Data cutoff: 11am on January 27

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

The United States is reportedly pushing Ukraine to cede the remainder of Donetsk Oblast to Russia in exchange for US security guarantees. ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian concessions of territory that Russia is unlikely to seize quickly or easily militarily would be a strategic mistake.[1] The Financial Times (FT) reported on January 27, citing sources familiar with ongoing peace talks, that the Trump administration is signaling that the United States' provision of security guarantees to Ukraine is contingent on Ukraine agreeing to a peace settlement that would likely involve ceding all of the territory of Donbas (Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts) to Russia.[2] Two FT sources stated that the United States suggested that it would provide more weaponry to bolster Ukraine's peacetime forces if Ukraine agreed to withdraw from all of Donbas. Two sources indicated that the proposed US security guarantees include a pledge that “mirrors” NATO’s Article 5 clause and a promise to conduct a coordinated military response in the case of a "sustained" Russian attack against post-war Ukraine. One of the sources suggested that the proposed guarantees may be “too vague” for Ukraine but “too broad” for Russia.

ISW continues to assess that Russia would need to expend significant amounts of resources, time, and personnel to seize the rest of Donbas.[3] Russian forces are unlikely to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast before August 2027, assuming Russian forces are able to sustain their rate of advance from late November 2025.[4] The Russian rate of advance slowed in late December 2025 and early January 2026, likely in part due to adverse weather conditions, and Russian efforts to seize the rest of Donetsk Oblast could take longer than ISW previously forecasted.[5] A Ukrainian withdrawal from Ukrainian-held territory in Donetsk Oblast would put Russian forces in more advantageous positions to renew attacks against southwestern and central Ukraine in the future after rest and reconstitution.[6] A strong Ukrainian military and robust Western security guarantees are necessary to effectively deter such future Russian aggression, but Russian officials have repeatedly rejected these security guarantees.[7] Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head Sergei Naryshkin, for example, claimed on January 26 that European states in the Coalition of the Willing are imposing conditions on a peace settlement that are "completely unacceptable" to Russia – likely referring to the coalition's efforts to finalize a plan to deploy troops to post-war Ukraine.[8] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlyov explicitly rejected on January 27 the deployment of troops from NATO states in post-war Ukraine.[9] The Kremlin remains unlikely to accept any settlement that includes meaningful security guarantees for Ukraine. The Kremlin's continued refusal of security guarantees for Ukraine and persistent dismissals of the negotiating process suggests that it remains committed to Russian President Vladimir Putin's theory of victory — the theory that Russia can win in Ukraine by outlasting Ukraine's ability to fight and the West's desire to support Ukraine.[10]

The Russian military command continues to present demonstrable lies and exaggerations about Russian battlefield gains in order to push Ukraine and the West to concede to the demands that Russia remains unable to achieve militarily. Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov inspected the Russian Western Grouping of Forces on January 27 and heard reports from the grouping commander, Colonel General Sergei Kuzovlev.[11] Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces are advancing in virtually all directions on the battlefield and have seized 17 settlements and over 500 square kilometers since January 1. ISW has observed evidence indicating that Russian forces advanced or established a presence following infiltration missions in only 265.45 square kilometers between January 1 and 27, however. Gerasimov further claimed that the Russian Dnepr Grouping of Forces advanced within 12 to 14 kilometers of the southern and southeastern outskirts of Zaporizhzhia City.[12] ISW has only observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have advanced to roughly 18 kilometers south of the city, however. Gerasimov highlighted that Russian forces are expanding the "buffer zones" in Kharkiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[13] Gerasimov stated that the Russian Central Grouping of Forces, which has been concentrating on seizing Pokrovsk, is now developing an offensive toward Dobropillya (north of Pokrovsk).

Gerasimov particularly emphasized the Western Grouping of Forces' alleged successes near Kupyansk. Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces seized Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (southeast of Kupyansk) and are attacking toward Kivsharivka (just southeast of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi) and Hlushkivka (further southeast of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi).[14] Gerasimov claimed that elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are destroying encircled Ukrainian forces on the east (left) bank of the Oskil River and that Russian forces have blockaded 800 Ukrainian servicemembers within a four-by-six-kilometer area near Kupyansk. The Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force refuted Gerasimov's claim that Russian forces seized Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi and reported that Ukrainian forces maintain full control over the settlement.[15] ISW has also not observed evidence of a Russian presence within Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi. ISW has only observed evidence of recent Russian infiltration missions roughly 3.5 kilometers from the northern boundary of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi and roughly 8.5 kilometers from the eastern boundary of the settlement.[16] ISW observed evidence on January 8 of Russian forces conducting an infiltration mission into eastern Podoly (just northeast of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi), but a Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged on January 16 that Ukrainian forces had liberated Podoly and a Russian milblogger reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces further stated on January 16 that Ukrainian forces had cleared Russian infiltrators from Podoly.[17]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has been lying about the scale of Russian advances for months, provoking repeated criticisms from even pro-war Russian milbloggers. Russian military officials have repeatedly presented inflated claims of Russian advances across the frontline in recent weeks.[18] Russian President Vladimir Putin and senior Russian military leaders have been exaggerating advances in the Kupyansk direction in particular, claiming that Russian forces seized the town in November 2025 despite ample visual evidence and Ukrainian and Russian reporting to the contrary.[19] Pro-war Russian milbloggers have repeatedly refuted the Russian MoD's exaggerations and continued to widely deny Gerasimov's January 27 claims. A prominent Russian milblogger involved in crowdfunding for the Russian military stated that Gerasimov presented a "beautiful report" (a phrase Russian milbloggers often use to criticize false battlefield reports).[20] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger stated that Russian forces in the Kostyantynivka direction are submitting false reports but to a lesser extent than those in the "notorious" Kupyansk direction.[21] One Russian milblogger stated that Russian forces do not control any settlements near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi.[22] Another milblogger stated that the Russian MoD's reports about the Kupyansk direction continue to exist in a "parallel reality."[23] The milblogger claimed that even the "most optimistic estimates" assess that Russian forces have only just reached the outskirts of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi, while other estimates find that Russian forces are "still a long way off." The milblogger sarcastically stated that there may be a "hidden side of Kupyansk" where "all these strange events" like the Russian MoD's regular seizures and encirclements are occurring, as there are no alternative explanations.

 The Russian military command has been boasting about the seizure of small, rural villages and presenting these seizures as alleged evidence of the prowess of the Russian military to further the false narrative that Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable. Gerasimov highlighted the seizures of Symynivka, Starytsya (both northeast of Kharkiv City), Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi, Bondarne (southeast of Slovyansk), Zakitne (east of Slovyansk), Pryvillya (northeast of Kostyantynivka), and Novoyakovlivka (southeast of Zaporizhzhia City) and ongoing fighting within Kutkivka (north of Kupyansk), Kivsharivka, Hlushkivka (both southeast of Kupyansk), Drobysheve, Yarova, Sosnove (all northwest of Lyman), Ozerne (southeast of Lyman), Novyi Donbas (east of Dobropillya), Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk), and Bilytske (north of Pokrovsk).[24] Data from the UN Humanitarian Data Exchange indicates that the largest of these settlements (Drobysheve) has a total area of about 8.3 square kilometers, but most of the settlements Gerasimov listed have a total area of less than two square kilometers. Senior Russian military commanders have been presenting long lists of settlements in their public reports in order to generate informational effects and create the appearance of sweeping Russian advances across the entire theater.[25] The Russian military command is trying to create an alternate battlefield reality in order to influence the ongoing US-led peace talks and to convince Ukraine and the West that Ukraine should accept Russia’s demands now out of fear of future Russian offensives or breakthroughs.[26] The seizure of small, rural villages only a few square kilometers in area does not portend Russia's ability to seize the much larger and heavily fortified cities in Ukraine's Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast in the near future.

Russian officials continue to indicate that Russia's demands go beyond control of territory in eastern Ukraine, despite the Kremlin's efforts to claim to Western audiences that Donbas is the main issue in ongoing peace talks. Lead Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev responded to the January 27 FT article about US security guarantees tied to Ukrainian territorial concessions, claiming that Ukraine's withdrawal from Donbas is the "path of peace" for Ukraine.[27] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Member Andrei Kolesnik claimed that the only possible solution to the war is for Ukraine to withdraw from the rest of Donbas.[28] Russia's territorial demands, however, extend beyond Donbas, as evidenced by Gerasimov's repeated references to buffer zones in Kharkiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts during his January 27 report.[29] Russian officials have claimed that these buffer zones are necessary to protect Russian-occupied areas in Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, but the latest public version of the 20-point US-Ukrainian-European peace plan called for Russia to withdraw from northern Ukraine and Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[30]

Russia's demands extend beyond Ukrainian territory and include demands for NATO and the West. Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Head Sergei Naryshkin claimed in a January 26 interview with Kremlin newswire RIA Novosti that a peace settlement must address the alleged "root causes" of the war.[31] Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlyov also stated on January 27 in an interview with Russian state TV channel Rossiya-1 that Donbas is not the main issue and questioned how Russia will deal with NATO and alleged Ukrainian neo-Nazism.[32] Naryshkin's and Zhuravlyov's statements refer to Russia's 2021 and 2022 demands for the cessation of NATO expansion, the rollback of NATO to its 1997 borders, and the replacement of the current democratically elected Ukrainian government with a Russian-selected regime. Russian ultranationalist outlet Tsargrad tied Russia's territorial demands in eastern Ukraine with Russia's wider war aims in an editorial piece published on January 27.[33] Tsargrad questioned why Kremlin officials are calling for Ukraine's withdrawal from eastern Ukraine but not from Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. Tsargrad then amplified a Russian milblogger claiming that Russia will agree to only a temporary ceasefire if Ukraine withdraws from Donbas and that a temporary ceasefire will allow Ukraine to "consider" Russia's other demands, such as Ukraine's "denazification" and "demilitarization."[34] ISW continues to assess that Russian officials' statements aimed at domestic Russian audiences, such as Naryshkin's and Zhuravlyov's statements to Russian state outlets, confirm that Russia's demands are not limited to territory in eastern Ukraine.[35]

Russia will not be satisfied with a peace settlement that does not meet all of its demands and is instead using informational tools to push for Ukraine's pre-emptive capitulation. The Kremlin has been engaged in a wide cognitive warfare campaign that aims to push the West and Ukraine to give in to all of Russia's demands now out of fear of future Russian offensives.[36] Russian officials promoted narratives on January 26 and 27 that aim to paint the Russian military and economy as able to militarily achieve all of Russia's demands in a protracted war — in line with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s theory of victory.[37] Naryshkin claimed that Russian forces are "consistently" advancing throughout the theater, that the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) is developing at an "accelerated pace," and that the Russian economy is resilient.[38] Naryshkin also claimed that the Russian population supports Putin's policies and the Russian military. Naryshkin referenced the Burevestnik and Oreshnik ballistic missiles and Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicle that Russia debuted in 2024 and 2025 – an attempt to use implicit threats to push the West and Ukraine to capitulate. Duma Defense Committee Member Andrei Kolesnik claimed that Russia can only resolve the war through military means and dismissed ongoing US-led diplomatic efforts.[39] Kolesnik called on Ukraine to "realize" that resistance is "futile" and claimed that Ukraine does not have the potential to stop Russian advances.[40] Kolesnik and Zhuravlyov claimed that Russian forces will inevitably seize Donbas "sooner or later."[41] The Kremlin has also been demanding that any peace settlement not include meaningful security guarantees for Ukraine — a demand which Naryshkin repeated on January 27.[42] This cognitive warfare effort hopes to accomplish what Russia will fail to do militarily — secure victory over all of Ukraine.

Russian forces conducted a Shahed drone strike against a civilian passenger train in Kharkiv Oblast on January 27, killing at least five people. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that a Russian drone strike hit a civilian passenger train near Barvinkove, Kharkiv Oblast (roughly 49 kilometers from the frontline) on January 27.[43] Zelensky reported that there were over 200 passengers on board, with 18 passengers in the car that Russian forces struck. The Kharkiv Oblast Prosecutor's Office reported that the strike killed at least five civilians.[44] Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister and Development Minister Oleksiy Kuleba reported that Russian forces struck the train with three Shahed drones.[45] A Ukrainian soldier who was among the passengers told Ukrainian outlet Hromadske that a Shahed drone struck the train and that another Shahed did not reach the train, presumably crashing on the ground nearby.[46] ISW assesses that Russian forces have been leveraging recent drone adaptations, including equipping drones with artificial intelligence (AI), integrated cameras, and radio control capabilities, to increasingly target moving trains across Ukraine.[47] ISW has not observed reports as of this writing confirming that Russian forces used Shaheds with cameras or other adaptations to strike the moving train, but the use of multiple drones suggests that the strike was deliberate. Russian strikes causing disproportionate civilian loss of life, civilian injuries, and damage to civilian objects compared to the expected military gain from striking a civilian passenger train carrying a limited number of military personnel are likely a violation of international law.[48]

 Russian forces continue to commit war crimes on the battlefield, including in areas where Russian forces have recently intensified offensive operations. Geolocated footage published on January 27 shows Russian first-person view (FPV) drone operators striking and killing two civilians in Hrabovske (southeast of Sumy City).[49] The Ukrainian 14th Army Corps (AC) reported on January 27 that Russian forces executed the two civilians as they were attempting to leave occupied territory near Hrabovske.[50] The 14th AC stated that the Russian FPV drones first hit and instantly killed a woman and that a second strike hit a wounded man next to the deceased woman. Russian forces launched a series of cross-border attacks in Hrabovske on the night of December 19 to 20, during which Russian forces forcibly deported about 50 civilians.[51] Russian sources credited elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) with launching the December 2025 attacks, and ISW has observed reports of the brigade operating near Hrabovske as recently as January 10.[52]

Key Takeaways:

• The United States is reportedly pushing Ukraine to cede the remainder of Donetsk Oblast to Russia in exchange for US security guarantees. ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian concessions of territory that Russia is unlikely to seize quickly or easily militarily would be a strategic mistake.
• The Russian military command continues to present demonstrable lies and exaggerations about Russian battlefield gains in order to push Ukraine and the West to concede to the demands that Russia remains unable to achieve militarily.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has been lying about the scale of Russian advances for months, provoking repeated criticisms from even pro-war Russian milbloggers.
• The Russian military command has been boasting about the seizure of small, rural villages and presenting these seizures as alleged evidence of the prowess of the Russian military to further the false narrative that Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable.
• Russian officials continue to indicate that Russia's demands go beyond control of territory in eastern Ukraine, despite the Kremlin's efforts to claim to Western audiences that Donbas is the main issue in ongoing peace talks.
• Russia will not be satisfied with a peace settlement that does not meet all of its demands and is instead using informational tools to push for Ukraine's pre-emptive capitulation.
• Russian forces conducted a Shahed drone strike against a civilian passenger train in Kharkiv Oblast on January 27, killing at least five people.
• Russian forces continue to commit war crimes on the battlefield, including in areas where Russian forces have recently intensified offensive operations.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Slovyansk, in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and near Pokrovsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Satellite imagery taken on January 27 shows that an overnight January 5 to 6 Ukrainian drone strike on the 100th Arsenal of the Russian Main Missile and Artillery Directorate (GRAU) near Neya, Kostroma Oblast destroyed at least three storage buildings.[53]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk and Sumy Oblasts on January 26 and 27, but ISW does not assess that Russian forces made any advances.

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Sumy and Kursk Oblasts on January 26 and 27. [54]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces criticized on January 27 Russian forces’ recruitment of elderly contract servicemembers to the 2nd Battalion of the Russian 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps, Leningrad Military District), operating near Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City).[55]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) and other drone operators of the Russian 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) and the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly continue to operate in the Sumy direction.[56] Assault elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (Russian Strategic Missile Forces [RVSN] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces) are reportedly operating in the Kursk direction.[57]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on January 27 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, Prylipka, Lyman, Nesterne, and Dehtyarne and toward Hrafske on January 26 and 27.[58]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on January 27 that the Russian military command plans to deploy elements of the 3rd Battalion of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (Russian Strategic Missile Forces [RVSN] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces) to positions near Starytsya (northeast of Kharkiv City), detrimentally impacting morale within the unit.[59]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk towards Khatnie and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Dvorichanske on January 26 and 27 but did not advance.[60]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently maintained positions or advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on January 26 shows elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) striking Ukrainian positions northeast of Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk) – an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[61]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[62]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kupyansk itself; east of Kupyansk toward Petropavlivka, Podoly, and Kucherivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane on January 26 and 27.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kupyansk and Radkivka (north of Kupyansk).[64]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on January 27 that elements of the Russian 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are suffering from drone shortages in the Kupyansk direction despite intensified drone operations.[65] The milblogger claimed that servicemembers constantly contribute personal funds for drones, but that these contributions are actually bribes to avoid being sent on highly attritional assaults.

Order of Battle: Molniya fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment are striking Ukrainian positions in northwestern Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[66] Zemledeliye remote minelaying elements of the 45th Engineer Brigade (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[67]

A Russian source claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Borova near Borivska Andriivka and south of Borova near Korovii Yar and Vovchyi Yar on January 27, but ISW does not assess that Russian forces made any advances.[68]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 27 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Khromivka and advanced in southeastern Nykyforivka (both southeast of Slovyansk).[69]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in southeastern Nykyforivka, northwest of Ozerne (east of Slovyansk), and south of Zakitne (northeast of Slovyansk).[70]

Russian forces attacked near and within Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Drobysheve and Yarova and toward Sosnove and Svyatohirsk; southeast of Lyman near Yampil and Maslyakivka; east of Slovyansk near Siversk, Platonivka, Riznykivka, Zakitne, and Svyato-Pokrovske; and southeast of Slovyansk near Soledar and Nykyforivka on January 26 and 27.[71]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating north of Svyato-Pokrovske.[72] Elements of the 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) reportedly continue to operate near Siversk and Zakitne.[73]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Pryvillya (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[74]

Refinement of area under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on January 22 and 23 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions in northeastern Minkivka (northeast of Kostyantynivka) and in northern Yablunivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka) – areas where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[75] ISW assesses that these changes did not occur in the past 24 hours.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Ivanopillya (south of Kostyantynivka).[76]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar and Orikhovo-Vasylivka and toward Pryvillya; east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne and Stupochky; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Kleban-Byk and Shcherbynivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka and Ivanopillya; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Novopavlivka, Sofiivka, and toward Pavlivka on January 26 and 27.[77]

A Ukrainian drone unit operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on January 26 that around 2,000 Ukrainian civilians remain in Kostyantynivka.[78]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators and reconnaissance elements of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade, including its 1st Krasnodar Battalion, and of the 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade (both of the 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Novopavlivka and Illinivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka).[79] FPV drone operators of the 13th Rusichi Assault Detachment of the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 3rd CAA) are striking Ukrainian vehicles in northwestern Kostyantynivka.[80] FPV drone operators of the 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion of the Baltic Fleet (a consolidated motorized rifle regiment of the Navy, operationally subordinated to the Central Grouping of Forces) are striking Ukrainian forces near Illinivka and Yablunivka.[81] Elements of the 1465th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are striking Ukrainian positions in southwestern Kostyantynivka and near Berestok (south of Kostyantynivka).[82] Elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Toretsk (southeast of Kostyantynivka) direction.[83] Drone operators of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment and of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (both of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions and equipment near Mykolaipillya (south of Druzhkivka).[84] FPV drone operators of the 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment) (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kostyantynivka.[85]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on January 27 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Nove Shakhove and Toretske on January 26 and 27.[86]

An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Dobropillya tactical area reported on January 27 that Russian forces conduct daily large infantry assaults and occasionally conduct mechanized and motorized assaults.[87] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger acknowledged on January 26 that it is unclear whether Russian forces consolidated positions in Novyi Donbas (east of Dobropillya), consistent with ISW’s assessment that the Russian forces that Ukrainian forces struck in the settlement in geolocated footage published on January 26 were conducting an infiltration mission.[88]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 61st Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly operating toward Dobropillya.[89]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 26 shows Ukrainian forces conducting precision artillery strikes on Russian forces in western Pokrovsk in areas where Russian forces previously conducted infiltration missions, suggesting that Russian forces consolidated control over these positions.[90]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 26 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember on a motorcycle in northern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain of the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[91]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk) and west of Sukhetske (northeast of Pokrovsk).[92]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Shevchenko; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Novopidhorodne, and Molodetske on January 26 and 27.[93] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Rodynske.[94]

Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces Spokesperson Volodymyr Polevyi reported on January 27 that Ukrainian forces partially control northern Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) as Russian forces continue attempts to envelop Ukrainian positions from the north and from Kotlyne.[95] Polevyi added that Russian forces have withdrawn elements of the exhausted 76th Airborne (VDV) Division from the frontline. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will eventually seize Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad following a 22-month campaign, though Ukrainian forces maintain some tactical positions in the Pokrovsk pocket for the time being.[96] The corps reported on January 27 that Russian forces are accumulating troops and vehicles in occupied Novohrodivka (southeast of Pokrovsk and southeast of Myrnohrad) for attacks on northern Myrnohrad.[97] The corps added that the Russian military command in the Pokrovsk direction continues to direct its main efforts against Hryshyne, concentrating light vehicles and personnel on the northern outskirts of Pokrovsk. The corps reported that Russian forces recently infiltrated Hryshyne but that Ukrainian forces repelled them. The corps noted that Russian forces are using fiber-optic drones with a range of over 20 kilometers. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on January 27 that Russian forces are intensifying their usage of Molniya fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drones for supply drops and in mothership, false target, reconnaissance, strike, and repeater roles near Myrnohrad.[98]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on January 26 that weather conditions are complicating Russian forces' ability to resupply assault infantry with drones near Hryshyne and that both Russian and Ukrainian forces are exploiting the concealment of poor weather to conduct troop rotations and to improve tactical positions.[99]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly coordinating Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) FAB guided glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian forces near Hryshyne and Novopidhorodne.[100]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on January 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Novopavlivka.[101]

Russian forces attacked south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on January 26 and 27.[102]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on January 27 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Zelenyi Hai and Ivanivka and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Verbove on January 26 and 27.[103] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksandrivka and Novoskelyuvate (southwest of Oleksandrivka).[104]

Order of Battle: Lancet loitering munition and drone operators of the Russian Vega Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Dnipropetrovsk (Oleksandrivka) direction.[105]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on January 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

 Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Hulyaipole, northwest of Dorozhnyanka (south of Hulyaipole), and south of Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole).[106]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Svyatopetrivka; north of Hulyaipole near Zelene, Varvarivka, Nove Zaporizhzhia, and Dobropillya; northeast of Hulyaipole near Zlahoda and Solodke; south of Hulyaipole near Dorozhnyanka; and west of Hulyaipole toward Zaliznychne on January 27 and 28.[107] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hulyaipole.[108]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces east of Dobropillya.[109] Drone operators of the 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue to operate in Zaporizhia Oblast.[110]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 27 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian forces in central Pavlivka (northwest of Orikhiv) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[111]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 27 that Russian forces seized Novoyakovlivka (northwest of Orikhiv).[112] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Pavlivka.[113]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on January 27 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian servicemember northwest of Lukyanivske (northwest of Orikhiv) – an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[114]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; west of Orikhiv near Plavni, Stepnohirsk, and Prymorske; and northwest of Orikhiv near Richne, Novoyakovlivka, and Mahdalynivka on January 26 and 27.[115]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Shaman detachment of the Russian 1455th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Lukyanivske.[116] Drone operators of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Orikhiv direction.[117] Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[118]

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on January 27.

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge on January 27.[119]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on January 26 that Ukrainian reconnaissance forces observed Russian forces abandoning positions on Oleksiivskyi Island, opposite of occupied Oleshky, Kherson Oblast, due to Ukrainian operations and low morale among Russian forces.[120] Voloshyn reported that Russian forces are unable to place new observation posts on Oleksiivskyi Island and are redeploying forces to the Orikhiv direction.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in the Kherson direction.[121]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Crimea overnight on January 26 to 27. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 27 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Tor-M2 anti-aircraft missile system near Kacha (roughly 221 kilometers from the frontline).[122]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 26 to 27. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 165 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones – of which roughly 100 were Shahed-type drones, including jet-propelled Shaheds – from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Cape Chauda and Hvardiiske, occupied Crimea.[123] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 135 drones, that 24 drones struck 14 locations, and that drone debris impacted nine locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, energy, and civilian infrastructure in Cherkasy, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Lviv, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts.[124]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko proclaimed the People's Republic of China (PRC) as Belarus’ most reliable ally and set strategic goals for the development of the Belarus-PRC bilateral relations. Lukashenko claimed on January 27 during a high-level government meeting that Belarus will invest resources, time, and attention to strengthen its relations with the PRC, setting the goal of increasing the PRC’s share in Belarus’ exports to double-digit figures and bolstering PRC investment in the Belarusian economy.[125] Lukashenko claimed that Russia, the US, and other countries recognize the special status and long-term nature of the Belarus-PRC relations.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.