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July 26, 2026
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 26, 2026
Assessment as of: 6 PM ET
Data Cutoff: 12 PM ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
For more information on ISW’s map methodology, please view our statement here.
Note: Today’s update includes static maps only of areas in which noteworthy changes or events occurred.
The Russian Navy is forming unmanned systems regiments, likely in part to protect Russian vessels from intensified Ukrainian strikes against Russian naval assets in the Black and Azov seas. Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Alexander Moiseyev stated on July 26 that the Russian Navy formed its first unmanned systems regiment within the Northern Fleet on July 1, 2026, and plans to form additional unmanned systems regiments within the Northern Fleet in 2026 and incorporate a similar structure within the Russian Pacific Fleet in 2027.[1] Moiseyev claimed that the Russian Navy has commissioned 20 ships, vessels, and boats and plans to commission an additional 21 ships into the Russian Navy by the end of 2026, including the first nuclear-powered submarine armed with the Zirkon hypersonic missile system.[2] Russia began forming a dedicated Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) in 2024, whose elements are currently operating on the frontlines in Ukraine, in an effort to centralize drone operations.[3] The newly announced unmanned systems regiments will be subordinate to the Russian Navy and appear to be separate from USF, which has operated in support of Russian ground forces in Ukraine. The Russian military command is likely forming these regiments in part to protect Russian vessels and ports from Ukrainian drone strikes, including in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov.[4] The expansion of USF structures and command systems to the Russian Navy is also a reflection of the way the Russian military writ large is trying to integrate unmanned systems throughout the wider force. Russian forces have implemented a wide range of measures to defend against Ukraine’s intensifying intermediate-range strike campaign against occupied Ukraine and Russia, including against Russian vessels in the Black and Azov seas by relocating and dispersing ships, installing anti-drone netting, and introducing mobile task force units and aviation patrol, but have largely failed to defend against and adapt to Ukrainian strikes.[5]
Russian President Vladimir Putin used Russia's Navy Day to project strength while reinforcing expansive territorial claims beyond Ukraine. Putin stated on July 26 that the Russian Navy plays a vital role in achieving Russia's war goals in Ukraine and is a key element in ensuring Russian global security.[6] Putin emphasized that Franz Josef Land is a Russian archipelago - a collection of islands exclusively inhabited by military personnel - and claimed that Russia has begun re-establishing its presence there in response to external militarization and rivalry with Russia in the Arctic.[7] Putin stated that Russia intends to protect its interests in the Northern Sea Route as it runs largely through Russian territorial waters and that Russia will also ensure the security of Kaliningrad by all available means in the event of any threat.[8] Putin's references to these small Arctic islands and Russian claims to the Northern Sea Route are part of the Kremlin's continued effort to project Russian strength globally while reinforcing territorial claims beyond Ukraine.[9]
A Romanian F-16 fighter jet intercepted an unidentified drone in Romanian airspace on July 26 for the third time in three days. Romanian Prime Minister Nicusor Dan stated that a Romanian F-16 intercepted a drone in the Sulina-Chilia area (near Romania’s southeastern border with Ukraine) at about 1015 local time.[10] Romanian authorities previously intercepted drones over Romanian airspace on July 24 and 25.[11] Romanian authorities have not yet specified the origin of the drone and are still investigating the origins of the intercepted drones from July 25 and 26.[12] Romanian authorities confirmed that the intercepted drone from July 24 is a Russian Shahed.[13] Romanian Foreign Minister Oana Țoiu summoned the Russian Ambassador to Romania, Vladimir Lipaev, on July 26 following the drone interception on the morning of July 26.[14]
Key Takeaways:
- The Russian Navy is forming unmanned systems regiments, likely in part to protect Russian vessels from intensified Ukrainian strikes against Russian naval assets in the Black and Azov seas.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin used Russia's Navy Day to project strength while reinforcing expansive territorial claims beyond Ukraine.
- A Romanian F-16 fighter jet intercepted an unidentified drone in Romanian airspace on July 26 for the third time in three days.
- Russia launched one Kh-59/69 cruise missile, seven Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles, and 136 drones against Ukraine overnight on July 25 to 26.
- Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances on July 26.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
- Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
- Significant Activity in Belarus
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Ukrainian sources provided updated battle damage assessments (BDA) on recent Ukrainian strikes against Russia. The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on July 26 that Ukrainian forces struck the Tyumen Oil Refinery in Tyumen City, Tyumen Oblast (roughly 1,980 kilometers from the frontline) on July 25, and geolocated footage published on July 25 and 26 shows smoke plumes rising from the refinery.[15]
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)
Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on July 26 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[16]
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)
Ukrainian forces recently maintained positions or advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Geolocated footage published on July 25 shows Ukrainian forces clearing a Russian position in southern Hrafske (northeast of Kharkiv City) in areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[17] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Virivka (northeast of Kharkiv City).[18]

Russian forces continue to strike Ukrainian logistics in Kharkiv Oblast. Geolocated footage published on July 26 shows Russian forces conducting first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against a locomotive and a delivery truck in northern Kharkiv City.[19]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 25 and 26 but did not advance.[20]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on July 25 and 26 but did not advance.[21] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in western Kivsharivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[22]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 25 and 26 but did not advance.[23] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Borova and west of Novoplatonivka (northeast of Borova).[24]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 26 that Ukrainian forces struck and destroyed Russian drones in occupied Chervonpopivka (southeast of Borova and roughly 20 kilometers from the frontline) and Purdivka (roughly 45 kilometers from the frontline).[25]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on July 25 and 26 but did not advance.[26]
Russian forces continue infiltration missions in Kostyantynivka while Ukrainian forces maintain positions within the city. Geolocated footage published on July 24 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in northern, southern, and western Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[27] Geolocated footage published on July 23 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions in southern and western Kostyantynivka in areas where Russian forces had previously infiltrated.[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Osykove (northwest of Kostyantynivka).[29]


Geolocated footage published on July 24 and 25 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions in western Kostyantynivka and northwest of Rusyn Yar (southwest of Kostyantynivka) in areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[30]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Soulless Drone Unit of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Rusyn Yar — the first time ISW has observed this unit operating on the battlefield.[31]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on July 25 and 26 but did not advance.[32]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on July 25 and 26 but did not make confirmed advances.[33] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Shevchenko (northwest of Pokrovsk).[34] A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division with the claimed seizure of Shevchenko.[35] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also seized Bilytske (northeast of Pokrovsk) after Russian sources posted likely artificial intelligence (AI) altered footage purporting to show Russian forces operating in the settlement.[36]
Russian forces are reportedly preparing to intensify assaults in the Pokrovsk direction. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on July 26 that Russian forces are conducting aerial reconnaissance and trying to demine routes north of Pokrovsk in preparation for intensified offensive operations with the objective of reaching Dobropillya.[37]
Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on July 26.
Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Oleksandrivka direction. Geolocated footage published on July 25 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in Andriivka-Klevtsove (northeast of Oleksandrivka) after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[38]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on July 25 and 26 but did not advance.[39]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the 14th Separate Unmanned Systems Battalion (reportedly under the operational control of the Eastern Grouping of Forces) are operating in the Zaporizhia direction - the first time ISW has observed evidence of this battalion operating on the battlefield.[40]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 25 and 26 but did not advance.[41]
Russian forces continue to target Ukrainian logistics into Zaporizhzhia City. Ukrainian Minister of Infrastructure Mykola Kalashnyk reported on July 26 that Ukrainian passenger trains have been unable to reach Zaporizhzhia City for the last three days (since July 23) and that continued Russian drone strikes against Ukrainian logistics have effectively cut off the city from rail links with other Ukrainian oblasts.[42]
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian forces reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on July 26.
Ukrainian forces continue their strike campaign against occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 26 that Ukrainian forces struck the Chornomornaftogaz facility in occupied Vnukovo overnight, which Russian forces use to store and produce natural gas and petroleum products.[43] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian ground relay for controlling Geran and Gerbera drones near occupied Chornomorske.
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 25 to 26. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Kh-59/69 cruise missile from the Black Sea; seven Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Voronezh cities; and 136 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type strike drones, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[44] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed one Kh-59/69 cruise missile, five Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles, and 104 drones, that two ballistic missiles and 27 drones struck 18 locations, and that drone and missile debris fell on seven locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential and civilian infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Sumy oblasts.[45]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on July 26 that Russian forces launched 1,700 drones, over 1,630 aerial bombs, and 95 missiles against Ukraine in the last week (since around July 19).[46]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://www dot interfax.ru/russia/1105647 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/387155
[2] kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80339
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-16-2024/
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-17-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-11-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-4-2025/
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_4-14/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_9-6/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-24-2024/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-28-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-6-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-18-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-12-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-16-2026/
[6] https://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80339
[7] kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80341
[8] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/26/07/2026/6a661cd89a7947b8a0264fb2?utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-23-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-21-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-15-2026/
[10] https://x.com/NicusorDanRO/status/2081285580269211664
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-24-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2026/
[12] https://www.facebook.com/mae.romania/posts/1470803451753627?ref=embed_post ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2026/
[13] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-25-2026/
[14] https://www.facebook.com/mae.romania/posts/1470803451753627?ref=embed_post
[15] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41491 ; https://x.com/Vlad_23456/status/2081113881515110586; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/27102; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/27122; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/27144 ; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2081243979870511359 ; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2081237814122061880 ; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/27168 ; https://x.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/2081238539124011121; https://x.com/NOELreports/status/2081284119800000678 ; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/27126 ; https://t.me/supernova_plus/56606 ; https://x.com/BeamTracker_/status/2081062504961106118
[16] https://t.me/wargonzo/35792; https://t.me/severnnyi/8817
[17] https://x.com/auditor_ya/status/2081126220154970425; https://x.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/2080973863001756153
[18] https://t.me/divgen/82591
[19] https://x.com/ShahedTracker/status/2081233698859397430; https://t.me/Brigada_VARYAG/62; https://t.me/osint_alarm/3925; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2081283662473998760; https://t.me/kharkiv_1654/153821; https://t.me/suspilne_kharkiv/96497
[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ARe7Ua5FiCPdsEFCERSZdg254bjszoYxKWsCp47zen6biD25ghcrQtGN4DkyLiW3l?__cft__[0]=AZbDJ2cxL4njTGRMVx0CSHInbsyBUeK4e1snRbCW6tW94W3JixLlc57bpWM8CQMpBruDo7UGLafaL8u5AgjuBMqtIdV38CSJN4UC6y5tsAuEGm0VoQ9eALH7IIGODU2V3Jdsy2vjsy72xiCduQ4TWNea5X5Ag4feJ_qGtoK2YJz1f5d4zEwFdUYuJjDlpLnedkY&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41477;
[21] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41499 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ARe7Ua5FiCPdsEFCERSZdg254bjszoYxKWsCp47zen6biD25ghcrQtGN4DkyLiW3l?__cft__[0]=AZbDJ2cxL4njTGRMVx0CSHInbsyBUeK4e1snRbCW6tW94W3JixLlc57bpWM8CQMpBruDo7UGLafaL8u5AgjuBMqtIdV38CSJN4UC6y5tsAuEGm0VoQ9eALH7IIGODU2V3Jdsy2vjsy72xiCduQ4TWNea5X5Ag4feJ_qGtoK2YJz1f5d4zEwFdUYuJjDlpLnedkY&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41477 https://t.me/wargonzo/35792 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19248
[22] https://t.me/motopatriot78/54369
[23] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41499 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ARe7Ua5FiCPdsEFCERSZdg254bjszoYxKWsCp47zen6biD25ghcrQtGN4DkyLiW3l?__cft__[0]=AZbDJ2cxL4njTGRMVx0CSHInbsyBUeK4e1snRbCW6tW94W3JixLlc57bpWM8CQMpBruDo7UGLafaL8u5AgjuBMqtIdV38CSJN4UC6y5tsAuEGm0VoQ9eALH7IIGODU2V3Jdsy2vjsy72xiCduQ4TWNea5X5Ag4feJ_qGtoK2YJz1f5d4zEwFdUYuJjDlpLnedkY&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41477 https://t.me/wargonzo/35792 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19248
[24] https://t.me/motopatriot78/54357
[25] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41491
[26] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41499 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ARe7Ua5FiCPdsEFCERSZdg254bjszoYxKWsCp47zen6biD25ghcrQtGN4DkyLiW3l?__cft__[0]=AZbDJ2cxL4njTGRMVx0CSHInbsyBUeK4e1snRbCW6tW94W3JixLlc57bpWM8CQMpBruDo7UGLafaL8u5AgjuBMqtIdV38CSJN4UC6y5tsAuEGm0VoQ9eALH7IIGODU2V3Jdsy2vjsy72xiCduQ4TWNea5X5Ag4feJ_qGtoK2YJz1f5d4zEwFdUYuJjDlpLnedkY&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41477 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/35792
[27] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2081209179398697355 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2081032368022818823 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2081058664085852537; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2081038256385282502; https://www.instagram.com/ua.military.police/reel/DbNVggcgSVF/ https://t.me/Volyn100obrTrO/3894 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2081032357969096796; https://t.me/kurt_compani_group/869
[28] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2081020026983748068; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2081020037817671732; https://t.me/TRO_DPR/17647 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2081020030578311424
[29] https://t.me/motopatriot78/54367
[30] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2081048959263424715; https://t.me/MSP1465/903 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2081212371209499087; https://t.me/bezdushnie/835
[31] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2081212371209499087; https://t.me/bezdushnie/835
[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41499 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ARe7Ua5FiCPdsEFCERSZdg254bjszoYxKWsCp47zen6biD25ghcrQtGN4DkyLiW3l?__cft__[0]=AZbDJ2cxL4njTGRMVx0CSHInbsyBUeK4e1snRbCW6tW94W3JixLlc57bpWM8CQMpBruDo7UGLafaL8u5AgjuBMqtIdV38CSJN4UC6y5tsAuEGm0VoQ9eALH7IIGODU2V3Jdsy2vjsy72xiCduQ4TWNea5X5Ag4feJ_qGtoK2YJz1f5d4zEwFdUYuJjDlpLnedkY&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R
; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41477 ; https://t.me/sashakots/63369
[33] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41499 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ARe7Ua5FiCPdsEFCERSZdg254bjszoYxKWsCp47zen6biD25ghcrQtGN4DkyLiW3l?__cft__[0]=AZbDJ2cxL4njTGRMVx0CSHInbsyBUeK4e1snRbCW6tW94W3JixLlc57bpWM8CQMpBruDo7UGLafaL8u5AgjuBMqtIdV38CSJN4UC6y5tsAuEGm0VoQ9eALH7IIGODU2V3Jdsy2vjsy72xiCduQ4TWNea5X5Ag4feJ_qGtoK2YJz1f5d4zEwFdUYuJjDlpLnedkY&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41477 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/119954
[34] https://t.me/mod_russia/65968 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/65969
[35] https://t.me/epoddubny/28373
[36] https://t.me/divgen/82597; https://t.me/Osintpen/3218; https://t.me/izvestia/247323; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2081379494628298886; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2081383122109923800
[37] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/07/26/kurs-na-dobropillya-vorog-gotuyetsya-do-aktyvizacziyi-nastupalnyh-dij-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/; https://t.me/rubizh3018/5282
[38] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12544; https://t.me/craftoriz/692
[39]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41499 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ARe7Ua5FiCPdsEFCERSZdg254bjszoYxKWsCp47zen6biD25ghcrQtGN4DkyLiW3l?__cft__[0]=AZbDJ2cxL4njTGRMVx0CSHInbsyBUeK4e1snRbCW6tW94W3JixLlc57bpWM8CQMpBruDo7UGLafaL8u5AgjuBMqtIdV38CSJN4UC6y5tsAuEGm0VoQ9eALH7IIGODU2V3Jdsy2vjsy72xiCduQ4TWNea5X5Ag4feJ_qGtoK2YJz1f5d4zEwFdUYuJjDlpLnedkY&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41477
[40] https://t.me/voin_dv/20382
[41]https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid0ARe7Ua5FiCPdsEFCERSZdg254bjszoYxKWsCp47zen6biD25ghcrQtGN4DkyLiW3l?__cft__[0]=AZbDJ2cxL4njTGRMVx0CSHInbsyBUeK4e1snRbCW6tW94W3JixLlc57bpWM8CQMpBruDo7UGLafaL8u5AgjuBMqtIdV38CSJN4UC6y5tsAuEGm0VoQ9eALH7IIGODU2V3Jdsy2vjsy72xiCduQ4TWNea5X5Ag4feJ_qGtoK2YJz1f5d4zEwFdUYuJjDlpLnedkY&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41477 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/35792
[42] https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/10978
[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41491
[44] https://t.me/kpszsu/70134
[45]https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20166; https://t.me/chernigivskaODA/30720; https://t.me/chernihivrada/4123; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31016; https://t.me/synegubov/24225; https://t.me/olexandrprokudin/14100; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/7159; https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/10988
[46] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/20166