Assessment as of: 5:30pm ET

Data cutoff: 11:55 AM ET on January 17

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

US and Ukrainian officials held another round of peace negotiations in Miami, Florida on January 17.[1] Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Kyrylo Budanov, Ukrainian Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov, and Ukrainian Servant of the People Party Head Davyd Arakhamia arrived to the United States to discuss details of a peace agreement with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff, former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner, and US Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll on January 17.[2] The outcome of these negotiations is unclear as of this writing, and ISW will continue to monitor reports of US-Ukrainian peace negotiations in the coming days.

European countries appear to be cracking down against oil tankers associated with the shadow fleets of Russia and its allies. Bloomberg reported on January 16 that an unregistered oil tanker claiming to be the Arcusat turned back from a heading between Denmark and Sweden toward German waters to sail north toward Russia’s Arctic coast.[3] Bloomberg reported that prominent shipping organizations did not find a ship linked to the tanker's claimed registration identity and that the Arcusat originated from a Chinese shipyard and disappeared from records in April 2025. Bloomberg reported that data shows that the Arcusat has sailed under different flags, including the flags of Tanzania and Cameroon. The German Federal Police recently denied the Tavian, another name for the Arcusat, entry into German territorial waters - the first time a European country has turned away a shadow fleet tanker from its territorial waters. The German Federal Police stated that it has recently denied several Russian ships passage through German territorial waters.[4] The Italian Guardia di Finanza and Customs Agency of Brindisi seized on January 17 a Tuvalu-flagged ship illegally carrying 33,000 tons of Russian ferrous material after it sailed from Russian territorial waters in the Black Sea.[5] Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi reported that monitoring service data indicates that the detained ship is likely the Turkish-owned bulk carrier Hizer Reis.[6] Commercially available maritime tracking data indicates that the ship stopped at a port in Novorossiysk from November 13 and 16, and monitoring services indicated that the vessel sailed frequently between Turkish and Russian ports.[7] European countries appear to be increasingly cracking down on vessels affiliated with Russia and its allies, whose shadow fleets are often intermingled. Dozens of shadow fleet tankers off the coast of Venezuela have reportedly switched to using Russian flags in recent months, and many shadow fleet vessels with Russian associations are sanctioned for carrying cargo in support of the Iranian regime.[8]

NATO jets scrambled in response to another Russian military aircraft flight close to NATO airspace. NATO Air Command reported that Italian Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets based in Estonia intercepted a Russian Be-200 multirole amphibious aircraft approaching the Baltic Sea during the day on January 16.[9] The January 16 interception is part of a broader pattern of Russian flights close to and violations of NATO airspace, likely intended to gauge NATO responses to Russian aggression.[10] ISW continues to assess that Russia is intensifying its “Phase Zero” campaign to destabilize Europe, undermine NATO’s cohesion, and set the political, informational, and psychological conditions for a potential future Russian war against NATO.[11]

Key Takeaways:

• US and Ukrainian officials held another round of peace negotiations in Miami, Florida on January 17.
• European countries appear to be cracking down against oil tankers associated with the shadow fleets of Russia and its allies.
• NATO jets scrambled in response to another Russian military aircraft flight close to NATO airspace.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Pokrovsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on January 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southeast of Sadky and east of Myropillya (both northeast of Sumy City).[12]

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy Oblasts, including northwest of Sumy City near Komarivka; north of Sumy City near Andriivka and Oleksiivka; and northeast of Sumy City near Yablunivka and Plekhovo, Kursk Oblast and toward Nova Sich and Myropillya on January 16 and 17.[13] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Varachyne (north of Sumy City).[14]

Order of Battle: KVN fiber optic first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Pitersk Battalion are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Velyka Rybytsya (northeast of Sumy City).[15] Artillery elements of the 106th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate in the Sumy direction.[16]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on January 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on January 16 that Russian forces advanced in Vovchanski Khutory, near Vilcha, and southwest of Lyman (all northeast of Kharkiv City).[17]

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Lyptsi and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, Vilcha, Starytsya, Prylipka, Lyman, Hrafske, and Symynivka on January 16 and 17. [18]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces are increasing activity near Lyptsi, an area of the front that has been dormant since Summer 2025.[19]

Russian milbloggers published footage on January 17 of Russian first-person view (FPV) drones striking a mined Ukrainian-controlled bridge reportedly over the Vovcha River near Varvarivka (northeast of Kharkiv City).[20]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Kharkiv direction.[21]

Russian forces continued attacks in the Velykyi Burluk direction on January 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claim: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Ambarne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[22]

Russian forces attacked north of Velykyi Burluk near Dehtyarne and toward Kruhle and northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove, Khatnie, and Ambarne and toward Chuhunivka on January 16 and 17.[23]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 15 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Kupyansk.[24]

Russian forces attacked in Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk near Dvorichna and Krasne Pershe; east of Kupyansk toward Petropavlivka, Podoly, and Kucherivka; and southeast of Kupyansk toward Pishchane and Kurylivka on January 16 and 17.[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kindrashivka and Radkivka (both north of Kupyansk).[26]

A Belarusian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have encircled Russian forces in Kupyansk.[27] Another milblogger claimed that Russian servicemembers are complaining about senior Russian military commanders' January 16 false claims of advance in Kupyansk.[28]

Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast of Borova near Novovodyane and toward Novoserhiivka on January 16 and 17 but did not advance.[29]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Borova direction refuted Russian claims of seizing Novoplatonivka (north of Borova), consistent with Russian milbloggers' own refutations of claims that Russian forces seized Novoplatonivka on January 6.[30]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued infiltration missions northeast of Slovyansk on January 17 but did not make confirmed advances in the Slovyansk direction.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 17 shows Russian servicemembers holding flags in western Zakitne (northeast of Slovyansk) in what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[31] Ukraine’s Eastern Grouping of Forces refuted on January 17 Russian sources’ claims that Russian forces seized Zakitne and stated that Ukrainian forces maintain fire control over Russian troop concentration areas, drone operator positions, and ground lines of communication (GLOCs).[32]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Stavky, Svyatohirsk, Sosnove, and Yarova; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi, Zarichne, Drobysheve, and Myrne; southeast of Lyman near Dibrova and Ozerne; northeast of Slovyansk near Dronivka, Platonivka, and Zakitne; east of Slovyansk near Riznykivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Nykyforivka on January 16 and 17.[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked from Brusivka (south of Lyman).[34]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on January 17 that Russian forces continue to accumulate reserves near Dronivka for future offensive operations against the settlement.[35] The brigade stated that Russian forces are attempting to cross the Siverskyi Donets River on rubber boats near Dronivka and Platonivka. The brigade reported that a Russian prisoner of war (POW) stated that Russian commanders are prioritizing the seizure of the ridgeline between Zakitne and Kryva Luka (east of Slovyansk) to allow Russian forces to regularly shell Slovyansk, Lyman, and Mykolaivka (east of Slovyansk). The deputy chief of staff of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Lyman direction reported on January 17 that Russian forces are attempting to advance through fields and windbreaks in the Lyman direction using camouflage and with drone and artillery support.[36] The deputy chief of staff stated that Ukrainian drone operators can easily detect and strike Russian forces advancing in this manner.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Siversk (east of Slovyansk) and Zakitne.[37] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions in the Lyman direction.[38]

Russian forces continued infiltration missions south of Kostyantynivka on January 17 but did not make confirmed advances in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 17 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position southwest of Illinivka (south of Kostyantynivka) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the FEBA at this time.[39]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Pryvillya (north of Kostyantynivka).[40]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Minkivka, Markove, and Maiske and toward Holubivka; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Ivanopillya, Illinivka, Berestok and Shcherbynivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka on January 16 and 17.[41]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on January 17 that Russian forces are attempting to outflank Kostyantynivka and cut Ukrainian GLOCs to isolate the city in preparation for future offensive operations.[42] The commander stated that Russian forces in the Kostyantynivka direction are attempting to take advantage of foggy and windy weather conditions to assault and infiltrate Kostyantynivka with small groups of both dismounted and motorcycle-mounted infantry. The commander stated that Ukrainian drone operators continue to detect and strike Russian servicemembers in the Kostyantynivka direction despite the poor weather conditions.

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are striking Ukrainian forces in central Kostyantynivka.[43] Elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are operating east of Stupochky (east of Kostyantynivka).[44] FPV drone operators of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Mykolaipillya (south of Druzhkivka).[45] FPV drone operators of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Toretske (southwest of Druzhkivka).[46]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on January 17 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintain positions southwest of Dorozhnie (southeast of Dobropillya), an area where Russian sources claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[47]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on January 16 and 17.[48]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 17 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced northwest of Svitle (east of Pokrovsk).[49]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhetske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad and Rivne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on January 16 and 17.[50] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.[51]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on January 17 that Ukrainian forces continue to operate in Myrnohrad and its outskirts as Russian forces continue attempts to accumulate to sever Ukrainian GLOCs and infiltrate into Myrnohrad.[52]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Kaira Drone Detachment of the Russian 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are striking Ukrainian vehicles in the northern outskirts of Bilytske.[53] Grad multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) elements of the 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, CMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Pokrovsk direction.[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on January 16 and 17 but did not advance.[55]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on January 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Zelenyi Hai and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Krasnohirske, Vyshneve, Stepove, and Oleksiivka on January 16 and 17.[56]

Elements of the Russian 77th Separate Counter-Unmanned Systems Regiment (EMD) reportedly operated near Novoivanivka (southeast of Oleksandrivka) as of December 23, 2025.[57]

Ukrainian forces continued their medium-range strike campaign against Russian military and infrastructure targets in occupied Donetsk Oblast on the night of January 16 to 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 17 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone storage and launch preparation facility near occupied Donetsk City (roughly 39 kilometers behind the frontline) overnight.[58] The Ukrainian Mariupol City Rada reported on January 17 that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the Azovska power substation in occupied Kalmiuskyi Raion, Mariupol (approximately 175 kilometers from the frontline), cutting power to occupied Mariupol, Manhush (west of Mariupol), and Yalta (southwest of Mariupol).[59] Ukrainian forces struck the Azovska power substation on the night of January 12 to 13.[60]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on January 17 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 17 that elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Pryluky (northwest of Hulyaipole).[61] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Pryluky as of January 11 and 14.[62] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Pryluky and Varvarivka (north of Hulyaipole), north of Svyatopetrivka, and near Kosivtseve (both northwest of Hulyaipole).[63]

Russian forces attacked near and within Hulyaipole; northwest of Hulyaipole near Pryluky, Bratske, and Olenokostyantynivka and toward Ternuvate; north of Hulyaipole near Andriivka, Varvarivka, and Zelene; northeast of Hulyaipole near Zlahoda and Solodke; south of Hulyaipole near Dorozhnyanka; and west of Hulyaipole toward Krynychne, Zaliznychne, and Staroukrainka on January 16 and 17.[64] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hulyaipole, Bratske, Ternuvate, Andriivka, Krynychne, Zaliznychne, and Staroukrainka.[65]

Order of Battle: Assault elements of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly operating southwest of Hulyaipole.[66] Armored elements of the 218th Tank Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division) reportedly continue to operate in Zaporizhia Oblast.[67]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 17 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Orikhiv near Myrne and toward Hulyaipilske; northwest of Orikhiv near Lukyanivske and toward Richne, Veselyanka, Mahdanylivka, Novoyakovlivka, Pavlivka, and Novoboikivske; and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk, Prymorske, and Shcherbaky on January 16 and 17.[68]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators and other elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 108th VDV Regiment, reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[69] Air defense elements of the 104th VDV Division are reportedly continuing to operate in Zaporizhia Oblast.[70]

A Russian source claimed that Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on January 17.

A Russian milblogger claimed on January 16 that Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are operating near Kozatske and Vesele (northeast of Kherson City).[71]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 331st VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) and of the BARS-33 Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in occupied Kherson Oblast.[72]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Crimea overnight on January 16 and 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 17 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Nebo-U air defense radar near occupied Yevpatoria (roughly 158 kilometers from the frontline) and a Pantsir-S1 short-range air defense (SHORAD) system near occupied Khutorok (roughly 156 kilometers from the frontline) in occupied Crimea.[73]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 16 to 17. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 115 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones — of which 75 were Shahed-type drones — from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Donetsk City.[74] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 96 Russian drones, that 16 drones struck 11 locations, and that drone debris impacted two locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian and energy infrastructure in Kyiv City and in Chernihiv, Odesa, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[75]

Kharkiv Oblast and City officials reported on January 17 that Russian forces struck critical infrastructure in Kharkiv City during the afternoon of January 17, injuring three civilians.[76]

Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) expert Tymofii Yurkov reported on January 17 that Russian forces are integrating mostly Chinese-manufactured mesh networking modules into Shahed-type drones to allow communication between drones, increase the complexity of mass drone strikes, and improve drones’ resistance to EW, and connectivity with drone operators.[77] Yurkov reported that mesh technology enables Russian drone operations to continue even when individual drones lose connection with their operator. Yurkov further noted that Russian forces can use automated algorithms or elements of artificial intelligence (AI) to coordinate drone strikes without the operator’s manual control. Yurkov reported that Russian forces primarily install such mesh network modules on drones slated for mass strike packages.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.