Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 3, 2026

Assessment as of: 7:45 PM ET

Data cutoff: 11:30am ET on March 3

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

The United States and Israel are striking Iran's drone and missile facilities to reduce the pressure on missile and drone interceptors – a capability the United States is denying Ukraine by refusing to provide Tomahawk cruise missiles. The US-Israeli combined strike campaign is targeting missile and drone production and storage facilities throughout Iran.[i] The United States, however, has long denied Ukraine the weapons necessary to do the same to Russian facilities. Ukrainian forces are able to conduct long-range drone strikes against a significant portion of Russia’s rear, but these drones' payloads are limited and not suitable to destroy hardened objects or large facilities. Ukraine has therefore repeatedly requested US-produced Tomahawk missiles, a request that the United States ultimately denied in Fall 2025.[ii] The US provision of a small number of Tomahawks to Ukraine would likely enable Ukrainian forces to significantly damage or even destroy key missile and drone production and storage facilities deep in the Russian rear, particularly highly concentrated production areas such as the Shahed drone factory at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in the Republic of Tatarstan (roughly 1,100 kilometers from the Ukrainian border).[iii] Ukraine would likely also be able to significantly damage Russian missile production sites in the rear with Tomahawks, such as the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant in Votkinsk, Udmurtia Republic (roughly 1,300 kilometers from the Ukrainian border) that manufactures a variety of ballistic missiles.[iv] Ukrainian forces struck Alabuga with long-range drones in 2025 and struck the Votkinsk plant with Ukrainian-produced FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles in February 2026.[v] These previous Ukrainian strikes did not destroy or disable the Alabuga or Votkinsk plants, however. US provisions of Tomahawks in Fall 2025 could have helped Ukraine to strike drone and missile production and storage sites in the Russian rear as Ukraine continued to develop and produce its own Flamingo missiles. Such Tomahawk strikes may have been able to significantly degrade Russia's Winter 2025-2026 long-range missile and drone strike campaign against Ukrainian energy and civilian infrastructure.

Russian officials continue to condemn the US-Israeli strike campaign against Iran, while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to support the United States. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Russia respects other states' sovereignty and does not interfere in their internal affairs, and called for all parties to cease hostilities.[vi] Lavrov denied US President Donald Trump's statements that Iran is interested in developing its nuclear weapons program, claiming that there is no evidence to support this assertion.[vii] Zelensky, in contrast, commended on March 3 the recent US and Israeli strikes on Iranian military assets in Iran, calling the strikes “a good decision” against a regime that wants to build a nuclear weapon.[viii] Zelensky affirmed that Ukraine is ready to provide Middle Eastern states with drone interceptors in exchange for interceptor missiles for Patriot air defense systems.[ix] Zelensky noted that Patriot systems are important for Middle Eastern states but are not suitable to defend against hundreds of Shahed drones.

Ukrainian forces liberated more territory than they lost in the last two weeks of February 2026 for the first time since the Summer 2023 counteroffensive. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces liberated roughly 257 square kilometers since January 1. Ukrainian forces achieved a net gain of almost 33 square kilometers between February 14 and 20 and a net gain of roughly 57 square kilometers between February 21 and 27. The last time Ukrainian forces made net gains was during the Summer 2023 counteroffensive, when Ukrainian forces gained 377 net square kilometers in June 2023, 257 net square kilometers in July 2023, and 1.47 net square kilometers in September 2023. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated in an interview published on March 3 that Ukrainian forces have regained 460 square kilometers since the start of 2026.[x] ISW's mapping methodology underestimates Ukrainian advances, as ISW depicts the furthest assessed extent of Russian advances until enough open-source evidence emerges to allow ISW to confidently assess that Russian forces no longer hold those positions. The frontline in Ukraine has also become porous with a lack of contiguous lines, adding additional complexity to assessing the true control of terrain (COT). Ukrainian successes in February 2026 are noteworthy, the variation between Zelensky's and ISW's numbers notwithstanding. The successful, localized Ukrainian counterattacks of recent weeks are unlikely to grow into a large-scale counteroffensive, and Russian forces will very likely stabilize their positions and begin advancing again. Ukraine's recent battlefield successes, however, have disrupted Russian efforts to set conditions for their Spring-Summer 2026 offensive and will force Russian troops to establish stable defenses before starting the fight to regain lost ground.

The Russian military command continues to operate in an alternate reality, setting wildly unrealistic deadlines that do not match Russia's actual battlefield capabilities. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 2 that Russian military plans for 2025-2027 call for Russian forces to seize the remainder of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, continue advancing in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts, and advance into and seize all of Odesa Oblast.[xi] The Russian military command‘s specific deadlines for completing these objectives within the three-year time period are unclear. Russia's plans to continue attacks in southern Ukraine demonstrate the Kremlin's disinterest in freezing the line in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts, and Russian objectives in Odesa Oblast demonstrate that the Kremlin maintains territorial ambitions beyond the five Ukrainian regions Russia has illegally annexed – as ISW has long assessed.[xii] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are highly unlikely to be able to advance to Odesa City, let alone seize the entire oblast.[xiii]

The Russian military command has continuously set unrealistic deadlines that Russian forces have failed to meet, starting with the Russian attempt to seize Kyiv City in a few days in February 2022.[xiv] The Russian military command has issued deadlines for the seizure of all of Donetsk Oblast multiple times, with Russian forces failing each time.[xv] Russian forces have expended significant resources and manpower trying to fulfill the command's objectives, yet have failed to make significant progress over the past four years.[xvi] Russian milbloggers have even often complained about the military command’s unrealistic and broad territorial objectives that cause Russian forces to suffer heavy casualties in costly attacks.[xvii] The Russian military command has not adjusted its demands despite these failures and justified complaints.[xviii] Russian President Vladimir Putin has even attempted to present these objectives to the United States as not only possible but inevitable in order to influence US thinking about Ukraine's alleged need to surrender.[xix]

Russia has failed to achieve the objectives of its Winter 2025-2026 long-range missile and drone campaign against Ukrainian energy and civilian infrastructure. ISW previously assessed that Russia’s winter campaign aimed to degrade Ukraine’s energy security, industrial capacity, and will to continue fighting against Russian aggression.[xx] Russia has failed to accomplish each of these objectives, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noting on March 3 that Russia failed to divide Ukrainians, turn the Ukrainian population against the Ukrainian military, or cause the Ukrainian people to call for a stop in fighting.[xxi] Russia was able to significantly damage the Ukrainian energy grid and create months of hardship for the population across the country. Russian forces, however, did not succeed in their goal of splitting Ukraine’s energy grid in half and creating energy islands cut off from electricity generation, deliveries, and transmission systems.[xxii] Russian strikes also failed to prevent Ukraine’s defense industrial base (DIB) from growing, with Advisor to the Ukrainian Defense Minister Hanna Gvozdiar stating on February 19 that the DIB had increased production fiftyfold since 2022 and reached an estimated $50 billion worth of production.[xxiii] Ukrainian government sources reportedly assessed in January 2026 that Russian strikes aimed to make Kyiv City uninhabitable, but the city of nearly three million continues to function and to repair its energy infrastructure.[xxiv] Zelensky stated on March 2 that Russian forces are preparing a new wave of strikes, including against Ukraine's water supply.[xxv] Russia’s shift to a new target set is an implicit acknowledgement that its Winter 2025-2026 strike campaign failed to achieve its objectives. Russia will likely be able to apply the lessons it learned during its winter strikes against energy infrastructure to future strikes against water infrastructure, particularly as both Soviet-era systems contain limited but critical vulnerabilities that Russian drones can successfully damage or destroy despite their smaller payloads.

Insider reports continue to indicate that the Kremlin is expecting the war to continue until at least the September 2026 State Duma elections. A Kremlin insider source claimed on March 3 that the Russian Presidential Administration held a seminar for vice governors working on domestic policy in order to define the key scenarios surrounding the upcoming September 2026 Duma elections.[xxvi] The insider source claimed that election planning will focus on Russia's progress in the full-scale invasion. The insider source claimed that the Presidential Administration outlined three scenarios, all of which centered around the idea that the war would still be ongoing at the time of the elections. The scenarios differed, however, in the degree to which Russia was achieving strategic success in the war or facing pressure that required more societal support for the war. The insider source claimed that the "most likely scenario" was one in which the current wartime dynamics continued and the military and economic spheres did not require "drastic changes." ISW has recently observed similar reports about Kremlin efforts to incorporate the protracted war into its political agenda ahead of the upcoming elections, including endorsements of candidates who strongly support the war and targeted media campaigns focused on the war effort as a marker of national unity.[xxvii] These insider claims suggest that the Kremlin is planning for the war to continue at a minimum until September, but likely for much longer. The Kremlin, however, may feel confident that it could easily portray a potential peace settlement before September as a win for the Russian populace and, therefore, is not spending time and energy creating a plan for such a scenario.

Key Takeaways:

• The United States and Israel are striking Iran's drone and missile facilities to reduce the pressure on missile and drone interceptors – a capability the United States is denying Ukraine by refusing to provide Tomahawk cruise missiles.
• Russian officials continue to condemn the US-Israeli strike campaign against Iran, while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky continues to support the United States.
• Ukrainian forces liberated more territory than they lost in mid to late February 2026 for the first time since the Summer 2023 counteroffensive.
• The Russian military command continues to operate in an alternate reality, setting wildly unrealistic deadlines that do not match Russia's actual battlefield capabilities.
• Russia has failed to achieve the objectives of its Winter 2025-2026 long-range missile and drone campaign against Ukrainian energy and civilian infrastructure.
• Insider reports continue to indicate that the Kremlin is expecting the war to continue until at least the September 2026 State Duma elections.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Novopavlivka. Russian forces recently advanced near Slovyansk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck Russian energy infrastructure in Krasnodar Krai on February 27. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on March 3 that sources in the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations stated that 13 Ukrainian drones struck the 500 kV Taman electrical substation in Temryuksky Raion, Krasnodar Krai, on the afternoon of February 27.[xxviii] The strike reportedly caused a fire, partially disabled the substation, and destroyed two autotransformers. Astra noted that the substation is a key node in the power bridge across the Kerch Strait and transmits power to occupied Crimea.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on March 3 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on March 3 that elements of the Russian 80th Separate Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) seized Bobylivka (on the international border roughly 90 kilometers northwest of Sumy City).[xxix] A Russian milblogger credited elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 80th Separate Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade with the seizure of the settlement.[xxx] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are continuing their cognitive warfare campaign that uses the alleged seizures of small border villages in previously dormant frontline areas in northern Ukraine to try to convince the West that the frontlines in Ukraine are collapsing.[xxxi]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces attacked northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka on March 2 and 3.[xxxii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly continue to operate in the Sumy direction.[xxxiii]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on March 3 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 2 shows Ukrainian forces striking one Russian servicemember in the western outskirts of Vilcha (northeast of Kharkiv City) after what ISW assessed was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[xxxiv]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Kruhle (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xxxv]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Zybyne, Vovchanski Khutory, Starytsya, Izbytske, Vovchansk, Nesterne, and Dehtyarne on March 2 and 3.[xxxvi]

A deputy commander of a Ukrainian company operating in the South Slobozhansk direction reported on March 2 that Russian forces withdrew armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) from the frontline north of Kharkiv City due to effective Ukrainian targeting of Russian equipment and are instead increasing airstrikes and the use of Shahed and fiber-optic drones.[xxxvii]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces refuted on March 3 the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) February 28 claimed seizure of Neskuchne (northeast of Kharkiv City) and asserted that a significant number of servicemembers of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) were declared missing in action (MIA) in the area.[xxxviii] The milblogger further claimed that Russian forces do not fully control Zelene (northeast of Kharkiv City), contrary to the Russian MoD’s February 1 claims.[xxxix] Another Russian milblogger claimed on March 2 that Russian forces are not conducting large offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast but are instead launching small-scale attacks along the frontline to compel Ukrainian forces to maintain and disperse significant reserves in several different areas of the line.[xl]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on March 3.

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on March 2 that Ukrainian forces continue to control forested areas near Chuhunivka (northeast of Velykyi Burluk), contrary to Russian claims.[xli]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 3 but did not advance.

Assessed Russian infiltration: Geolocated footage published on March 2 shows Russian servicemembers operating west of Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk) during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[xlii]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kupyansk itself, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk toward Kurylivka on March 2 and 3.[xliii]

A Russian milblogger reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on March 3 that Ukrainian forces are overwhelming Russian forces in Kupyansk and forcing Russian forces to move through basements and to conduct logistics via drone drops.[xliv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations south of Borova near Serednie and Oleksandrivka on March 2 and 3 but did not advance.[xlv]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.

Assessed Russian Advances: Geolocated footage published on March 2 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Drobysheve (northwest of Lyman).[xlvi]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 2 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions south of Fedorivka Druha (southeast of Slovyansk) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[xlvii]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Lyman, in southern Riznykivka (east of Slovyansk), and west of Nykyforivka (southeast of Slovyansk).[xlviii]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Svyatohirsk; north of Lyman near Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Drobysheve; southeast of Lyman near Ozerne; northeast of Slovyansk near Zakitne and Platonivka; east of Slovyansk near Riznykivka, Kalenyky, and Kryva Luka and toward Mykolaivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Nykyforivka, Fedorivka Druha, and Lypivka on March 2 and 3.[xlix]

Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Hryhorii Shapoval reported on March 3 that Ukrainian forces control Fedorivka Druha and Riznykivka, contrary to Russian claims that Russian forces seized both settlements.[l]

The commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on March 3 that diverse Ukrainian terrain, including rivers and swamps, as well as varying weather conditions, complicate Russian forces’ advances.[li] The commander noted that Russian forces send high quality troops to attack well-fortified urban areas while sending units composed of prisoners to attack in open fields. The commander stated that Russian forces shape the battlefield not just with infiltration tactics but also with a general level of flexibility and creativity as Russian forces attack simultaneously along five to seven routes to complicate Ukrainian drone operator efficiency. The commander of a Ukrainian tank battalion operating in the Kramatorsk direction stated on March 3 that Russian forces are exploiting rain and fog that complicate Ukrainian drone operations to provide cover during Russian attacks.[lii]

A Russian milblogger reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on March 3 that Russian forces maintain positions in most of Novoselivka (northwest of Lyman) but that Russian forces do not fully control the settlement due to frequent Ukrainian counterattacks in the area.[liii] The milblogger noted that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) rushed prematurely to declare that Russian forces had Novoselivka and Drobysheve.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and Grad Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) elements of the 31st Motorized Rifle Regiment (67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Lyman direction.[liv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on March 3 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Pryvillya; east of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka and Ivanopillya; south of Kostyantynivka near Illinivka and Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Novopavlivka on March 2 and 3.[lv]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones near Poltavka and Rusyn Yar (both south of Druzhkivka).[lvi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Dobropillya near Novyi Donbas on March 3 but did not advance.[lvii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on March 3 but did not advance.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 2 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in western Rodynske after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or FEBA at this time.[lviii]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Shevchenko; north of Pokrovsk near Bilytske and Rodynske; southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Molodetske, and Novopidhorodne; and west of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka and Novooleksandrivka on March 2 and 3.[lix] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hryshyne.[lx]

A sergeant in a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on March 3 that Russian forces are increasingly using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to conduct logistics in the brigade’s area of responsibility (AoR) due to successful Ukrainian strikes on Russian logistics.[lxi]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are striking Ukrainian forces in eastern Shylivka (northwest of Pokrovsk).[lxii] Elements of the 76th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[lxiii] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Svitle (north of Pokrovsk) and Rodynske.[lxiv]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 2 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced southwest of Novomykolaivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[lxv]

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself on March 2 and 3.[lxvi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on March 3 but did not advance.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 2 shows Ukrainian forces shelling a Russian position west of Pryvillya (southwest of Oleksandrivka) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the FEBA at this time.[lxvii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Ivanivka and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Ternove and Kalynivske and toward Vyshneve on March 2 and 3.[lxviii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Dnipropetrovsk direction.[lxix] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in the Vremivka (Oleksandrivka) direction.[lxx]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on March 3 but did not advance.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 3 shows one Russian servicemember raising a Russian flag in northeastern and southern Rizdvyanka (northwest of Hulyaipole) during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle (FEBA) at this time.[lxxi] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are using flag raising tactics to claim advances in areas where Russian forces have conducted small group infiltration missions, but did not establish enduring positions to generate informational effects.[lxxii]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Zelene, Svyatopetrivka, Rizdvyanka, Tsvitkove, and Varvarivka and toward Vozdvyzhivka and Verkhnya Teral and west of Hulyaipole near Staroukrainka and Zaliznychne on March 2 and 3.[lxxiii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 3 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 1 shows Ukrainian forces striking one Russian servicemember south of Richne (northwest of Orikhiv) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the FEBA at this time.[lxxiv]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Veselyanka (northwest of Orikhiv).[lxxv]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Orikhiv toward Hulyaipilske, west of Orikhiv near Plavni and Stepnohirsk, and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske on March 2 and 3.[lxxvi]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[lxxvii]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on March 3.

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) project reported on March 2 that Ukrainian forces struck the Yevpatoriya Aviation Plant near occupied Yevpatoriya (roughly 150 kilometers from the frontline) on February 27.[lxxviii] The Ukrainian OSINT project noted that the plant stored and maintained Russian Orior and Forpost drones. Geolocated footage published on March 2 shows that the Ukrainian strike damaged three hangars.[lxxix]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 2 to 3. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 136 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones, of which roughly 80 were Shaheds, from the directions of Kursk City; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[lxxx] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 127 drones, that five drones struck three locations, and that downed debris fell on three locations as of 0900 local time. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential and civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv City and Oblast and port and transport infrastructure in Odesa Oblast.[lxxxi] The Ukrainian Energy Ministry and Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported that Russian strikes caused power outages in Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, and Chernihiv oblasts.[lxxxii]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.