Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 7, 2026

Assessment as of: 7:45 PM ET

Data cutoff: 12:15 PM ET on March 7

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The Russian military command likely has laterally redeployed elite airborne (VDV) and naval infantry units from the Pokrovsk direction and the Dobropillya tactical area in eastern Ukraine to the southern frontline, likely in part in order to respond to recent Ukrainian gains in the Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk direction. An OSINT analyst observed on March 6 that the Russian military command recently redeployed elements of the Russian 68th Army Corps (AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]), including of its 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 1472nd Motorized Rifle Regiment, from near Pokrovsk and Dobropillya in Donetsk Oblast to the Hulyaipole direction, which comprises territory in southern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.[i] Geolocated footage published on March 4 shows a Russian tank from the 68th AC, possibly of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade, shelling Ukrainian positions south of Hirke (west of Hulyaipole).[ii] A Russian milblogger published footage on March 7 reportedly showing drone operators of the 1st Battalion of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade striking Ukrainian forces in the Zaporizhia direction, possibly referring to the Hulyaipole direction.[iii] The Russian military command previously redeployed elements of the 68th AC from the Kurakhove and Vuhledar directions to the Toretsk direction in March 2025 before then redeploying elements of the corps to the Pokrovsk and Dobropillya directions by June 2025.[iv] ISW previously observed reports that drone operators of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade were striking Ukrainian forces in Bilytske (north of Pokrovsk) as of January 17 and that elements of the 1472nd Motorized Rifle Regiment were in the Dobropillya direction as of December 15, 2025, and in northern Kharkiv Oblast as of January 4.[v] The elements of the 68th AC, as EMD elements, will now be operating among the main operational grouping of EMD elements in the Eastern Grouping of Forces' area of responsibility (AoR) as they had been prior to their lateral redeployments to the eastern front in March 2025. The redeployment of 68th AC elements to southern Ukraine is likely a reaction to Ukraine’s ongoing counterattacks in Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts that began in late January and early February 2026.

The OSINT analyst also observed that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) from the Dobropillya tactical area to the Hulyaipole direction as of February 25, and elements of the 55th Naval Infantry Division (Pacific Fleet) (newly formed from the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade) to the Polohy (south of Hulyaipole) area as of February 21.[vi] The Russian military command has previously committed relatively elite naval infantry units to priority directions in response to Ukrainian counterattacks, such as the Kursk direction in August 2024 and Dobropillya tactical area in September 2025.[vii] The redeployment of Pacific Fleet naval infantry elements to southern Ukraine is likely a reaction to Ukraine’s ongoing counterattacks in Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts that began in late January and early February 2026.

The Russian military command likely redeployed elements of the relatively elite 76th Airborne (VDV) Division from the Pokrovsk direction to the Zaporizhia direction in January and February 2026. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on March 7 that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the Russian 76th VDV Division to the Orikhiv direction around January 2026.[viii] Available open-source evidence suggests that the Russian military command redeployed various elements of the 76th VDV Division, including reports that elements of its 104th VDV Regiment likely redeployed to the Zaporizhia direction as of January 21, elements of its 237th VDV Regiment as of January 23, and elements of its 234th VDV Regiment as of February 5.[ix] ISW previously observed reports that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 76th VDV Division, including its 104th, 234th, and 237th VDV regiments, to the Pokrovsk direction in November 2025, likely in response to the slowed rate of Russian advances near Pokrovsk - a priority sector at that time.[x] Russia has used the redeployment of elements of the 76th VDV Division to respond to critical situations on the front in the past, including deployments to Zaporizhia Oblast during the Ukrainian counteroffensive in 2023 and to Kursk Oblast during the Ukrainian incursion in 2024.[xi] The redeployment of the 76th VDV Division elements to southern Ukraine likely was not a reaction to Ukraine’s counterattacks in Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, as the counterattacks occurred later, though these VDV elements are now all the same involved in responding to the Ukrainian counterattacks that began in late January and early February 2026.

The Russian military command’s redeployment of some VDV elements to southern Ukraine in January before Ukrainian forces began counterattacking suggests that Russia may have been planning to continue exploiting tactical successes in the Hulyaipole direction in Spring and Summer 2026. Ukraine’s counterattacks in February 2026 thus may have disrupted Russia’s plans to continue exploiting tactical successes in Zaporizhia Oblast and also may have generated spoiling effects for the anticipated Spring-Summer 2026 offensive against Ukraine’s Fortress Belt. ISW previously observed reports that the Russian military command may have been planning summer operations to seize Orikhiv from the south and east.[xii] The Russian command reportedly redeployed elements of the 76th VDV Division to the south of Orikhiv before the Starlink block occurred on February 1, which enabled the recent Ukrainian counterattacks.[xiii] The Russian command’s redeployment of elements of the 76th VDV Division to Zaporizhia Oblast before the Starlink block and Ukrainian counterattacks suggests that this redeployment was not in response to the counterattacks but rather an indication of Russia’s plans to continue pressing tactical successes near Orikhiv and Hulyaipole. The complications from the Starlink block and Ukrainian counterattacks likely spoiled Russian plans and prompted reactive lateral redeployments of the EMD elements discussed above.

The Russian military command’s redeployment of troops from efforts in Donetsk Oblast to Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts illustrates the competing dilemmas that the Russian military command faces in attempting to conduct simultaneous offensive efforts, further complicated by recent Ukrainian counterattacks.[xiv] The Ukrainian counterattacks in Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts and Russia’s redeployments to southern Ukraine thus could complicate Russian plans for the anticipated a Spring-Summer 2026 offensive against the Fortress Belt.[xv] The Ukrainian corps commanders responsible for the Slovyansk direction and the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area reported on March 6 that the Russian military command aims to seize Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, Druzhkivka, and Kostyantynivka, the series of highly fortified cities that make up Ukraine's Fortress Belt, before the start of Summer 2026.[xvi] Russian forces have not yet made operationally significant gains in either the Slovyansk direction or Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area after months of fighting, and Russian forces’ tempo of advance in these areas has slowed since the start of 2026.[xvii] The Russian military command has previously set ambitious deadlines for the seizure of Ukraine’s Fortress Belt, and Russian forces have repeatedly failed to meet these goals.[xviii] The Russian military command’s need to address competing priorities across the theater also demonstrates that the Russian seizure of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad has failed to allow Russian forces to concentrate troops against the Fortress Belt after achieving better lines, contrary to the Kremlin’s expectations.[xix] Russian forces have previously failed to conduct simultaneous offensives in different sectors of the front, and it is unlikely that they will be able to make significant efforts to advance in the Fortress Belt area while contending with Ukraine’s recent successes in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions.[xx]

Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 6 to 7 that resulted in significant civilian casualties in Kharkiv City. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Zirkon hypersonic cruise missiles from occupied Crimea; 13 Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles from Bryansk, Kursk, and Voronezh oblasts; and 14 Kalibr cruise missiles from the Black Sea.[xxi] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 480 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other strike drones – of which about 290 were Shahed drones – from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda and Hvardiiske, Crimea. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 453 drones, eight Iskander-M/S-400 missiles, and 11 Kalibr missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that nine missiles and 26 drones struck 22 locations; that drone debris fell at five locations; and that Ukrainian authorities were clarifying information about one missile as of 0900 local time.

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, energy, port, and rail infrastructure in Kharkiv, Kyiv, Khmelnytskyi, Chernihiv, Chernivtsi, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Vinnytsia, and Zhytomyr oblasts.[xxii] The Ukrainian Energy Ministry reported that the strikes caused power outages in Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Zaporizhia, Mykolaiv, Khmelnytskyi, Poltava, and Kharkiv oblasts and heating outages in Kyiv City.[xxiii] Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strike against an apartment building in Kharkiv City killed at least 11 civilians and that preliminary information indicates that Russian forces used an Izdeliye-30 missile in the strike.[xxiv] Kyiv City Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko reported that the overnight strikes left 1,905 homes in Kyiv City without heat, and that almost 2,700 homes in the city are without heat.[xxv]

The March 6 to 7 Russian strike series notably contained a higher quantity of ballistic missiles than Russia usually includes in its regular strike packages. Russia is likely trying to exploit Ukraine’s shortage of Patriot interceptors and take advantage of the ongoing conflict in the Middle East. About half of the missiles in the overnight strike package were ballistic missiles.[xxvi] Russia infrequently launches more than 10 ballistic missiles in a single strike package, either launching only a few or none at all on most days. Russia does occasionally launch a higher quantity of ballistic missiles, but it is rare that the ballistic missiles make up such a high proportion of the overall missile count. Ukraine continues to heavily rely on US-produced Patriot air defense systems to intercept Russian ballistic missiles. Russia is likely trying to take advantage of the ongoing public discussions about not only Ukraine's dwindling supply of PAC-3 interceptors for Patriot systems but also the United States' and Gulf states' recent intense use of Patriot interceptors in the Middle East to defend against Iranian and Iranian proxy strikes.[xxvii] Russia is likely trying to further exhaust Ukraine's limited Patriot interceptors and exploit their shortages, hoping that the United States will be unwilling or unable to provide Ukraine with more interceptors as the US-Israeli campaign continues in the Middle East.

Ukrainian forces conducted an Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS)/SCALP-EG missile strike against a Russian Shahed drone launch site near occupied Donetsk City on March 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted an ATACMS and SCALP missile strike against a site near the Donetsk Airport that Russian forces used to store, prepare, and launch Shahed-type drones.[xxviii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strike caused a large fire and secondary explosions, and geolocated footage confirmed the strike.[xxix] Russian authorities began constructing this Shahed launch site no later than August 2025.[xxx]

Swedish authorities seized on March 6 a tanker that may be part of the Russian shadow fleet and has previously shipped stolen grain from occupied Ukraine. Swedish forces boarded the Caffa cargo vessel in Swedish territorial waters in the Baltic Sea.[xxxi] Swedish authorities reported that the vessel was sailing from Casablanca, Morocco, possibly toward St. Petersburg, Russia, and was sailing with an unclear flag status.[xxxii] Swedish Minister for Civil Defense Carl-Oskar Bohlin stated that the vessel switched from flying a Russian flag to a Guinean flag in Summer 2025, and the Swedish Coast Guard reported that it considers the vessel to be stateless.[xxxiii] Swedish Coast Guard Spokesperson Mattias Lindholm noted that Sweden has the authority to intervene when a ship has an “extremely unclear” flag status.[xxxiv] Ukrainian intelligence reported that the vessel had previously shipped stolen Ukrainian grain, including from occupied Sevastopol, Crimea, to Syria in July 2025.[xxxv] Ukraine added the Caffa to its sanctions list in November 2025.[xxxvi] European states have been increasingly seizing Russian shadow fleet tankers illegally shipping Russian oil.[xxxvii] The Swedish seizure of a ship previously involved in transporting Ukrainian grain marks a notable inflection.

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian military command likely has laterally redeployed elite airborne (VDV) and naval infantry units from the Pokrovsk direction and the Dobropillya tactical area in eastern Ukraine to the southern frontline, likely in part in order to respond to recent Ukrainian gains in the Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk direction.
• The Russian military command’s redeployment of some VDV elements to southern Ukraine in January before Ukrainian forces began counterattacking suggests that Russia may have been planning to continue exploiting tactical successes in the Hulyaipole direction in Spring and Summer 2026. Ukraine’s counterattacks in February 2026 thus may have disrupted Russia’s plans to continue exploiting tactical successes in Zaporizhia Oblast and also may have generated spoiling effects for the anticipated Spring-Summer 2026 offensive against Ukraine’s Fortress Belt.
• The Russian military command’s redeployment of troops from efforts in Donetsk Oblast to Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts illustrates the competing dilemmas that the Russian military command faces in attempting to conduct simultaneous offensive efforts, further complicated by recent Ukrainian counterattacks.
• Russian forces conducted a large-scale series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 6 to 7 that resulted in significant civilian casualties in Kharkiv City.
• The March 6 to 7 Russian strike series notably contained a higher quantity of ballistic missiles than Russia usually includes in its regular strike packages. Russia is likely trying to exploit Ukraine’s shortage of Patriot interceptors and take advantage of the ongoing conflict in the Middle East.
• Ukrainian forces conducted an Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS)/SCALP-EG missile strike against a Russian Shahed drone launch site near occupied Donetsk City on March 7.
• Swedish authorities seized on March 6 a tanker that may be part of the Russian shadow fleet and has previously shipped stolen grain from occupied Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian strikes on the night of March 1 and 2 reportedly damaged two Russian frigates in Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on March 7 that Ukrainian strikes against the Novorossiysk naval base on the night of March 1 to 2 damaged the Admiral Essen and Admiral Makarov Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates.[xxxviii] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that the strike may have damaged other Russian vessels as well. Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) sources told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on March 5 that the strikes critically damaged the Admiral Essen and rendered it unable to launch Kalibr cruise missiles.[xxxix]

Ukrainian forces recently continued their frontline strike campaign against military assets in Belgorod Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 6 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point in Murom (roughly 10 kilometers from the international border) and a personnel concentration near Kolotilovka (600 meters from the international border) either on March 5 or the night of March 4 to 5.[xl]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on March 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to central Stepok (east of Sumy City near the international border) and southwest of Popivka (southeast of Sumy City near the international border).[xli]

Russian forces attacked in Sumy Oblast, including northwest of Sumy City near Sopych, north of Sumy City near Andriivka, and southeast of Sumy City near Vysoke, on March 6 and 7.[xlii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Sumy direction.[xliii]

Ukrainian forces recently continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military targets in the Russian near rear. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 6 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian personnel concentration near Sopych (on the international border) on either March 6 or the night of March 6 to 7.[xliv]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on March 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Hrafske, Symynivka, Izbytske, Zybyne, Vovchanski Khutory, and Vilcha and toward Verkhnya Pysarivka on March 6 and 7.[xlv] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vovchanski Khutory, Izbytske, and Symynivka.[xlvi]

A Ukrainian battalion commander operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on March 7 that Ukrainian forces continue to use artillery in the area, although in a somewhat limited capacity compared to drones.[xlvii] The battalion commander noted that Ukrainian forces in his sector use drones five to ten times more regularly than artillery to inflict fire damage.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on March 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Shevyakivka on March 6 and 7.[xlviii]

The Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force reported on March 7 that Russian forces crossed the Russia-Ukraine international border in an attempt to attack toward Shevyakivka on March 6.[xlix] The Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force stated that Russian forces were unsuccessful and withdrew after suffering losses.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have controlled the hospital in central Kupyansk for four months (since roughly early November 2025), but that there have been conflicting reports from the ground about Ukrainian forces holding positions within the facility.[l] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are attacking the hospital. Geolocated footage posted on March 4 shows that the hospital is in ruins, and Russian forces likely do not maintain consolidated positions there.[li]

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk near Kivsharivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Podoly and toward Novoosynove, Kurylivka, and Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi on March 6 and 7.[lii]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian artillery systems at firing positions near Tavilzhanka (northeast of Kupyansk) on March 6 or overnight on March 6-7.[liii]

Order of Battle: Lancet loitering munition operators of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are striking Ukrainian vehicles in Osynove (south of Kupyansk).[liv]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 7 shows two Ukrainian servicemembers striking two Russian servicemembers in central Zahryzove (northeast of Borova), indicating that Russian forces infiltrated into the settlement at a prior date but that Ukrainian forces have subsequently eliminated the infiltrators.[lv]

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Novoplatonivka and southeast of Borova near Tverdokhlibove and Serednie and toward Stepove on March 6 and 7.[lvi]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command and observation point near Kruhlyakivka (northeast of Borova) on March 6 or overnight on March 6-7.[lvii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently infiltrated in the Slovyansk direction.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 6 and 7 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember northeast of Pazeno (southeast of Slovyansk) and a Russian position in central Riznykivka (east of Slovyansk) after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA).[lviii]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Yarova, Derylove, Novoselivka, and Drobysheve; north of Lyman near Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Slovyansk near Kryva Luka, Platonivka, Kalenyky, Riznykivka, and Zakitne and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Pazeno, Lypivka, and Fedorivka Druha on March 6 and 7.[lix]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Dibrova and a manpower concentration near Torske (both east of Lyman) on March 6 or the night of March 6 to 7.[lx] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are infiltrating into southern Fedorivka Druha in small groups and that the settlement is a contested "gray zone."[lxi]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian Starlink terminals near Kalenyky. First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 9th Engineer-Sapper Regiment (reportedly of the 25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Mykolaivka (east of Slovyan[lxii][lxiii] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[lxiv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on March 7 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 6 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember in the northern outskirts of Ivanopillya during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[lxv]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and toward Minkivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Shcherbynivka, and Ivanopillya; south of Kostyantynivka near Berestok and Illinivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Novopavlivka and Sofiivka on March 6 and 7.[lxvi]

Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vadym Filashkin reported on March 7 that Russian forces conducted a KAB-500 glide bomb strike against Kramatorsk, damaging residential and commercial infrastructure and injuring six civilians.[lxvii] Kostyantynivka Military Administration Head Serhiy Horbunov reported on March 7 that Russian forces conducted a FAB-500 guided glide bomb strike against a reservoir dam in Novodmitrivskyi Starostynskyi Okruh, damaging the dam and flooding an unspecified amount of the area.[lxviii] Geolocated footage published on March 6 shows a Russian bomb strike against the dam north of Novodmytrivka (east of Kostyantynivka).[lxix]

Order of Battle: Lancet loitering munition operators of the Reconnaissance and Strike Battalion of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are striking Ukrainian vehicles in the eastern outskirts of Mykhailivka (northwest of Druzhkivka).[lxx] Drone operators of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones near Nova Poltavka and Poltavka (both south of Druzhkivka) and striking Ukrainian positions near Novopavlivka.[lxxi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on March 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Novyi Donbas on March 6 and 7.[lxxii]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles and equipment near Dobropillya.[lxxiii] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are striking Ukrainian vehicles near Vodyanske (south of Dobropillya).[lxxiv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on March 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and Novooleksandrivka; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman and Zatyshok and toward Serhiivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Molodetske, Novopidhorodne, and Kotlyne on March 6 and 7.[lxxv]

A Ukrainian battalion commander operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on March 7 that Russian forces’ increasing use of fixed-wing and fiber-optic drones is complicating Ukrainian logistics.[lxxvi] The battalion commander reported that Russian forces are unable to gain a foothold outside urban areas in the Pokrovsk direction, as a lack of foliage prevents Russian forces from evading Ukrainian drone strikes in open terrain.

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in the Russian near rear. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 7 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian artillery systems near occupied Novopavlivka (roughly seven kilometers from the frontline) either on March 6 or on the night of March 6 to 7.[lxxvii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka on March 6 and 7 but did not advance.[lxxviii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on March 7 but did not advance.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 7 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in southern Ternove (southeast of Oleksandrivka) during what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of battle (FEBA).[lxxix]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Oleksandrivka near Novohryhorivka and toward Novooleksandrivka, Verbove,  Hai, and Ternove on March 6 and 7.[lxxx] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from north of Ivanivka, Havrylivka (both northeast of Oleksandrivka), Oleksandrivka, Dobropasove (just east of Oleksandrivka), and Velykomykhailivka (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[lxxxi]

An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on March 5 that Russian forces have significantly decreased their tempo of attack in the Oleksandrivka direction due to recent Ukrainian counterattacks.[lxxxii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) reportedly continue to operate near Ivanivka.[lxxxiii]

Ukrainian forces recently continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military targets in the Russian near rear. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 7 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian artillery systems and firing positions near Voskresenka (southeast of Oleksandrivka) and a manpower concentration near Novohryhorivka on either March 6 or the night of March 6 to 7.[lxxxiv]

Ukrainian forces recently continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 6 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Tor air defense system near occupied Volnovakha (roughly 76 kilometers behind the frontline) either on March 5 or on the night of March 5 to 6.[lxxxv] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian fuel and lubricants depot near occupied Mariupol (roughly 115 kilometers behind the frontline), and an equipment depot in occupied Pryazovske (roughly 102 kilometers behind the frontline) either on March 4 on the night of March 4 to 5.[lxxxvi]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on March 7 but did not advance.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 6 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember in southern Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[lxxxvii]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Dobropillya, Varvarivka, Zelene, Rizdvyanka, Krynychne, Olenokostyantynivka, Svyatopetrivka, and Verkhnya Tersa and toward Vozdvyzhivka; southwest of Hulyaipole near Myrne; and west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne on March 6 and 7.[lxxxviii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 57th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast.[lxxxix]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline and medium-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in the Russian near rear and in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 7 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian military personnel concentration near Zaliznychne either on March 6 or on the night of March 6 to 7.[xc] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 6 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian military command and observation post near Hulyaipole on either March 4 or on the night of March 4 and 5.[xci] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 6 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian forces’ training ground near occupied Novopetrivka (roughly 100 kilometers from the frontline) either on March 5 or on the night of March 5 to 6.[xcii]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Zaporizhia direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 7 shows Ukrainian forces capturing three Russian prisoners of war (POWs) in eastern Prymorske (northeast of Orikhiv), indicating that Russian forces conducted an infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA) on a prior date and that Ukrainian forces subsequently captured the infiltrators.[xciii]

Russian forces attacked east of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and Plavni on March 6 and 7.[xciv]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn stated on March 5 that Ukrainian intelligence indicates that the Russian military command has tasked Russian forces with advancing as close as possible to Orikhiv from the southwest and southeast.[xcv]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division and of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Zaporizhia direction.[xcvi]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian material and technical warehouses in Berdyansk (roughly 100 kilometers from the frontline) and Shevchenkivske (roughly 60 kilometers from the frontline) and a communications tower in Prymorsk (roughly 90 kilometers from the frontline) on March 4 or the night of March 4 to 5.[xcvii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense system near Yakymivka (roughly 95 kilometers from the frontline) on March 5 or the night of March 5 to 6.[xcviii]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on March 7 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Bridge on March 6 and 7.[xcix]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 331st VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River, and sappers of the regiment are reportedly demining roads in the Kherson direction.[c]

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign near and in occupied Crimea and in the Black Sea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition unloading site in Hvardiiske on March 4 or the night of March 4 to 5.[ci] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian S-300 air defense system launcher near Strilkove, Kherson Oblast; an ammunition warehouse near Novooleksiivka, Kherson Oblast (both just north of occupied Crimea); a concentration of Iskander missile systems of the Russian 12th Separate Missile Brigade (58th CAA, SMD) near Kurortne, Crimea; and an observation post and a Ka-27 naval helicopter on the Svyash drilling rig in the Black Sea on March 5 or the night of March 5 to 6.[cii]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline for reports of Russia’s combined missile and drone strike against Ukraine.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.