Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 3, 2026

Assessment as of: 7:45 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 12:30 PM ET

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The Russian ultranationalist community presented extreme and unrealistic scenarios for Russia’s military and geopolitical future at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) that likely somewhat differ from the Kremlin's positions. Russian business newspaper Kommersant reported on June 3 that Kremlin-affiliated Russian oligarch and Orthodox nationalist Konstantin Malofeev and Russian ultranationalist ideologue Alexander Dugin presented several “future scenarios” for Russia at SPIEF.[1] The presentation slides outlined “good,” "inertial" (continuing), and “bad” scenarios for 2036 and 2050 and divided perceived threats to Russia into five categories, including geopolitics, ideology and politics, demography, economy, and technologies. The “good” scenario includes the Russian occupation of Kyiv, Odesa, Kharkiv, and other Ukrainian cities and the collapse of the European Union (EU) by 2036 and other Russian narratives about alleged imminent victory in Ukraine. The presentation’s “bad” scenario included a Russian military defeat in Ukraine, Ukraine joining NATO, the loss of Russian influence over post-Soviet countries by 2036, and the “colonization of Russia” by 2050. The presentation’s "continuing" 2036 scenario speculated that Russia would use nuclear weapons if the military situation in Ukraine remained the same, effectively threatening that Russia will use nuclear weapons against Ukraine if the war in Ukraine continues its current path. Malofeev also spoke about the potential actions of Russia and Russian “enemies” and outlined the threat dynamics from 2000 until 2026. Dugin noted that his ultranationalist think tank Tsargrad Institute also presented the “future scenarios” report at the Russian forces' General Staff Academy and will publish the report by the end of 2026. Malofeev and Dugin are part of an ultranationalist hardline community in Russia that has continuously advocated for a protracted war in Ukraine and are likely presenting the report at SPIEF to outline their personal goals and the goals of the hardliners they represent for Russia's future.[2] The Kremlin may use the unrealistic nature of these three scenarios to portray Russian President Vladimir Putin’s and other government officials' rhetoric as moderate and reasonable in comparison to the extreme scenarios presented by a small cadre of ultranationalists. The Kremlin will likely have to strike a balance between the demands and expectations of the Russian ultranationalist community, with its own rhetoric and the battlefield realities in Ukraine, however, as Putin likely does not want to risk losing the support of the ultranationalists.

Ukrainian forces conducted a series of long-range strikes against Russian military assets and oil infrastructure in St. Petersburg, coinciding with the first day of SPIEF. The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on June 3 that Ukrainian forces struck the Baltic Fleet's Project 20380 Boykiy Steregushchiy-class corvette stationed at the Kronstadt Naval Base in St. Petersburg.[3] Geolocated footage published on June 3 shows a column of smoke rising from the Kronstadt Naval Base following the Ukrainian strike.[4] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the St. Petersburg Oil Terminal, causing a fire.[5] Geolocated footage published on June 3 shows the aftermath of Ukrainian strikes on the St. Petersburg Oil Terminal.[6] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that the terminal is one of the largest oil transfer complexes in the Baltic Sea and has a capacity of 10 million tons per year. Brovdi noted that this is the 20th Ukrainian strike against oil refining infrastructure in St. Petersburg since May 1, 2026.[7] Leningrad Oblast Governor Aleksandr Drozdenko confirmed that Ukrainian drones struck infrastructure facilities in Kronstadt, as well as Kirovsky and Krasnoselsky raions.[8] Ukrainian forces have significantly increased the frequency, range, and intensity of strikes against Russian oil infrastructure deep in the Russian rear since March 2026, creating outsized impacts on Russian oil exports and refining capacity.[9] The Kremlin has historically capitalized on SPIEF to project economic strength and power to global audiences, and Ukrainian strikes against St. Petersburg on the first day of SPIEF undercut this Russian narrative. Ukrainian long-range strikes over 1,000 kilometers from the international border continue to demonstrate how Ukraine is bringing Russia's war closer to home, disrupting events that the Kremlin has historically capitalized on.[10]

Russian officials have recently intensified a pattern of weaponizing alleged Ukrainian strikes on civilian targets to justify devastating strikes on Ukraine under the guise of retaliation. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed on June 3 that Ukrainian forces struck a civilian bus on the Moscow-Simferopol route in occupied Yenakiyeve (roughly 35 kilometers from the frontline), killing eight civilians and injuring 11 others.[11] Geolocated footage published on June 3 shows the aftermath of a drone strike on the bus in occupied Yenakiyeve.[12] Russian officials claimed that Ukrainian forces deliberately struck the bus to cause civilian casualties and threatened that Russia could conduct a retaliatory military response.[13] Ukrainian officials have not commented on the alleged strike, and ISW is unable to verify Russian claims regarding the strike. Russia made claims about the alleged strike in occupied Yenakiyeve one day after the Kremlin launched another devastating drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of June 1 to 2 that killed at least 22 civilians and injured at least 130.[14] The Kremlin has started to use claims about Ukraine’s alleged strikes against civilians to justify massive strike packages against Ukraine that the Kremlin intended to conduct regardless of Ukrainian actions, causing extensive damage to civilian infrastructure and resulting in high civilian casualties.[15] Russia is likely prioritizing such devastating strikes in part to obfuscate its ongoing battlefield challenges and is likely using these accusations in an attempt to shroud these strikes in a fabricated veneer of legitimacy.

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian ultranationalist community presented extreme and unrealistic scenarios for Russia’s military and geopolitical future at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) that likely somewhat differ from the Kremlin's positions.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a series of long-range strikes against Russian military assets and oil infrastructure in St. Petersburg, coinciding with the first day of SPIEF.
• Russian officials have recently intensified a pattern of weaponizing alleged Ukrainian strikes on civilian targets to justify devastating strikes on Ukraine under the guise of retaliation.
• Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances throughout the theater in the past day.  
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and oil infrastructure on June 3. Russian forces launched 198 drones toward Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text for reports on Ukrainian strikes against Leningrad Oblast.

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and oil infrastructure on the night of June 2 to 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 3 that Ukrainian forces struck the Michurinsk Progress Plant in Tambov Oblast, which produces components for high-precision weapons, causing a fire at the plant.[16] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the plant specializes in producing parts for control systems for Russian aviation and missile technology, including gyroscopic stabilization devices, autopilots, and navigation equipment. Tambov Oblast Governor Yevgeny Pervyshov acknowledged that Ukrainian forces struck Tambov Oblast on the night of June 3.[17]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukraine's June 2 strikes against Ilsky Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai damaged the technological overpass, the AVT primary oil processing unit, and two RVS-5000 tanks.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukraine's June 2 strike against the Zenzevatka oil pumping station, Volgograd Oblast, forced the station to stop pumping.[19]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations north and northeast of Sumy City on June 3 but did not advance.[20]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 3 but did not advance.[21]

A servicemember from a Ukrainian drone brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction reported on June 3 that Russian forces are concentrating troops and equipment in the Vovchansk direction in preparation for an intensified offensive effort in summer 2026.[22] The servicemember stated that Russian forces are using the month of June to test Ukrainian defenses and find weaknesses.

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on June 3.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Kupyansk direction. Geolocated footage published on June 2 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in Novoosynove (southeast of Kupyansk) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[23]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 3 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks south of Borova.[24]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 3 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian fuel and lubricants depot near occupied Bilolutsk (roughly 83 kilometers from the frontline).[25]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Slovyansk direction as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[26] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets published a report that indicates that Russian forces recently infiltrated southeastern Lyman and the fields north of Dibrova (southeast of Lyman).[27] Mashovets’ report indicates that Ukrainian forces recently either maintained positions or advanced east of Oleksandrivka and in Sosnove, Pryshyb, Novoselivka, Yarova (all northwest of Lyman), Drobysheve (north of Lyman), Svyatohirsk (north of Slovyansk), Staryi Karavan, and Brusivka (both south of Lyman).[28] Geolocated footage published on June 3 shows Ukrainian forces operating in northern Nykyforivka (southeast of Slovyansk) in an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[29]

Russian forces appear to be replicating aspects of their unsuccessful 2022 campaign to encircle the Slovyansk area under even less advantageous circumstances. Mashovets reported on June 3 that the Russian 20th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) and 25th CAA (Central Military District [CMD]) have been bogged down trying to encircle Lyman.[30] Mashovets reported that the Russian military command has reinforced the 20th and 25th CAAs with forces and assets from the 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, MMD) and tasked the armies with encircling Lyman from the north/northwest and south/southeast, respectively.[31] Mashovets reported that the 20th CAA failed in its attempts to seize Drobysheve and Novoselivka and advance toward Oleksandrivka and that Ukrainian forces cleared Russian infiltration groups from Yarova. Mashovets reported that elements of the 25th CAA failed in their attempts to recapture positions near Ozerne (east of Slovyansk) and Yampil (southeast of Lyman) and have only been able to establish positions near Dibrova. Mashovets noted that Russian forces hold positions along the T-05-13 Lyman-Zakitne road but face intense flanking pressure from Ukrainian forces. Mashovets reported that Russian forces have failed to infiltrate into all but a small, isolated section of Lyman in the southeast of the city and that Russian reports that Russian forces established positions in northern and northeastern Lyman are false.

Mashovets reported that the 20th and 25th CAAs’ failures are creating complications for other Russian units in the area and are impeding the Russian spring-summer 2026 offensive toward Slovyansk and Kramatorsk.[32] Mashovets reported that the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces will have to attack Slovyansk directly from the east if encirclement efforts fail, which will reduce their chances of success. Mashovets further stated that the Russian 3rd Motorized Rifle Division and elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (both 20th CAA) are operating toward Borova rather than toward Lyman because of Russian forces’ failures to secure Lyman.

Mashovets reported that Russian forces seek to advance along the entire area from Borova to Zakitne (northeast of Slovyansk, a frontage of roughly 60 kilometers) and to penetrate approximately 35 kilometers.[33] Mashovets reported that the 20th CAA is impaled on too many tactical tasks to accomplish its goals, including advancing toward Svyatohirsk (north of Slovyansk) and Oleksandrivka, the northern and northeastern outskirts of Lyman, Borova, and Oskil (northwest of Lyman). Mashovets reported that the 25th CAA also lacks sufficient forces to accomplish its task of leading the Russian advance toward Lyman.

Current Russian efforts to secure positions north, northeast, and east of Lyman are reminiscent of the Russian summer 2022 campaign, which sought to broadly encircle the city from Lyman in the northeast and Izyum in the northwest.[34] The Russian frontline in this direction, as of June 2026, however, is much less advantageous than the summer 2022 frontline, from which Russian forces ultimately lost both Izyum and Lyman during Ukraine's fall 2022 lightning counteroffensive.[35] Russian forces’ floundering attempt to encircle Lyman and advance on Slovyansk demonstrates that the Russian military command has been unable to recognize and adapt to Russian operational failures and that the Russian military command may believe that it can achieve unrealistic battlefield goals despite Russia’s decline in battlefield performance in 2026.[36] The Russian Summer 2026 offensive is exceedingly unlikely to achieve significant tactical, much less operational, gains in the Slovyansk direction.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on June 3 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[37]

Russian forces have committed several potential war crimes in the Kostyantynivka direction in recent days. Head of the Proliska humanitarian mission Yevhen Kaplin reported on June 3 that Russian forces struck a clearly marked humanitarian evacuation vehicle in the Druzhkivka direction with a first-person view (FPV) drone.[38] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on June 3, and geolocated footage confirms, that Russian forces struck northwestern Kostyantynivka with a white phosphorus munition.[39] Protocol III of the Convention on Conventional Weapons prohibits the use of incendiary weapons, such as white phosphorus, against civilian targets or in areas with concentrations of civilians.[40] Russian forces have notably previously used white phosphorus and incendiary munitions, likely in violation of international law, in Ukraine.[41]

Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces struck Kramatorsk with a FAB-250 glide bomb on June 3, killing three people and injuring four.[42]

Russian forces continued limited ground operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on June 3 but did not advance.[43]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 3 but did not advance.[44]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions on June 3 but did not advance.[45]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in the Hulyaipole direction. Geolocated footage published on June 3 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in central Dobropillya (northwest of Hulyaipole) and southwest of Hulyaipilske (southwest of Hulyaipole) after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[46] Geolocated footage published on June 2 shows Ukrainian forces operating northeast of Hulyaipilske in an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[47]

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on June 3 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in northern Stepnohirsk (northwest of Orikhiv) after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[48]

Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian logistics in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast as part of their intermediate-range strike campaign. Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported on June 3 that a Ukrainian regiment struck the Russian "Leonid Pestrykov" dry cargo in the port of occupied Berdyansk (approximately 105 kilometers from the frontline.[49] Geolocated footage published on June 3 shows the aftermath of a reported Ukrainian drone strike on a Russian fuel truck on the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway (which Russian occupation officials denote as the R-280 highway) near occupied Prymorsk (roughly 90 kilometers from the frontline).[50]

Ukrainian sources provided battle damage assessments (BDA) of recent Ukrainian strikes in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 3 that Ukraine's May 30 strike against the Primorsky Posad Training Ground in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast inflicted at least 30 Russian personnel losses and destroyed personnel shelters at the camp.[51] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi noted on May 30 that the training ground belongs to the Russian 36th CAA (Eastern Military District [EMD]) in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast, where elements of the Russian 64th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) were training.[52]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge on June 3 but did not advance.[53]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate- and long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 3 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian RBSN-4N short-range navigation radio system at the Saki airfield near occupied Novofedorivka (approximately 185 kilometers from the frontline).[54] Brovdi clarified on June 2 that the vessel Ukrainian forces struck near occupied Mizhovodne (roughly 115 kilometers from the frontline) was a Project 1454 special tugboat and the command post Ukrainian forces struck in the same area belonged to the Russian 1st Division of the 92nd Riverboat Brigade (Dnieper Flotilla, Russian Black Sea Fleet).[55]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 2 to 3. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 198 Shahed, Gerbera, Italmas, and Parodiya drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[56] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 189 drones, that eight drones struck seven locations, and that debris fell on seven locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces also struck Kharkiv and Odesa oblasts.[57] Zaporizhia Oblast State Emergency Services reported on June 3 that Russian forces conducted a double-tap missile strike against a fire station in Zaporizhia Oblast, killing a rescue worker who was responding to the aftermath of an earlier Russian strike.[58]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Russia and Belarus continue bilateral military cooperation. Russian President Vladimir Putin held a phone conversation on June 2 with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko to discuss bilateral cooperation.[59] The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 2 that Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin led a military delegation to Moscow City to discuss Russian-Belarusian military cooperation, visit a Russian defense industry facility, and participate in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Ministers of Defense meeting.[60]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.