Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 22, 2026

Assessment as of: 8:20 pm ET

Data cutoff: 12:00 PM ET on January 22

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Russian President Vladimir Putin's meeting with US envoys in Moscow ended after the completion of this update and will be covered in ISW's January 23 report.

Ukrainian and US officials continued meetings in Switzerland on January 22. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with US President Donald Trump at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland on January 22.[i] Zelensky stated that they discussed air defenses for Ukraine. Ukrainian Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov reported that he, Ukrainian Servant of the People Party Head Davyd Arakhamia, and Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Oleksandr Kamyshin met with former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner and US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff in Davos to discuss Ukraine's economic development, post-war recovery, and security guarantees.[ii] Witkoff and Kushner met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on the night of January 22, but the meeting has not concluded as of this writing. ISW will report on the US-Russia meeting as information becomes available.

Witkoff and Western outlets offered limited reporting about what the US-Russian meeting may discuss. Witkoff stated on January 22 that peace talks still need to resolve one issue but did not specify.[iii] Witkoff stated that Trump is considering ideas such as a "tariff-free zone" for Ukraine to boost its economy.[iv] FT reported that two sources stated that the United States and Ukraine have discussed proposing a limited ceasefire in which Russia would stop strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure and Ukraine would stop strikes against Russian oil refineries and shadow fleet tankers.[v]

Putin is trying to use Trump's Board of Peace to curry favor with Trump and negotiate the release of frozen Russian assets to fuel the Russian economy. Putin stated on January 21 that Russia is considering Trump's proposal to join Trump's Board of Peace and that Russia could send the required one billion dollars from frozen Russian assets held in the United States.[vi] Putin stated that the remaining frozen Russian assets in the United States could go towards rebuilding "territories damaged by the fighting" after a Russia-Ukraine peace treaty. Putin stated that he would address the issue in his meeting with Witkoff and Kushner. Putin is likely referring to Russian-occupied territories, not Ukrainian-held territories ravaged by Russian strikes. Putin appears to be trying to negotiate the unfreezing of Russian assets not only to fund Trump's Board of Peace but also to rebuild the areas that Russian forces have damaged in Russia's full-scale invasion. The use of frozen Russian assets to rebuild Russian-occupied Ukraine would effectively release the funds back to Russia and offset the costs Russia caused by invading in 2022. Funding towards reconstruction in occupied Ukraine would put this money back into the Russian economy and would help Russia further integrate occupied Ukraine's economy, society, and infrastructure into the central Russian system.

There is conflicting reporting about possible US, Ukrainian, and Russian meetings in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on January 23 and 24. Zelensky stated that US, Ukrainian, and Russian officials will hold a trilateral meeting in the UAE on January 23 and 24.[vii] Zelensky’s office clarified to the Financial Times (FT) that a trilateral meeting was still unconfirmed and that the United States and Ukraine are still waiting for Russia's response.[viii] An unspecified source told FT that Russian officials told the United States that Putin was open to holding parallel talks with Ukraine, with US mediators shuttling between the Russian and Ukrainian delegations. Witkoff stated that he and Kushner would go to Abu Dhabi to participate in "working group" meetings discussing "military-to-military" issues and Ukrainian "prosperity" after their meeting with Putin in Moscow.[ix] Zelensky has repeatedly reiterated that he is open to bilateral or trilateral meetings with Putin and that Ukraine is open to direct negotiations, but Putin has often resisted such meetings.[x]

The Russian military command is reportedly prioritizing the provision of light motorized vehicles to Russian troops, further demonstrating how the Russian military is optimizing itself for positional warfare. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on January 22 that the Russian military command plans to provide over 2,600 light vehicles, including buggies, motorcycles, and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), from the Russian General Staff reserve to Russian assault units in 2026, with the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) delivering about 4,200 vehicles in the first quarter of 2026.[xi] Mashovets stated that the Russian military command is relying on "non-systemic purchases," such as volunteer assistance, donations, and budgetary contributions from individual oblasts, to meet its total goals. Russian forces are largely using light motorized vehicles to transport infantry closer to frontline positions.[xii] The Russian military command's focus on light vehicle production and provision further demonstrates ISW's ongoing assessment that Russian forces have optimized themselves for positional warfare in Ukraine and that Russian advances will likely remain constrained to a foot pace in the near to medium-term.[xiii]

The Russian military command is reportedly introducing a tactical-level situational awareness system to help streamline battlefield decision-making, seeking to use artificial intelligence to compensate for the low level of junior officer training and initiative in the Russian military, among other things. Mashovets reported that the Russian military command is accelerating the implementation of the Svod situational awareness system for tactical commanders.[xiv] Mashovets stated that the system will collect different types of intelligence, including satellite data, aerial photography, electronic and engineering reconnaissance data, and open-source intelligence, into a single information space that will enable real-time target detection and identification. Mashovets stated that the system will also analyze data, including with help from AI, and will model scenarios for operations and missions taking into account changing dynamics. Mashovets added that Russian forces will likely begin testing the system in combat units at the battalion level across elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces, starting in the 2nd and 41st combined arms armies (CAAs, Central Military District [CMD]) in April and May 2026. The Central Grouping of Forces is currently overseeing offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction.

The Svod system likely aims to replicate the functionality of similar Ukrainian IT systems that help with target detection and identification. The Svod system, particularly its use of AI, likely further aims to help with real-time decision-making on the battlefield at the tactical level. ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command has optimized its military decision-making process around a system designed to use lower quality individual service members who choose a plan from a playbook of battle orders and execute it with minimal alterations.[xv] The highly tactical nature of the Svod system reflects the Russian military command’s need to micromanage junior officers with limited training to compensate for a Russian military hierarchy that discourages autonomy. Russian efforts to integrate technologies such as AI as tactical decision-support tools are thus likely in part attempts to empower tactical units and commanders. The Russian military command appears to be trying to fulfill its long-held goal of offsetting junior officer incompetence by generating templated yet responsive decision-making platforms. It is unclear if Russia's elite Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies will be incorporated into the Svod system. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov stated in August 2025 that the newly created Svod system will undergo combat testing between September and November 2025, and the reason for the delays is unclear.[xvi]

The Russian General Staff is reportedly creating a new drone brigade that will incorporate a large variety of unmanned systems, likely as part of wider efforts to centralize drone units in the Russian military. Mashovets reported that the Russian military command plans to create the 50th Unmanned Systems Brigade of the Supreme Command from the Grom-Kaskad drone brigade (reportedly of the 4th Air Force and Air Defense Army, Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]) by December 2026.[xvii] Mashovets reported that the brigade will include crews from a variety of unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including reconnaissance UAVs, Lancet loitering munitions, Geran strike UAVs, fiber-optic UAVs, and interceptor UAVs. Mashovets reported that a major general will lead the brigade, that the brigade will consist of approximately 7,000 servicemembers, and that the brigade would be stationed in various Russian oblasts and in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[xviii] The Russian military command reportedly plans to form the brigade in four stages - to be completed by February 1, April 1, and September 1, and December 1.[xix] Mashovets reported that the brigade will be exclusively subordinated to the Russian General Staff through the commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces.

The reported size and commander's rank of the 50th Unmanned Systems Brigade do not correspond with the traditional characteristics of a brigade. The Russian General Staff may be trying to fit an elite organizational structure into the Russian order of battle, and the brigade will likely not function as a brigade in reality. The new brigade appears part of wider efforts to establish control over and centralize informal drone units in the Russian military.[xx] It is unclear how this brigade will relate to or interact with the Rubikon Center. ISW will continue to monitor reports of the brigade’s development and functional role on the battlefield.

European states are increasingly seizing Russian shadow fleet tankers following a series of similar US actions in recent weeks. French President Emmanuel Macron stated that the French Navy boarded and diverted a Russian shadow fleet oil tanker in the Mediterranean Sea on the morning of January 22.[xxi] Macron stated that the tanker was travelling from Russia and was under international sanctions. The French Maritime Prefecture of the Mediterranean later confirmed that French authorities inspected and diverted the Grinch cargo tanker in the Alboran Sea as it was en route from Murmansk, Russia, and confirmed suspicions that the vessel was flying a false flag.[xxii] The French Maritime Prefecture reported that the UK cooperated with France in the inspection, and French military officials told the Associated Press (AP) that the UK gathered and shared intelligence that enabled French forces to intercept the vessel.[xxiii] Data from the Starboard Maritime Intelligence ship-tracking platform indicates that the Grinch sailed under the Comoros Islands flag and confirmed that the ship left an area near Murmansk on January 5. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky applauded the French seizure of the tanker and called for states to apprehend more Russian tankers operating near European shores.[xxiv] France has previously taken action against the Russian shadow fleet, boarding a tanker in late September 2025.[xxv] The January 22 seizure comes against the backdrop of similar US actions to seize tankers tied to the Russian shadow fleet in the Caribbean Sea off the coast of Venezuela.[xxvi]

Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov dismissed five deputy defense ministers on January 22. Fedorov reported that he dismissed Anatoliy Klochko, Oleksandr Kozenko, Mykola Shevtsov, Volodymyr Zaverukha, and Hanna Hvozdiar.[xxvii] Fedorov stated that some of the dismissed deputy ministers will continue to work in the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in other areas as advisors or heads of project offices.

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian and US officials continued meetings in Switzerland on January 22.
• Putin is trying to use Trump's Board of Peace to curry favor with Trump and negotiate the release of frozen Russian assets to fuel the Russian economy.
• There is conflicting reporting about possible US, Ukrainian, and Russian meetings in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on January 23 and 24.
• The Russian military command is reportedly prioritizing the provision of light motorized vehicles to Russian troops, further demonstrating how the Russian military is optimizing itself for positional warfare.
• The Russian military command is reportedly introducing a tactical-level situational awareness system to help streamline battlefield decision-making, seeking to use artificial intelligence to compensate for the low level of junior officer training and initiative in the Russian military, among other things.
• The Russian General Staff is reportedly creating a new drone brigade that will incorporate a large variety of unmanned systems, likely as part of wider efforts to centralize drone units in the Russian military.
• European states are increasingly seizing Russian shadow fleet tankers following a series of similar US actions in recent weeks.
• Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov dismissed five deputy defense ministers on January 22.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced near Slovyansk, in the Dobropillya tactical area, and near Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure overnight on January 21 to 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 22 that Ukrainian drones struck the Tamannefttegaz Oil Terminal near Volna, Krasnodar Krai, causing an explosion and a fire.[xxviii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Tamannefttegaz Oil Terminal supplies petroleum products to the Russian military. Geolocated footage published on January 21 and 22 shows a fire at the terminal and a Ukrainian drone striking port infrastructure at the port of Taman.[xxix] Krasnodar Krai Governor Veniamin Kondratyev acknowledged that Ukrainian forces struck port terminals in Volna, setting fire to four oil tanks.[xxx] Ukrainian forces struck the Tamanneftegaz terminal on December 31.[xxxi]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in unspecified areas of Kursk and northern Sumy oblasts on January 22 but did not advance.[xxxii]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 3rd Battalion of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (Territorial Control) (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces) are reportedly operating near Bezsalivka (northwest of Sumy City on the international border).[xxxiii]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on January 22 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of and in northern Vovchanski Khutory (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xxxiv]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Lyman, Starytsia, Vovchansk, Prylipka, Vovchanski Khutory, and Kruhle and toward Nesterne, Izbytske, Symynivka, and Hrafske on January 21 and 22.[xxxv] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vovchansk.[xxxvi]

The Ukrainian 16th Army Corps (AC) reported on January 22 that elements of the Russian 1009th Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are suffering heavy losses in attacks near Synelnykove (northeast of Kharkiv City), causing an increase in servicemembers refusing to fight.[xxxvii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne and Milove and toward Vilkhuvatka, Chuhunivka, and Khatnie, east of Velykyi Burluk near Odradne and toward Hryhorivka, and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Dvorichanske and toward Kolodyazne on January 21 and 22.[xxxviii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 22 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near and within Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Kutkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka; east of Kupyansk toward Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and toward Kurylivka on January 21 and 22.[xxxix]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on January 22 that only about 50 Russian servicemembers remain in Kupyansk.[xl] The deputy commander of a Ukrainian strike group operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on January 22 that Ukrainian forces maintain fire control over a pipeline that Russian forces previously used as their primary ground line of communication (GLOC) near Kupyansk, as Russian forces have resumed infiltration attempts via the pipeline.[xli] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on January 21 that Russian forces attack more frequently during foggy and snowy weather that hinders Ukrainian reconnaissance.[xlii] The spokesperson stated that the Russian military command will eventually have to acknowledge the Russian forces’ failure in Kupyansk.

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in Kupyanskyi Raion.[xliii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 22 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Karpivka (southeast of Borova).[xliv]

Russian forces attacked toward Borova itself, north of Borova near Bohuslavka and Novoplatonivka, and southeast of Borova near Novoserhiivka and Novomykhailivka on January 21 and 22.[xlv]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in Riznykivka (east of Slovyansk).[xlvi]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into northern Drobysheve (northwest of Lyman).[xlvii]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Drobysheve, Zarichne, Myrne, Yampolivka, Minkivka, and Kolodyazi; southeast of Lyman near Dibrova, Ozerne, and Yampil; northeast of Slovyansk near Dronivka and Zakitne; and east of Slovyansk near Siversk, Riznykivka, and Svyato-Pokrovske on January 21 and 22.[xlviii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zakitne.[xlix]

The deputy commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on January 21 that Russian forces continue to attempt infiltrations in small groups of no more than three servicemembers towards Lyman.[l] The deputy commander reported that Russian forces take advantage of poor weather conditions to try to push through the kill zone, but have not been able to enter Lyman. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on January 22 that Russian forces continue infiltration attempts toward Lyman with small groups of poorly trained servicemembers, resulting in a casualty ratio of one to 11 in Ukrainian forces’ favor.[li] The spokesperson added that Russian forces also occasionally attack with well-trained troops.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating in central Svyato-Pokrovske.[lii] Elements of the 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) reportedly continue to operate near Siversk and Zakitne.[liii]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southeastern Kostyantynivka.[liv] ISW cannot independently verify the likely route of Ukrainian forces to southeastern Kostyantynivka. The geolocated footage also indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain strongpoints that Russian forces bypassed using infiltration tactics in southeastern Kostyantynivka and may not have lost control of an area that ISW previously assessed that Russian forces advanced in.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Kostyantynivka and southwest of Stepanivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka).[lv]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Orikhovo-Vasylivka, Chasiv Yar, and Markove; east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne and Stupochky; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Ivanopillya, and Shcherbynivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and toward Stepanivka and Illinivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and toward Pavlivka on January 21 and 22.[lvi]

An officer in a Ukrainian fire support regiment operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported that Russian forces are taking advantage of poor weather conditions to try to penetrate Kostyantynivka and build up forces for future assaults.[lvii] The officer stated that Russian forces are trying to cut off Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs). A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that it is too early to talk about Russian consolidation in eastern Kostyantynivka as it is unclear how many servicemembers advanced in the area.[lviii] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are reluctant to advance further within Pleshchiivka to seize the settlement out of fear of exposure to Ukrainian drone strikes from the heights on the northern bank of the Kleban-Byk Reservoir (southwest of Pleshchiivka). The milblogger claimed that most of the west (left) bank of the Kryvyi Torets River is therefore a contested "gray zone."

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating near Kostyantynivka.[lix] Artillery elements of the BARS-13 Pisarev Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are striking Ukrainian forces in southeastern Kostyantynivka.[lx] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Pryiut (southwest of Druzhkivka).[lxi] Drone and artillery elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[lxii]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Dorozhnie (southeast of Dobropillya).[lxiii]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Nove Shakhove, Ivanivka, Toretske, and Novyi Donbas, and southeast of Dobropillya near Dorozhnie on January 21 and 22.[lxiv] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Toretske.[lxv]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Toretske.[lxvi] FPV drone operators of the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade reportedly continue to operate in the Dobropillya direction.[lxvii]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southeastern Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[lxviii]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Serhiivka; north of Pokrovsk near Bilytske and Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhetske and Zatyshok; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Molodetske, and Novopidhorodne on January 21 and 22.[lxix] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hryshyne.[lxx]

An officer of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on January 22 that colder temperatures and snowstorms are slowing Russian offensive operations near Pokrovsk.[lxxi] The officer stated that Russian forces continue to rotate servicemembers and conduct attacks during poor weather conditions, but that Russian forces will resume higher-intensity offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction once temperatures rise.

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment near Shevchenko (northwest of Pokrovsk).[lxxii]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 22 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southwestern Novopavlivka.[lxxiii]

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself, southeast of Novopavlivka near Horikhove, and south of Novopavlivka near Dachne and Filiya on January 21 and 22.[lxxiv]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Novopavlivka.[lxxv]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Zelenyi Hai and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Stepove, Vyshneve, Krasnohirske, and Sosnivka on January 21 and 22.[lxxvi]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Donetsk Oblast on the night of January 21 to 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 22 that Ukrainian forces struck a company command observation post of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division and a troop concentration of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA) near occupied Selydove, Donetsk Oblast (roughly 28 kilometers from the frontline).[lxxvii] Satellite imagery taken on January 21 shows that a January 20 Ukrainian strike on an ammunition depot of the 101st Logistics Brigade (reportedly of the 51st CAA) in occupied Debaltseve, Donetsk Oblast (roughly 72 kilometers from the frontline) destroyed the depot and caused large scale detonations.[lxxviii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Zelene (north of Hulyaipole).[lxxix]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 21 and 22 shows Russian forces operating in northwestern Hulyaipole and north of the T-0814 highway in western Hulyaipole in what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[lxxx] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Kosivtseve is a contested ”gray zone” where Russian forces’ presence included only small groups under drone cover, contrary to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD)’s December 26 claim that Russian forces seized the settlement. The milblogger added that Ukrainian drone strikes are preventing Russian forces from retaking positions in the settlement.[lxxxi]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Hulyaipole.[lxxxii]

Refinement of areas under Russian control: Geolocated footage published on January 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions or recently advanced in southern Kosivtseve (northwest of Hulyaipole).[lxxxiii]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Pryluky and Svyatopetrivka; north of Hulyaipole near Varvarivka, Nove Zaporizhzhia, Yehorivka, Zelene, Nechaivka, and Dobropillya; northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke and Zlahoda; and south of Hulyaipole near Dorozhnyanka on January 21 and 22.[lxxxiv]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces southeast of Kopani (northwest of Hulyaipole).[lxxxv] Drone operators of the 1466th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA) are intercepting Ukrainian drones over northwestern Hulyaipole.[lxxxvi] Drone operators of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, EMD) are striking Ukrainian equipment in western Ternuvate (northwest of Hulyaipole).[lxxxvii] Elements of the 218th Tank Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Hulyaipole direction.[lxxxviii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 22 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced toward Mahdalynivka and Lukyanivske (both northwest of Orikhiv).[lxxxix]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Bilohirya; west of Orikhiv near Plavni; and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske, Stepnohirsk, and Lukyanivske and toward Richne, Mahdalynivka, Novoboykivske, Pavlivka, and Novoyakovlivka on January 21 and 22.[xc]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are still able to enter Prymorske despite Russian sources’ claims that Russian forces control the settlement.[xci] The milblogger noted that closely interspersed nature of the settlements in the area renders Russian control of individual settlements tenuous. The milblogger added that the open terrain of the dried out Kakhovka Reservoir and the railway in Malokaterynivka (northwest of Orikhiv) facilitates Ukrainian drone strikes, hindering Russian advances in the area. The milblogger noted that Russian forces are currently able only to strike and shell Malokaterynivka, contrary to other Russian milbloggers’ claims that Russian forces are attacking the settlement itself.

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 1141st Artillery Regiment (7th Airborne (VDV) Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Prymorske.[xcii] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv) and Orikhiv.[xciii] Drone operators of the 108th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[xciv]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in unspecified areas of the Kherson direction on January 21 and 22 but did not advance.[xcv]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 331st VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in the Kherson direction.[xcvi]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Kherson Oblast and occupied Crimea on the night of January 21 and 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 22 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian 59H6-E Protivnik-GE radar station in Kytay (roughly 265 kilometers from the frontline), a 55Zh6 Nebo-U radar station in Yevpatoriya (roughly 165 kilometers from the frontline), and a 55Zh6M Nebo-M radar station in Rusakivka (roughly 206 kilometers from the frontline), all in occupied Crimea, and a drone storage warehouse in occupied Novohryhorivka, Kherson Oblast (roughly 116 kilometers from the frontline).[xcvii]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 21 to 22. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 94 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — of which roughly 55 were Shahed-type drones — from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda, Crimea.[xcviii] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 80 drones, that 10 drones struck 10 locations, and that drone debris impacted four locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential and energy infrastructure in Kharkiv, Cherkasy, Poltava, Kirovohrad, Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Chernihiv, and Odesa oblasts.[xcix]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarusian forces continue to strengthen their air defense network in cooperation with Russia. Radio Svoboda reported on January 21 that the Belarusian armed forces deployed an unknown air defense system similar to the Russian Tor surface-to-air missile (SAM) system at the Mazyr Oil Refinery, Gomel Oblast (approximately 30 kilometers northeast of the Belarus-Ukraine border), in early August 2025.[c] Radio Svoboda added that the deployed system is likely an imported Russian Tor-M2 mounted on a Belarusian chassis. Radio Svoboda reported that the Tor-M2 specializes in targeting low-altitude and small air targets, particularly large strike drones, and that Belarusian forces’ deployment of the system indicates the establishment of a preventative air defense network.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.