Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 23, 2026

Data cutoff: 12pm on January 23

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

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Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

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Russian President Vladimir Putin met with a US delegation in Moscow on the night of January 22 to 23 and agreed to trilateral US, Russian, and Ukrainian working group meetings in Abu Dhabi on January 23 and 24. Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated that Putin met with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner, and Josh Gruenbaum, senior advisor to US President Donald Trump's Board of Peace.[1] Ushakov stated that the parties discussed Trump's meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Davos, Switzerland on January 22 and other US meetings with Ukrainian and European delegations in December 2025 and January 2026. Ushakov stated that Putin agreed that Russia will meet with Ukraine and the United States at trilateral working group meetings to discuss security issues in Abu Dhabi on January 23 and 24. Ushakov stated that Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate (GRU) Head Admiral Igor Kostyukov will lead a Russian delegation consisting of representatives of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in the trilateral talks.[2] Zelensky reported on January 23 that Ukrainian Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov is leading the Ukrainian delegation, which includes Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Kyrylo Budanov, Ukrainian Servant of the People Party Head Davyd Arakhamia, Advisor to the Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Oleksandr Bevz, First Deputy Head of the Ukrainian Presidential Office Serhiy Kyslytsya, First Deputy Ukrainian Defense Council Secretary Yevhenyi Ostryanskyi, Ukrainian Chief of the General Staff Major General Andriy Hnatov, Head of Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Oleh Ivashchenko, GUR Deputy Head Major General Vadym Skibitskyi, and First Deputy Head of Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) Oleksandr Poklad.[3] Ushakov additionally stated that the lead Russian negotiator and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev and Witkoff will hold bilateral working group meetings on economic issues in Abu Dhabi.[4]

The Kremlin is trying to push Trump to abandon the negotiation process with Ukraine and Europe that he has been leading and to concede to the demands Russia made at the August 2025 US-Russia summit in Alaska. Ushakov stated after Putin's January 22-23 meeting with the US delegation that "there is no hope" of achieving a long-term settlement to the war without resolving the territorial issue according to the "formula" the United States and Russia allegedly agreed to in Alaska.[5] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on January 23 that the Kremlin considers it "inadvisable" to "publicly delve into the details" of the "Anchorage formula" but that Ukraine's withdrawal of its forces from all of Donbas (Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts) is an important condition for a peace settlement.[6] A source close to the Kremlin told Reuters that the Kremlin considers the "Anchorage formula" to include Ukraine ceding all of Donbas to Russia and freezing the current frontlines elsewhere in southern and eastern Ukraine.[7] Trump has led conversations with Ukraine and Europe in recent weeks that have made significant progress in determining the conditions necessary to ensure an enduring and reliable peace in Ukraine. These US-led talks have notably led to Ukraine making considerable concessions, such as changing Ukrainian laws to allow for elections during the current period of martial law.[8] Trump also worked with Ukraine and Europe to alter the initial US-proposed 28-point peace plan into the latest iteration of the 20-point plan, signaling the administration's commitment to working with Ukraine and Europe to secure a just end to the war. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin has been trying to manipulate the lack of publicly available agreements resulting from the Alaska Summit, presenting the alleged US-Russian agreements in ways that benefit Russia.[9] The Kremlin has been using the ambiguity around the summit to try to conceal the way Russia — not Ukraine — has been impeding the negotiations process by maintaining its original war demands. Russia is likely attempting to convince Trump to walk away from US efforts to work with Ukraine and Europe by offering the ambiguous "Alaska formula" as a way to end the war.

The Kremlin is engaged in an informational campaign aimed at Ukraine's partners that attempts to present control over Donbas as the main issue left to discuss in peace talks, but Russian officials' statements for domestic audiences have repeatedly confirmed that Russia's demands go beyond eastern Ukraine. Peskov repeated Kremlin demands for Ukraine's withdrawal of its forces from all of Donbas on January 23.[10] A Reuters source close to the Kremlin discussed Russian demands about southern and eastern Ukraine, but did not specify Russian demands about Russian-occupied areas in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts in northern Ukraine.[11] Kremlin officials often reference the "buffer zones" Russian advances have created in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts, with Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov claiming in December 2025 that Russian advances in and near Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast, are necessary to protect Russian-occupied territory in northern Luhansk Oblast.[12] Russian State Duma officials, whose rhetoric largely targets the Russian population and not international audiences, continue to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with any agreement that freezes the current lines in southern Ukraine. Duma Defense Committee Member Andrei Kolesnik, for example, stated on January 23 that Russia needs international and Ukrainian recognition of the "constituent entities" outlined in the Russian Constitution, referring to all of Crimea and Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.[13]

Kremlin officials, including Putin, have also recently reiterated Russia's other demands that are unrelated to Ukrainian territory, namely demands that NATO halt expansion and roll back to its 1997 borders.[14] Russian Federation Council Foreign Affairs Committee Chairperson Grigory Karasin stated on January 23 that Russian negotiators in Abu Dhabi have the authority to demand resolutions to the strategic and political issues that Russia outlined at the start of its full-scale invasion — likely including Russia's 2021 ultimatums to NATO.[15] Putin has repeatedly demonstrated that his demands are greater than those encapsulated in the US-proposed 28-point plan and subsequent US-Ukrainian-European peace plans.[16]

Long-term support for Ukraine's economy and reconstruction is essential for Ukraine's security, but it is not a substitute for robust security guarantees that deter future Russian aggression. Zelensky noted on January 23 that Trump supports the idea of a free trade zone in Ukraine, which Zelensky noted will help Ukrainian businesses, and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen reported that the EU has almost completed work with the United States and Ukraine on a "prosperity package" for Ukraine's reconstruction.[17] Politico reported on January 23 that a draft of the prosperity plan outlines a 10-year agreement that includes fast-tracking Ukraine's EU membership and investments from the US, EU, and international organizations into Ukraine's recovery.[18]

Economic support for Ukraine will be insufficient to safeguard Ukraine's future security, however. Ukraine requires reliable security guarantees that credibly and effectively deter future Russian aggression, ensure the strength of the Ukrainian military, and include a strong partner-led reassurance force. Zelensky noted on January 23 that he is ready to sign the main US-Ukrainian security guarantees document that the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada and US Congress will ratify, and von der Leyen reported that the EU is also making progress towards finalizing the security guarantees that the Coalition of the Willing discussed in Paris on January 6.[19] The Kremlin has repeatedly stated that Russia views any security guarantees required to ensure a lasting peace as unacceptable and has repeatedly demanded significant reductions in the Ukrainian military and rejected foreign troop deployments to post-war Ukraine.[20]

Kremlin officials indicated that Russia wants to use its assets frozen in the United States to benefit the Russian economy and offset the cost of Russia's full-scale invasion — as ISW recently assessed. Ushakov stated after Putin's January 22-23 meeting with the US delegation that the parties discussed Putin's proposal to contribute $1 billion to Trump's Board of Peace from Russian assets currently frozen in the United States.[21] Ushakov reiterated Putin's other proposal that the remaining funds in the United States go toward reconstructing Ukrainian territories that sustained damage during the war.[22] Peskov clarified on January 23 that Russian assets could help rebuild territory in Donbas, and Zelensky stated that Putin proposed that the funds go towards rebuilding Kursk Oblast.[23] The Kremlin is demanding that Ukraine hand over all of Donbas to Russia, suggesting that the Kremlin hopes to use the frozen assets to rebuild Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine, not Ukrainian-held areas. ISW recently assessed that Putin's initial January 21 proposal to use the frozen funds for reconstruction likely did not include the Ukrainian-held territories that Russian strikes have severely damaged.[24] The use of frozen Russian assets to rebuild Russian-occupied Ukraine or Kursk Oblast would effectively release the funds back to Russia and offset the costs Russia incurred with its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Russian access to additional funds for the reconstruction of occupied Ukraine would allow Russia to maximize its economic exploitation of Ukrainian territories, thereby funneling profits back into the Russian economy and supporting Russian efforts to forcibly integrate occupied Ukraine into Russia.

The Kremlin is likely preparing to carefully manage the succession plan for Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov in order to avoid a tumultuous transfer of power that may result in unrest in Chechnya and divert Chechen resources from the war in Ukraine. Russian opposition outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on January 23 that a source close to the Kremlin and the ruling United Russia party stated that the Kremlin is working to find a solution to possible succession problems in Chechnya against the backdrop of reports that Kadyrov is seriously ill and that his son and possible successor, 18-year-old Adam, was recently in a car accident.[25] A Russian insider source claimed on January 22 that Adam Kadyrov required surgery for fractures, facial injuries, and spleen injuries following the January 16 car crash.[26] Vazhnye Istorii noted that Kadyrov is promoting his son, Adam, to be his successor, as ISW has previously assessed, and noted that Adam Kadyrov cannot legally govern the republic until he turns 30.[27] A former Federal Security Service (FSB) officer and a member of the Chechen diaspora stated that the next leader will likely be someone from the Benoi teip (a Chechen clan), the largest teip in Chechnya, to which Kadyrov is a member. Vazhnye Istorii reported that Russian State Duma Deputy for Chechnya Adam Delimkhanov and Chechen Republic Parliament Deputy Magomed Daudov, who are both part of the Benoi teip, may take over as head of the Chechen Republic - presumably until Adam Kadyrov turns 30. Delimkhanov has held influence in a variety of spheres in Chechnya, including by coordinating Chechen forces fighting in Ukraine, fulfilling diplomatic roles, and navigating political and religious tensions between Russian and Chechen societies.[28] Russian opposition outlet Novaya Gazeta Europe reported in May 2025 that Kadyrov tasked Delimkhanov with acting as a "coach-mentor" to Adam Kadyrov, including by connecting him with political and criminal contacts in Russia and abroad.[29]

Russian President Vladimir Putin has long relied on Kadyrov’s control over Chechnya to maintain stability in the area, which historically had a tense relationship with Moscow before the accession of the Kadyrov regime. A tense power struggle in the region could lead to unrest and internal fighting, which would require attention from Moscow. Elements of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army ([CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are stationed in Chechnya, and numerous Chechen units are currently operating in Ukraine.[30] Kadyrov's control over Chechnya has allowed Putin to employ these forces in the war in Ukraine without having to make considerations for issues in Chechnya that would require the attention of Russia's military and security services. The Kremlin may not have sufficient forces to handle any future unrest emerging from internal Chechen power struggles while also maintaining its current deployments in Ukraine. The Kremlin is likely to prioritize finding a solution to Chechen succession issues that avoids the potential for regional unrest.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov appointed Serhiy Sternenko to advise the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) on scaling up the use of drones on the front.[31] Fedorov stated that Sternenko will focus on systematizing drone supplies and increasing the lethality of underperforming Ukrainian drone units. Sternenko is a prominent Ukrainian volunteer and fundraiser who has previously provided the Ukrainian military with first-person view (FPV) fiber optic drones and FPV drones with autonomous detection and strike capabilities.[32] Sternenko created the largest non-state FPV drone supplier for the Ukrainian military on January 15, 2025.[33] Sternenko survived a Russian intelligence-sponsored assassination attempt in May 2025.[34] Sternenko met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on January 15 to discuss legislative support for volunteers helping the Ukrainian military and targeted work with Ukrainian brigades.[35]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin met with a US delegation in Moscow on the night of January 22 to 23 and agreed to trilateral US, Russian, and Ukrainian working group meetings in Abu Dhabi on January 23 and 24.
• The Kremlin is trying to push Trump to abandon the negotiation process with Ukraine and Europe that he has been leading and to concede to the demands Russia made at the August 2025 US-Russia summit in Alaska.
• The Kremlin is engaged in an informational campaign aimed at Ukraine's partners that attempts to present control over Donbas as the main issue left to discuss in peace talks, but Russian officials' statements for domestic audiences have repeatedly confirmed that Russia's demands go beyond eastern Ukraine.
• Long-term support for Ukraine's economy and reconstruction is essential for Ukraine's security, but is not a substitute for robust security guarantees that deter future Russian aggression.
• Kremlin officials indicated that Russia wants to use its assets frozen in the United States to benefit the Russian economy and offset the cost of Russia's full-scale invasion, as ISW recently assessed.
• The Kremlin is likely preparing to carefully manage the succession plan for Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov in order to avoid a tumultuous transfer of power that may result in unrest in Chechnya and divert Chechen resources from the war in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov appointed Serhiy Sternenko to advise the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) on scaling up the use of drones on the front.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Slovyansk and Novopavlivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure overnight on January 22 to 23. Geolocated footage published on January 23 shows Ukrainian drones striking the Penzanefteprodukt oil depot in Penza City, Penza Oblast.[36] Penza Oblast Governor Oleg Melnichenko acknowledged that Ukrainian forces struck an oil depot in Penza City, causing a fire.[37] Geolocated footage published on January 23 shows an explosion after a reported Ukrainian strike against an unidentified Russian air defense system in Novaya Adygea, Republic of Adygea.[38] Satellite imagery taken on January 22 shows that an overnight January 21 to 22 Ukrainian drone strike on the Tamannefttegaz Oil Terminal near Volna, Krasnodar Krai, damaged several oil tanks and pipelines.[39]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in Kursk and northern Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Varachyne and toward Nova Sich, on January 22 and 23, but did not advance.[40]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 1st Battalion of the Russian 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[41]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued infiltration missions in northern Kharkiv Oblast on January 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember in southwestern Lyman (northeast of Kharkiv City) in what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[42]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers claimed on January 23 that elements of the Russian 82nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division [MRD], 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) seized Symynivka (northeast of Kharkiv City).[43] A Russian milblogger characterized the claimed seizure of Symynivka as a premature assessment, given that Russian forces have yet to clear remaining Ukrainian forces from the settlement.[44]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Lyman, Starytsya, Prylipka, Vovchansk, and Vovchanski Khutory and toward Izbytske and Nesterne on January 22 and 23.[45]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Vovchansk direction reported on January 23 that Russian servicemembers conducting infiltration missions use pre-set coordinates on mobile phones for navigationand that the Russian military command distributes survivors into new fireteams, pre-existing units fall apart after taking casualties.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 23 that Ukrainian drone strikes are hindering Russian advances near Hrafske (northeast of Kharkiv City).[47] A second Russian milblogger claimed on January 23 that Ukrainian forces’ pervasive drone use is preventing elements of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division), operating near Vovchansk, from evacuating the bodies of servicemembers.[48]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne and toward Khatnie and east of Velykyi Burluk toward Sonino on January 22 and 23, but did not advance.[49]

The Ukrainian 16th Army Corps (AC) reported on January 23 that elements of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment lack basic supplies to repair drone-damaged shelters along the Ambarne-Milove line (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) since the Russian military command in the area is unable to conduct timely deliveries of engineering materials.[50] The corps also reported that the regiment is unable to evacuate wounded Russian servicemembers, leaving them to suffer from frostbite and illness.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued infiltration missions in the Kupyansk direction on January 23 but did not advance.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking two Russian-occupied buildings along the P-79 Kupyansk-Chuhuiv Highway in central Kupyansk after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[51]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and toward Kurylivka on January 22 and 23.[52]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on January 23 that Russian forces have returned to using small infantry groups after previously failing to advance in mechanized and motorized assaults.[53]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 92nd Engineer-Sapper Regiment (Russian Engineer Troops, operationally subordinated to the Russian Western Grouping of Forces) are reportedly operating in Kharkiv Oblast.[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 22 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Borova near Ridkodub and Shandryholove and south of Borova toward Korovii Yar and Vovchyi Yar.[55] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Korovii Yar.[56]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Luhansk Oblast between January 22 and 23. A Ukrainian drone unit published geolocated footage on January 23 that shows Ukrainian forces striking 14 Russian armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) southeast of Korzhove (roughly 50 kilometers from the front line).[57] The Ukrainian drone unit reported that Russian forces were storing the vehicles for future attacks.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Svyato-Pokrovske (east of Slovyansk).[58]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Zvanivka (east of Slovyansk).[59]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Stavky, Sosnove, Yarova, and Novoselivka; northeast of Lyman near Drobysheve, Zarichne, Yampolivka, and Kolodyazi; southeast of Lyman near Dibrova and Yampil; east of Slovyansk near Siversk, Svyato-Pokrovske, and Riznykivka; and southwest of Slovyansk near Pazeno on January 22 and 23.[60]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD])) reportedly continue to operate near Siversk and Zakitne (northeast of Slovyansk).[61]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on January 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka toward Minkivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka and Ivanopillya; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Kleban-Byk; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and toward Stepanivka and Illinivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and toward Novopavlivka and Pavlivka on January 22 and 23.[62]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on January 23 that Russian forces are attempting to vary offensive tactics by using a combination of heavy and light vehicles and horses to attack Ukrainian positions.[63]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Pavlivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[64] FPV drone operators of the 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment) (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC], SMD) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in the Kostyantynivka direction.[65]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on January 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove, Nove Shakhove, Ivanivka, Toretske, and Novyi Donbas, and southeast of Dobropillya near Dorozhnie on January 22 and 23.[66]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces near Toretske.[67] Elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division reportedly continue to operate in the Dobropillya direction.[68]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on January 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Shevchenko; north of Pokrovsk near Bilytske and Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhetske; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on January 22 and 23.[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hryshyne.[70]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) reportedly continue to operate near Rodynske.[71]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Footage published on January 22 and geolocated by ISW on January 23 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Novopavlivka.[72]

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself; southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove; and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and Dachne on January 22 and 23.[73]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction published geolocated footage on January 23 that shows Ukrainian forces repelling a roughly platoon-sized Russian mechanized assault and striking one tank and three BMP infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) on the northern outskirts of Filiya.[74] The brigade reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed one tank and two armored fighting vehicles (AFVs), killed 20 Russian servicemembers, and wounded three more.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on January 23 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Novoselivka, Vorone, Sosnivka, and Orestopil (all southeast of Oleksandrivka) and advanced to the east (left) bank of the Vovcha River east of Velykomykhailivka (east of Oleksandrivka) and between Novoselivka and Oleksandrohrad (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[75]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Zelenyi Hai and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Stepove, Oleksandrohrad, Vyshneve, Krasnohirske, and Verbove on January 22 and 23.[76] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vidradne (south of Oleksandrivka).[77]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on January 23 that Ukrainian forces kill roughly 50 servicemembers of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) per day in the brigade's area of responsibility (AoR).[78]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on January 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Svyatopetrivka and toward Ternuvate; north of Hulyaipole near Nechaivka, Zelene, and Varvarivka and Dobropillya; northeast of Hulyaipole near Zlahoda; and south of Hulyaipole near Dorozhnyanka on January 22 and 23.[79] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hulyaipole, Ternuvate, and Kosivtseve (northwest of Hulyaipole).[80]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating between Hulyaipole and Dorozhnyanka.[81] Elements of the 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating toward Zaliznychne.[82] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Vozdvyzhivka (northwest of Hulyaipole).[83] Elements of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division, including armored elements of its 218th Tank Regiment, reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[84]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 23 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Plavni and northwest of Orikhiv near Pavlivka, Mahdalynivka, Novoyakovlivka, and Prymorske on January 22 and 23.[85]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and drone operators of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv).[86] Artillery elements of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 1141st Artillery Regiment, are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Prymorske.[87] First-person view (FPV) drone operators and electronic warfare (EW) elements of the 4th Military Base (58th CAA) and the 104th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Orikhiv direction.[88]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in unspecified areas of the Kherson direction on January 22 and 23 but did not advance.[89]

Russian forces are continuing their “human safari” tactics against civilians in Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Administration Head Oleksandr Prokudin reported on January 22 that Russian forces conducted drone strikes against civilians within Kherson City, critically wounding one.[90]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 331st VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in the Kherson direction.[91]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Crimea overnight on January 22 to 23. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 23 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Podlyot radar station near Bahaily (roughly 279 kilometers from the frontline) in occupied Crimea overnight.[92]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 22 to 23. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 101 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — of which roughly 60 were Shahed-type drones — from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Donetsk Oblast.[93] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 76 drones and that 19 drones struck 12 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential and civilian infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kharkiv oblasts.[94]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.