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March 08, 2026
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 8, 2026
Data cutoff: 12:00pm ET on March 8
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.
Ukraine will send an unspecified number of Ukrainian military personnel with expertise in downing Shahed drones to the Middle East, underscoring how Ukraine’s experience in defense against Iranian drones can strengthen the air defenses of the United States and its allies in the Middle East. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 8 that an unspecified number of Ukrainian experts and military personnel will depart from Ukraine on March 9 to teach unspecified Middle Eastern states Ukraine’s knowledge on how to destroy drones.[1] Zelensky stated that Ukraine will provide the United States and countries in the Middle East with Ukraine’s expertise and military experience combating Shahed drones, cruise missiles, and other aerial threats and noted that three unspecified gulf states (likely the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, and Kuwait) seek to buy Ukrainian Shahed interceptors.[2] Zelensky has also spoken with several leaders from Middle Eastern states in recent days, including Bahraini King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman al Saud, to discuss insights into countering Iranian threats.[3] Ukraine can offer the United States and US allies in the Middle East unique insights into how to combat Iranian strikes as the Ukrainian military has institutionalized and operationalized the fighting experience that Ukraine has learned throughout the past four years of war.
Several Ukrainian companies have the ability to export battle-tested interceptor drones to the United States and other US allies. Reuters reported on March 7 that Ukrainian manufacturers of low-cost interceptor drones stated that they have the capacity to export large volumes of drones.[4] SkyFall, a major Ukrainian drone and drone interceptor manufacturer, estimated on March 7 that it could produce up to 50,000 interceptor drones per month and could export 5,000 to 10,000 drones while still fulfilling Ukraine’s needs. Ukrainian drone manufacturer TAF Industries Head Oleksandr Yakovenko stated on March 8 that the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait have already requested or expressed interest in importing Ukrainian interceptor drones.[5] Yakovenko noted that it has taken several months to train drone interceptor operators and that training interceptor operators is the main limiting factor for countries looking to use the Ukrainian technology. Ukraine’s institutional knowledge has enabled Ukrainian firms to rapidly develop and refine capabilities specifically tailored to counter Iranian-origin weapons, and continued investment into Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB) is important for not just Ukrainian security but also for the United States and its allies.
Ukrainian officials confirmed the redeployment of naval infantry elements to the Hulyaipole direction as ISW assessed on March 7.[6] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Hulyaipole direction reported on March 7 that elements of the Russian 40th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) are operating in the Hulyaipole direction.[7] Geolocated footage published on March 7 confirmed the report and showed Ukrainian forces striking elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade in Olenokostyantynivka (northwest of Hulyaipole).[8] ISW observed reports on March 7 that the Russian military command redeployed naval infantry elements — including elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade — from the Pokrovsk direction and the Dobropillya tactical area in Donetsk Oblast to the Hulyaipole direction near the junction of Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts.[9] ISW continues to assess that this redeployment is likely in response to recent Ukrainian gains in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions.[10]
The Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade conducted a limited mechanized assault in the Hulyaipole direction on March 8. Geolocated footage published on March 8 shows Ukrainian forces repelling a reduced platoon-sized mechanized assault in Hulyaipole.[11] The Ukrainian brigade that repelled the assault reported that elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade conducted the assault with a tank, an armored fighting vehicle, and two all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) east of Hulyaipole along the route of Malynivka-Zalenyi Hai-Hulyaipole.[12] Russian forces have recently prioritized conducting small group infiltrations with dismounted infantry and have infrequently conducted mechanized assaults.[13] ISW last observed small-scale mechanized assaults in southern Pokrovsk and Kupyansk on February 5 and 9, respectively.[14]
Ukrainian forces likely continued their mid-range strike campaign against military assets in occupied Donetsk City on March 8. Geolocated footage and imagery published on March 8 show columns of smoke and debris at the site of several buildings in the northwestern area of occupied Donetsk City near the Tochmash Plant.[15] Open-source intelligence (OSINT) analysts and media sources reported that Ukrainian forces struck an ammunition depot at the plant and amplified local reports that there were massive explosions, including a secondary detonation, in the area.[16] ISW is unable to independently verify the reports of the strike at this time but will continue to monitor for further reporting and battle damage assessments (BDA). The Ukrainian General Staff reported, and geolocated footage confirmed, that Ukrainian forces conducted an Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS)/SCALP-EG missile strike against a Russian Shahed drone launch site near the Donestk City Airport on March 7.[17] The Tochmash Plant is just southwest of the airport.
Key Takeaways:
- Ukraine will send an unspecified number of Ukrainian military personnel with expertise in downing Shahed drones to the Middle East, underscoring how Ukraine’s experience in defense against Iranian drones can strengthen the air defenses of the United States and its allies in the Middle East.
- Ukrainian officials confirmed the redeployment of naval infantry elements to the Hulyaipole direction as ISW assessed on March 7.
- Ukrainian forces likely continued their mid-range strike campaign against military assets in occupied Donetsk City on March 8.
- Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances on March 8.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian forces recently struck Russian military assets near the international border. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point in Dunayka, Belgorod Oblast (west of Belgorod City and roughly six kilometers from the international border) on March 7 or the night of March 7 to 8.[18]
Ukrainian forces struck Russian energy infrastructure in Krasnodar Krai on the night of March 7 to 8. The Krasnodar Krai Operational Headquarters stated on March 7 that a Ukrainian drone strike started a fire at an oil depot in Armavir, Krasnodar Krai.[19] Geolocated footage shows a strike and explosion near the Armavir linear production and control station.[20] National Aeronautics and Space Administration Fire Information for Resource Management System (NASA FIRMS) data shows heat anomalies in the area.[21] Ukrainian source Militarnyi noted that the Transneft facility receives, stores, and ships fuel by rail.[22]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on March 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Sydorivka and Komarivka (both northwest of Sumy City near the international border).[23]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Sumy City near Sopych and southeast of Sumy City near Pokrovka on March 8.[24]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on March 8 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Hrafske, Vilcha, Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, and Starytsya, and toward Zybyne and Verkhnya Pysarivka, and north of Kharkiv City toward Vesele on March 7 and 8.[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Izbytske (northeast of Kharkiv City) and Vovchanski Khutory.[26]
Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on March 8 that Russian attacks in the Kharkiv direction have decreased as Russian forces regroup or renew their forces.[27] Trehubov added that the pause is likely temporary and part of preparation for intensified hostilities. Trehubov stated that Russian forces need the pause to in part restore their communications after losing some satellite communications — referring to the February 1 block of Russian forces' Starlink terminals in Ukraine.[28]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 11th Tank Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[29]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on March 8 but did not advance.
A Russian milblogger claimed on March 8 that Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Chuhunivka.[30]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces do not control the area near Chuhunivka.[31]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 8 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked within Kupyansk itself; east of Kupyansk near Kucherivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Podoly and toward Kivsharivka, Kurylivka, and Novosynove on March 7 and 8.[32]
Russian forces attacked southeast of Borova near Serednie, Novyi Myr, and Oleksandrivka on March 7 and 8 but did not advance.[33]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)


Russian forces recently infiltrated in the Slovyansk direction.

Assessed Russian infiltration: Geolocated footage published on March 7 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position south of Riznykivka (east of Slovyansk) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Riznykivka, whereas ISW assesses that Russian forces only conducted an infiltration mission as described above[35]
Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Yarova and Drobysheve and toward Sosnove and Svyatohirsk; north of Lyman near Stavky; northeast of Slovyansk near Dronivka; east of Slovyansk near Kryva Luka, Platonivka, Kalenyky, Riznykivka, Zakitne, and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Pazeno, Lypivka, and Fedorivka Druha on March 7 and 8.[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Svyatohirsk and Drobysheve.[37]
Geolocated footage published on March 6 shows damage to a Ukrainian Red Cross vehicle in Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk) after a Russian first-person view (FPV) drone strike.[38]
Order of Battle: Air defense elements of the Russian 169th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) and drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[39]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on March 8 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Minkivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Shcherbynivka, Ivanopillya, and Illinivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Novopavlivka and Sofiivka on March 7 and 8.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novopavlivka.[41]
A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area reported on March 8 that Russian forces are establishing Wi-Fi bridges after losing access to their Starlink terminals.[42] The spokesperson stated that the Wi-Fi quality is lower, but is sufficient to operate drones. The spokesperson assessed that Russian forces may also try to use balloons that hover 100 to 200 meters above ground.
Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions and equipment within Dovha Balka (southwest of Kostyantynivka).[43] Drone operators of the 13th Rusichi Assault Detachment of the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], SMD]) are striking Ukrainian equipment on the southern outskirts of Kostyantynivka.[44] Artillery elements of the 17th High Power Artillery Brigade (3rd AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are striking Ukrainian equipment within Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka (southeast of Druzhkivka).[45] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment and Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are striking Ukrainian forces within Kramatorsk.[46] Elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly near Novopavlivka, and FPV drone operators of the division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Serhiivka (northwest of Druzhkivka), Pavlivka, and Toretske (both southwest of Druzhkivka).[47]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on March 8 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Novyi Donbas and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on March 7 and 8.[48]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating near Nove Shakhove (east of Dobropillya).[49] Drone operators and artillery elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Dobropillya direction.[50]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on March 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk) and northeast of Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[51]
Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Zatyshok and Sukhetske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Molodetske, and Novopidhorodne; west of Pokrovsk toward Novooleksandrivka and Serhiivka; and northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Shevchenko on March 7 and 8.[52]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point and command and observation post near Selydove (southeast of Pokrovsk, roughly 16 kilometers from the front) on March 7 or the night of March 7 to 8.[53]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are operating at the mine east of Rodynske.[54]
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka on March 7 and 8 but did not advance.[55]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on March 8 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked southeast of Oleksandrivka near Ternove, Verbove, and Novohryhorivka on March 7 and 8.[56] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Orestopil (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[57]
A Ukrainian drone regiment operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on March 7 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian North Korean-supplied M-1978 Koksan self-propelled gun in [58]the Oleksandrivka direction.[59]
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Donestk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian command and observation posts near Novopetrykivka (southeast of Oleksandrivka, roughly 43 kilometers from the front line) and Volnovakha (southeast of Oleksandrivka, roughly 75 kilometers from the front line) on March 7 or the night of March 7 to 8.[60]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on March 8 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Verkhnya Tersa and Svyatopetrivka and toward Vozdvyzhivka and Rizdvyanka; north of Hulyaipole near Dobropillya, Varvarivka, and Zelene; northeast of Hulyaipole toward Zlahoda; southwest of Hulyaipole near Myrne; and west of Hulyaipole near Hirke and Zaliznychne on March 7 and 8.[61] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Tsvitkove and Staroukrianka (both northwest of Hulyaipole).[62]
The leader of a combat training group for a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Hulyaipole direction reported that some Russian infantry are well-trained and that Russian forces use different tactics depending on the weather conditions and terrain.[63] The training group leader stated that Russian forces try to use the element of surprise to initiate close combat.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Hulyaipole on March 7 or night of March 7 to 8.[64]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Zaporizhia direction, likely referring to the Hulyaipole direction.[65]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Zaporizhia direction on March 8 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk on March 8.[66]
Order of Battle: TOS-2M thermobaric artillery crews of the Russian 40th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Protection Regiment (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Orikhiv.[67] Drone operators of the Nemets group of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Orikhiv.[68] Elements of the 11th Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating in the Orikhiv direction.[69]
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on March 8 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Bridge on March 8.[70]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command and observation post near Nyzhny Rohachyk (possibly referring to the settlement in occupied Kherson Oblast northeast of Kherson City and along the Dnipro River) on March 7 or the night of March 7 to 8.[71]
Ukrainian forces recently continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense system and a BK-16 transport and landing vessel near occupied Novoozerne (roughly 135 kilometers from the frontline)and an Orion drone control point near occupied Krasnosilske (either in eastern Crimea roughly 220 kilometers from the frontline or in western Crimea roughly 123 kilometers from the frontline) on March 7 or the night of March 7 to 8.[72]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces launched a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 7 to 8. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Rostov and Voronezh oblasts and 117 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones — of which about 70 were Shaheds — from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[73] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 98 drones and that the two ballistic missiles and 19 strike drones struck 11 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck energy and civilian infrastructure in Chernihiv and Kharkiv oblasts.[74] Ukraine's State Emergency Service reported that Russian forces overnight conducted a "double tap" strike against firefighters responding to a drone strike against Velyka Babka, Kharkiv Oblast.[75] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces conducted a Lancet loitering munition strike against the passenger train between Sumy and Kyiv cities in Sumy Oblast on the morning of March 8.[76] Ukrzaliznytsia (Ukrainian Railways) Board Chairperson Oleksandr Pertsovsky stated that Russian forces have intensified their strikes against logistics since the start of spring (March 1).[77]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces used almost 1,750 drones, 1,530 guided glide bombs, and 39 missiles against Ukraine in the past week (since February 1).[78] Zelensky reported that Russian forces targeted energy and residential infrastructure and that Ukrainian forces downed most of the air targets.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media, as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://tsn dot ua/exclusive/ukrayina-vidpravliaye-hrupu-viyskovykh-na-blyzkyy-skhid-shcho-vony-tam-robytymut-detali-vid-zelenskoho-3036662.html; https://t.me/TCH_channel/212648; https://suspilne dot media/1258506-zelenskij-zaaviv-so-nastupnogo-tizna-na-blizkij-shid-pribude-persa-grupa-vijskovih-ekspertiv-z-ukraini/
[2] https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/vazhlivo-sho-razom-z-niderlandami-viroblyayemo-zbroyu-i-obov-103301; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18262; https://suspilne dot media/1258506-zelenskij-zaaviv-so-nastupnogo-tizna-na-blizkij-shid-pribude-persa-grupa-vijskovih-ekspertiv-z-ukraini/
[3] https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/prezident-proviv-rozmovu-zi-spadkoyemnim-princom-saudivskoyi-103285; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18158; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18167; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18168; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2029255383785615628; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2029257929988133298; https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2029266899318509610; https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/mi-pracyuyemo-shob-povernuti-vsih-nashih-lyudej-dodomu-z-ros-103233; https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/prezident-obgovoriv-iz-korolem-bahrejnu-protidiyu-iranskim-r-103225; https://www.president dot gov.ua/news/volodimir-zelenskij-obgovoriv-zi-spadkoyemnim-princom-derzha-103229
[4] https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/ukraines-interceptor-drone-makers-look-exports-gulf-iran-war-flares-2026-03-07/
[5] https://www.ft.com/content/bbd79c63-8131-4b20-9d2d-708bc8acea38
[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-7-2026/
[7] https://t.me/OSHP_225/5308
[8] https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/2030337396433134020?s=20; https://t.me/OSHP_225/5308
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-7-2026/
[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-7-2026/
[11] https://t.me/MaxximOSINT/275; https://x.com/MaxximOSINT/status/2030582683345047562; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2030341196435107898; https://t.me/romedronen/532; https://t.me/OSHP_225/5309
[12] https://t.me/OSHP_225/5309
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-7-2026/
[14] https://x.com/NOELreports/status/2019007278850920702; https://t.me/army_corp_10/1510
[15] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2030600567849197912; https://t.me/supernova_plus/49291; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/12631?single; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/34118; https://x.com/blinzka/status/2030594320093360364; https://t.me/supernova_plus/49285
[16] https://t.me/astrapress/106591; https://x.com/NOELreports/status/2030601147015213262?s=20; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/12631; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/34118; https://t.me/astrapress/106591; https://t.me/supernova_plus/49285; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/17193
[17] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-7-2026/; https://x.com/NOELreports/status/2030601147015213262; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/12631?single
[18] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35847
[19] https://t.me/opershtab23/15299; https://t.me/opershtab23/15300
[20] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/12627; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/17216
[21] https://firms.modaps.eosdis.nasa.gov/map/#d:24hrs;@41.050,45.006,15.667z
[22] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/drony-urazyly-vuzlovu-naftostantsiyu-armavyr-u-krasnodarskomu-krayi/
[23] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/110664
[24] https://t.me/wargonzo/32778 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/7060 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/110664
[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35848 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35823; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20200 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40599 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40599 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/7060 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/32778
[26] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40599
[27] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1258358-rosiani-vzali-operativnu-pauzu-na-ponovlenna-viktor-tregubov-pro-situaciu-na-vidtinkah-frontu-u-harkivskij-oblasti/
[28] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-1-2026/
[29] https://t.me/dva_majors/89299
[30] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40599
[31] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40599
[32] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/201778; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35848; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35823 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20200 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35821; https://t.me/wargonzo/32778
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35823 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20200 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35821 ; https://t.me/rybar/78323
[34] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11437; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1232245332221152
[35] https://t.me/rybar/78363
[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35848; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35823 ; https://t.me/Joint_Forces_Task_Force/20200; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35821; https://t.me/wargonzo/32778;
[37] https://t.me/rybar/78323
[38] https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2030374736698429644; https://www.facebook.com/100015946423623/videos/pcb.2087567508451443/930790956119675
[39] https://t.me/mod_russia/61801; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/201751
[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35848; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35823 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35821; https://t.me/rybar/78322
[41] https://t.me/motopatriot78/49297
[42] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/08/mova-pro-yakisnyj-zvyazok-ne-jde-vtrata-starlinkiv-zmusyla-voroga-shukaty-alternatyvu/
[43] https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/31437 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2030314079852642598; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2030314079852642598?s=20
[44] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2030312647355207824?s=20; https://t.me/rusich13sho/1466
[45] https://t.me/Osintpen/2635; https://t.me/verumreactor/33895
[46] https://t.me/belarusian_silovik/70503 ; https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/49761 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/201825
[47] https://t.me/motopatriot78/49297; https://t.me/nm_dnr/15112 ;
[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35848; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35823; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35821; https://t.me/motopatriot78/49289
[49] https://t.me/motopatriot78/49289
[50] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/110661
[51] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/201778
[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35848; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35823; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35821; https://t.me/wargonzo/32778; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40597; https://t.me/motopatriot78/49289
[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35847
[54] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/34113; https://t.me/soniah_hub/14731; https://x.com/MilAviaUA/status/2030577416557474079
[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35823; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35821
[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35848; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35823; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35821
[59] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=804159928758506; https://suspilne dot media/1258204-kilkist-zagiblih-cerez-udar-po-harkovu-zrosla-do-11-v-ukraini-stvorat-cifrovij-reestr-vijskovih-1474-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1772946623&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps
[60] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35847
[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35848; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35823; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35821; https://t.me/wargonzo/32778; https://t.me/rybar/78321
[62] https://t.me/voin_dv/18889
[63] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/03/08/protyvnyk-zombovanyj-praczyuye-propaganda-na-gulyajpilskomu-napryamku-likviduvaly-vmotyvovanyh-rosiyan/
[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35847
[65] https://t.me/voin_dv/18890
[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35848
[67] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/201736
[68] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/201724
[69] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/40591
[70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35848
[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35847
[72] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/35847
[73] https://t.me/kpszsu/57441
[74] https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/27868; https://t.me/synegubov/20428
[75] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/59407
[76] https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1258314-bila-sum-rf-vdarila-po-potagu-z-pasazirami/; https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1258562-ak-na-vulkani-kozen-den-letat-u-sumah-rosijskij-dron-poskodiv-privatnij-budinok/; https://t.me/OleksiiKuleba/8294
[77] https://suspilne dot media/sumy/1258314-bila-sum-rf-vdarila-po-potagu-z-pasazirami/
[78] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/18257