3 days ago

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 16, 2025

Angelica Evans, Christina Harward and George Barros

June 16, 2025, 5:30pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15am ET on June 16. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 17 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukraine and Russia conducted an exchange that included the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA), on June 16 in accordance with agreements reached during talks in Istanbul on June 2. Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of POWs reported on June 16 that Russia returned 1,245 bodies to Ukraine.[i] Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov stated on June 16 that Ukraine repatriated 6,000 bodies in the last week.[ii] Umerov stated that this is the final stage of the Istanbul framework for KIA repatriations. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russia returned 1,248 bodies and received 51 bodies from Ukraine on June 16.[iii] Russian Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky claimed that Russia returned a total of 6,060 bodies and received 78 bodies from Ukraine over the last week.[iv] The Russian MoD claimed that Russia is ready to return an additional 2,239 KIA bodies to Ukraine.[v] Ukrainian Internal Affairs Minister Ihor Klymenko reported that Russia mixed Russian KIA bodies with Ukrainian KIA bodies during a previous repatriation exchange, possibly in order to intentionally increase the number of bodies that Russia was transferring to Ukraine or out of negligence.[vi] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on June 16 that Russia proposed exchanging kidnapped Ukrainian children held in Russia for Russian POWs held in Ukraine, which Zelensky emphasized is "beyond international law."[vii]

Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) reported that the Kremlin is spreading narratives about the POW and KIA exchanges in order to sow panic in Ukraine and discredit Ukraine in the international community – in line with ISW’s recent assessments. The SZRU reported on June 16 that Russian President Vladimir Putin personally decided to launch an information campaign depicting Ukraine as spoiling the POW exchanges and KIA repatriations in order to provoke discontent and demoralize Ukrainian society and to discredit Ukraine in the international community.[viii] The SZRU reported that the campaign leverages pro-Kremlin sources, including Russian milbloggers, and pro-Russian media sources in Europe to project emotionally charged content, manipulate statistical data, and portray delays in exchanges and repatriations as the deliberate actions of the Ukrainian authorities. The SZRU reported that the campaign will culminate in the final days of the POW exchanges, which are set for June 20. ISW assessed in early June 2025 that the Kremlin was baselessly accusing Ukraine of failing to conduct POW exchanges and KIA repatriations and was promoting narratives that vilify Ukraine in order to socialize Russian domestic audiences ahead of Russia's possible rejection of any peace agreement in the future and to discredit Ukraine on the international stage.[ix] Russia has previously launched similar discreditation campaigns against Ukraine that aimed to destabilize Ukraine internally, such as the "Maidan-3" information operation, which Ukrainian intelligence reported in early 2024 sought to sow panic and discontent among Ukrainians and drive a wedge between Ukrainian society and military and political leadership.[x]

Russia’s consumption of its Soviet-era tank stores appears to be slowing, possibly due to Russia's increasing transition to using motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) on the battlefield. A social media source tracking equipment at Russian military depots via satellite imagery shared an updated assessment of smaller Russian tank and armored vehicle storage facilities on June 15 and assessed that Russia still has 46 percent of its pre-war tank reserves, 42 percent of its pre-war infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) reserves, and 48 percent of its pre-war armored personnel carrier (APC) reserves as of a recent unspecified date.[xi] The source stated that imagery of eight Russian military depot appears to show that Russia has emptied most of the depots of their vehicle reserves and assessed that Russia will likely deplete its remaining tank and armored vehicle reserves by the end of 2025.[xii] The social media source assessed in late December 2024 that Russia had 47 percent of its pre-war tank reserves, 52 percent of its pre-war IFV reserves, and 45 percent of its pre-war APC reserves remaining in storage.[xiii] (The source noted on June 15 that they updated their previous assessments of Russia’s pre-war reserves and found that Russia had 241 more tanks, 174 more IFVs, and 687 more APCs before the full-scale invasion than the source previously assessed, which likely accounts for the increase in Russian APCs stores from 45 percent in the December 2024 assessment to 48 percent in June 2024.[xiv]) The social media source also stated that satellite imagery analysis indicates a ”dramatic” increase in ”almost all” types of equipment deployed to a Russian military base near Petrozavodsk, Republic of Karelia, located roughly 373 kilometers from the international border with Finland.[xv] Russia may have additional armored vehicles and tanks in covered storage that are not visible in satellite imagery. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on April 27 that a senior Finnish military official stated that Russia is sending "almost none" of its newly produced tanks to the frontline in Ukraine but is stockpiling the."[xvi]

The social media source's data suggests that Russia's consumption of Soviet-era tank stocks has slowed in recent months, an observation consistent with ISW’s study of recent battlefield combat footage which shows that Russian forces are increasingly using motorcycles and buggies in place of armored vehicles along the frontline in Ukraine. Russian forces have been increasingly using unarmored civilian vehicles, mainly motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), throughout the theater in Ukraine since late Fall 2024.[xvii] ISW previously noted that Russia's increased use of motorcycles is an adaptation in response to pervasive Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian armored vehicles and the unsustainable armored vehicle losses that Russian forces suffered in late 2023 and 2024.[xviii] Ukrainian drone operations have significantly complicated how to tactically employ tanks, as large and slow-moving armored vehicles and tanks are vulnerable to drones. Russian forces appear to be leveraging faster-moving motorcycles and buggies to advance through the contested "gray zones" that Ukrainian and Russian drone operators have created along the frontline. Russia's adaption has succeeded in granting Russian forces marginal tactical gains at the expense of significant infantry losses.[xix] ISW previously assessed that Russian armored vehicle losses are unsustainable and are undermining Russia’s ability to sustain a protracted high-intensity war , but it remains unclear if Russia’s increased reliance on motorcycles and buggies will be sufficient to offset these losses in the medium- to long-term.[xx]

Russia continues to set conditions to pose a long-term strategic threat to the United States and its Western allies even after the end to Russia's war in Ukraine. Swedish news outlet SVT reported on June 16 that Planet Labs satellite imagery collected in May 2025 shows that Russia is developing and upgrading at least five nuclear facilities in western Russia and Belarus.[xxi] The satellite images show recently constructed test sites, fencing, loading quays, and storage and communications infrastructure at Russian nuclear bases in Kaliningrad Oblast and Novaya Zemlya, Arkhangelsk Oblast as well as at the Gadzhiyevo Submarine Base and a supporting facility at Olenya Bay, Murmansk Oblast. The satellite imagery also shows upgrades to fencing and railway infrastructure at a military base in Asipovichy, Belarus.[xxii] Swedish Defense Minister Pål Jonson told SVT that Swedish defense services have been tracking these construction efforts, which indicate continued Russian investment in its nuclear capabilities.[xxiii] ISW observed reports in March 2025 that satellite imagery showed that construction work on hangars for Iskander ballistic missiles in Asipovichy was in its final stage, and the New York Times reported in May 2024 that satellite imagery indicated that Belarus had been constructing facilities that could house nuclear warheads at a base 12 kilometers away from the Iskander storage site in Asipovichy.[xxiv]

Key Takeaways:

Ukraine and Russia conducted an exchange that included the bodies of soldiers killed in action (KIA), on June 16 in accordance with agreements reached during talks in Istanbul on June 2.
Ukraine's Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) reported that the Kremlin is spreading narratives about the POW and KIA exchanges in order to sow panic in Ukraine and discredit Ukraine in the international community – in line with ISW’s recent assessments.
Russia’s consumption of its Soviet-era tank stores appears to be slowing, possibly due to Russia's increasing transition to using motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) on the battlefield.
Russia continues to set conditions to pose a long-term strategic threat to the United States and its Western allies even after the end to Russia's war in Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Borova and in Zaporizhia Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced near Siversk, Toretsk, and Novopavlivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on June 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in Kursk Oblast on June 15 and 16.[xxv] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked toward Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo).[xxvi]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in northwesternmost Belgorod Oblast on June 16.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border and approach to within tube artillery range of Sumy City)

Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 16 shows Ukrainian force striking Russian positions in southwestern Kindrativka (north of Sumy City), indicating that Russian forces recently seized the settlement.[xxvii]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Myropillya, in northern Yunakivka (both northeast of Sumy City), and in Novomykolaivka (north of Sumy City).[xxviii]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast, including near Yunakivka and Sadky (northeast of Sumy City).[xxix]

Ukraine's Border Service Spokesperson Andriy Demchenko stated that the number of Russian attacks in northern Sumy Oblast, including with motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), has decreased recently, likely due to manpower losses.[xxx] The commander of the Russian 11th Airborne (VDV) Brigade stated that Russian forces are trying to cut off the Ukrainian ground of line of communication (GLOC) from Yunakivka to Sumy City.[xxxi] The commander stated that Russian forces are conducting assaults on motorcycles, quad bikes, and electric scooters.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian “Chernye Volki” ("Black Wolves”) Detachment, Smuglyanka Detachment, and Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction, and drone operators of the "Anvar" Spetsnaz detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in northern Sumy Oblast.[xxxii]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on June 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Starytsya on June 15 and 16.[xxxiii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian "Anvar" Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 "Anvar" volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Krasivka (northwest of Kharkiv City).[xxxiv]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on June 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Dvorichna, south of Stroivka, and south of Krasne Pershe (all northeast of Kupyansk).[xxxv]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka, north of Kupyansk near Holubivka and toward Dovhenke, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Stepova Novoselivka on June 15 and 16.[xxxvi]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 25th Motorized Rifle Brigade (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating west of Zapadne (north of Kupyansk).[xxxvii] Elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[xxxviii]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 15 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northwest of Makiivka (southeast of Borova).[xxxix]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and Nova Kruhlyakivka, east of Borova near Kopanky and Nadiya, and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka and toward Olhivka on June 15 and 16.[xl]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on June 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Zelena Dolyna, in eastern Karpivka, and 450 meters toward Hlushchenkove (all north of Lyman).[xli]

Russian forces attacked north of Lyman near Ridkodub, Karpivka, Lypove, and Zelena Dolyna and toward Shandryholove and east of Lyman near Torske and in the Serebryanske forest area on June 15 to 16.[xlii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking from Shandryholove and near Kolodyazi (northeast of Lyman).[xliii]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated that Russian forces have switched to attacking in small groups, including in groups of three to four motorcycles.[xliv] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces will try to retrieve motorcycles from the battlefield following assaults and that the terrain in the areas makes quick advances with heavy mechanized equipment almost impossible.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are reportedly operating near Novomykhailivka (northeast of Lyman), and elements of the 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA) are reportedly operating near Ridkodub.[xlv]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Siversk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 16 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Hyrhorivka and along Raiko Depreradovycha Street east of Serebryanka (both northeast of Siversk).[xlvi]

[xlvii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Siversk near Hryhorivka and Serebryanka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on June 15 and 16.[xlviii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on June 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself; north of Chasiv Yar toward Novomarkova; southeast of Chasiv Yar near Kurdyumivka; and south of Chasiv Yar toward Bila Hora and Predtechyne on June 15 and 16.[xlix]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Kurdyumivka.[l] Elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division, including elements of its 217th and 331st VDV regiments, are reportedly operating in the Chasiv Yar direction.[li]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 16 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway northwest of Yablunivka (northwest of Toretsk) and in western Yablunivka.[lii]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Dyliivka (north of Toretsk), northwest of Toretsk, and west of Popiv Yar (northwest of Toretsk).[liii]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka and Novospaske; and northwest of Toretsk near Oleksandro-Kalynove, Popiv Yar, Rusyn Yar, and Yablunivka on June 15 and 16.[liv]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces northwest of Toretsk.[lv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on June 16 but did not make any confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced from Pishchane to Zvirove (both southwest of Pokrovsk) and west of Hrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk).[lvi] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on June 16 that elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Malynivka (northeast of Pokrovsk).[lvii]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northeast of Pokrovsk near Malynivka, Myrne, Koptieve, and Shevchenko Pershe; east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Promin and toward Mykolaivka; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne on June 15 and 16.[lviii]

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on June 16 that the Russian military command tasked part of the large concentration of Russian forces near Pokrovsk, which includes elements from multiple combined arms armies (CAAs), to focus on advancing west toward Dnipropetrovsk Oblast while another part of the group tries to break through beyond the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway after Russia’s offensive to seize Pokrovsk in Winter 2024-2025 was unsuccessful.[lix] Trehubov reported that Russian forces are attacking with small infantry groups, buggies, and motorcycles and are taking advantage of summer foliage to infiltrate Ukrainian positions.[lx]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) posted footage on June 16 purportedly showing Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions near Pokrovsk and Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk) with Shahed drones.[lxi]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian BARS-11 “Kuban” Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating near Malynivka.[lxii] Elements of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Novotoretske (east of Pokrovsk).[lxiii]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 16 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Komar (south of Novopavlivka).[lxiv]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Novomykolaivka (northeast of Novopavlivka) and Peredubova (south of Novopavlivka) and advanced northwest of Oleksiivka, southwest of Horikhove (both southeast of Novopavlivka), and west of Komar.[lxv] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces closed the pocket between Komar and Odradne (south of Novopavlivka), but another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are still trying to close the pocket.[lxvi]

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiikva and Novomykolaivka; east of Novopavlivka near Kotlyarivka; southeast of Novopavlivka near Oleksiivka, Konstyantynopil, Odradne, Bahatyr, Andriivka, and Horikhove; and south of Novopavlivka near Novyi Komar and Vesele and toward Zaporizhzhia on June 15 and 16.[lxvii]

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Viktor Trehubov stated on June 15 that Russian forces are likely moving toward Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in an effort to achieve “political goals”- likely meaning informational objectives meant to shape international opinion about Russia’s war in Ukraine.[lxviii] Ukrainian military expert Oleksandr Musienko stated on June 16 that Russian forces likely seek to seize the entirety of Donetsk Oblast in Summer-Fall 2025 and aim to disrupt Ukrainian logistics, create a contested ”gray zone,” and support Russian offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction.[lxix] Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin and former DNR People’s Militia Spokesperson Eduard Basurin claimed that Russian forces are advancing in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast with the goal of encircling Pokrovsk.[lxx]

A former Storm-Z instructor and Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continue to submit false reports to superiors about which elements are responsible for recent seizures.[lxxi] The milblogger denied recent claims that elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st DNR AC, SMD) seized Oleksiivka, claiming that Ukrainian forces still maintain positions within the settlement.[lxxii] The milblogger claimed that this is not an isolated incident and noted that the command of the 51st CAA has also submitted false reports about the seizure of Toretsk.[lxxiii] The milblogger noted that false reports often lead to heavy and unjustified personnel and equipment losses. The Russian military command reportedly arrested and removed several commanders within the 3rd CAA following inaccurate reports about alleged advances near Bilohorivka (northeast of Siversk) and repeated outcries from the Russian milblogger community.[lxxiv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velyka Novosilka direction on June 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest of Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole, Burlatske, and Shevchenko; west of Velyka Novosilka near Zelene Pole and Novosilka; and southwest of Velyka Novosilka near Novopil on June 15 and 16.[lxxv]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Shakhtarske and Vremivka (Velyka Novosilka) directions.[lxxvi]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued assaults in the Hulyaipole direction on June 16 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Malynivka (east of Hulyaipole).[lxxvii]

Russian forces conducted assaults near Hulyaipole itself and east of Hulyaipole near Malynivka on June 16.[lxxviii]

Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on June 15 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced west of Myrne (east of Orikhiv).[lxxix]

Russian forces continued assaults southwest of Orikhiv near Nesteryanka and toward Novoandriivka on June 15 and 16.[lxxx]

Order of Battle: Elements of the "Nemets" group of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[lxxxi]

Russian forces continued assaults northeast of Kherson City near the Antonivsky Bridge on June 16 but did not make confirmed advances.[lxxxii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 104th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[lxxxiii]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of June 15 to 16. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 138 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities and Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast.[lxxxiv] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 84 drones and that 41 were "lost" or suppressed by Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems. Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces struck Zaporizhia, Cherkasy and Kyiv oblasts.[lxxxv]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[i] https://t.me/Koord_shtab/13144 ; https://suspilne dot media/1043823-v-ukrainu-povernuli-tila-se-1245-zagiblih/ ; https://www.bbc.com/russian/live/c3081p27qept ; https://t.me/astrapress/84107

[ii] https://www.facebook.com/rustemumerov.ua/posts/pfbid02piXX8ygAjEg4SMZ2hCPNA2W85smD5rsLZdeq9MpbtQ42fA9oeqm8fj6p6PkrZDjnl?__cft__[0]=AZXsrEvQejQeTZVEKn8kr4yR0SMc7NSxa2BDNQ-UpW975EJCkDm_LJn3wD6kzK7yECCnFjjezPDJ1GLqoixqDmdW3ibM2bm_4npnTxAoCTkvbVEq7lxuYYso4Nu_nWW3vuLTepxgdOn19iPqgrG5tDjlZn3fL3cUi7S5XYTwFs5t2g&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

[iii] https://t.me/mod_russia/53834;

[iv] https://t.me/mod_russia/53837; https://t.me/vr_medinskiy/2619; https://t.me/tass_agency/320457;

[v] https://t.me/tass_agency/320464; https://t.me/astrapress/84110

[vi] https://t.me/Klymenko_MVS/1502 ; https://suspilne dot media/1044009-pid-cas-ostannih-repatriacij-rosiani-peredali-tila-rosijskih-vijskovih-klimenko/ ; https://t.me/astrapress/84118

[vii] https://www.youtube.com/live/jBcU9FXanyU ; https://suspilne dot media/1044123-zelenskij-zaaviv-so-rf-proponuvala-obminuvati-vikradenih-ukrainskih-ditej-na-polonenih-soldativ-rosijskoi-armii/

[viii] https://szru.gov dot ua/news-media/news/szru-poperedzhaie-rosiya-planuie-na-nastupnomu-tyzhni-kulminatsiyu-kampanii-z-dyskredytatsii-ukrainy-u-konteksti-obminiv-shcho-tryvayut; https://suspilne dot media/1043951-rf-prodovzit-namaganna-diskredituvati-ukrainu-sodo-obminiv-a-kulminacia-provokacij-zaplanovana-na-20-cervna-szr/

[ix] https://isw.pub/UkrWar060725

[x] https://isw.pub/UkrWar022724; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052424

[xi] https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1934232801441927622; https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1FnfGcdqah5Et_6wElhiFfoDxEzxczh7AP2ovjEFV010/edit?gid=0#gid=0

[xii] https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1934232843431100847; https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1934232807783485885; https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1FnfGcdqah5Et_6wElhiFfoDxEzxczh7AP2ovjEFV010/edit?pli=1&gid=0#gid=0

[xiii] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-23-2024

[xiv] https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1934232855007395843

[xv] https://x.com/Jonpy99/status/1934232865287319825

[xvi] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-28-2025; https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/russia-military-nato-europe-finland-ff53b912

[xvii] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-7-2025

[xviii] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-7-2025

[xix] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar052525

[xx] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage

[xxi] https://www.svt dot se/nyheter/utrikes/bilder-har-rustar-ryssland-upp-karnvapenbas-27-mil-fran-sverige

[xxii] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2025

[xxiii] https://www.svt dot se/nyheter/utrikes/bilder-har-rustar-ryssland-upp-karnvapenbas-27-mil-fran-sverige

[xxiv] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2025; https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/10/world/europe/russia-nuclear-weapons-belarus.html

[xxv] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25547; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25523; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25520

[xxvi] https://t.me/wargonzo/27249; https://t.me/dva_majors/73495; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/168903

[xxvii] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9397; https://t.me/Waryaz_we_are/244

[xxviii] https://t.me/dva_majors/73495; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/21684; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/168909

[xxix] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25547; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30121; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30123 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/27249; https://t.me/dva_majors/73495; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/21684

[xxx] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/16/brak-zhyvoyi-syly-na-pivnichnomu-kordoni-kilkist-atak-voroga-zmenshylasya/

[xxxi] https://www.kp dot ru/daily/27712.5/5100758/

[xxxii] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/168754; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/168806; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/168852; https://t.me/dva_majors/73528

[xxxiii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25523; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25520; https://t.me/otukharkiv/6608; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12305

[xxxiv] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/168806; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/168852

[xxxv] https://t.me/rybar/71360

[xxxvi] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25547; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25523; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25520; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12305

[xxxvii] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93733

[xxxviii] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/93733

[xxxix] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/1934371665393389576; https://t.me/bratstvo252/1365

[xl] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25547; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25523; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25520; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12305

[xli] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30146 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37238; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30146

[xlii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25547; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25523; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25520; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12305 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65151

[xliii] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/65151

[xliv] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/16/tehnika-znyshhuyetsya-za-30-hvylyn-poblyzu-lymanu-postijno-bilshaye-vorozhogo-bruhtu/

[xlv] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37228; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30146

[xlvi] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9403; https://t.me/feniksdpsu/885

[xlvii] https://t.me/rybar/71366; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30144

[xlviii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25547; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25523; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25520; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12305; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30144

[xlix] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25547; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25523 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25520; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12305; https://t.me/wargonzo/27249

[l] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37213

[li] https://t.me/mod_russia/53822; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30134

[lii] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9396; https://t.me/ua_marines_36brigade/3176 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9396; https://t.me/ua_marines_36brigade/3176

[liii] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37213 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/37222 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30141

[liv] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25547 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25523 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25520 ; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12305 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/73495

[lv] https://t.me/motopatriot78/37222

[lvi] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30120; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30123; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/168909

[lvii] https://t.me/mod_russia/53827

[lviii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25547; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25523; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25520; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12305; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02EpJq89RnMtrZAAM1P7BJin28Cs5Q8jnDMeNNBsXKrogfsK7dpdJK3Nhu2JPrbaRWl?__cft__[0]=AZVo3rGilK_NJ3jHEa811R4FSBDDGd_9B99gj5kHHXVhpqo2uHD4u6RL-rH4z_uxiy0kMWCBJ7zNtmGFKHpP_oFenMF3lgs_XCImHK75aL6ffI8Qsyz-wjZvTPMY_hv0eX1wc8EI0SfXErU2vBjb5NXeHe3f5fQTGoOw7dSwhC4ZKg&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

[lix] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1043921-rosijski-vijska-rozdilili-pokrovske-ugrupuvanna-ta-ruhautsa-u-dvi-rizni-storoni-tregubov/; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/06/16/ye-zelenka-i-mozhlyvist-infiltruvatysya-poblyzu-pokrovska-polyuyut-na-vorozhi-grupy-pihoty/

[lx] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/16/ye-zelenka-i-mozhlyvist-infiltruvatysya-poblyzu-pokrovska-polyuyut-na-vorozhi-grupy-pihoty/; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j5TqaWCCdUg

[lxi] https://t.me/mod_russia/53835

[lxii] https://t.me/B_A_R_S_11/9580

[lxiii] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13925

[lxiv] https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/28971; https://t.me/OVMBr_5/160

[lxv] https://t.me/wargonzo/27249; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30119; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30123;

[lxvi] https://t.me/wargonzo/27249; https://t.me/dva_majors/73495

[lxvii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25547; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25523; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25520; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/12305; https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid02EpJq89RnMtrZAAM1P7BJin28Cs5Q8jnDMeNNBsXKrogfsK7dpdJK3Nhu2JPrbaRWl?__cft__[0]=AZUvZftRdxkyMxjq7ZwhGH3ubavIbs_-kl34joz2M1N86AI0ec36B0UZM-O_Oos0zySiCevGDwwtPmAmVkG5YRNcUi83X523L2XJJpddQNywX8ddHhcw2NUoA4JTqn3JD3mUMf0ahwlCKujJrxzYGYyfA9_5DLE8BljhJsiBZWwoKg&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

[lxviii] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1043307-kilkist-boiv-na-novopavlivskomu-napramku-anomalno-visoka-osuv-hortica/

[lxix] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/06/16/tysk-ta-demoralizacziya-ekspert-rozpoviv-pro-taktyku-rosiyan-pid-chas-litnoyi-nastupalnoyi-kampaniyi/

[lxx] https://t.me/basurin_e/19368; https://t.me/tass_agency/320408

[lxxi] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2564; https://t.me/philologist_zov/2565

[lxxii] https://t.me/mo114rf/94; https://t.me/philologist_zov/2564

[lxxiii] https://t.me/philologist_zov/2565

[lxxiv] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-23-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-16-2024

[lxxv] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25547; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25523; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25520; https://t.me/voin_dv/15520

[lxxvi] https://t.me/voin_dv/15509; https://t.me/voin_dv/15519

[lxxvii] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30149

[lxxviii] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25547 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/30149

[lxxix] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13924; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1934293692879417442

[lxxx] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25547 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/25523 ; https://www.face