Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 13, 2026

Assessment as of: 6:00 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 11:45 AM ET

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Ukrainian forces continue to intensify and expand their strike campaign aimed at denying Russia's ability to sustain logistics and transport fuel to occupied Crimea and isolate the peninsula. The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) reported on July 13 that Ukrainian forces conducted a large-scale strike operation on the night of July 12 to 13, simultaneously striking Russian military, logistics, and fuel facilities in occupied Crimea and Russia.[1] The SBU reported that Ukrainian forces struck two Russian project 12150 Mangust-class patrol boats in the Black Sea; hangars with military and special equipment at the Baherove military air base in occupied Crimea; three stationary radar stations that Russia uses to detect Ukrainian unmanned service vehicles (USVs) and drones in an unspecified location; the Yeisk and Maria cargo and passenger ferries at the Krym ferry terminal in occupied Kerch, Crimea; the Lavrentiy and Panagia cargo and passenger ferries and three oil tanks in the port of Kavkaz, Krasnodar Krai; a railway warehouse with oil tanks at the Kavkaz freight station, Krasnodar Krai; and an oil tank farm at an oil depot in Vyazniki, Stavropol Krai. Ukrainian forces are engaged in a systematic multipronged interdiction campaign aimed at isolating Crimea and denying Russia the ability to sustain logistics to the peninsula, striking bridges, major highways, and rail infrastructure from occupied Kherson Oblast to occupied Crimea; Kerch Strait crossings and ferries moving between occupied Crimea and Krasnodar Krai; and fuel tankers and vessels in the Sea of Azov.[2] The SBU's July 12 to 13 overnight strikes demonstrate the enhanced planning capabilities of Ukrainian forces in their ability to simultaneously conduct such strikes against various targets in support of Ukraine's effort to isolate the Crimean Peninsula. Continued Ukrainian strikes, if sustained, can continue to disrupt Russia's ability to sustain logistics to the peninsula, which can degrade frontline Russian offensive operations and impede Russian advances in southern Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces reportedly liberated six settlements and 120 square kilometers in the Oleksandrivka direction over an unspecified time period as part of their ongoing counterattacks in the area supported by intensifying intermediate-range strikes. A Ukrainian regiment operating in the Oleksandrivka direction announced on July 13 that Ukrainian forces liberated Ternove, Zaporizke, Novoheorhiivka, Vorone, Sichneve, and Maliivka (all southeast of Oleksandrivka), liberating 120 square kilometers and advancing 25 kilometers in depth.[3] The regiment seemingly deleted its original announcement without issuing a formal statement retracting its initial report later on July 13. Several Ukrainian media outlets have reported on and republished the regiment’s announcement, and these secondary reports remain available.[4] Ukrainian forces began counterattacks in the Oleksandrivka direction in Winter 2026, liberating around 480 square kilometers in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts since January 2026.[5] The regiment reported that Ukrainian forces have been systematically striking Russian drone crews and ground lines of communications (GLOCs) in the area to prepare the battlespace for Ukrainian counterattacks. The regiment reported that it inflicted critical losses on elements of the Russian 120th Naval Infantry Division (Baltic Fleet) (newly formed from the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade) operating in the area and destroyed a personnel concentration of the Russian 656th Motorized Rifle Regiment (29th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) in Temyrivka (southeast of Zaporizke) which Russian forces relied on to conduct logistics, forcing Russian units to retreat.[6] Ukraine’s tactical success in the Oleksandrivka direction over the last several months, supported by Ukraine’s intensified intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics, which has degraded Russian forces’ ability to conduct offensive operations, continues to force Russia to choose between defending against Ukrainian counterattacks or allocating manpower and resources to priority sectors.[7]

A Russian Geran-2 drone struck Copanca, Moldova, on the night of July 12 to 13. The Moldovan Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on July 13 that a Russian Geran-2 (the Russian-produced version of an Iranian Shahed-136) drone crashed and exploded in Copanca, roughly 25 kilometers from the Moldovan-Ukrainian border, after the Russian drone entered Moldovan airspace during strikes against Odesa Oblast.[8] Russian drones or drone debris have crashed onto Moldovan territory over 20 times and onto Romanian territory at least 30 times since February 2022.[9] Increasingly frequent Russian drone incursions into European and NATO airspace indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin has adopted a reckless policy that accepts the risk of Russian drones entering European and NATO airspace as an acceptable consequence of its strikes in Ukraine. Russia's acceptance of such risks underscores the need for European and NATO states to consider negotiating possible air defense agreements with Ukraine as a matter of self-defense against Russian drone strikes against NATO countries, regardless of whether the Russian drone incursions are accidental or intentional.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continue to intensify and expand their strike campaign aimed at denying Russia's ability to sustain logistics and transport fuel to occupied Crimea and isolate the peninsula.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly liberated six settlements and 120 square kilometers in the Oleksandrivka direction over an unspecified time period as part of their ongoing counterattacks in the area supported by intensifying intermediate-range strikes.
• A Russian Geran-2 drone struck Copanca, Moldova, on the night of July 12 to 13.
• Russian forces launched three Kh-59/69 cruise missiles and 134 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline for more information about Ukrainian operations in Russia.

Gasoline shortages due to Ukrainian long-range strikes on Russia's energy infrastructure are impacting Russia's agricultural sector and the delivery of aid to Russian forces in the war zone. The Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) reported on July 10 that Russian farmers are complaining about fuel supply shortages.[10] The SZRU reported that restrictions on the quantities of gasoline that gas stations can sell are forcing Russian forklift drivers to fill up almost every hour. The SZRU noted that prohibitions on filling up canisters at gas stations are affecting the work of bulldozers or excavators, which cannot drive on public roads to access the gas stations to refuel. The SZRU reported that Russian farmers are noting that the fuel crisis could lead to a loss of up to 30 percent of the harvest this season.

Russian opposition source Verstka reported on July 13 that several Russian volunteer organizations are struggling to deliver humanitarian aid to the war zone due to the fuel shortages.[11] Verstka reported that Russian volunteers from the Krasnodar City-based Dobrotvortsy Foundation stated that shortages at gas stations along all highways in occupied Ukraine are making it difficult to move supplies and that there is no gasoline available in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.

The Ukrainian General Staff provided a battle damage assessment (BDA) of Ukraine’s July 11-12 strike on the Syzran Oil Refinery. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on July 13 that Ukrainian strikes against the Syzran Oil Refinery in Syzran, Samara Oblast, on the night of July 11 to 12 damaged its AVT-5 and AVT-6 primary oil processing units.[12]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continue to conduct infiltration missions in northern Sumy Oblast. Geolocated footage published on July 13 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position north of Komarivka (northwest of Sumy City along the international border) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[13] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian strikes in the past few months against Ukrainian drone points, command posts, and logistics have facilitated Russian advances in Sumy Oblast.[14]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on July 12 and 13 but did not make confirmed advances.[15] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv City).[16]

Ukrainian authorities implemented measures to protect against Russia’s growing first-person view (FPV) drone strike campaign against major roads near Kharkiv City. Kharkiv Oblast Administration Head Oleh Synehubov stated on July 13 that Ukrainian authorities have installed anti-drone nets on an unspecified section of the Kharkiv City ring road.[17] Synehubov emphasized that Ukrainian authorities are working on ways to restore traffic and noted that the area north of the city remains dangerous such that civilians should continue to use other routes. Russian forces struck vehicles on the Kharkiv City M-03 ring road in late May 2026.[18]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on July 12 and 13 but did not make any confirmed advances.[19]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued infiltration missions in the Kupyansk direction. Geolocated footage published on July 13 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in central Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[20] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 13 that Russian forces conducted a guided FAB-500 glide bomb strike against a Ukrainian temporary deployment point near Blahodativka (southwest of Kupyansk).[21]

A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on July 13 but did not advance.[22]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces maintain positions east of Slovyansk, contrary to Russian previous claims of advance. Geolocated footage published on July 12 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position in northwestern Rai-Oleksandrivka (east of Slovyansk), an area in which Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces advanced.[23]

Russian forces continued infiltration missions within and southwest of Kostyantynivka. Geolocated footage published on July 4 and 8 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian-occupied buildings in northwestern Kostyantynivka and in eastern Dovha Balka (southwest of Kostyantynivka) after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[24] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin acknowledged on July 12 that Ukrainian forces continue to operate in northern and northwestern Kostyantynivka.[25] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Dovha Balka.[26]

Russian sources continue to publish likely artificial intelligence (AI)-altered footage showing alleged Russian advances in Kostyantynivka. A Russian milblogger posted likely AI-altered footage on July 13 showing Russian forces raising flags in southern Kostyantynivka.[27] Such footage is in line with a wider pattern of Russian sources, including the Russian MoD, publishing AI-altered footage to propagate claims of expansive Russian gains in Kostyantynivka and other areas of the frontline for informational effects.[28]

Russian forces are intensifying their strikes against Druzhkivka to prepare the battlefield and force civilians to evacuate. Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vadym Filashkin stated on July 13 that Russian forces are increasing the number of guided glide bomb, artillery, Shahed drone, Gerbera drone, and fiber optic drone strikes against Donetsk Oblast and that the situation in the region is most difficult in Druzhkivka.[29] Filashkin noted that Russian forces are trying to take control of the access roads leading to Druzhkivka and Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka (between Druzhkivka and Kostyantynivka). Filashkin reported that 4,000 people remain in Druzhkivka without power, water, and gas, as Ukrainian authorities cannot restore damaged infrastructure due to Russian shelling and the significant number of wounded energy workers.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in the Dobropillya tactical area. A Russian milblogger claimed on July 13 that Ukrainian forces maintain control of Novyi Donbas (east of Dobropillya), contrary to the Russian MoD’s claim on June 16 that Russian forces seized the settlement.[30]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on July 12 and 13 but did not advance.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Bilytske (north of Pokrovsk).[32]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on July 12 and 13 but did not advance.[33]

See topline text for reports on Ukrainian advances in the Oleksandrivka direction.

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. A Ukrainian brigade posted geolocated footage on July 13 showing Ukrainian forces striking a Russian Navy vessel in the port of Mariupol (roughly 115 kilometers from the frontline); a Russian truck along the T-0507 Amvrosiivka-Khartsyzk highway near occupied Kuteinykove (roughly 88 kilometers from the frontline); and two trucks and liquid natural gas tanks at a gas station near occupied Starobesheve (roughly 81 kilometers from the frontline).[34] Geolocated footage published on July 12 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian truck along the M-30 Donetsk City-Luhansk City highway in occupied Yenakiieve (roughly 42 kilometers from the frontline).[35]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction and western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 12 and 13 but did not advance.[36]

Russian forces continue to use the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to store military equipment and launch drone strikes. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated on July 13 that Russian forces are storing military equipment in the engine rooms of four power units at the ZNPP, have set up weapons depots in the plant's basements and bomb shelters, have installed machine-gun nests and missile systems on the roofs of reactor compartments, and are storing ammunition and military equipment under technical passages and overpasses that connect power units to other buildings.[37] The GUR also reported that Russian forces are deploying drone control points to launch Geran-type and Gerbera-type strike drones, including with the involvement of underage student workers from the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ). The GUR reported that Russian forces have mined some of the ZNPP's technical facilities near the shore of the dried-up Kakhovka Reservoir and that 1,500 Russian soldiers are guarding the plant. The GUR stated that Russian forces are not allowing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) full access to the ZNPP's power units and technical areas and that Russian forces only allow IAEA inspections along specific routes. The GUR added that the ZNPP is suffering from a labor shortage, with only 7,500 people working at the plant, as compared to 11,000 before the full-scale invasion. The GUR reported that the employees whom Russian authorities have brought in from Russia lack the necessary qualifications, as the ZNPP is significantly different than NPPs in Russia.

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on June 13.

Russian forces continue their strike campaign against gas stations in occupied Kherson Oblast. The Kherson Oblast Military Administration reported on July 13 that a Russian drone struck a gas station in Dniprovskyi Raion, Kherson City, injuring three employees.[38]

Ukrainian forces used an unmanned surface vehicle (USV) to deploy an unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) to the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast in the first unmanned amphibious assault mission. A Ukrainian brigade deployed a Tanchik Droid-type UGV from a USV onto an area about seven kilometers east of the tip of the Kinburn Spit.[39] ISW is unable to assess the immediate purpose of the mission or its success at this time. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported in June and early July that Russian forces had to withdraw from unspecified parts of the spit as Ukrainian strikes had caused severe supply issues in the area, but it is unclear if Russian forces maintain some positions on the spit at this time.[40]

Ukraine's strikes on Russian vessels in the past week have significantly reduced naval traffic in the Sea of Azov. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi and the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck seven tankers, five dry cargo ships, one ferry, and two tugboats in the Sea of Azov on the night of July 12 to 13, for a total of 105 vessels between July 6 and 13.[41] An open-source channel on X (formerly Twitter) reported on July 13 that Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) imagery indicates that the number of vessels in the Sea of Azov decreased from 132 on July 6 to 43 on July 12.[42] The channel assessed that the signatures of the detected objects suggest that the number of tankers and bulk carriers in the sea decreased severalfold and that the vessels currently in the sea are mostly smaller vessels, such as tugboats.

Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian military and energy infrastructure in occupied Crimea on the night of July 12 to 13. Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck four power substations throughout Crimea, an S-400 air defense system launcher near Kerch (roughly 240 kilometers from the front), the Kuban-Crimea electricity transfer point near Hlazivka (roughly 250 kilometers from the front), a Pantsir-S1 air defense system near Osovyny (roughly 250 kilometers from the front), and a Nebo-U radar system near Melek-Chesme (roughly 240 kilometers from the front) overnight.[43] A Russian source and Crimea-based Telegram channel Crimean Wind claimed that Ukrainian forces struck a large, semi-underground Russian logistics hub that included command posts and warehouses near Armyansk (roughly 85 kilometers from the front) overnight.[44] Crimean Wind also claimed that locals reported a possible strike near the railway bridge over the Fiolentovske Highway in Sevastopol (roughly 240 kilometers from the front) overnight.^[45] NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data shows heat anomalies near the Chonhar Bridge connecting occupied Crimea and Kherson Oblast, and Crimean Wind assessed that fuel tankers and semi-trailers are likely burning after Ukrainian drone strikes.^[46] Crimean Wind also posted a picture showing how Russian forces are disguising their military fuel tanker trucks as civilian trucks in Simferopol, likely to prevent Ukrainian drones from striking them.[47]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of July 12 to 13. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on July 13 that Russian forces launched three Kh-59/69 cruise missiles from the airspace over occupied Crimea and 134 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type strike drones and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda, Crimea.[48] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed all three Kh-59/69 missiles and 123 drones, that six drones struck five locations, and that debris fell at four locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged residential, educational, transport, energy, and commercial infrastructure in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Kherson, Odesa, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[49] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck the ports of Chernomorsk and Odesa City and hit a Togo-flagged civilian merchant vessel that was carrying fertilizers, killing three and injuring 10.[50] Ukrainian energy operators Ukrenergo and Chernihiv Oblenergo reported that Russian strikes caused power outages in Kharkiv, Sumy, Chernihiv, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[51]

Russian strikes against Ukrainian port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast are destroying grain and sunflower oil meant for export. Ukrainian grain exporter Kernel Holding reported on July 13 that large-scale Russian strikes on the Chornomorsk port in Odesa Oblast on July 10-11 and 11-12 damaged the company's terminals.[52] The company stated that Russian strikes damaged loading and unloading equipment, power lines, grain silos, and sunflower oil storage tanks and blocked, damaged, or destroyed 45,000 tons of wheat and 9,000 tons of sunflower oil.

Russia continues to adapt its drone strikes to push Ukrainians to leave Kyiv City. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated in an article published on July 11 that between 25 and 30 percent of Russia's current strike packages consist of Shahed-type drones with jet engines, which enable the drones to fly at low altitudes and at fast speeds and to quickly dive.[53] Ihnat noted that the low-flying drones frighten Ukrainian civilians even more than other types of Shahed drones that fly at higher altitudes. Ihnat assessed that recent Russian strikes aim to make Kyiv City "completely unlivable."

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.