Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 6, 2026

Assessment as of: 6:45 PM ET

Data cutoff: 11:15am ET on March 6, except for reports about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s March 6 call with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

Russia is reportedly sharing intelligence with Iran to support Iranian attacks against US forces in the Middle East in contrast to the Kremlin’s recent attempts to frame Russia as a potential US ally and US-Russia relations as increasingly friendly. Three officials told the Washington Post on March 6 that Russia has given Iran the locations of US military assets, including warships and aircraft, since the US-Israeli February 28 strikes against Iran.[i] One of the officials characterized Russia’s provision of targeting information to strike US forces in the Middle East as a “pretty comprehensive effort.” The Washington Post noted that analysts indicated that Russia’s reported intelligence sharing fits the pattern of Iran’s strikes against US command and control infrastructure, radars, and temporary structures. The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) Principal Research Scientist Mike Peterson stated that Russia could be giving Iran high-quality satellite imagery with which Iran could identify what bases the United States and its allies are currently using and other information, such as the location of aircraft, intelligence stations, and logistics flows.[ii] Iran may not have regular access to high-quality satellite imagery, even from commercially available sources, and may be relying on Russia to get such imagery. Prominent commercial publisher of satellite imagery Planet Labs enacted a policy on March 6 subjecting all new imagery collected over the Gulf States and adjacent conflict zones, excluding Iran, to a mandatory 96-hour delay before making it publicly available, and other companies have held policies to never release images of US or allied bases.[iii] Russian intelligence sharing, thus, may be supporting Iranian strikes on US military assets.

ISW has long assessed that the Kremlin has self-defined the United States as one of Russia’s primary geopolitical adversaries and has been conducting several strategic efforts to challenge US interests globally.[iv] ISW has previously observed reports that Russia provided targeting data to the Iranian-backed Houthis in 2024, with which the Houthis used to strike western shipping vessels.[v] Russian intelligence sharing with a state against which the United States is conducting a military campaign belies recent official Russian statements that Russia is interested in warming its relations with the United States.[vi] Russia is likely only maintaining a friendly facade toward the United States as a means of persuading the United States to abandon Ukraine in ongoing peace negotiations and secure an unwarranted reset of US-Russia relations, allowing Russia to more easily accomplish its longstanding goal of destroying the Ukrainian state.  

Russian President Vladimir Putin called on the United States to halt its ongoing military operation in the Middle East while refusing any meaningful ceasefire in Ukraine. Putin spoke with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on the phone on March 6 and stated that Russia is opposed to “force as a method” to address any concerns surrounding Iran or in the Middle East.[vii] Putin also called for “an immediate cessation of hostilities.” Putin himself has continuously refused to allow a ceasefire in Ukraine that would enable meaningful peace negotiations; however, Putin is now calling on the United States to halt its campaign while simultaneously refusing to allow the ceasefire necessary to end the war in Ukraine that Putin himself started.[viii]

Ukraine continues to share its expertise and support air defense efforts in countering Iranian Shahed drone strikes in the Middle East. The Telegraph reported on March 4 that the UK sent Ukrainian-trained British drone operators to the Middle East as of March 3 to defend British bases in the region, and that the UK plans to deploy more later in the week.[ix] One Western official told The Telegraph that these British drone operators have experience working in Ukraine, where they learned about layering sensing, warning, and targeting drones. Reuters reported on March 5, citing a source familiar with the matter, that US and Qatari officials are in talks with Ukraine to purchase Ukrainian interceptor drones to down Iranian Shahed drones.[x] The source stated that parties are also discussing the transfer of Ukrainian technologies that ”listen out“ for incoming enemy drones and ”disrupt their communication signals,” likely referring to acoustic sensors and electronic warfare (EW). Ukraine manufactures and relies on relatively cheap Shahed interceptor drones that cost only a few thousand dollars each to produce.[xi] Ukraine has years of experience defending against almost nightly large-scale Russian drone and missile strike packages, which have included Iranian-origin strike drones much like those the United States and its allies currently face in the Middle East.[xii] Ukraine also has a reported 90 percent interception rate of such drones.[xiii]

Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly addressed the Kremlin's recent restrictions against Telegram for the first time and the widespread complaints about battlefield communications issues that ensued. Putin met on March 5 with a group of professional women in a choreographed meeting ahead of International Women's Day on March 8.[xiv] Putin raised the issue of the recent block on Russian forces' Starlink terminals in Ukraine and referenced "other" unspecified communications issues. Putin claimed that Ukraine has been "exploiting" Russian forces' use of technical capabilities that were not "directly" Russia's – likely referring to the early February 2026 throttling of Telegram that disrupted Russian battlefield communications.[xv] Lieutenant Colonel Irina Godunova, the commander of a Russian communications battalion, claimed to Putin that Russian authorities have raised the issue of blocking Telegram and the need to further improve Russian state messaging app Max, after which "everything will be fine on the frontlines." Godunova claimed that the Russian military is "excellently" organizing special military communications and that there are "no problems." Putin and Godunova both claimed that the use of foreign communication systems poses a danger to Russian forces. The Kremlin has been manufacturing different justifications for a future Telegram ban since the early February 2026 throttling, including claims that Ukrainian and other foreign intelligence services are exploiting data they obtain through Telegram "for military purposes" and therefore pose a threat to Russian forces.[xvi] Putin's choreographed interaction with Godunova aims to add validity to these claims and to present the justification not as a Kremlin fabrication, but as a real complaint coming from Russian personnel themselves. The Kremlin appears to not have expected the widespread backlash that emerged in recent weeks from Russian milbloggers, including pro-war and ultranationalist milbloggers, about the Telegram restrictions.[xvii] Putin's public comments likely aim to appease this part of the Russian information space and gain their backing for future Kremlin policies against Telegram.

Many Russian milbloggers, however, responded negatively to Putin's interaction with Godunova, rejecting the claims that there are no frontline communications issues.[xviii] One milblogger criticized the Russian military command for not providing soldiers with phones with pre-installed military messengers, forcing Russian troops to use civilian messenger platforms like Telegram.[xix] Another milblogger claimed that communications below the regiment level are more reliant on foreign platforms and technology and that Telegram is "indispensable" for Russian soldiers.[xx] The milbloggers absolved Putin of responsibility, however, claiming that Godunova "misled" and lied to Putin.[xxi]

The Kremlin continues its wider efforts to prevent Russians from using foreign platforms and virtual private networks (VPNs). The Russian Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS) claimed on March 5 that there are signs that Instagram, Facebook, WhatsApp, YouTube, Telegram, and VPN services are violating Russian laws on advertising.[xxii] The FAS claimed that both the advertisers and the distributors are responsible for the violations. The Kremlin has targeted advertising profits in its censorship campaigns in the past, using these mechanisms to target independent television media in the 2000s and, more recently, targeting Russian milbloggers' ability to make money from their pages.[xxiii] The Kremlin likely seeks to make these foreign platforms and VPN services unprofitable such that they have to leave the Russian market. The Kremlin has also been claiming that foreign platforms like WhatsApp and Telegram are violating various Russian laws in order to set conditions to justify a future ban on these platforms.[xxiv]

The Kremlin is reportedly collecting data on Russians' use of VPNs and foreign platforms, likely to better tailor future censorship policies. Russian opposition source The Bell reported on March 5 that technical specialists found that the Max app collects on its users to determine whether users have a VPN connection on their device.[xxv] The specialists also found that the app tries to connect to foreign platforms, like Telegram, WhatsApp, Amazon Web Services, and Google. ISW recently observed that the Max app is discreetly surveilling Max users' online behavior writ large, allowing Russian authorities to link accounts on other platforms to the registered Max user.[xxvi] Max has remained largely unpopular in Russia, but the Kremlin has moved many everyday functions to the platform to force Russians to interact with the app.[xxvii] Even Russians who use the app minimally can still provide the Kremlin with a wide swathe of information that informs its future internet censorship efforts. The Kremlin can also use Max to individually target Russians who are using foreign platforms or VPNs. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin intensified its internet censorship campaign in recent months in order to prepare for future limited, rolling involuntary callups that are highly likely to be domestically unpopular and spark widespread criticism.[xxviii]

Ukrainian forces continue to liberate territory in southern Ukraine. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces have liberated 244 square kilometers in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions since January 1, 2026, while Russian forces seized 115 square kilometers in the same period. ISW’s mapping methodology may underestimate Ukrainian advances. Recent reports and geolocated footage indicate that Ukrainian forces have made significant gains south of the Vovcha River in the area southwest, south, and southeast of Oleksandrivka and west of the Haichur River in areas north of Hulyaipole. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on March 6 that Ukrainian forces likely consolidated positions in Ternove (southeast of Oleksandrivka), partially pushed Russian forces out of Berezove (just southwest of Ternove), and advanced into central Novomykolaivka (south of Berezove).[xxix] Mashovets added that Ukrainian forces advanced further south into Novohryhorivka and to Solodke (both southeast of Oleksandrivka and northeast of Hulyaipole). Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces cleared Russian forces from areas west of the Haichur River, indicating that Ukrainian forces likely liberated Ternuvate and Kosivtseve (both northwest of Hulyaipole) and that Russian claims that Russian forces seized Rizdvyanka (southwest of Ternuvate) are false. Mashovets also reported that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Tsvitkove (northwest of Hulyaipole), Krynychne, and Staroukrainka (both west of Hulyaipole) in areas where ISW previously assessed that Russian forces advanced in. Geolocated footage published on March 5 also indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Andriivka (southwest of Oleksandrivka).[xxx] ISW has also refined its assessment of Russian advances within Hulyaipole as Mashovets also reported that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in central Hulyaipole.[xxxi]

Communications disruptions and the thinly held nature of Russian lines likely facilitated recent Ukrainian gains. Ukrainian forces exploited the February 1 blocking of Starlink that disrupted Russian communications and command and control (C2) to launch the counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions.[xxxii] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction noted on February 26 that the Russian military command’s focus on frontline infiltrations to generate informational effects in late 2025 led to a failure to establish strongpoints or defensive lines in the near rear that contributed to Ukrainian forces’ recent advances in the area.[xxxiii] Mashovets reported that the Ukrainian counterattacks have forced the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces to commit elements of its operational reserve to combat — likely disrupting Russian preparations for a potential offensive from Hulyaipole toward Orikhiv or Zaporizhzhia City during Spring and Summer 2026.[xxxiv] The recent Ukrainian gains could force the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces command to choose between prioritizing offensive efforts west of Hulyaipole or protecting Russian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) toward Hulyaipole from Ukrainian counterattacks from the north.

Russia and Ukraine conducted civilian prisoner and prisoner of war (POW) exchanges on March 5 and 6. Russian and Ukrainian authorities announced on March 5 and 6 that Russia and Ukraine exchanged a total of 500 prisoners over two days in accordance with an agreement from recent trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian talks in Geneva.[xxxv] Russian and Ukrainian officials reported that each side returned 200 POWs on March 5 and 300 POWs on March 6. Russia also returned two Ukrainian civilians on March 6.[xxxvi] Russian authorities stated that the United States and United Arab Emirates (UAE) mediated the exchanges.[xxxvii]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia is reportedly sharing intelligence with Iran to support Iranian attacks against US forces in the Middle East in contrast to the Kremlin’s recent attempts to frame Russia as a potential US ally and US-Russia relations as increasingly friendly.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin called on the United States to halt its ongoing military operation in the Middle East while refusing any meaningful ceasefire in Ukraine.
• Ukraine continues to share its expertise and support air defense efforts in countering Iranian Shahed drone strikes in the Middle East.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly addressed the Kremlin's recent restrictions against Telegram for the first time and the widespread complaints about battlefield communications issues that ensued.
• The Kremlin continues its wider efforts to prevent Russians from using foreign platforms and virtual private networks (VPNs).
• Ukrainian forces continue to liberate territory in southern Ukraine.
• Russia and Ukraine conducted civilian prisoner and prisoner of war (POW) exchanges on March 5 and 6.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Oleksandrivka, and Hulyaipole. Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian drones struck energy infrastructure in Krasnodar Krai on March 6. Geolocated footage published on March 6 shows a fire near the 500 kV Abinsk substation near Berezhnoe.[xxxviii] Russian authorities claimed that Ukrainian drone debris started a fire at a substation in Berezhnoe.[xxxix]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on March 6 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets reported on March 6 that Russian forces kidnapped 19 Ukrainian civilians from Sopych (northwest of Sumy City along the international border), indicating that Russian forces have likely infiltrated through the entire settlement.[xl] A Sumy Oblast local media outlet reported on March 2 that Russian forces attempted small group infiltrations toward Sopych on March 2.[xli]

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Sumy Oblast on March 5 and 6.[xlii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[xliii]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on March 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vilcha, Vovchanski Khutory, Hrafske, and Symynivka and toward Verkhnya Pysarivka on March 5 and 6.[xliv]

The Ukrainian Joint Task Force reported on March 6 that the intensity of fighting in Kharkiv Oblast has decreased as Russian forces are regrouping for a possible Spring 2026 offensive and due to command and control (C2) disruptions from the blocking of Starlink.[xlv]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Chechen Zapad-Akhmat Battalion, the Chechen Kurchaloyevsky Raion Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) Department, the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), and the 116th Rosgvardia Special Purpose Brigade are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Vovchanski Khutory.[xlvi] Drone operators of the 71st Guards Motorized Rifle Division (14th AC, LMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces south of Volokhivka (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xlvii]  

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk toward Shevyakivka on March 6 but did not advance.[xlviii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 5 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Kupyansk.[xlix]

Russian forces attacked east of Kupyansk near Podoly; south of Kupyansk near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane on March 5 and 6.[l]

The deputy commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on March 5 that Russian forces have started to increase their usage of unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and heavy bomber drones, including both drones copied from Ukrainian designs and Russian-designed drones based on first-person view (FPV) drones.[li] The deputy commander added that Russian forces have recently intensified Shahed-type drone strikes against frontline settlements 20 to 30 kilometers behind the frontline.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 6 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Karpivka (southeast of Borova), north of Korovii Yar, and northeast of and into southern Oleksandrivka (both south of Borova).[lii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Borova near Novoplatonivka and southeast of Borova near Tverdokhlibove and toward Stepove and Cherneshchyna on March 5 and 6.[liii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Bohuslavka (north of Borova) direction.[liv]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on March 6 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 6 shows servicemembers of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) raising a flag east of Svyatohirsk (northwest of Lyman) during what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[lv]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on March 6 that Russian forces seized Sosnove (northwest of Lyman).[lvi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Riznykivka (east of Slovyansk).[lvii]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Yarova, Derylove, and Svyatohirsk; north of Lyman near Stavky and Drobysheve; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; southeast of Lyman near Yampil; south of Lyman toward Brusivka and Staryi Karavan; northeast of Slovyansk near Zakitne; east of Slovyansk near Kalenyky, Kryva Luka, Platonivka, and Riznykivka and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Fedorivka Druha and Nykyforivka on March 5 and 6.[lviii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novoselivka (northwest of Lyman).[lix]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on March 6 that Russian forces have recently begun to deploy hexacopter heavy bomber drones analogous to Ukrainian Vampire drones.[lx] A Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on March 6 that Russian forces use drones to guide Russian servicemembers to concealment in abandoned dugouts, trenches, and other shelters during infiltration missions.[lxi] The drone battalion added that Russian forces are attempting to cross bodies of water in boats.  

Order of Battle: A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division with the March 5 claimed seizure of Yarova.[lxii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on March 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Orikhovo-Vasylivka, east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka and Ivanopillya; south of Kostyantynivka near Illinivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka on March 5 and 6.[lxiii]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Toretske (southwest of Druzhkivka).[lxiv] FPV drone operators of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Novopavlivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[lxv] FPV drone operators of the BARS-31 Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Kramatorsk-Druzhkivka direction.[lxvi]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on March 6, but ISW has not collected any evidence to assess that Russian forces advanced.

A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting continued in Novyi Donbas (east of Dobropillya) on March 5 and 6.[lxvii]

Order of Battle: Loitering munitions operators of the Russian Berkut Group of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles near Krasnohorivka (west of Dobropillya).[lxviii] Loitering munitions operators of the 120th Naval Infantry Division (Baltic Fleet) (newly formed from the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade) are reportedly operating in the Dobropillya direction.[lxix]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian Advances: Geolocated footage published on March 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[lxx]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Novooleksandrivka; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman and Zatyshok; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Molodetske, Kotlyne and Novopidhorodne on March 5 and 6.[lxxi]

Geolocated footage published on March 5 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian North Korean-supplied M-1978 Koksan self-propelled gun south of Shevchenko (south of Pokrovsk).[lxxii]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are advancing exclusively with dismounted infantry in the Pokrovsk direction as the weather has created swampy conditions hinder vehicles.[lxxiii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on March 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself, northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka and Novomykolaivka, and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on March 5 and 6.[lxxiv]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.

See topline text for assessed Ukrainian advances in the Oleksandrivka direction.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Oleksandrivka near Novohryhorivka and Krasnohirske and toward Verbove on March 5 and 6.[lxxv]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are operating near Berezove (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[lxxvi] Mashovets reported that elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are operating south of the Vovcha River in the Velyka Novosilka (southeast of Oleksandrivka)-Pokrovske (north of Oleksandrivka) direction. Mashovets stated that the elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 29th CAA, EMD) continue to operate along the H-15 Zaporizhzhia City-Donetsk City highway (northeast of Oleksandrivka).

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Donetsk Oblast on the night of March 4 to 5. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on March 5 that Ukrainian forces struck two Russian Tor air defense systems in unspecified locations in occupied Donetsk oblast overnight on March 4 to 5.[lxxvii] Geolocated footage published on March 5 confirms that Ukrainian strikes on an ammunition depot of a Russian motorized rifle brigade near occupied Amvrosiivka (roughly 95 kilometers from the frontline) and a fuel and lubricants depot near occupied Novoamvrosiivske (roughly 85 kilometers from the frontline) overnight on February 27 to 28 started fires.[lxxviii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

See topline text for assessed Ukrainian advances and recessions of Russian claims in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported March 5 that there are no Ukrainian positions in Varvarivka (north of Hulyaipole), Pryluky and Olenokostyantynivka (both northwest of Hulyaipole), indicating that Russian forces likely seized these settlements.[lxxix]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 4 shows a Russian servicemember on the T-0401 Highway in central Dobropillya (north of Hulyaipole).[lxxx] ISW assesses that this event does not indicate a change in the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), given that Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces have yet to consolidate positions in Dobropillya, indicating that the settlement is likely contested between Ukrainian and Russian forces.[lxxxi] Mashovets reported that Russian forces infiltrated west of Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole), which ISW assesses does not indicate a change in the control of terrain or FEBA.

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Rizdvyanka, Pryluky, Olenokostyantynivka, and Tsvitkove and toward Vozdvyzhivka and Verkhnya Tersa; north of Hulyaipole near Varvarivka and Zelene; southwest of Hulyaipole near Myrne; and west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne and Staroukrainka on March 5 and 6.[lxxxii]

Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on March 6 that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]), including its 114th, 143rd, and 394th motorized rifle regiments, are operating west and north of Hulyaipole, including near Olenokostyantynivka and Pryluky.[lxxxiii] Mashovets reported that elements of the 57th and 60th motorized rifle brigades are operating along the Hulyaipole-Omelnyk road and in the Dorozhnyanka–Hulyaipilske direction (all south to west of Hulyaipole).[lxxxiv] Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 1198th Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.[lxxxv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 6 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Orikhiv toward Hulyaipilske; northwest of Orikhiv toward Novoyakovlivka; and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and Prymorske on March 5 and 6.[lxxxvi]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division), the 104th VDV Division, and the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[lxxxvii]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast on March 5. The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported on March 6 that Ukrainian drone operators struck a Russian S-300V air defense system in an unspecified area of occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[lxxxviii]

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults northeast of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi bridge on March 5 and 6.[lxxxix]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 331st VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[xc]

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea overnight on March 5 to 6. The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported on March 6 that SBU drone operators struck production workshops at the Yevpatoriya Aircraft Repair Plant in occupied Yevpatoriya (roughly 165 kilometers behind the frontline) and equipment and personnel deployment points in occupied Pushkyne (roughly 131 kilometers behind the frontline).[xci] The SBU added that Ukrainian forces struck two Pantsir-S2 air defense systems, a Mokhadzher-6 drone, a ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft gun on a truck, two fuel tankers, and a Forpost drone ground control station during the strikes. The Ukrainian Navy reported on March 5 that Ukrainian forces used unmanned surface vessels (USVs) and aerial drones to strike the Syvash drilling platform in the Black Sea on the night of March 4 to 5, which Russian forces used as an electronic warfare (EW) and short-range air defense (SHORAD) site, observation post, and communications relay to guide strike drones targeting infrastructure in Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts and shipping in the Black Sea.[xcii] The Ukrainian Navy added that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian Ka-27 naval helicopter attempting to land on the platform’s helipad. Geolocated footage published on March 5 shows a Ukrainian drone striking a Russian Ka-27 helicopter on the drilling platform.[xciii]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 5 to 6. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 141 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other strike drones – of which about 100 were Shahed drones – from the directions of Oryol, Kursk, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[xciv] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 111 drones, that 24 drones struck 16 locations, and that drone debris fell at one location. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential infrastructure in Chernihiv Oblast.[xcv]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.