Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 9, 2026

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The Kremlin is seeking to delegitimize the results of Armenia’s June 8 parliamentary elections, in which Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's Civil Contract Party won a majority of the vote. Pashinyan’s Civil Contract Party won the Armenian general election on June 7 with 49.82 percent of the vote.[i] Russian government officials and Russian milbloggers emphasized false narratives on June 8 and 9 to delegitimize the Civil Contract Party’s win, by claiming that Pashinyan lost the election as he did not secure more than 50 percent of the vote, that Armenia held elections under intense pressure from the West and domestic opposition suppression, and alleged that the election featured mass election interference and fraud.[ii] The head of the Russian Federal Agency for Fishery Rosrybolovstvo also released a warning on June 8 that Russia will increase restrictions on fish imports from Armenia if “veterinary risks” arise, attempting to threaten Armenia with economic punishment for distancing itself from Russia.[iii] Russian officials are likely attempting to delegitimize Pashinyan's victory as Pashinyan has recently begun distancing Armenian connections and cooperation with Russia and no longer represents or serves the Kremlin’s interests in Armenia. Armenia's Civil Contract Party has been reorienting itself and its policies away from Russia and toward the EU in recent months and has sought to reduce Armenia's participation in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).[iv]  The Kremlin engaged in a similar delegitimization campaign following Maia Sandu's victory in the Moldovan Presidential elections in 2024.[v] The Kremlin emphasized similar narratives of election fraud, suppression of opposition, and “illegitimate” results, suggesting that Sandu’s victory materialized only after counting Western diaspora ballots.[vi] The Kremlin continues spreading false narrative of stolen elections in post-Soviet states when those results to not favor Russian interests.

The Russian military command reportedly prohibited military cargo traffic along Russia’s main highway connecting mainland Russia to Crimea due to Ukrainian strikes. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on June 9 that the Russian military command of the Eastern Grouping of Forces (GoF) issued a decree on June 6 prohibiting military cargo traffic along the M-14 Rostov-Crimea (which Russian occupation officials denote as the R-280) and the A-291 Kerch - Simferopol - Sevastopol Tavrida highways starting on June 7.[vii] The M-14 is Russia’s main supply route connecting mainland Russia to occupied Crimea through occupied southern Ukraine. Brovdi reported that the Russian military command banned logistics traffic along these roads for safety reasons due to Ukrainian fire control over these highways. This reported restriction follows Russian occupation officials‘ earlier restrictions against commercial passenger transport vehicles’ use of the M-14 highway and the section of the Belgorod City-Mariupol (R-150) highway that runs through occupied Luhansk Oblast.[viii] Ukraine’s expanding intermediate-range strike campaign against Russia’s major ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and against railway infrastructure in occupied Ukraine since Spring 2026 are disrupting Russia’s military logistics and are very likely degrading sustainment for Russian frontline forces — an effect which will likely continue to mature in the near future or until Russian forces develop countermeasures.[ix] Ukraine will likely further expand and intensify its intermediate-range strike campaign, which will likely have cascading effects on Russian offensive operations in the coming months, especially as Ukraine’s efforts to shape the battlefield mature.

Unknown actors conducted a car bomb attack in Balashikha, Moscow City, that reportedly killed a high-ranking Russian officer. Geolocated footage published on June 9 shows a car exploding in Balashikha - a suburb of Moscow City that houses Russian military personnel and several official Russian military facilities.[x] The car bomb attack occurred within a kilometer of the 26th Central Research Institute of the Russian Ministry of Defense, within five kilometers of the Military Academy of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, and within five kilometers of a training center of the Russian Federal Protective Service - the federal service responsible for protecting high-ranking Russian government officials.[xi] The Russian Investigative Committee (Sledkom) claimed that the footage suggests the explosive device was on the outside of the vehicle and that the explosion killed the driver.[xii] Russian insider source VChK-OGPU claimed that the explosion killed the Head of the Main Missile and Artillery directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) Colonel Damir Davydov.[xiii] Other sources speculated that the attack alternatively killed Chief of the General Staff and First Deputy Commander in Chief of the Aerospace forces (VKS) Lieutenant General Alexander Maksimtsev.[xiv] A similar improvised explosive device (IED) attack killed the deputy head of the Russian General Staff’s Main Operational Directorate, Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik, in Balashikha in April 2025.[xv]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin is seeking to delegitimize the results of Armenia’s June 8 parliamentary elections, in which Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's Civil Contract Party won a majority of the vote.
• The Russian military command reportedly prohibited military cargo traffic along Russia’s main highway connecting mainland Russia to Crimea due to Ukrainian strikes.
• Unknown actors conducted a car bomb attack in Balashikha, Moscow City, that reportedly killed a high-ranking Russian officer.
• Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets on June 8 and June 9. Russian forces launched two Kh-59/69 cruise missiles and 166 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova and the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets on June 8 and overnight on June 8 to 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 9 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot near Prokhorovka, Belgorod Oblast.[xvi]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Sumy City on June 8 and 9 but did not make confirmed advances.[xvii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Bachivsk (northwest of Sumy City and approximately 5 kilometers from the international border), in eastern Pysarivka and south of Korchakivka (both north of Sumy City) and that Russian forces seized Zapisillya and Myropillya (northeast of Sumy City).[xviii]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military setts on June 8 and overnight on June 8 to 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 9 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian personnel concentration and a drone control point near Iskra, Kursk Oblast (north of Sumy City).[xix]

Russian forces are failing to rotate positions in Sumy Oblast. The commander of a Ukrainian artillery battalion operating in the North Slobozhansk direction reported on June 9 that Ukrainian radio intercepts indicate that forces are promising Russian servicemembers that they will rotate positions but failing to execute the rotations.[xx] The officer stated that Russian forces are using manpower rather than unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to deliver logistics to the frontline.

The commander of a Ukrainian artillery battalion operating in the North Slobozhansk direction reported on June 9 that Russian forces are using satellite and radio for communication rather than fiber optic lines on this section of the frontline.[xxi]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 9 but did not make confirmed advances.[xxii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Shevchenka (north of Kharkiv City) and east of Karaichne (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xxiii]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on June 9 that the Vovchansk direction is stable.[xxiv]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets on June 8 and overnight on June 8 to 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 9 that Ukrainian forces struck a drone control point in Naumovka, Belgorod Oblast (north of Kharkiv City).[xxv]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on June 9.

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on June 9 that Velykyi Burluk is calm and that Russian forces are trying to hold on to the positions they already control in this direction.[xxvi]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 8 and 9 but did not make confirmed advances.[xxvii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Kurylivka (southeast of Kharkiv City).[xxviii]

Russian forces continued infiltration missions from multiple directions near Kupyansk. Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on June 9 that Russian forces are conducting infiltration missions on the left bank of the Oskil River and pressing forward on the right bank near Holubivka (north of Kupyansk) and the northern outskirts of Kupyansk.[xxix] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that the Russian command is deploying troops to fill gaps in the Kupyansk direction but also tasking elements of units with various different tasks without giving them sufficient time to become effective.[xxx]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction. Geolocated footage published on June 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced near Karpivka, east of Serednie, and northwest of Zelena Dolyna (all southeast of Borova).[xxxi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Zahryzove (northeast of Borova).[xxxii]

A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Hrekivka (southeast of Borova).[xxxiii]

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian warehouse in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 9 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian material and technical warehouse near occupied Mykhailivka (roughly 71 kilometers from the frontline).[xxxiv] Geolocated imagery published on June 8 shows a fire and explosions at an ammunition depot in Mykhailivka.[xxxv]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strikes against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on June 9 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian electrical substation near occupied Lysychansk (approximately 35 kilometers from the frontline), an electrical substation and gas infrastructure near occupied Luhansk City (approximately 104 kilometers from the frontline), and an electrical substation and fuel and lubricants tanks near occupied Sievierodonetsk (approximately 43 kilometers from the frontline).[xxxvi] Satellite imagery published on June 8 shows damage to a power station after a Ukrainian strike west of occupied Lozivskyi (approximately 80 kilometers from the frontline).[xxxvii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on June 9 but did not make confirmed advance.[xxxviii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Lyman.[xxxix]

Russian forces are sending non-infantry servicemembers to conduct assaults in the Lyman direction. The battle captain of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on June 9 that Russian forces are sending logistics workers, repairmen, and other non-infantry personnel to advance because Russian forces cannot bring enough infantry to the frontline to conduct assaults.[xl] The officer reported that Russian officers lie to their superiors and that the Russian command keeps ordering Russian forces to advance.

Russian forces are intensifying their assaults in the Lyman directions as Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs). Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported January 9 that Russian forces are intensifying assaults in the Lyman direction.[xli] Trehubov reported that Ukrainian forces are inflicting 200-250 casualties a day on Russian forces across the Velykyi Burkluk, Kupyansk, Borova, and Lyman directions and that Russian forces rarely send servicemembers to evacuate wounded Russian soldiers. Trehubov reported that Russian and Ukrainian forces are striking each other’s GLOCs but Ukrainian forces currently have the advantage due to their superior intermediate-range strike capabilities.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 9 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian material and technical warehouse near Fedorivka (southeast of Slovyansk) on June 8 or the night of June 8 to 9.[xlii]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area as Russian forces infiltrated into Kostyantynivka itself. Geolocated footage published on June 7 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in northwestern Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[xliii] Geolocated footage published on June 8 shows Russian forces operating in and near buildings in Western Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[xliv] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Stinky (north of Kostyantynivka), west of Kostyantynivka, north of Illinivka (south of Kostyantynivka), and east of Pavlivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[xlv] Geolocated footage published on June 4 and 7 shows Ukrainian forces operating in eastern and western Kostyantynivka in areas where Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces maintained a presence.[xlvi]

Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on June 9 that Ukrainian forces struck a command and observation post of a unit of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies on June 9 in Shevchenko Pershe (southeast of Kostyantynivka, roughly 10 kilometers from the frontline).[xlvii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 9 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian personnel concentrations near Stupochky (east of Kostyantynivka) on June 8 or the night of June 8 to 9.[xlviii]

A Russian milblogger claimed June 9 that Russian forces are struggling to operate in Kostyantynivka as Ukrainian forces are counterattacking and striking Russian logistics with drones.[xlix]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on June 9 but did not advance.[l]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 9 but did not advance.[li]

Russian forces are using single-shot analogues of the GRAD multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) in the Pokrovsk direction due to shortages of regular MLRS. The spokesperson for the Ukrainian 7th Corps operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on June 9 that Russian forces began to use a single-charge “Capricorn” rocket launcher, indicating that Russian forces do not have sufficient MLRS and struggle to move them around the frontline.[lii]

The kill zone in the Pokrovsk direction exceeds 15 kilometers. The chief of staff of a Ukrainian anti-aircraft missile and artillery battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on June 9 that Ukrainian and Russian forces have created a kill zone — an area of elevated drone strike risk — stretching over 15 kilometers from the frontline in either direction.[liii] The kill zone is not uniform in depth in all areas of the theater, with the kill zone being narrower in some sectors of the front, and deeper in others.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions on June 9 but did not advance.[liv]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 9 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration point near Novohryhorivka (southeast of Oleksandrivka) on June 8 or overnight on June 8 to 9.[lv]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate range strike campaign against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on June 9 that Ukrainian forces struck a temporary deployment point of the Russian 228th Motorized Rifle Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st Combined Arms Army (CAA), Central Military District [CMD]) in occupied Kurakhove (roughly 32 kilometers from the frontline) and electrical substations in occupied Mariupol (roughly 107 kilometers from the frontline) and Makiivka (roughly 58 kilometers from the frontline).[lvi] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 9 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian personnel concentrations near occupied Kurakhove (roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline), Kalynove (roughly 85 kilometers from the frontline), and Shevchenko (one of several settlements between 70 and 124 kilometers from the frontline) on June 8 or the night of June 8 to 9.[lvii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on June 9 but did not advance.[lviii]

Russian forces conducted limited ground operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 9 but did not advance.[lix]

Russian forces continue targeted first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against Ukrainian civilians. Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov reported on June 8 that Russian forces conducted an FPV drone strike against a minibus in the Khortyts’kyy Raion of Zaporizhia City, killing two civilians and injuring at least 15.[lx] Russian forces regularly conduct  “human safari” strikes across the frontline – using tactical drones to “hunt” civilians and civilian infrastructure.[lxi] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are expanding their use of the ”human safari” tactics they developed in Kherson Oblast to other reaches of the frontline.[lxii]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast on the night of June 8 to 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 9 that Ukrainian forces struck a material and technical warehouse near occupied Hyunivka (roughly 58 or 32 kilometers from the frontline).[lxiii] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on June 9 that Ukrainian forces struck two Russian P-19 Terek radar systems in occupied Sofiivka (roughly 78 kilometers from the frontline) and Ivanivka (one of several settlements between 26 and 78 kilometers from the frontline).[lxiv]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on June 9.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 9 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone command center in Oleshky (east of Kherson City) on June 8 or overnight on June 8 to 9.[lxv]

Ukrainian forces struck the Chonhar Bridge, which connects occupied Kherson Oblast to occupied Crimea, for the second time since June 7. The Commander of a Ukrainian regiment reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Chonhar Bridge on the night of June 7 to 8 and launched a second strike against the bridge on June 9.[lxvi] The commander stated that Russian forces use the bridge to deliver ammunition and fuel from occupied Crimea and supply Russian forces fighting in the Hulyaipole direction. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo temporarily closed traffic on June 9 across the Chonhar Bridge due to damages following the Ukrainian strike.[lxvii] Saldo previously closed the bridge and reopened it on June 7 and 8, respectively.[lxviii]

Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razovozhaev stated on June 9 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) increase one-time regional payments for Crimean residents signing contracts with the MoD to 2.5 million rubles (roughly $34,700) from the previous 1.5 million rubles (roughly $20,800).[lxix]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 8 to 9. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from Voronezh oblast and 166 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and Italmas-type strike drones, Banderol-type loitering munitions, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea; and occupied Donetsk Oblast.[lxx] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 146 drones, that the two cruise missiles and 17 drones struck 18 locations, and that debris fell on eight locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged residential, commercial, and energy infrastructure in Chernihiv and Kharkiv oblasts.[lxxi]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.