Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 31, 2026

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly. 

For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

Russian forces’ months of strikes have significantly degraded and damaged the Ukrainian energy grid, which is now facing significant problems even during the moratorium on Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Ukraine’s power grid suffered a significant shutdown of the 400-kilowatt (kW) line between the Romanian and Moldovan power systems and the 750-kW line between western and central Ukraine on the morning of January 31. Ukrainian Energy Minister Denys Shmyhal reported on January 31 that the cause of the shutdown was an unspecified technological disruption, not a Russian strike.[1] The Ukrainian Ministry of Finance stated that a cyberattack did not cause the outages.[2] The Moldovan Energy Ministry stated that "serious problems" in the Ukrainian power grid caused the 400-kW line to disconnect, and Ukrainian Energy Research Center Director Oleksandr Kharchenko stated that existing damage to Ukraine's energy system "complicated" the situation.[3] Shmyhal stated that the shutdowns caused cascading power outages in the Ukrainian power grid, activated protections at Ukrainian substations, and forced operators to unload Ukraine's nuclear power plants.[4] Shmyhal reported emergency shutdowns in Kyiv City and Kyiv, Zhytomyr, and Kharkiv oblasts. Shmyhal reported that Ukrainian authorities restored power to critical infrastructure in Kyiv City and Kyiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts by 1400 local time and were working to restore power to civilian consumers in Kharkiv, Zhytomyr, and Odesa oblasts.[5]

Russian strikes did not directly cause the large-scale outages, but the Russian strike campaign has already damaged and compromised the Ukrainian power grid to the point where the degraded grid is fragile and prone to significant disruptions due to technical malfunctions. Shmyhal notably reported on January 16 that Russian forces have struck every power plant in Ukraine since February 2022.[6] The Kremlin agreed to a week-long moratorium on strikes against some Ukrainian energy infrastructure on January 29 only after inflicting severe damage to Ukraine’s national energy grid. The enduring cascading blackouts in Ukraine through January 31 during the ceasefire further demonstrate how the temporary moratorium does not mark a significant Russian concession.[7]

A US delegation met with lead Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev in Miami, Florida, on January 31. US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff reported on January 31 that he, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner, and senior advisor to US President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace Josh Gruenbaum met with Dmitriev in Miami.[8] Witkoff called the talks "productive" and "constructive" but did not offer details about the discussions. The United States will meet with Russian and Ukrainian delegations in Abu Dhabi on February 1, and ISW will continue to monitor for additional reports of ongoing negotiations.

Belarusian balloons illegally entered Polish airspace on the night of January 30 to 31 for the second time within 72 hours. The Polish Armed Forces Operational Command reported that Polish military radar detected objects entering Polish airspace from Belarus overnight and that the objects were highly likely balloons.[9] Polish authorities temporarily restricted airspace over Podlaskie Voivodeship (along Poland’s eastern border with Belarus) in response. Belarusian balloons also entered Polish airspace on the night of January 28 to 29 and have frequently violated Polish and Lithuanian airspace since October 2025.[10] ISW continues to assess that Russia has de facto annexed Belarus and that Russia is using airspace incursions of Poland and Lithuania from Belarus as part of its “Phase Zero” effort — the informational and psychological condition-setting phase — to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[11]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces’ months of strikes have significantly degraded and damaged the Ukrainian energy grid, which is now facing significant problems even during the moratorium on Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure.
• A US delegation met with lead Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev in Miami, Florida, on January 31.
• Belarusian balloons illegally entered Polish airspace on the night of January 30 to 31 for the second time within 72 hours.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and near Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on January 31 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy Oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Andriivka, on January 30 and 31.[12]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 31 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Sluchovsk, Bryansk Oblast (northwest of Sumy City near the international border) overnight on January 30 to 31.[13]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division and of the 34th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Sumy direction.[14]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 30 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Nesterne (northeast of Kharkiv City).[15]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Zelene, Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, Vilcha, Starytsya, Prylipka, and Kruhle and toward Ternova, Symynivka, and Hrafske on January 30 and 31.[16]

The Ukrainian 16th Army Corps (AC) reported on January 31 that Russian forces are exploiting adverse weather conditions that impede Ukrainian drone operations to conduct more frequent highly attritional assaults.[17] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the northern Kharkiv direction reported that Ukrainian forces are expanding the ”kill zone“ (an area immediately near the frontline where a mass of tactical strike and reconnaissance drones pose an elevated risk to any equipment or personnel that enters the area) into Belgorod Oblast with fiber-optic drone strikes in response to Russian TOS-1A thermobaric artillery strikes from the Shebekino area (northeast of Kharkiv City and south of Belgorod City).[18]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk toward Khatnie and east of Velykyi Burluk toward Hryhorivka on January 29 and 30 but did not advance.[19]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 30 and 31 shows Russian servicemembers operating in central Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk) and in northern Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk) in what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA).[20]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Podoly (southeast of Kupyansk).[21] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces almost completely control Petropavlivka (just northeast of Podoly) but characterized Podoly as a contested "gray zone."[22] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces have been attacking Podoly from the Petropavlivka direction for two weeks (since roughly January 17).[23]

Russian forces attacked north of Kupyansk toward Kutkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka and toward Petro-Ivanivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Podoly and Pishchane and toward Novoosynove and Kurylivka on January 30 and 31.[24]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian military command is posting footage alleging that Russian forces seized Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi in order to counter the current "crisis" that emerged after Russian forces tried to conduct flag raisings in the settlement.[25] The milblogger criticized Russian commanders for submitting false reports that then deny the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) the opportunity to strike Ukrainian-held territory and force Russian commanders to rely only on small group infantry tactics. Another prominent Russian milblogger also complained about Russian forces' false reports, particularly those related to the area south of Kupyansk.[26] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are attacking encircled Russian groups within Kupyansk.[27]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 31 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Novoplatonivka; southeast of Borova near Serednie, Tverdokhlibove, and Druzhelyubivka and toward Novoserhiivka and Shyikivka; and south of Borova near Oleksandrivka on January 30 and 31.[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Krymky (south of Borova).[29]

Order of Battle: Knyaz Vandal Novgorodsky (KVN) fiber optic first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 84th Reconnaissance Battalion (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces west of Stepove (southeast of Borova).[30]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on January 31                but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near and within Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Yarova and Svyatohirsk; north of Lyman near Drobysheve; northeast of Lyman near Zarichne and Stavky; southeast of Lyman near Yampil; northeast of Slovyansk near Zakitne and Dronivka; east of Slovyansk near Svyato-Pokrovske; and southeast of Slovyansk near Bondarne and Fedorivka and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka, Nykyforivka, and Fedorivka Druha on January 30 and 31.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked toward Novoselivka (northwest of Lyman) and near Stavky.[32]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Slovyansk direction reported that Ukrainian forces are patrolling the Serebryanske forest area with first-person view (FPV) drones rather than winged or Mavic drones to detect Russian infiltrators attempting to conceal themselves in the forest.[33]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Siversk (east of Slovyansk) and Zakitne.[34]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 31 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Yablunivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka).[35]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 28 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced in southeastern Kostyantynivka.[36]

Assessed Russian infiltration: Geolocated footage published on January 31 shows Russian servicemembers operating near the Donetska railroad in southeastern Kostyantynivka in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission that did not change in the control of terrain or forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[37]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) credited elements of the Russian 10th Tank Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) with seizing Berestok (south of Kostyantynivka).[38]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on January 28 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions in northern Yablunivka – an area in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[39]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Minkivka, Pryvillya, and Holubivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Shcherbynivka, Kleban-Byk, and Ivanopillya; southwest of Kostyantynivka toward Illinivka and Stepanivka; west of Kostyantynivka toward Mykolaipillya and Novopavlivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka on January 30 and 31.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Holubivka, Minkivka, Maiske (east of Druzhkivka), and Virolyubivka (north of Kostyantynivka).[41]

A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported that Russian forces are having less success with infiltration tactics, so they are focusing on guided glide bomb, artillery, and drone strikes against Ukrainian logistics in the near rear.[42] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces have recently started to conduct drone strikes against and begun using drones for remote mining in Druzhkivka. Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov stated that Russian forces in the Kostyantynivka direction are equipping Molniya fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drones with rocket-propelled grenades.[43]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA), including its 1465th Motorized Rifle Regiment, are striking Ukrainian forces in southern Kostyantynivka, in central Ivanopillya, south of Kostyantynivka, and north of Yablunivka.[44] Drone operators of the 7th Military Base (49th CAA, SMD) are striking Ukrainian forces east of Stepanivka.[45] Drone operators of the 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion of the Baltic Fleet (consolidated motorized rifle regiment of the Navy, under operational control of the Central Grouping of Forces) are striking Ukrainian forces in Yablunivka.[46] Drone operators of the 89th Tank Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are striking Ukrainian forces in eastern Kostyantynivka.[47] Artillery elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are striking Ukrainian forces within Illinivka.[48] Artillery elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade's 1st Krasnodar Battalion and reconnaissance drone operators of the 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian air defense systems and drone control points near Illinivka.[49] Drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian drone antennas near Novohryhorivka (southwest of Druzhkivka) and in Mykolaipillya and Novopavlivka.[50] FPV drone operators of the 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment) (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles in the Kostyantynivka direction.[51]

Ukrainian forces continued strikes against the Russian near rear in the Kostyantynivka direction on the night of January 30 to 31. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the control point of an unspecified Russian motorized rifle regiment near Poltavka (southwest of Druzhkivka) and a Russian manpower concentration near Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[52]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on January 31 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 31 that Russian forces seized Toretske (east of Dobropillya).[53] A Russian milblogger credited elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) with the claimed seizure of Toretske.[54]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar and east of Dobropillya near Ivanivka on January 30 and 31.[55]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 30 and 31 indicates that Russian forces advanced, seized Balahan (east of Pokrovsk), and advanced in central Myrnohrad and along the E-50 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway south of Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[56]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Molodetske, and Novopidhorodne on January 30 and 31.[57]

The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on January 31 that Ukrainian forces destroyed two of three Russian armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) involved and killed over ten Russian servicemembers during an unsuccessful, roughly platoon-sized mechanized assault near Hryshyne.[58] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on January 31 that Ukrainian forces repelled a roughly reinforced company-sized Russian motorized assault in the Pokrovsk direction, destroying ten quad bikes, four motorcycles, and six vehicles, and killing over 80 Russian servicemembers.[59]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian Kaira Drone Detachment of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps [AC], Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Pokrovsk direction.[60]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself, northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka, and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on January 30 and 31.[61]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on January 30 and 31 but did not advance.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 30 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian servicemembers south of Ivanivka (northeast of Oleksandrivka) in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or FEBA.[62]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Oleksandrohrad and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Verbove on January 30 and 31.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Bohodarivka (southwest of Oleksandrivka).[64]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 30 and 31 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Dobropillya (north of Hulyaipole) and west of Pryluky (northwest of Hulyaipole).[65]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 31 shows Russian servicemembers operating northwest of Zelene (north of Hulyaipole) and elements of the Russian 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) raising flags in eastern and western Svyatopetrivka (northwest of Hulyaipole) in what ISW assesses were infiltration missions that did not change the control of terrain or forward edge of battle (FEBA).[66]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Svyatopetrivka.[67]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on January 30 shows Ukrainian forces capturing Russian servicemembers in the northwestern outskirts of Olenokostyantynivka (northwest of Hulyaipole) – an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[68]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Svyatopetrivka and Olenokostyantynivka; north of Hulyaipole near Nove Zaporizhzhia, Dobropillya, Danylivka, Varvarivka, and Zelene; northeast of Hulyaipole near Zlahoda; west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne; and southwest of Hulyaipole near Myrne on January 30 and 31.[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Rizdvyanka, Vozdvyzhivka (both northwest of Hulyaipole), and Staroukrainka (west of Hulyaipole).[70]

The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command rejected on January 31 the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) January 30 claim that Russian forces seized Ternuvate (northwest of Hulyaipole).[71] The command stated that Ukrainian forces quickly cleared Russian infiltrators who exploited poor weather conditions to enter the settlement.

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA) are striking Ukrainian positions in Vozdvyzhivka.[72]

Ukrainian forces continued strikes against the Russian near rear in the Hulyaipole direction on the night of January 30 to 31. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 31 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Rivnopillya (north of Hulyaipole), a logistics depot near occupied Voskresenka (south of Hulyaipole), and Russian force concentrations near Rivnopillya (north of Hulyaipole), Pryvillya (northeast of Hulyaipole), and Uspenivka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[73]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 31 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Orikhiv toward Hulyaipilske; west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk, Pavlivka, and Plavni; and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske and Lukyanivske and toward Novoboikivske, Richne, Mahdalynivka, and Novoyakovlivka on January 30 and 31.[74]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 328th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (104th VDV Division) are striking Ukrainian forces in central Lukyanivske.[75] Drone operators and other elements of the 7th VDV Division and 11th Separate VDV Brigade reportedly continue to operate in Zaporizhia Oblast.[76]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on January 31 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Kherson Oblast, including east of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Bridge, on January 30 and 31.[77]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 98th VDV Division reportedly continue to operate in the Kherson direction.[78]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on January 30 to 31. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 85 Shahed, Gerbera, and Italmas-type strike drones – of which about 55 were Shaheds – from the directions of Oryol City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[79] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 64 strike drones and that 20 drones struck 13 locations.

A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) source reported on January 31 that satellite images collected on January 29 indicate that Russian forces are expanding drone launching capabilities and building additional drone hangars at the Primorsko-Akhtarsk airfield.[80] A Ukrainian OSINT source posted satellite imagery taken in January 2026, confirming the existence of Russian Iskander-M and Iskander-K ballistic missile launch sites in Shumakovo, Shchigry, and Cheryomushki, Kursk Oblast; Klintsy, Bryansk Oblast; and Novoselivske, occupied Crimea.[81]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] https://t.me/Denys_Smyhal/12227

[2] https://t.me/mintsyfra/7757

[3] https://www.facebook.com/MinisterulEnergieiRM/posts/pfbid0osjLWkVU15wdNLNcTnXej5UNUVu5shwHxAgNyybDTxjUszztgh3vkWZ5R2ND1pxWl; https://kyivindependent dot com/ukraine-hit-by-mass-blackouts-after-grid-disruption/

[4] https://t.me/Denys_Smyhal/12227

[5] https://t.me/Denys_Smyhal/12228

[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-18-2026/

[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-30-2026/

[8] https://x.com/SEPeaceMissions/status/2017640301293113621?s=20

[9] https://x.com/DowOperSZ/status/2017478294187176128

[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-29-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-7-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-29-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-24-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-31-2025/

[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-14-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-6-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-2-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-29-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-7-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-14-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-27-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-24-2025

[12] https://t.me/dva_majors/87374; https://t.me/wargonzo/31997

[13] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34453

[14] https://t.me/mod_russia/60763; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/39161; https://t.me/mod_russia/60764

[15] https://x.com/ukrliberation/status/2017325148001509508; https://t.me/hart_brigade/873; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/33403

[16] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34465; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34437; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34434; https://t.me/wargonzo/31997; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/15034; https://t.me/motopatriot78/48192

[17] https://t.me/corpsarmy16/2051; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/31/povernulys-do-myasnyh-shturmiv-na-harkivshhyni-vorog-aktyvizuvavsya-cherez-pogodni-umovy/

[18] https://youtu.be/ZvYCNVwGL-Y; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2026/01/31/vzhe-popalyly-i-budemo-palyty-dali-na-vovchanskomu-napryamku-protystoyat-solnczepokam-i-kabam/

[19] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34437; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34434; https://t.me/wargonzo/31997

[20] ttps://t.me/creamy_caprice/11157; https://t.me/frontline_pvt/15820; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2017320167362204122 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11161; https://t.me/operationall_space/9340; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2017478859021815927  

[21] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/15034

[22] https://t.me/motopatriot78/48176; https://t.me/motopatriot78/48177

[23] https://t.me/motopatriot78/48176

[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34465; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34437; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34434; https://t.me/wargonzo/31997

[25] https://t.me/rybar/77118

[26] https://t.me/dva_majors/87362; https://t.me/dva_majors/87374

[27] https://t.me/dva_majors/87374

[28] https://t.me/wargonzo/31997 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34465; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34437; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34434

[29] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/39180

[30] https://x.com/ZoamSc2/status/2017402123768701142; https://t.me/privet_iz_doma152/20782

[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34465; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34437; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34434; https://t.me/wargonzo/31997; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/39180; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/108454; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/70315; https://t.me/dva_majors/87374

[32] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/39180

[33] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/31/chorna-plyama-na-dorozi-tilky-zalyshylas-indianczi-letily-za-garmatoyu-a-spalyly-dva-grady/

[34] https://t.me/motopatriot78/48199

[35] https://t.me/MSP1465/15; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2017558818100527113?s=20

[36] https://t.me/libertas666_28/31; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2017302026560913837  

[37] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2017565261683888308; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1247238697470430; https://www.instagram.com/arta28ombr/reel/DT2pLaSDScY/

[38] https://t.me/mod_russia/60758

[39] https://t.me/beslavnaya_baltica/182; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2017558024609468772

[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34465; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34437 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34434; https://t.me/wargonzo/31997; https://t.me/dva_majors/87374; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/108454; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/70315

[41] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/70315

[42] https://youtu.be/ZvYCNVwGL-Y; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/31/dronamy-pochaly-duzhe-aktyvno-praczyuvaty-po-druzhkivczi-vorog-ne-maye-prosuvan-ale-bye-po-logistyczi/

[43] https://t.me/serhii_flash/6892

[44] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2017579757165072554; https://t.me/DKulko/1408; https://t.me/MSP1465/15; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2017558818100527113?s=20; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2017554855401836973; https://t.me/Legion_W_Bat1/1050; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2017370420911931894; https://t.me/tatianavitusheva/19150

[45] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2017561334821355594; https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/30476

[46] https://t.me/beslavnaya_baltica/182; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2017558024609468772

[47] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2017318561329393880?s=20; https://t.me/razvedkasibir/6318

[48] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2017311983427535280; https://t.me/nm_dnr/14956

[49] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14973

[50] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14971

[51] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14972

[52] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34453

[53] https://t.me/mod_russia/60769; https://t.me/mod_russia/60772

[54] https://t.me/motopatriot78/48193

[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34465; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34437; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34434

[56] https://x.com/InBigall/status/2017448654240452948; https://t.me/argus38/762; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2017530203057140068?s=20; https://t.me/corps7DSHV/1049

[57]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34465; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34437; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34434; https://t.me/wargonzo/31997; https://t.me/dva_majors/87374

[58] https://www.facebook.com/reel/1660719748251061; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1228211-sili-oboroni-vidbili-mehanizovanij-sturm-grisinogo-zaliski-rosijskoi-pihoti-sukaut-v-seli/

[59] https://t.me/ngu_war_for_peace/34481; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/01/31/vorog-vtratyv-majzhe-chotyry-vzvody-v-hodi-provalnogo-shturmu-na-pokrovskomu-napryamku/

[60] https://t.me/mod_russia/60768

[61]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34465; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34437; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34434

[62] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2017552034720059788; https://t.me/OBMP_505/1060

[63] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34465; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34437; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34434 

[64] https://t.me/dva_majors/87374

[65] https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2017649020898861442; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11167; https://t.me/ombr_110/2056; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2017630022761062873; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1604271793939165

[66] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11163; https://t.me/voin_dv/18516; https://t.me/Osintpen/2467; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2017514060536025173; https://t.me/OSHP_225/5262; https://x.com/PuenteUribarri/status/2017513679541977488; https://x.com/99Dominik_/status/2017518071427047854

[67] https://t.me/motopatriot78/48176

[68] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11156; https://t.me/OSHP_225/5261

[69] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34465; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34437; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34434  

[70] https://t.me/dva_majors/87374

[71] https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13551; https://t.me/mod_russia/60734 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/60738; https://t.me/mod_russia/60740

[72] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2017608431499395492; https://t.me/voin_dv/18518

[73] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34453

[74] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34465; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34437; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34434; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/39165; https://t.me/dva_majors/87374

[75] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2017549778125808009; https://t.me/GORA_GROUP_BPLA/916

[76] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/39165; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/39179; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/39163; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/39157; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/39161

[77] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34437; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/34434

[78] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/39161

[79] https://t.me/kpszsu/54147

[80] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/rosiya-rozshyryuye-majdanchyky-dlya-zberigannya-shahediv-u-prymorsko-ahtarsku-suputnykovi-znimky/; https://t.me/StrategicaviationT/25342

[81] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/7122