Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 18, 2026

Assessment as of: 6:15 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 11:30 AM ET

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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Ukraine has sent 201 military experts to assist Middle Eastern countries in defending against Iranian Shahed drone strikes and that the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) is ready to support Middle Eastern air defense efforts.[i] Zelensky stated on March 17 that there are 201 Ukrainian military experts deployed to the Middle East and that Ukraine is “ready” to send another 34 experts to the region. Zelensky reported that Ukrainian specialists are already working in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, and Saudi Arabia and that Ukrainian specialists are en route to Kuwait. Zelensky reported that Ukraine can produce over 2,000 interceptor drones daily, of which Ukraine only needs 1,000 drones for its own defense. Zelensky stated that Ukraine can supply at least 1,000 drone interceptors to its partners daily and can produce more drones if partners invest in Ukraine’s drone production capabilities. Increased outside investment would enable Ukraine to increase its own drone production and more effectively support its partners, especially in strengthening the air defenses of the United States and its allies in the Middle East against Iranian drone strikes.[ii] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine can offer the United States and US allies in the Middle East unique insights into how to counter Iranian strikes, as the Ukrainian military has institutionalized and operationalized the fighting experience that Ukraine has learned throughout the past four years of war.[iii]

Major Chinese oil companies may be interested in purchasing Russian-origin oil, which would allow both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia to benefit from the March 12 US decision to temporarily lift sanctions against Russian oil stranded at sea.[iv] Five trade sources told Reuters on March 1 that the major Chinese oil companies Sinopec and PetroChina have made inquiries with suppliers about possible purchases of Russian oil to mitigate supply shortages caused by the war in the Middle East.[v] Sources told Reuters that these purchases would mark the first time that the companies have purchased Russian oil since November 2025, and two sources indicated that the purchases were ”likely to be imminent.“ A source involved in Russian oil trading and familiar with PetroChina's trading operations told Reuters that the companies could seek to purchase oil from intermediaries or traders that already hold Russian-origin oil in storage. Brent crude oil futures are currently trading at $109.68 per barrel, and such high prices, if sustained, could reverse over a year of declining Russian oil revenues as ISW has noted.[vi] ISW continues to assess that the US decision to temporarily lift sanctions on Russia will benefit Russia‘s war economy, allowing Russia to continue to finance its war in Ukraine in the near term.[vii] Temporary sanctions relief could enable the PRC to purchase discounted imports from Russia.

Russian forces are continuing their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against Ukrainian military and civilian targets in the near rear and are testing alternatives to Starlink to control drones. An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on March 17 that Russian forces are striking at operational depths of 40 to 50 kilometers behind the front line with Molniya-type drones to interdict Ukrainian logistics.[viii] The officer reported that Russian forces are using Molniya drones as “motherships” to transport tactical first-person view (FPV) drones toward the Ukrainian rear. The officer noted that the Molniya drones deploy the FPV drones, which often strike civilian vehicles and other objects in the rear — in line with ISW‘s running assessment of how Russian forces use FPV drones to target civilian objects as part of its wider BAI campaign.[ix] A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on March 17 that his brigade destroyed over 100 Molniya drones in the last three days (since roughly March 15) and that Molniya drones are less effective without Starlink communications.[x] The servicemember reported that Russian forces are attempting to adapt by using radio transmission, fiber-optic internet, and communications provided by Russia’s Kometa satellites to communicate with drones, but that these alternative forms of communication are still slower than Starlink. The servicemember noted that Russian forces have still been able to partially substitute for the lack of Starlink using these imperfect mitigations, however.

Russian forces have been facing setbacks on the frontlines since the February 1 Starlink block, which degraded Russian strike and command and control (C2) capabilities.[xi] Two Ukrainian servicemembers, each operating in different areas of the theater, both reported that Russian forces are attempting to restore C2 capabilities and continue their BAI campaign using Molniya drones.[xii] Russian forces are attempting to overcome the setbacks generated by the Starlink block, and both reports are consistent with ISW’s assessment that Russian forces continue to search for alternatives to Starlink to recreate the BAI effects they achieved with Starlink-equipped drones.[xiii]

Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide aid to Ukraine, including supporting Ukraine’s defense industrial base. Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez reported on March 18 that Spain is allocating a new military aid package for Ukraine, including joint production of defense materials worth one billion euros (roughly $1.4 billion).[xiv] The Ukrainian and Spanish governments signed an agreement defining the main forms of assistance, including technology and equipment transfers, and the ministries of defense signed a memorandum of understanding that pertains to joint production.[xv] Ukrzaliznytsia (Ukraine’s national railroad operator) signed agreements and contracts with Spanish rail company Tria Ingenieria and Spanish bank Instituto de Credito Oficial on rail infrastructure restoration and modernization programs. Ukraine and Spain signed a memorandum of understanding on joint development and production of complex defense systems to strengthen the production capabilities of both states.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Ukraine has sent 201 military experts to assist Middle Eastern countries in defending against Iranian Shahed drone strikes and that the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) is ready to support Middle Eastern air defense efforts.
• Major Chinese oil companies may be interested in purchasing Russian-origin oil, which would allow both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia to benefit from the March 12 US decision to temporarily lift sanctions against Russian oil stranded at sea.
• Russian forces are continuing their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign against Ukrainian military and civilian targets in the near rear and are testing alternatives to Starlink to control drones.
• Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide aid to Ukraine, including supporting Ukraine’s defense industrial base.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Slovyansk and Pokrovsk.
• Russian forces launched 147 drones against Ukraine, including Chernihiv, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces confirmed that they struck Russian aviation facilities on March 16 and 17. The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on March 18 that Ukrainian forces struck the Aviastar aircraft manufacturing plant in Ulyanovsk City on March 16.[xvi] The General Staff reported that the plant produces the Il-76MD-90A transport aircraft, IL-78M-90A tanker aircraft, and services the An-124 Ruslan heavy transport aircraft for Russian forces. The General Staff reported that the strike damaged the climate shelter, aircraft parking areas and some aircraft, though Ukrainian forces are still clarifying the extent of the damage. The Ukrainian General Staff also confirmed that Ukrainian forces struck the 123rd Aircraft Repair Plant in Staraya Russa, Novgorod Oblast, on March 17.[xvii] The General Staff reported that the facility repairs and modernizes military transport aircraft and components for Russian forces. The General Staff reported that the strike damaged a hangar that services Il-76 and L-410 aircraft, though Ukrainian forces are still clarifying the extent of the damage. Satellite imagery collected on March 17 shows three holes in the roof of a hangar at the facility after the strike.[xviii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on March 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in the Sumy direction, including north of Sumy City near Novomykolaivka and Oleksiivka and toward Mala Korchakivka, Pysarivka, and Khrapivshchyna and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on March 17 and 18.[xix]

The Ukrainian 14th Army Corps (AC) reported on March 17 that the Russian military command appointed Major General Zulfat Nigmatzyanov as the deputy commander of the Russian 11th AC (Leningrad Military District [LMD]), elements of which are operating in Sumy Oblast.[xx] Nigmatzyanov previously commanded the 71st Motorized Rifle Division (14th AC, LMD) before this appointment. The Ukrainian 14th AC reported that Nigmatzyanov's subordinates accused him of lying about advances and complained about the lack of artillery support and his use of highly attritional infantry-led assaults when he commanded the 67th Motorized Rifle Division (25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) in late 2024.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division and of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Sumy direction.[xxi]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on March 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City toward Veterynarne and northeast of Kharkiv City near Lyman, Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, Starytsya, Zelene, Prylipka, and Pishchane and toward Verkhnya Pysarivka, Bochkove, and Okhrimivka on March 17 and 18.[xxii]

The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on March 18 that Russian forces conducted a drone strike, likely with Geran-2, against a residential area in Zolochiv (northwest of Kharkiv City) overnight.[xxiii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 82nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Hatyshche (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xxiv] Drone operators of the 71st Guards Motorized Rifle Division (14th Army Corps [AC], LMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian drone control points and armored combat vehicles near Zybyne and Volokhivske (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[xxv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Chuhunivka on March 18 but did not advance.[xxvi]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk toward Kurylivka, Novoosynove, and Hlushkivka on March 17 and 18.[xxvii] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on March 18 that it repelled a reduced platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault, destroying two armored fighting vehicles.[xxviii]

A Ukrainian officer assessed that Russian forces in the Kupyansk direction are preparing for their spring-summer offensive. A Ukrainian brigade command staff officer operating in the Kupyansk direction reported that Russian forces intensified the number of assaults from a maximum of two assaults per day in the past week (roughly March 9 to 16) to nine attacks in the past day.[xxix] The officer assessed that the intensification may be part of preparations for the spring-summer campaign and noted that Ukrainian forces across the front have information about Russian forces accumulating personnel for the future campaign. The officer stated that Russian forces are using poorly trained soldiers and small groups of two to three soldiers to attack. The officer forecasted that Russian forces may start using better-trained soldiers after the spring foliage appears, however.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 18 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian 283rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) seized Oleksandrivka (south of Borova).[xxx]

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Novoplatonivka and southeast of Borova near Novovodyane and Novoyehorivka and toward Chervonyi Stav on March 17 and 18.[xxxi]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 16 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Novoselivka (northwest of Lyman).[xxxii]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Kalenyky (east of Slovyansk).[xxxiii]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Svyatohirsk, Drobysheve, and Yarova; north of Lyman near Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; southeast of Lyman near Yampil and toward Dibrova; south of Lyman toward Brusivka and Staryi Karavan; northeast of Slovyansk near Platonivka; and east of Slovyansk near Zakitne, Riznykivka, Kryva Luka, and Rai-Oleksandrivka on March 17 and 18.[xxxiv]

Ukrainian forces are innovating drone tactics to more successfully interdict Russian forces in the Lyman direction. The planning head of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Lyman direction reported on March 17 that Ukrainian forces have adapted their drone tactics, which has allowed them to regain territory and decrease the number of Russian forces’ assaults in the Lyman direction.[xxxv] The planning head noted that the Russian military command views infantry as expendable, so Ukrainian forces must focus on interdicting Russian forces’ ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to degrade Russia’s comparatively limited equipment and operational ability to support frontline forces.

Ukrainian forces continue to counterattack in the Lyman direction. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on March 18 that Ukrainian forces continue to fight to defend their foothold in Lyman and that Ukrainian forces reportedly launched counterattacks in the Ozerne (east of Slovyansk) - Yampil direction.[xxxvi] Mashovets noted that while it is too soon to discuss the results of the counterattack, it will likely significantly delay the attempts of forward units of the Russian 25th CAA (Central Military District [CMD]) to advance toward southeastern Lyman.

Order of Battle: A howitzer artillery crew and drone operators of the Russian 6th and 7th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions north of Rai-Oleksandrivka.[xxxvii] Drone operators of the 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are striking Ukrainian forces in Rai-Oleksandrivka.[xxxviii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on March 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Minkivka, Holubivka, Pryvillya, Novomarkove, and Chasiv Yar; north of Kostyantynivka toward Malynivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Ivanopillya, and Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Illinivka and Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka, Pavlivka, and Novopavlivka on March 17 and 18.[xxxix]

Ukrainian 11th Army Corps (AC) Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on March 18 that the Russian military command wants to seize Kostyantynivka before the May 2026 holidays (likely referring to Russia's May 9 Victory Day holiday) and start fighting for Slovyansk and Kramatorsk in Summer 2026.[xl] Zaporozhets stated that Russian forces have intensified assaults, artillery selling, and tactical aviation, striking over 100 times per day in the Slovyansk direction. Zaporozhets reported that Russian forces have separately increased the use of first-person view (FPV) drones, launching over 400 FPV drones daily as well as fiber optic drone ambushes.

A Ukrainian battalion commander operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on March 18 that Russian forces are increasingly using servicemembers from occupied Ukraine in the Kostyantynivka direction.[xli] The commander noted that over 40 percent of Russian forces are from occupied Crimea or Zaporizhia Oblast.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[xlii]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Dobropillya near Dorozhnie; east of Dobropillya near Nove Shakhove, Novyi Donbas, Toretske, and Vilne; and northeast of Dobropillya near Kucheriv Yar on March 17 and 18 but did not advance.[xliii]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 17 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Zatyshok (northeast of Pokrovsk).[xliv]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; northeast of Pokrovsk near Zatyshok; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Shevchenko and Novooleksandrivka; west of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Kotlyne, Molodetske, and Novopidhorodne on March 17 and 18.[xlv]

Russian forces are increasingly conducting motorized and limited mechanized assaults in the Pokrovsk direction. Ukraine's 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on March 18 that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Myrnohrad with two armored fighting vehicles and that Ukrainian forces destroyed both vehicles.[xlvi] The corps reported that Ukrainian forces also repelled a Russian assault with 13 motorcycles against Hryshyne - the first observed Russian motorcycle assault against the settlement since early December 2025. The corps reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed nine motorcycles on the settlement's outskirts and four more within the settlement. Ukraine's East Group of Forces reported that Russian forces also attacked with 14 motorcycles and two Lada Nivas toward Kotlyne on March 17 and that Ukrainian forces destroyed all the vehicles.[xlvii]

A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are using well-equipped and better-trained infantry in attacks after previously using poorly trained soldiers to attack.[xlviii] The servicemember assessed that Russian forces are rotating forces and will likely conduct more "professional" attacks going forward. The servicemember noted that the number of Russian attacks had decreased from 50 or more before January 2026 to seven to 10 per day in February and March 2026, likely due to poor winter weather conditions and Russian efforts to accumulate forces and means after suffering heavy losses. The servicemember reported that Russian forces are trying to attack as much as possible under springtime foggy conditions.

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Svitle (north of Pokrovsk).[xlix] FPV drone operators of the 1st and 5th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions and drone launch points near Shevchenko.[l] Elements of the 24th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[li]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka and Muravka; and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and Dachne on March 17 and 18 but did not advance.[lii]

Russian forces recently infiltrated in the Oleksandrivka direction.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on March 17 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember in southern Zlahoda (south of Oleksandrivka) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA).[liii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Zelenyi Hai; east of Oleksandrivka toward Velykomykhailivka; south of Oleksandrivka near Zlahoda and Krasnohirske; and southwest of Oleksandrivka toward Boikove on March 17 and 18.[liv] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hai (south of Oleksandrivka), Velykomykhailivka, and Pokrovske (just north of Oleksandrivka).[lv]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported that the “kill zone” in which Ukrainian forces can quickly detect and strike Russian forces has expanded to about 25 kilometers.[lvi] The spokesperson stated that the side with superior communications and faster data exchange among reconnaissance and strike elements will have the battlefield advantage.

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian embarkment crossing and bridge over the Haichur River near Novoskeliuvate (southwest of Oleksandrivka).[lvii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Velykomykhailivka.[lviii]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast on the night of March 17 to 18. Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies base and a Russian drone coordination center in occupied Donetsk City.[lix] The SSO reported that Ukrainian forces also struck equipment and ammunition depots and distribution points in occupied Vilne (roughly 70 kilometers from the front). Geolocated footage of the SSO strikes confirmed strikes against northern Donetsk City and just south of Vilne.[lx]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on March 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Verkhnya Tersa, Vozdvyzhivka, Zirnytsya, Olenokostyantynivka; north of Hulyaipole near Dobropillya and Zelene; southwest of Hulyaipole near Myrne and toward Hulyaipilske; and west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne and Hirke and toward Staroukrainka on March 17 and 18.[lxi]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 57th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Zaporizhia Oblast.[lxii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 17 and 18 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked south of Orikhiv toward Novodanylivka; west of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky, Stepove, Prymorske, and Stepnohirsk; and northwest of Orikhiv near Lukyanivske and Mahdalynivka on March 17 and 18 but did not advance.[lxiii]

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults southwest of Kherson City near Bilohrudyi island on March 17 and 18 but did not advance.[lxiv]

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in and near occupied Crimea. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on March 18 that Ukrainian forces struck two Russian BK-16 high-speed landing craft and a Valdai radar in occupied Crimea between March 1 to 14.[lxv] Geolocated footage shows Ukrainian forces striking the Russian Valdai radar north of Prymorskyi (roughly 275 kilometers from the frontline), as well as infrastructure for a Russian satellite calibration station northwest of Vitnye (roughly 150 kilometers from the frontline), and a  Russian jamming station vehicle in Katsiveli (roughly 270 kilometers from the frontline).[lxvi]

The Atesh Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan group reported that its agents disabled a diesel train on the night of March 17 to 18, blocking supplies to Russian forces operating the Zaporizhia direction.[lxvii]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 17 to 18. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 147 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones — of which over 70 were Shaheds — from the directions of Oryol, Kursk, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[lxviii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 128 drones; that 15 drones struck 12 locations; and that drone debris fell at three locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck railway, civilian, energy, and critical infrastructure in Chernihiv, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts.[lxix] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones hit a diesel locomotive in Chernihiv Oblast.[lxx]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.