Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 28, 2026

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The People's Republic of China (PRC) continues to provide critical support to Russia's defense industrial base (DIB), including to produce Oreshnik missiles and Shahed long-range drones. The Telegraph reported on January 28 that it has identified $10.3 billion worth of technology and advanced equipment that the PRC has sent to Russia during an unspecified time frame.[1] The Telegraph reported that Russia is using Chinese computer numerical control machines (CNC) to produce Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) at the Votkinsk Plant in the Republic of Udmurtia and to produce Shahed-type drones at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (ASEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan. The Telegraph found that the PRC also supplies millions of dollars' worth of microchips, memory boards, ball bearings, telescopic sights, and mounted piezoelectric crystals to Russia. The PRC continues to refrain from directly supplying Russia with weapons but is supplying components and equipment, many of which are dual-use, to the Russian DIB instead. ISW continues to assess that the PRC's supplies to the Russian DIB have enabled Russia to improve and scale up its production of drones that Russian forces use to launch long-range strikes against the Ukrainian rear and to strike the Ukrainian near rear to generate battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effects along the front line.[2]

Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian military assets near the front line and in the Russian near rear on the night of January 27 to 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck military assets in the Russian near rear, including a manpower concentration and drone control point near Velyka Novosilka, Donetsk Oblast (roughly 23 kilometers from the front line); a manpower concentration near Hryhorivka, Donetsk Oblast (roughly 13 kilometers from the front line); and an ammunition depot near Nyzhnya Duvanka, Luhansk Oblast (roughly 25 kilometers from the front line).[3] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck Russian military assets near the front line, including manpower concentrations near Shakhove (east of Dobropillya) and Hulyaipole; a battalion command post near Berezove (southeast of Oleksandrivka); and a manpower concentration in Kolotylivka, Belgorod Oblast (west of Sumy City and north of Hrabovske). Ukrainian forces began increasing their mid-range strike campaign in late December 2025 and are undertaking their own battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign to parallel Russia's BAI campaign that enabled Russian advances in Fall 2025.[4] Ukrainian forces likely seek to use their mid-range strikes to counter recent Russian advances.

Key Takeaways:

• The People's Republic of China (PRC) continues to provide critical support to Russia's weapons production, including Oreshnik missiles and Shahed long-range drones.
• Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian military assets near the front line and in the Russian near rear on the night of January 27 to 28.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure on the night of January 27 to 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck Khokholsky Oil Depot in Khokholsky, Voronezh Oblast, causing a fire.[5] Voronezh Oblast Governor Alexander Gusev acknowledged that Ukrainian drones struck the plant and caused fires.[6]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on January 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced from the international border into eastern Lukashivka (southeast of Sumy City).[7]

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kursk and Sumy oblasts on January 27 and 28.[8]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 1st Battalion of the 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) and of the 51st Airborne VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Sumy direction.[9] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly continue to operate in the Sumy direction.[10]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on January 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 71st Guards Motorized Rifle Division (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) advanced into eastern Vovchanski Khutory (northeast of Kharkiv City).[11]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Starytsya, Kruhle, Symynivka, Vovchanski Khutory, Prylipka, Nesterne, and Dehtyarne and toward Hrafske on January 27 and 28.[12] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vovchansk.[13]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on January 28 that Starytsya remains disputed territory, despite Russian claims that Russian forces seized the settlement as of January 24.[14]

Order of Battle: Artillery and other elements of the Russian 1009th Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction, including near Starytsya.[15] Elements of the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th CAA) reportedly continue to operate in Kharkiv Oblast.[16]

Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast of Velykyi Burluk toward Obukhivka and Kolodyazne on January 27 and 28 but did not advance.[17]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 28 but did not advance.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 28 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in eastern Kutkivka (north of Kupyansk) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain of the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[18]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Kutkivka; east of Kupyansk toward Petropavlivka and Podoly; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and toward Kurylivka on January 27 and 28.[19]

The Ukrainian 16th Army Corps refuted on January 28 Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov’s claims that Russian forces are engaged in urban fighting and clearing operations in Kutkivka on January 28 and reported that Ukrainian forces fully control the settlement.[20]

A Russian milblogger claimed on January 28 that Gerasimov’s January 27 announcement about the seizure of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk) was a consequence of Russian commanders on the ground reporting exaggerated advances and does not reflect the current situation on the ground.[21]

Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast of Borova toward Novoserhiivka and south of Borova near Oleksandrivka and Korovii Yar on January 27 and 28 but did not advance.[22]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on January 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near and within Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve and toward Svyatohirsk; north of Lyman near Stavky; east of Lyman near Torske; southeast of Lyman near Yampil and Pazeno; east of Slovyansk near Siversk, Platonivka, Zakitne, Svyato-Pokrovske, and Riznykivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Fedorivka, Nykyforivka, Vasyukivka, Bondarne and Khromivka on January 27 and 28.[23]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on January 28 that Russian forces are increasing the tempo of offensive operations near Dronivka (southeast of Slovyansk) and that Russian forces are accumulating servicemembers and material in the Serebryanske Forest and Siversk to attack Dronivka, Platonivka, and Zakitne.[24] The brigade stated that Russian forces’ main goal is to establish control over the banks of the Siverskyi Donets River and to consolidate their positions on local heights to gain fire control over Ukrainian positions in rear areas. The brigade stated that Russian forces continue to use fireteam infiltration tactics to attempt to infiltrate Ukrainian forces’ tactical rear positions. A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on January 28 that Russian forces have increased their use of fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones, including drone ambushes to target Ukrainian ground lines of communications (GLOCs).[25] The NCO stated that Russian forces are exploiting frosty weather to intensify offensive operations and that warming weather conditions will complicate future Russian offensives in the Slovyansk direction.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Siversk and Zakitne.[26] Elements of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[27]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka on January 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north and south of Minkivka (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[28]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka near Virolyubivka and Maiske; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Novodmytrivka, Holubivka, Markove, and Minkivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Kleban-Byk and Shcherbynivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka and Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Novopavlivka and Sofiivka on January 27 and 28.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pavlivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[30]

The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka direction reported on January 28 that Russian forces continue to exploit bad weather to attempt small group infiltrations in the Kostyantynivka direction, often sending one soldier to attack across a field while others try to infiltrate along the flanks.[31] Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vadym Filashkin reported on January 28 that roughly 2,800 civilians remain in Kostyantynivka.[32]

Order of Battle: Done operators of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Novopavlivka and Pavlivka.[33]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on January 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Nove Shakhove, Ivanivka, Toretske, and Novyi Donbas on January 27 and 28.[34]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Dobropillya direction, including in and around Toretske.[35]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 28 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northwestern Pokrovsk.[36]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on January 27 and 28.[37]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and artillery elements of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]); of the Irlandtsy Strike Detachment of the Grom-Kaskad Drone Brigade (reportedly of the 4th Air Force and Air Defense Army, Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]); and of the Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[38] Artillery elements of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating near Hryshyne.[39] FPV drone operators of the 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Bilytske.[40]

Ukrainian forces recently maintained positions or advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Refinement of area under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on January 27 shows elements of the Russian 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, CMD) striking Ukrainian positions in southern Novomykolaivka (west of Novopavlivka) - an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[41]

Russian forces attacked south of Novopavlivka near Filya and Dachne on January 27 and 28.[42]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on January 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Oleksandrivka near Verbove on January 27 and 28.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hai (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[44]

The deputy commander of a Ukrainian drone company operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on January 28 that Russian forces only attack in small infantry groups and on light vehicles and do not conduct mechanized assaults.[45]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on January 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole).[46]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole toward Ternuvate, Tsvitkove, and Rizdvyanka; north of Hulyaipole near Yehorivka, Nove Zaporizhzhia, Dobropillya, and Zelene; northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke and Zlahoda; south of Hulyaipole near Dorozhnyanka; and west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne and toward Staroukrainka on January 27 and 28.[47] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vozdvyzhivka and Svyatopetrivka (both northwest of Hulyaipole), Ternuvate, and Staroukrainka.[48]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on January 28 that the Hulyaipole direction is one of the most active sectors of the front line and that Russian forces are trying to bypass Hulyaipole from north and south.[49] Voloshyn reported that Russian forces are attempting to cut off Ukrainian logistics to Hulyaipole and conduct remote mining using drones and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) of Ukrainian-held areas near Hulyaipole to prevent Ukrainian search and assault missions.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Orikhiv near Myrne and Zahirne; southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and Bilohirya; west of Orikhiv near Plavni and Prymorske; and northwest of Orikhiv near Lukyanivske and toward Mahdalynivka on January 27 and 28.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Mala Tokmachka and Stepove.[51]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction, including near Prymorske and Stepove (west of Orikhiv).[52] Drone operators of the Nemets group of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate in Zaporizhia Oblast.[53]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on January 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction on January 27 and 28.[54]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division reportedly continue to operate in the Kherson direction.[55]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 27 to 28. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from Rostov Oblast and 146 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — of which roughly 90 were Shaheds — from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda and Hvardiiske, Crimea.[56] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 103 drones and that the missile and 36 drones struck 22 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, energy, port, religious, and civilian infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odesa, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[57]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.