Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 9, 2026

Assessment as of: 7:45 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 12:00 PM ET

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The Kremlin appears to be struggling to adjust its narrative line in response to the Trump administration's recent denial of Russian negotiating tactics and acknowledgement of Ukrainian battlefield successes. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on July 9 that the US has always supplied military aid to Ukraine, attempting to downplay the importance of US President Donald Trump’s July 7 decision to grant Ukraine a license to produce an unspecified Patriot interceptor missile.[i] Peskov stated that the Kremlin sees Trump’s statements as a "misconception" rather than an escalation.[ii] Peskov also stated on July 9 that Trump did not call Russian President Vladimir Putin on July 8 but noted that Putin remains open to talking with Trump.[iii] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova reiterated on July 8 the Kremlin’s narrative that the US remains disinterested in contributing to European security and that European states are preparing for a long-term conflict with Russia.[iv] Peskov's and Zakharova's responses suggest that the Kremlin has not yet developed a coherent information response to recent Trump administration efforts to push back against Russian narratives. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, for example, confirmed on July 6 that there was no written agreement following the US-Russia Summit in Alaska in August 2025, undermining Russian attempts to weaponize the summit for negotiations purposes.[v] Senior US officials have also recently acknowledged Ukrainian tactical and operational successes, contrary to the Russian narrative that its forces are advancing across the entire frontline.[vi] The Kremlin appears to be attempting to downplay recent developments, including the importance of the Patriot licensing deal, in order to keep the door open for negotiations with the United States in the hopes that Russia can still extract concessions from Ukraine and its partners.

An anonymous Russian general reportedly acknowledged that the Kremlin is inflating Russian battlefield successes to generate a false perception of Russian sweeping advances while maintaining its commitment to a war of attrition that Russia cannot win in a continued attempt to convince Ukraine and the West to capitulate to Russia's demands. Russian journalist Dmitry Kolezev published an interview on July 6 with an alleged active-duty Russian general who spoke on the condition of anonymity, during which the general claimed that the Russian military command is reporting to Russian President Vladimir Putin that Russian forces will seize Donbas by the end of 2026.[vii] The general's statements reflect a July 9 Reuters report, which cited three sources close to the Kremlin as saying that Putin believes that Russian forces will soon seize Donbas, and is therefore rejecting the idea of negotiations or a ceasefire on the current frontline.[viii] The general claimed that the Kremlin would need to recruit at least 55,000-60,000 servicemembers per month to replace the current Russian casualty rates and seize Donbas by the deadline — an objective that he called “unrealistic” given Russian manpower shortages and falling recruitment rates.[ix] The general reaffirmed that Putin remains committed to his theory of victory which rests on the premise that Russia can win a war of attrition by having Russian forces maintain the initiative and advance across the entire theater indefinitely, thereby outlasting both Ukraine's ability to defend and Western support for Ukraine.[x] The general claimed that the Kremlin is operating on the assumption that Ukraine will soon experience a domestic politic crisis and that the Kremlin's exaggerated claims of Russian advances will influence the United States administration to force Ukraine to capitulate to Russia's demands, such as withdrawing Ukrainian forces from Donbas. The general claimed that Putin’s recent statements about Russian forces seizing Kostyantynivka and Kupyansk are part of such informational effort to convince the United States and Europe that Russian victory is inevitable, such that they should withdraw support from Ukraine. The general noted that the Kremlin is prioritizing seizing Donbas over all other objectives, including protecting the sky over occupied Ukraine and that the Kremlin is considering declaring mobilization either publicly or covertly to address manpower shortages in order to seize Donbas. The general claimed that Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov’s July 5 statement that Russia’s ”SVO” (Spetsialnaya Voennaya Operatsiya or Special Military Operation - the term that the Kremlin uses to refer to its war against Ukraine) has turned into a ”real war” is a condition-setting effort to prepare the Russian population for potential mobilization in the near future.[xi] Putin signed a bill in November 2025 that enables Russia to deploy reservists to combat areas without declaring mobilization, and ISW assessed at the time that the Kremlin would likely leverage this bill to conduct rolling partial mobilization.[xii] Mobilization is a very personal decision for Putin and is ultimately contingent on Putin’s personal perception of the battlefield situation and regime stability, as mobilization remains highly unpopular among the Russian public. The Russian general’s statements are consistent with ISW continued assessment that Putin's assessment of the battlefield is divorced from reality and that Putin will soon have to make difficult decisions to either continue the war at the risk of regime stability or engage in peace negotiations that he has thus far shown no interest in doing.

Ukrainian forces appear to have initiated a new phase in their campaign to isolate occupied Crimea by targeting Russian seaborne gasoline tankers. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on July 9 that Ukrainian forces struck 14 Russian vessels in the Sea of Azov on the night of July 8 to 9, including 12 gasoline tankers, the Alfeo tugboat and one dry cargo ship.[xiii] Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Chelsea-6, Aura, Sonar-1, Ilya Repin, Galiaskar Kamal, Venera-3, Penelope, and five other gasoline tankers. Brovdi added that Ukrainian forces struck 35 Russian fuel tankers, dry cargo ships, and unspecified special vessels in the past 96 hours.[xiv] An alleged active-duty Russian general reportedly told Russian journalist Dmitry Kolezev on July 6 that Russia cannot effectively counter Ukraine's intermediate-range strike campaign after the Russian General Staff disbanded the Crimean Defense Group in 2024 due to the lack of naval equipment to defend the peninsula.[xv] Ukraine’s continuous intermediate- and long-range strike campaign against Russian land transportation routes is degrading logistics between Russia and occupied Crimea, forcing occupied Crimea to rely on seaborne gasoline supplies to address gasoline shortages.[xvi] Ukrainian intensifying strikes against Russian seaborne fuel tankers demonstrate a new phase in Ukraine’s ability to rapidly adapt to Russia’s shift toward seaborne fuel transportation and will likely continue to disrupt Russia’s ability to sustain logistics and transport fuel between Russia and occupied Crimea in an effort to isolate the peninsula.[xvii]

Key Takeaways:

• The Kremlin appears to be struggling to adjust its narrative line in response to the Trump administration's recent denial of Russian negotiating tactics and acknowledgement of Ukrainian battlefield successes.
• An anonymous Russian general reportedly acknowledged that the Kremlin is inflating Russian battlefield successes to generate a false perception of Russian sweeping advances while maintaining its commitment to a war of attrition that Russia cannot win in a continued attempt to convince Ukraine and the West to capitulate to Russia's demands.
• Ukrainian forces appear to have initiated a new phase in their campaign to isolate occupied Crimea by targeting Russian seaborne gasoline tankers.
• Ukrainian forces conducted long-range strikes against Russian energy infrastructure in Russia on the night of July 8 to 9. Russian forces launched 2 Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 94 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces made confirmed advances on July 9.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces conducted long-range strikes against Russian energy infrastructure in Russia on the night of July 8 to 9. Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Stavropol oil depot in Stavropol Krai (roughly 585 kilometers from the frontline) and the Krasnaya Zvezda oil depot in Tver Oblast (roughly 520 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of July 8 to 9, and that both strikes resulted in fires.[xviii] Stavropol Krai Governor Vladimir Vladimirov acknowledged on July 9 that Ukrainian strikes caused a fire at an industrial facility in Shpakovsky Raion, Stavropol Oblast, and geolocated footage published on July 9 shows a fire at an oil depot in Shpakovsky Raion.[xix] Tver Oblast Governor Vitaly Korolev acknowledged on July 9 that Ukrainian strikes caused a fire at the Tverskaya Neftobaza Oil Depot and geolocated footage published on July 9 shows a fire at the facility.[xx] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Yug Rusi oil landing terminal in Bataysk, Rostov Oblast (roughly 215 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of July 8 to 9, causing a fire.[xxi] The Rostov Oblast Ministry of Emergency Situations acknowledged on July 9 that a large fire broke out in Bataysk, Rostov Oblast.[xxii] Rostov Oblast Governor Yuri Slyusar acknowledged on July 9 that Ukrainian forces struck two tankers in Taganrog Bay, causing mechanical damage and fires.[xxiii] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on July 9 that Ukrainian forces struck an unspecified fuel storage facility roughly 800 kilometers from the frontline.[xxiv]

Satellite imagery published on July 9 shows damage to fuel tanks at Borisoglebsk Airbase in Borisoglebsk, Voronezh Oblast (roughly 335 kilometers from the international border), after a July 7 Ukrainian strike against the airbase.[xxv]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on July 9 but did not advance.[xxvi]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 8 and 9 but did not advance.[xxvii] A Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on July 9 that it struck and destroyed Russian ”Sylok-01F” and ”Cheburashka” electronic warfare (EW) systems that Russian forces used to counter Ukrainian drones in the area.[xxviii] A source reporting on the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces reported on July 9 that Russian forces conducted a guided FAB-3000 glide bomb strike on Ukrainian positions in Ivanivka (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xxix]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 9 but did not advance.[xxx] Geolocated footage published on July 9 shows Russian forces conducting a Kh-39M helicopter-launched air-to-surface missile strike on a Ukrainian temporary deployment point in Hrachivka (north of Velykyi Burluk).[xxxi]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 8 and 9 but did not advance.[xxxii]

A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on July 9 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Katerynivka, Nove, and Ridkodub (all southeast of Borova).[xxxiii]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 9 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot near occupied Sorokyne (roughly 140 kilometers from the frontline).[xxxiv] Footage published on July 9 reportedly shows a fire at the ammunition depot near Sorokyne after the Ukrainian strike. ^[xxxv]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in the Slovyansk direction. Geolocated footage published on July 8 shows Russian forces striking an abandoned Ukrainian vehicle in Drobysheve (northwest of Lyman), indicating that Ukrainian forces are operating in the settlement and that Russian forces do not control the area.[xxxvi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Pyskunivka and west of Kalenyky (both east of Slovyansk).^[xxxvii]

Geolocated footage published on July 9 shows Russian forces striking a gas tank at a gas station in Slovyansk.[xxxviii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on July 8 and 9 but did not advance.[xxxix]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on July 8 and 9 but did not advance.[xl] Geolocated footage published on July 9 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian drone control point with two FAB-500 guided bombs in Dobropillya.[xli]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on July 8 and 9 but did not advance.[xlii]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on July 9.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1435th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Dnipropetrovsk direction.[xliii] ISW most recently observed elements of the regiment operating in the Pokrovsk direction on January 14, 2026.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on July 8 and 9 but did not advance.[xliv]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian transport and logistics infrastructure in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on July 8 shows Ukrainian drones striking a Russian truck and Russian logistics hub near occupied Kashtanove (roughly 40 kilometers from the frontline).[xlv] Former Mariupol City Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported on July 9 that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike near a destroyed bridge near occupied Novoazovsk (roughly 143 kilometers from the frontline).[xlvi] Residents reported a fire near the bridge and  NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data from July 9 shows heat anomalies near Novoazovsk.[xlvii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on June 8 and 9 but did not advance.[xlviii]

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on July 8 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position along the T-0803 highway southeast of Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[xlix]

Geolocated footage published on July 8 shows Russian forces conducted FAB aerial bomb strikes against a Ukrainian radar post near Orikhiv (roughly 10 kilometers from the frontline).[l]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on July 8 shows a damaged semi-truck southeast of Melitopol (roughly 75 kilometers from the frontline) after a reported Ukrainian Hornet drone strike.[li] Geolocated footage published on July 8 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian transport trucks near Melitopol (roughly 75 kilometers from the frontline), as well as a Russian military car near Molochansk (roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline) and a truck near Tokmak (roughly 40 kilometers from the frontline), both along the T-041 Tokmak-Melitopol highway.[lii]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on July 9.

Russian forces continue to strike civilian targets and conducted a double-tap strike in Kherson City on July 9. Kherson Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Prokudin reported on July 9 that Russian forces struck a minibus in Kherson City, injuring the driver and seven passengers.[liii] The Kherson Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on July 9 that Russian forces conducted a double-tap strike against first responders who were responding to a Russian strike against Kherson City, injuring the driver and two medics.[liv]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and energy facilities in occupied Kherson Oblast. Geolocated footage published on July 9 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian training ground near Oleksandrivka (roughly 120 kilometers from the frontline).[lv] The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported on July 9 that Ukrainian forces struck several energy facilities in occupied Kherson Oblast.[lvi] The strikes reportedly left a significant portion of the bridgehead on the left (south) bank of the Dnipro River without electricity, complicating Russian communications, electronic warfare, and logistics.

Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure in occupied Crimea. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on July 9 that Ukrainian forces struck 45 Russian military targets in occupied Crimea overnight on July 8 to 9, including the Saky Thermal Power Plant (roughly 185 kilometers from the frontline), three oil depots, two vehicle maintenance enterprises, the “Zhitel” jamming station, and communications towers.[lvii]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 8 to 9. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from occupied Crimea and 94 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea; and occupied Donetsk City.[lviii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 72 drones, that two Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 19 drones struck 13 locations, and that drone debris fell on four locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck transport, civilian, and gasoline infrastructure in Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts.[lix]

Russian forces continue their strike campaign targeting gas stations in Ukraine. Kharkiv City Mayor Ihor Terekhov reported on July 8 that Russian drones struck a gas station in Kharkiv City.[lx]  Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov reported on July 9 that Russian drones struck a gas station in Zaporizhzhia City, killing one person and injuring at least three.[lxi] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian Geran-2 drones struck at least two gas stations near Dnipro City and additional logistics targets, including gas terminal supply points, in Synelnykove, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[lxii] The milblogger claimed that a Russian Molniya first-person view (FPV) drone struck a gas station in Semenivka, Chernihiv Oblast. Another Russian milblogger claimed that no gas stations are operational along an unspecified 150-kilometer section of the M-18 Dnipro City-Kharkiv City highway due to Russian strikes against gas stations in Kharkiv Oblast.[lxiii]

Russian forces launched fewer drones and missiles against Ukraine in June 2026 compared to May 2026 as Ukraine's interception rate for drones and cruise missiles remains high. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Ukrainian forces intercepted almost 5,300 drones and missiles in June, including 90 percent of the Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other strike drones, 40 percent of all the ballistic missiles, and 89.4 percent of all other missile types.[lxiv] The Ukrainian MoD noted that Russian ballistic missile strikes remain the greatest threat. Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov stated on July 8 that Russian forces have conducted over 12,000 missile, guided glide bomb, and drone strikes against Sumy Oblast alone since the start of 2026.^[lxv] Fedorov stated that these Russian strikes have damaged or destroyed over 2,600 residential buildings, schools, hospitals, and energy and civilian infrastructure facilities; killed 122 civilians; and injured over 1,200 people. Fedorov added that Russian forces have changed their tactics in the area and are scaling up their use of Molniya drones, fiber optic drones, strike drones, and guided glide bombs since June 2026 in an attempt to terrorize the civilians and make life in border oblasts unbearable.[lxvi]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.