Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 22, 2025

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15 am ET on June 22. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 23 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russia condemned the recent US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22 amid reports that Iran's foreign minister will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on June 23. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) condemned the US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22, claiming that the US strikes are a violation of the UN Charter and that the UN Security Council is obliged to respond, while urging officials to return to diplomatic channels.[1] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that that the world will descend into chaos if countries are allowed to interpret the right to self-defense in the UN Charter as they wish.[2] Lavrov claimed that the US strikes marked a new, dangerous escalation during a phone call with Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó on June 22.[3] CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) and Presidential Special Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries Kirill Dmitriev claimed on June 22 that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi is en route to Moscow and will meet with Putin on June 23.[4] Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev responded to the US strike in social media posts, including on his English-language channels, on June 22 by claiming that US President Donald Trump has started a new war.[5] Medvedev also claimed that the United States failed to destroy Iran's nuclear capabilities, that Iran will continue to work towards the production of nuclear weapons, and that several unspecified countries are ready to "directly supply" Iran with nuclear warheads. The Kremlin typically leverages Medvedev to amplify narratives intended to stoke panic and fear among Western decisionmakers, particularly through nuclear saber rattling.[6] Medvedev's veiled threats thus do not represent a significant rhetorical inflection. ISW continues to assess that Russia is constrained in its ability to provide direct support to Iran due to its war in Ukraine and has likely resigned itself to providing diplomatic overtures for the time being, showcasing the immediate limitations in the Russian-Iranian strategic relationship.[7]

Iran's possible decision to close the Strait of Hormuz will cause a significant spike in global oil prices, which would greatly economically and financially benefit Russia by reversing months of declining Russian oil revenue and allowing Russia to continue to finance its war against Ukraine in the medium term. Brent crude oil futures prices closed at $77.27 on June 20, marking an 11.4 percent rise from June 12 just prior to the Israeli strikes against Iran.[8] Iran’s Parliament voted on June 22 to close the Strait, but the final decision remains with Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.[9] Oil prices will likely surge exponentially in the event that Iran closes the Strait of Hormuz, with varying reports predicting a spike to prices between $90 to $130 in a worst-case scenario.[10] Russia’s oil and gas revenue amounted to 11.1 trillion rubles ($120.3 billion) in 2024 and accounted for roughly 30 percent of Russia's total federal revenues. Russian oil revenue has been steadily decreasing through 2025 however, with May 2025 revenues notably 34 percent lower than in 2024.[11] The Russian Finance Ministry more than tripled its budget deficit target for 2025 in May from 0.5 percent of Global Domestic Product (GDP) to 1.7 percent of GDP after several months of staggeringly low oil and gas profits.[12] The Moscow Times stated on June 9 that, according to economists from the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Russia’s high expenditures and low oil revenues could exhaust the National Wealth Fund (NWF) by 2026.[13] The Kremlin relies on the NWF and oil and gas revenues to finance its war in Ukraine, as the Russian government allocated 41 percent (roughly $178 billion) of Russia’s total 2025 federal budget towards National Security and Defense alone.[14] ISW previously assessed that Russia’s high losses on the battlefield and ongoing economic constraints could prevent Russia from continuing the war in Ukraine in the medium to long term, however a sustained surge in oil prices could keep Russia afloat economically.[15]

Russian forces have continued to pursue long-standing operational objectives on the battlefield in Ukraine throughout Spring and Summer 2025 and will likely remain committed to these objectives for the coming months. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi told journalists on June 22 that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast and continued Ukrainian counterattacks in northern Sumy Oblast prevented the Russian military from redeploying 60,000 troops from Kursk Oblast to reinforce offensive operations in the Lyman, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson directions in Spring 2025.[16] Syrskyi noted that Ukraine prevented Russia from significantly intensifying offensive operations in these directions. A prominent Russian milblogger acknowledged on June 22 that Russia's "summer offensive" has mainly consisted of the same grinding offensive operations that Russian forces began in late 2023.[17] The milblogger claimed that the situation along the frontline is unlikely to significantly change during Summer 2025 and noted that Ukrainian forces are conducting an organized defense throughout the frontline.

Russian forces are currently engaged in intense combat operations along most of the frontline in Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts and appear to be prioritizing offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast - as they have since October 2023.[18] Russian forces intensified the tempo of offensive operations in early 2025 as the United States began to engage in efforts to mediate a resolution to the war in Ukraine, and Russian forces have sustained this intensified tempo over the last five months.[19] Russian forces previously struggled to conduct simultaneous large-scale offensive operations and compensated by conducting pulsing, more limited, offensive operations along different sectors of the frontline with one sector decreasing in intensity as another sector increases.[20] Russian forces currently appear to be advancing as part of at least three simultaneous large-scale offensive operations in the Borova-Lyman, Kostyantynivka, and Novopavlivka directions, however. Russian forces also appear to be allocating significant manpower to offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast, although Ukrainian forces appear to be slowing Russian gains in that area.[21] Russian forces have failed to make significant gains during this period of intensified offensive operations, however, due in part to the fact that Russian forces are largely relying on poorly trained infantry to make gains in the face of Ukraine's drone-based defense. The continuation of Russia's intensified offensive operations likely represents the extent of Russia's current offensive capacity, and Russia is unlikely to mount a distinct summer offensive operation.

Russia's intensified force generation efforts appear to be generating a reserve force that Russia will be able to leverage in Ukraine or against NATO in the future, despite current limitations on Russia's offensive capacity in Ukraine. Syrskyi stated on June 22 that the Russian military has approximately 695,000 troops stationed in Ukraine (including Russia's operational reserves) and that Russia has 13 divisions and an unspecified number of regiments and brigades (totaling roughly 121,000 troops) in its strategic reserve.[22] ISW previously noted that recent Kremlin statements indicate that the Russian military may be generating enough forces to replace personnel losses and reinforce the size of the Russian force grouping in Ukraine despite taking significant casualties in Ukraine.[23] Syrskyi's statements suggest that Russia is also recruiting enough forces to establish reserves not currently committed to combat, although it remains unclear if these forces are truly committable throughout the theater or if Russia intends to use the forces in a specific priority sector. Russian forces are unlikely to commit this entire reserve to the frontline in Ukraine in the near future, however. Russian forces already appear to have manpower advantage in their priority frontline areas and are mainly struggling with overcoming the 15-20 kilometer-wide contested "gray zone" that Russian and Ukrainian drone operations have created — something that a significant influx of manpower is unlikely to help address.

Russia may intend to withhold most of these forces from combat in Ukraine in preparation for a future war with a NATO member state. Syrskyi noted that Russia is preparing for a protracted war of attrition and that Russia will try to "exhaust" Ukraine with manpower advantage.[24] Syrskyi noted that Ukraine is maintaining defensive operations and conducting counterattacks in vulnerable areas of the frontline. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha reported on June 13 that Ukrainian intelligence suggests that Russia has started preparing strategic reserves, likely to use in combat operations "not only in Ukraine."[25] ISW previously assessed that the Russian military may be prioritizing recruitment as part of longer-term efforts to build out a post-war strategic reserve for a potential future conflict with NATO.[26] The Russian military command will likely continue to build up this reserve to use in the future against Ukraine or NATO if Russia can maintain force generation rates sufficient to replace losses in Ukraine while also building out this reserve.[27]

The Kremlin continues to promote rhetoric designed to undermine Ukrainian legitimacy and sovereignty, demonstrating its steadfast commitment to the complete destruction of Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin implied on June 22 that Ukraine was merely a construct created by Vladimir Lenin and a continuation of the Bolshevik policy on "indigenization."[28] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky echoed Putin's sentiment by stating that the Soviet Union's decision to transfer control of Crimea Oblast from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954 was not a "reunification," as "there was no Ukraine, there was no statehood."[29] These statements ignore the fact that Russia committed to respecting Ukraine’s territorial integrity, including by recognizing Crimea as part of Ukraine, in 1994 in exchange for Ukraine’s return of Soviet nuclear weapons remaining in Ukraine after the USSR’s collapse.[30] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to a question on June 22 as to why Putin often speaks about Ukraine's 2014 Revolution of Dignity as a "coup" by stating that this was the precursor to the war in Ukraine and that the West installed an illegitimate pro-Western government during this time.[31] Peskov underscored the claim that the resolution of the war in Ukraine must address the results of the "coup," which Peskov characterized as a "root cause" of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Peskov notably ignores that then-President Viktor Yanukovych fled Ukraine during the revolution, the Ukrainian parliament legally voted to remove Yanukovych, and that Ukraine held free and fair presidential elections in mid-2014.[32] ISW has reported extensively on the Kremlin's weaponization of the phrase "root cause" to allude to the unacceptable demands for regime change in Ukraine and altering of NATO's open-door policy.[33] The Kremlin's ongoing rhetorical campaign aimed at undermining Ukraine's legitimacy and sovereignty while continuing to call for the replacement of the current Ukrainian government further emphasizes that Russia maintains its maximalist goal of conquering Ukraine.

Kremlin officials are leveraging the Russian education system to indoctrinate children into the mythos of the Soviet Union's role in the Second World War and create a centralized state ideology that will shape generations in Russia and Russian-occupied Ukraine, likely to justify a protracted war in Ukraine and a future military conflict against the West. Putin met on June 22 with Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky, Moscow State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO) Rector Anatoly Torkunov, Scientific Director of the Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences Aleksandr Chubaryan, and the Minister of Education Sergei Kravtsov, who act as the editors-in-chief of the Russian Ministry of Education history textbooks for the fifth through eleventh grades, and discussed the presentation of the Second World War (referred to as the Great Patriotic War in Russia) in Russian history textbooks.[34] Putin claimed that Russian textbooks in the 1990s presented incongruous and "Russophobic" historical narratives or denied historical fact, especially about the Great Patriotic War and Russia's defeat of Nazism at significant national cost. Putin accused foreign governments of exploiting grant funding for textbooks to influence Russian historical narratives in the 1990s. Putin stated that Russia needs a unified history curriculum for children as young as preschool age. Kravtsov stated that all Russian state schools have adopted the unified history curriculum, which dedicates 30 percent of its content to the Great Patriotic War. Medinsky stated that the Ministry of Education edited the seventh-grade textbook to be "even more ideological" and reflect the fact that "there was no Ukraine, there was no statehood" before the Soviet Union. Kravtsov also stated that Russia will adopt a unified social studies textbook for the ninth through eleventh grades by September 2026. The Russian Ministry of Education will very likely distribute the new textbooks in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories, as it did in 2023 with the unified tenth- and eleventh-grade history textbooks.[35] These textbooks describe the Ukrainian government as a "neo-Nazi state" and include a chapter justifying Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The new textbooks will also support ongoing Russian efforts to leverage traditional school programs with extracurricular "military-patriotic" organizations to militarize Russian students and ensure long-term regime loyalty and stability.[36] ISW has long reported on the Kremlin's efforts to centralize control over and expand youth educational and military patriotic programs, both in Russia and in occupied Ukraine, as part of Russia's long-term force generation efforts and multi-pronged efforts to militarize Russian society.[37]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia condemned the recent US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22 amid reports that Iran's foreign minister will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on June 23.
• Iran's possible decision to close the Strait of Hormuz will cause a significant spike in global oil prices, which would greatly economically and financially benefit Russia by reversing months of declining Russian oil revenue and allowing Russia to continue to finance its war against Ukraine in the medium term.
• Russian forces have continued to pursue long-standing operational objectives on the battlefield in Ukraine throughout Spring and Summer 2025 and will likely remain committed to these objectives for the coming months.
• Russia's intensified force generation efforts appear to be generating a reserve force that Russia will be able to leverage in Ukraine or against NATO in the future, despite current limitations on Russia's offensive capacity in Ukraine.
• The Kremlin continues to promote rhetoric designed to undermine Ukrainian legitimacy and sovereignty, demonstrating its steadfast commitment to the complete destruction of Ukraine.
• Kremlin officials are leveraging the Russian education system to indoctrinate children into the mythos of the Soviet Union's role in the Second World War and create a centralized state ideology that will shape generations in Russia and Russian-occupied Ukraine, likely to justify a protracted war in Ukraine and a future military conflict against the West.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Sumy oblast. Russian forces advanced near Novopavlivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on June 22 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk Oblast on June 21 and 22.[38] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and in the general Glushkovo direction.[39]

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated on June 22 that Ukrainian deep rear strikes on Russia have inflicted ten billion dollars of damage, including 1.3 billion dollars in direct damages and another 9.5 billion dollars in indirect losses from enterprise shutdowns and disruption of transport infrastructure.[40] Syrskyi stated that Ukraine’s deep rear strikes are intended to weaken Russia’s military and economic potential and added that Ukraine spends roughly one dollar for each 15 dollars inflicted on Russian damages.

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces reported ground activity in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on June 22.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southern Andriivka (north of Sumy City).[41]

Russian forces attacked north of Sumy City near Andriivka and Kindrativka and northeast of Sumy City near Yablunivka, Yunakivka, and Sadky on June 21 and 22.[42] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka, Yablunivka, Yunakivka, Oleksiivka, Novomykolaivka (both north of Sumy City), Prokhody, and Marine (east of Sumy City just across the international border from Demidovka, Belgorod Oblast).[43]

An officer in a Ukrainian National Guard brigade operating in the Sumy direction reported that Russian forces are attempting to exploit the summer foliage in the area in order to conceal movements from Ukrainian drone operators and are not using armored vehicles.[44]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating near Pysarivka and Khotin (both north of Sumy City).[45]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 22 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City toward Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk on June 21 and 22.[46]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 22 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka, Krasne Pershe, Stroivka, Fyholivka, and Dovhenke; north of Kupyansk near Holubivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on June 21 and 22.[47]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in the Kupyansk direction with drones equipped with Groza Lezka fiber-optic control systems.[48] Drone operators of the 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], LMD) are also reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kupyansk direction.[49]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on June 22 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed on June 22 that Russian forces seized Hrekivka (southeast of Borova).[50]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Zeleny Hai and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Cherneshchyna on June 21 and 22.[51]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on June 22 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Karpivka, Novyi Myr, Zelena Dolyna, and toward Olhivka and northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka and Torske on June 21 and 22.[52]

The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian forces continue to mainly rely on infantry assaults with drone support to advance in the Lyman direction while avoiding mechanized assaults.[53] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces continue to use anti-thermal cloaks in an effort to mask their heat signatures and evade Ukrainian drone strikes during both daytime and overnight missions.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in Novyi Myr and elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA) are reportedly operating near Karpivka.[54]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on June 22 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and toward Serebryanka; east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske; and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on June 21 and 22.[55]

An officer of a Ukrainian National Guard brigade operating in the Siversk direction stated that Russian forces recently intensified assaults and drone operations in the area.[56] The officer stated that Russian forces are attacking in small tactical infantry groups on motorcycles and light armored vehicles and using fiber-optic drones to strike Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs).

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 22 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in the Shevchenko, Levanevsky, and Yuzhny microraions in southern and southwestern Chasiv Yar and near Ozaryanivka (southeast of Chasiv Yar).[57]

Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar itself; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka and Ozaryanivka and toward Bila Hora; and south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and toward Predtechyne on June 21 and 22.[58] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stupochky and Ozaryanivka.[59]

A senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) in a Ukrainian artillery company operating in the Kramatorsk (Chasiv Yar) direction reported that Russian forces are concentrating manpower and intensifying assaults, including assaults with drone and artillery support, in this direction.[60] The NCO stated that Russian forces are struggling to resupply frontline positions and that Russian infantry in the Chasiv Yar direction often lacks adequate food, water, and equipment. The NCO stated that Russian infantry sometimes walk five to six days to reach forward Russian positions and, in some cases, have written notices of surrender due to a lack of water. A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated that Russian forces are constantly transferring reinforcements to this direction due to high sustained casualty rates and that newly arrived Russian troops only receive a month of training.[61]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 217th and 331st VDV regiments, are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Chasiv Yar direction.[62]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Toretsk direction on June 22 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) advanced to central Yablunivka (west of Toretsk).[63] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced near Dyliivka (northeast of Toretsk) and toward Katerynivka (northwest of Toretsk).[64]

Russian forces attacked near Toretsk itself; northeast of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Rusyn Yar, Oleksandro-Kalynove, and Poltavka; west of Toretsk toward Yablunivka and Shcherbynivka; and southwest of Toretsk near Leonidivka and Nova Poltavka on June 21 and 22.[65] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Dyliivka.[66]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD), including drone elements of its 174th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion, are reportedly operating near Katerynivka and Popiv Yar (northwest of Toretsk).[67] Elements of the 20th Motorized Rifle Regiment (possibly a reformed Soviet unit) are reportedly operating near Oleksandro-Kalynove and west of Yablunivka.[68]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 22 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Malynivka, Myrne, Myrolyubivka, and Shevchenko Pershe and toward Shakhove; east of Pokrovsk near Promin and toward Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and Dachenske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Shevchenko and Zvirove on June 21 and 22.[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Promin and Mykolaivka (east of Pokrovsk).[70]

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov reiterated on June 21 that there are no Russian forces present in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, despite Russian forces intensifying assaults in the Pokrovsk-Novopavlivka directions in attempts to break through to Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[71] Trehubov stated that Russian forces are incurring increasingly large personnel and vehicle losses in these assaults and are sustaining as many as 800 daily personnel casualties. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 22 that Russian forces sustained a total of 1,100 casualties over the last day - suggesting that Russian forces could be sustaining over 70 percent of their casualties in the Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka directions.[72] A Ukrainian servicemember operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated that Russian forces are using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to supply ammunition to forward Russian positions.[73] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Shevchenko Pershe is a contested “gray zone,” and that Russian forces are attacking with armored vehicle support into the settlement's northern and eastern outskirts.[74] A milblogger also claimed that Russian forces complicated Ukrainian logistics in the area by destroying two bridges over the Kazenyi Torets River.[75]

Order of Battle: Drone elements of the Russian 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Battalion (9th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC], SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Pokrovsk direction.[76] Elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in Myrne.[77]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 22 indicates that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) recently advanced in Komar and Perebudova (both south of Novopavlivka) and likely seized the settlements.[78] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces crossed the Mokry Yaly River and seized Perebudova.[79] Russian sources recently credited elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade with participating in the seizure of Komar.[80] Additional geolocated footage published on June 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Novoserhiivka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[81]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and Muravka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, Zelenyi Kut, and Oleksiivka; and south of Novopavlivka near Zirka, Yalka, and Piddubne and toward Myrne on June 21 and 22.[82]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 22 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued assaults northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Shevchenko and Vilne Pole and toward Maliivka and Komyshuvakha and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on June 21 and 22.[83]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 5th Tank Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Shakhtarske (Velyka Novosilka) direction.[84] Drone operators of the Russian "Adskyi Krik" (Hell Scream) group of the 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating in the Vremivka (Velyka Novosilka) direction.[85]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on June 22.

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on June 22 that Russian forces are transferring personnel and equipment to the Hulyaipole direction and regrouping in order to intensify offensive operations near Malynivka and Poltavka (east of Hulyaipole) in the future.[86]

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 21 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske and toward Novoandriivka on June 21 and 22.[87]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on June 22 that the Orikhiv direction is the most active direction of the Southern Axis.[88] Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are trying to break through Ukrainian defenses near Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) and are constantly fighting toward Kamyanske and Novoandriivka and near Stepove and Lobkove (both southwest of Orikhiv) in order to establish conditions to attack Zaporizhzhia City.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian "893rd Regiment" (possibly a reconstituted Soviet unit) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Zaporizhia direction.[89]

Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on June 22 that its agents conducted a successful drone strike against a Russian train transporting fuel in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[90] Geolocated footage indicates that the strike occurred near occupied Tokmak (south of Orikhiv).[91] A Ukrainian official reported that 18 to 20 fuel tanks are still burning as a result of the strike.[92]

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on June 21 and 22 but did not advance.[93]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on June 21 to 22. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M/Kn-23 ballistic missiles from Voronezh and Rostov oblasts, one S-300 surface-to-air missile from occupied Donetsk Oblast, and 47 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk City and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[94] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian Forces downed 18 drones and that ten drones were “lost” or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian strikes primarily targeted Chernihiv Oblast and also struck Sumy and Odesa oblasts. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck medical, civilian, and residential infrastructure in Kharkiv and Odesa oblasts, and that Russian missiles struck residential infrastructure in Donetsk Oblast.[95]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.