one.[liii] The spokesperson added that Russian forces infiltrate in groups of two to three and then accumulate in groups of 10 to 20 before conducting further assaults. The spokesperson noted that some of the Russian Molniya drones are defective but that Russia can produce them cheaply and in high quantities so Russian forces are using them en masse.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 8 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian-held dugout in southeastern Kostyantynivka, indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[liv]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on March 9 that Russian forces seized Holubivka (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[lv]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on March 8 shows artillery and drone elements of the Russian 4th Assault Battalion of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) striking a Ukrainian position northeast of Berestok (south of Kostyantynivka) – an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[lvi]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar, Markove, and Minkivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Shcherbynivka, Ivanopillya, Kleban-Byk, and Illinivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Novopavlivka and Sofiivka on March 8 and 9.[lvii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pavlivka and Novopavlivka (both southwest of Druzhkivka).[lviii]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 9 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration near Poltavka (south of Druzhkivka in the Russian near rear) on March 8 or the night of March 8 to 9.[lix]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 1307th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd Army Corps [AC], under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are striking Ukrainian forces in Kostyantynivka.[lx] Drone operators of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are striking Ukrainian artillery in western Dmytrivka (west of Kramatorsk).[lxi] FPV drone operators of the 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Raiske (southwest of Druzhkivka).[lxii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on March 9 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Toretske, Shakhove, Nove Shakhove, VIilne, and Novyi Donbas and toward Kucheriv Yar and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on March 8 and 9.[lxiii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on March 9 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Bilytske (north of Pokrovsk), east of Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk), and southeast of Serhiivka (west of Pokrovsk).[lxiv]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Zatyshok and Sukhetske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Molodetske, and Novopidhorodne; west of Pokrovsk toward Novooleksandrivka and Serhiivka; and northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Shevchenko on March 8 and 9.[lxv] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hryshyne.[lxvi]

The Ukrainian “kill zone” continues to make Russian advances slow and costly in the Pokrovsk direction. The deputy commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on March 9 that Russian forces continue to use small group infiltration tactics with both well-trained and minimally trained infantry to gradually advance within the “kill zone.”[lxvii] The deputy commander stated that Russian forces sometimes take weeks to advance from position to position and have poor logistics supplying the positions. The commander stated that swampy terrain with the warming weather is preventing Russian forces from attacking but that the Russan military command hope that spring foliage will bring more cover for Russian forces. The commander reported that Russian forces are increasing their strikes against Ukrainian areas 10 to 20 kilometers from the frontline.

Russian forces continue to try to find alternatives to Starlink terminals in the Pokrovsk direction. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on March 9 that Russian forces are placing antennas and communication repeaters on the roofs of high-rise buildings in central Myrnohrad to expand the reach of Russian tactical drones and interdict Ukrainian logistics.[lxviii] The brigade reported that it has destroyed 40 such targets in February and 22 between March 1 and 7. Russian forces’ use of the antennas and repeaters may be an attempt to compensate for their loss of Starlink in early February 2026.

Ukrainian forces have reportedly significantly increased their use of FPV drones in the Pokrovsk direction and are interdicting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) further from the front. A Russian milblogger and former Storm-Z instructor claimed on March 9 that Russian servicemembers recently sent him reports that Ukrainian forces are significantly intensifying their use of FPV drones in the Pokrovsk direction.[lxix] The milblogger claimed that Russian electronic warfare (EW) is no longer able to counter the Ukrainian drones as before and that Ukrainian forces are striking Russian GLOCs that were previously ”quiet.” The reports claimed that Russian forces need three to four days to reach their operational bases now and that Russian logistics within the 15-kilometer zone is “practically nonexistent.”

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 9 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian manpower concentration near Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk) on March 8 or the night of March 8 to 9.[lxx]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Shevchenko.[lxxi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka on March 9 but did not advance.[lxxii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Oleksandrivka near Ivanivka and Andriivka-Klevtsove and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Novomykolaivka, Ternove, and Vorone on March 8 and 9 but did not advance.[lxxiii]

Ukrainian forces continue their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Buk-M3 air defense system near Lymanchuk (east of Donestk City roughly 100 kilometers from the front) on March 8 or the night of March 8 to 9.[lxxiv] Geolocated footage published on March 9 shows Ukrainian forces striking an air defense system in occupied Luhansk Oblast just northeast of Lymanchuk.[lxxv] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies temporary deployment point in occupied Donetsk Oblast, and geolocated footage from the Ukrainian General Staff confirms the strike in Zachativka (roughly 100 kilometers from the front).[lxxvi] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Zhitel electronic warfare (EW) system in occupied Luhansk Oblast and a Tor-M1 air defense system, two fuel depots, and a supply depot in occupied Donetsk Oblast on the night of March 7 to 8.[lxxvii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 7 shows elements of the Russian 1466th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) striking a Ukrainian-occupied building in northwestern Hulyaipole, indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[lxxviii]

Russian forces attacked west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne and Hirke and toward Verkhnya Tersa; northwest of Hulyaipole near Svyatopetrivka and toward Vozdvyzhivka and Zirnytsya; north of Hulyaipole near Dobropillya, Nove Zaporizhzhia, and Olenokostyantynivka; northeast of Hulyaipole near Pryvillya and toward Zlahoda; and southwest of Hulyaipole near Myrne and toward Hulyaipilske on March 8 and 9.[lxxix]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Zaporizhia direction, likely referring to the Hulyaipole direction.[lxxx] Drone operators of the 69th Separate Cover Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, likely referring to the Oleksandrivka direction or northern Hulyaipole direction.[lxxxi]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

See topline text for reports of assessed Ukrainian advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 108th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) seized Veselyanka (northwest of Orikhiv).[lxxxii]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske and Stepnohirsk, south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka, and southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka on March 8 and 9.[lxxxiii] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Malokaterynivka (northwest of Orikhiv).[lxxxiv]

Russian forces continue to strike bridges supporting Ukrainian logistics in Orikhiv. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted a FAB-3000 glide bomb strike against a bridge over the Konka River between Orikhiv and Preobrazhenka (just east of Orikhiv).[lxxxv]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian Nemets group of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Orikhiv.[lxxxvi]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian command and observation posts near Zaporizke, Chervonoselivka, and Hoholivka (all southeast of Hulyaipole roughly 34 to 37 kilometers from the frontline) on March 8 or the night of March 8 to 9.[lxxxvii]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks northeast of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Bridge on March 8 and 9 but did not advance.[lxxxviii]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces launched a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 8 to 9. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from occupied Crimea and 197 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones — of which about 120 were Shaheds — from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[lxxxix] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 161 drones, that the two ballistic missiles and 36 drones struck eight locations, and that drone debris fell at one location.  Ukraine’s Southern Air Command reported that the two Iskander-M ballistic missiles struck Odesa Oblast.[xc] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck energy and civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv, Kherson, Poltava, Odesa, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[xci]

A Ukrainian official stated that Russia increased its use of ballistic missiles in strikes on Ukraine during the winter, likely to take advantage of Ukraine’s dwindling supply of Patriot interceptor missiles. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on March 9 that Russian forces used a greater number of ballistic missiles during their large-scale strikes in Winter 2025-2026 and will likely continue to do so through 2026.[xcii] ISW recently observed Russia using a higher quantity of ballistic missiles than usual in its March 6 to 7 strike series, likely taking advantage of the ongoing conflict in the Middle East and the Unites States’ and Gulf states’ intense use of Patriot interceptors in the region.[xciii]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.