Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 16, 2026

Assessment as of 7:00 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 11:15 AM ET, January 16

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Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

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Russian milbloggers continue to loudly reject the alternate battlefield reality that Russian President Vladimir Putin and senior Russian military commanders are trying to create. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov inspected the Russian Western Grouping of Forces on January 16 and heard reports from the grouping commander, Colonel General Sergei Kuzovlev.[1] Kuzovlev claimed that Russian forces in the Kupyansk direction seized Kucherivka (east of Kupyansk), Podoly, and Kurylivka (both southeast of Kupyansk) in December 2025. Belousov specifically asked if Russian forces are clearing Kupyansk, to which Kuzovlev responded that Russian forces control all areas of Kupyansk and that Ukrainian attempts to break through into the town have been unsuccessful. Belousov's and Kuzovlev's claims about Russian control over Kupyansk follow similar claims from Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov on January 15 about the seizure of Kupyansk and the imminent seizure of Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk).[2] Senior Russian commanders have been issuing similar exaggerations about Kupyansk since November 2025.[3] Ukrainian forces have largely liberated most of Kupyansk and the surrounding area, however.[4] ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command is committing to its false claims about the seizure of Kupyansk, despite ample visual evidence and Ukrainian and Russian reporting to the contrary.[5]

Russian milbloggers, including a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger and multiple pro-war ultranationalist milbloggers, vehemently refuted the Russian military command's repeated false claims about Kupyansk and nearby settlements. Russian milbloggers denied that Russian forces control Kupyansk, Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi, Podoly, Kurylivka, and Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk), with some describing the Russian presence in Kupyansk as "several pockets of defense" and a "localized defense."[6] The Kremlin-affiliated milblogger stated that there is video evidence showing a Ukrainian presence within Kupyansk and Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi.[7] The milblogger stated that footage from about one week ago (roughly January 9) shows Russian artillery continuing to fire on Podoly, despite the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claiming on January 4 that Russian forces had seized the settlement.[8] The milblogger stated that the Russian Western Grouping of Forces is "in no hurry" to stop sending "embellished" reports to higher-ups, directly citing Belousov's January 16 meeting with Kuzovlev as an example.

A Russian milblogger reporting on the Western Grouping of Forces stated that Gerasimov's presentation of a "parallel reality" failed to mention the surrounded Russian soldiers in Kupyansk, who held out "longer than anyone expected" but whom other Russian forces cannot reach.[9] The milblogger noted that only a "handful" of Russian forces have been able to reach Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi, but that Ukrainian forces have already destroyed them. The milblogger stated that a group of Russian forces was filming a flag-raising video in Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (likely to support Russian officials' false claims of its seizure in the near future) before Ukrainian forces struck the group. The milblogger noted that the final moments of the video "will not be published anywhere." The milblogger stated that Russian forces only recently reached Petropavlivka and Podoly but have been unable to gain control over the settlements, despite Russian MoD claims that Russian forces seized them as of November 21 and January 4, respectively.[10]

One Russian milblogger stated in direct response to Belousov's January 16 meeting that statements about Russian control over Kupyansk are "not only inaccurate" but "do not even come close to reflecting the actual situation on the ground," as Russian forces have not controlled Kupyansk "for a single day."[11] Milbloggers widely complained about repeated "failures" in the area and criticized the practice of sending "beautiful reports" alleging Russian advances to higher-ups.[12] Russian milbloggers complained that the Western Grouping of Forces' practice of "groundlessly" claiming advances is leading to insufficient Russian countermeasures to the Ukrainian offensive to liberate the area, high losses "in the hundreds", difficulties in unit coordination, and "brutal" assaults.[13]

The Russian military command has displayed a clear pattern of publicly presenting false information about the battlefield as part of a wider cognitive warfare effort that aims to influence US decision-making about ongoing peace negotiations. These Kremlin claims aim to spread the false narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable and to convince Ukraine and the West that Ukraine should accept Russia’s demands now out of fear of future Russian offensives or breakthroughs. Kupyansk has become a particular point of neuralgia for the Russian military command, likely due to the fear that the battlefield realities in the area will undermine the narratives about Russia's military prowess that Putin and senior Russian military commanders have been trying to spread.

Falling Russian oil and gas revenues and Russia's continued depletion of its liquid reserves will likely complicate Kremlin efforts to fund a protracted war in Ukraine. Bloomberg reported on January 15 that Russian oil and gas revenues in 2025 dropped to a five-year low amid declining gas exports due to Western sanctions and falling crude oil prices.[14] The Russian Ministry of Finance stated on January 15 that Russia's federal budget received a total of 8.48 trillion rubles (roughly $108 billion USD) in oil and gas taxes in 2025, which Bloomberg noted is a decrease of 24 percent compared to 2024.[15] Bloomberg noted that Russia's federal budget received fewer rubles for each barrel produced and sold in 2025 due to the strengthened ruble. The strengthened ruble increased Russia's purchasing power on the global market, making parallel imports cheaper amid Western sanctions, but had adverse effects on Russia's export profits.[16] Russia's oil and gas revenues accounted for roughly 30 percent of Russia's total federal revenues in 2024 but fell 22 percent year on year in 2025.[17] Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov acknowledged in September 2025 that Russian authorities expect the share of Russia’s revenues from oil and gas sales to fall by roughly 30 percent in 2026.[18]

Russia has also gradually depleted its liquid reserves over the last four years of its war in Ukraine. Bloomberg reported that Russia has spent more than half of its sovereign wealth fund to bridge the widening gap between revenues and spending and has turned to expensive borrowing that will take years to pay back.[19] The sovereign wealth fund is a state-owned investment fund from which Russia pulls money to avoid incurring debt, but Russia has been steadily depleting the fund's liquid reserve to fund its war, including by selling its gold reserves in late November 2025.[20] Putin has grossly mismanaged Russia's economy, which is suffering due to unsustainably high spending on the Russian military and the Russian defense industrial base (DIB), significant labor shortages, and reductions in Russia's sovereign wealth fund.[21] ISW continues to assess that increased Western sanctions on Russia — in tandem with continued Western military support to Ukraine — will likely further impact the Russian economy and Russia's ability to fund a protracted war.[22]

Insufficient infrastructure investments in Russia's Far East are likely hurting Russian economic agreements with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Russian state business outlet Kommersant reported on January 16 that the PRC halted electricity purchases from Russia as of January 1 after Russian export prices rose above domestic Chinese prices for the first time.[23] Kommersant stated that the PRC refused to purchase the minimum contracted volumes under its long-term agreement, despite the contract running through 2037. Kommersant stated that electricity prices in Russia's Far East have been rising since the beginning of 2026 and that price dynamics indicate that electricity prices could be up to 42 percent higher than in January 2025. Kommersant credited the rising prices to "market liberalization" in the Far East. Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged in September 2024, however, that energy shortages in the Far East were holding back industrial and infrastructure projects, and Russian authorities have not maintained energy infrastructure in the region, causing power shortages and rising prices for residents.[24] Years of neglect of the Far East's infrastructure likely contributed to the shortages and price spikes that led to the PRC halting electricity purchases.

Ukrainian forces are countering recent Russian Shahed strike drone adaptations that allowed Russian forces to target Ukrainian aircraft, highlighting the short offense-defense technological cycle in the war. Ukrainian drone charity Wild Hornets posted footage on January 15 showing Ukrainian forces successfully using a Sting interceptor drone to down a Russian jet powered Shahed (Geran) drone equipped with an R-60 air-to-air missile.[25] Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on December 1 that Ukrainian forces downed for the first time a Russian Shahed drone equipped with an R-60 missile meant to destroy Ukrainian helicopters and tactical aircraft that hunt Shaheds, and Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) confirmed on December 15 that Russian forces modified their Shahed drones with the R-60 missiles.[26] Russian forces have continuously adapted their Shahed drones to maximize their damage potential, including a recent innovation of attaching man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) to Shaheds to target mobile components of the Ukrainian air defense umbrella.[27] Ukrainian and Russian forces have been engaged in an offense-defense technological race throughout the full-scale invasion, and Ukrainian forces have repeatedly innovated new air defense measures to combat modifications to Russia's long-range strike campaign.[28] ISW continues to assess that Western support for Ukraine’s interceptor drone program is vital not only for Ukraine’s defense against Russian strikes against the frontline and the rear but also for the defense of Europe.[29]

Media reports suggest that a car accident seriously injured Adam Kadyrov, the son of Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov and possible successor, but ISW cannot independently verify these reports. Two unspecified sources told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's North Caucasus service Kavkaz Realii that Adam Kadyrov is unconscious in intensive care at a hospital in Grozny, Republic of Chechnya, following a car accident.[30] A Chechen opposition outlet claimed that Adam Kadyrov’s motorcade encountered an unidentified obstacle and crashed.[31] The outlet cited local reports about a large convoy of vehicles, including ambulances, driving toward the Grozny airport and authorities flying Kadyrov and other victims to Moscow City for medical treatment.[32] A source reportedly affiliated with Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) told Ukrainian news agency Ukrinform on January 11 that Ramzan Kadyrov is undergoing inpatient dialysis for kidney failure and is in the process of selecting a new leader of the Republic of Chechnya.[33] Kadyrov previously appointed Adam, who is currently 18 years old, to a senior position within the Chechen government, and ISW has previously observed reports indicating that Kadyrov was likely planning on positioning Adam as his successor.[34]

Ukraine’s European partners announced new aid to support the Ukrainian military and energy grid. The Finnish Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on January 16 that Finland will provide a military aid package worth 98 million euros (roughly $114 million) to Ukraine and that the contents of the package are classified.[35] Czech President Petr Pavel stated on January 16 that the Czech Republic will provide Ukraine with unspecified combat aircraft capable of downing drones and may also supply early warning systems, including passive radars.[36] United Kingdom Defense Secretary John Healy told Bloomberg on January 15 that the United Kingdom will open a business center in Kyiv City in 2026 to assist defense startups in accelerating sales of air defense systems and drones.[37] The United Kingdom announced on January 16 that it will provide 20 million pounds (roughly $26.7 million) to support repairs to Ukrainian energy infrastructure that intensified Russian strikes have damaged.[38] Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Oleksiy Kuleba reported on January 16 that Italy will provide Ukraine with about 80 industrial boilers worth a total of 1.85 million euros (roughly $2.1 million) and with capacities ranging from 550 to 3,000 kilowatts (kW).[39] Norwegian Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide announced on January 12 that Norway will provide $200 million to Ukraine to restore energy infrastructure, including immediate energy needs and gas procurement.[40]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian milbloggers continue to loudly reject the alternate battlefield reality that Russian President Vladimir Putin and senior Russian military commanders are trying to create.
• The Russian military command has displayed a clear pattern of publicly presenting false information about the battlefield as part of a wider cognitive warfare effort that aims to influence US decision-making about ongoing peace negotiations.
• Falling Russian oil and gas revenues and Russia's continued depletion of its liquid reserves will likely complicate Kremlin efforts to fund a protracted war in Ukraine.
• Insufficient infrastructure investments in Russia's Far East are likely hurting Russian economic agreements with the People's Republic of China (PRC).
• Ukrainian forces are countering recent Russian Shahed strike drone adaptations that allowed Russian forces to target Ukrainian aircraft, highlighting the short offense-defense technological cycle in the war.
• Media reports suggest that a car accident seriously injured Adam Kadyrov, the son of Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov and possible successor, but ISW cannot independently verify these reports.
• Ukraine’s European partners announced new aid to support the Ukrainian military and energy grid.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Slovyansk, Pokrovsk, and Hulyaipole.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian military sources provided additional battle damage assessments (BDA) of Ukraine’s overnight January 12 to 13 missile strike against a drone production facility in Rostov Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 16 that Ukraine’s overnight January 12 to 13 missile strike against the Atlant Aero drone production facility in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast damaged a drone assembly workshop, two production workshops, and an administrative building.[41] The Ukrainian Navy published high resolution satellite imagery on January 16, confirming the damage to the facility.[42]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on January 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on January 16 that elements of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (Russian Strategic Missile Forces [RVSN] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces) recently seized Komarivka (northwest of Sumy City) and entered neighboring Bila Bereza (just northeast of Komarivka).[43] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Komarivka as of January 14.[44]

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Andriivka and Oleksiivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on January 15 and 16.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked south of Varachyne (north of Sumy City).[46]

The Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on January 16 that Russian forces are unlikely to rapidly advance deeper into Sumy Oblast following the claimed seizure of Komarivka, as Ukrainian forces are transferring reinforcements to the area, and because Komarivka is an easy artillery target because of its small size.[47] The milblogger added that elements of the 1st Company of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (Territorial Control) (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces), operating near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo), have not received rotations since September 2025 as the Russian military command immediately committed the scheduled replacements to costly attritional assaults.

A senior officer of a Ukrainian border detachment operating in the Kursk direction reported on January 16 that Ukrainian forces are employing fiber optic first person view (FPV) drones with a range of 15 to 25 kilometers to deter Russian forces from employing mechanized vehicles in the area.[48] The officer added that Ukrainian drone operators generally strike Russian infantry between five and 10 kilometers behind the frontline.

Geolocated footage published on January 16 shows a reported Russian Shahed drone strike against a Ukrainian High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) north of Svirok, Chernihiv Oblast (roughly 50 kilometers from the international border).[49]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly continue to operate in the Sumy direction.[50]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on January 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Kruhle (northeast of Kharkiv City).[51]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Starytsya, Dehtyarne, Tykhe, Vovchanski Khutory, Lyman, and Prylipka and toward Hrafske, Izbytske, Nesterne, and Kruhle on January 15 and 16.

Geolocated footage published on January 15 and 16 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian servicemembers southwest of Strilecha (north of Kharkiv City and near the international border) and north of Dehtyarne (northeast of Kharkiv City near the international border).[52] ISW assesses that Russian activities near the border are unlikely to be part of a new major offensive but rather are intended to support the Kremlin’s longstanding cognitive warfare effort to portray Russian battlefield victory as inevitable.[53]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Vakha Battalion (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment), the 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), and the 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[54]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne and Milove and toward Chuhunivka and Khatnie on January 15 and 16.[55]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 16 but did not advance.

See topline text for refinements of areas under assessed Russian infiltrations and unconfirmed claims.

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; east of Kupyansk toward Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk toward Pishchane, Kurylivka, and Kivsharivka; and south of Kupyansk near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi on January 15 and 16.[56]

Order of Battle: Molniya-2 fixed-wing FPV drone operators of the Russian 375th Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion of the 47th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian pontoon bridges over the Oskil River in Kupyanskyi Raion.[57]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Bohuslavka, southeast of Borova near Novovodyane and toward Druzhelyubivka, and south of Borova near Oleksandrivka on January 15 and 16.[58]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Borova direction reported on January 16 that Ukrainian forces still control Novoplatonivka (northeast of Borova) – contrary to Russian Western Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Sergei Kuzovlev’s January 16 claim that Russian forces seized the settlement in December 2025.[59]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 16 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced north of Riznykivka (east of Slovyansk).[60]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 16 shows a Russian servicemember raising a flag in eastern Zakitne (northeast of Slovyansk) in what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[61] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on January 16 that elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) seized Zakitne.[62] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed, however, that there are reports of ongoing fighting within Zakitne.[63]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in northeastern and southern Lyman.[64]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Svyatohirsk, Sosnove, Yarova, Novoselivka, and Drobysheve; north of Lyman near Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi, Zarichne, and Torske; southeast of Lyman near Dibrova and Ozerne; northeast of Slovyansk near Dronivka, Platonivka, and Zakitne; east of Slovyansk near Siversk and Riznykivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Rai-Oleksandrivka, Nykyforivka, Svyato-Pokrovske, and Pazeno on January 15 and 16.[65] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Ozerne and Svyato-Pokrovske.[66]

A senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported that Russian forces have significantly increased their use of reconnaissance drones but are not using heavy equipment.[67] The NCO stated that Russian forces are accumulating forces in Siversk but that the town's lowland terrain allows Ukrainian forces to strike Russian troop concentrations. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces struck crossings over the Siverskyi Donets River near Malaky (west of Lyman) and Bohorodychne (northwest of Lyman).[68]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are striking Ukrainian vehicles in Kalenyky (east of Slovyansk) and south of Riznykivka.[69] FPV drone operators of the 37th Motorized Rifle Regiment (67th Motorized Rifle Division, 25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles in Lyman.[70] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[71]

Russian forces continued infiltration missions north of Kostyantynivka but did not make confirmed advances in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kramatorsk direction reported on January 16 that Russian infiltrators entered Markove (north of Kostyantynivka) during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the FEBA at this time.[72]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced into eastern Minkivka and northwest of Novomarkove (both northeast of Kostyantynivka), northwest of Stupochky (east of Kostyantynivka), south of Berestok (south of Kostyantynivka), and in southern Stepanivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka).[73]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on January 16 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions in eastern Kostyantynivka – an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[74]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka toward Virolyubivka; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Minkivka and toward Pryvillya; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Ivanopillya, and Shcherbynivka; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka and Yablunivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and toward Novopavlivka on January 15 and 16.[75]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kramatorsk direction reported that Ukrainian forces are using drones to detect and strike Russian soldiers attempting to infiltrate in the Kramatorsk direction under the cover of snowfall.[76] The spokesperson reported that Russian drones targeted Russian servicemembers when they attempted to flee during an unsuccessful infiltration attempt in Markove. A Russian POW, who Ukrainian forces captured after the attempt, stated that Russian forces have low morale and poor training, that Russian forces instruct soldiers to take positions at any cost regardless of losses, and that snow and cold weather make it difficult for Russian forces to operate.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are striking Ukrainian forces in eastern Kostyantynivka.[77] FPV drone operators of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division and 238th Artillery Brigade (both 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Toretske (southwest of Druzhkivka) and Mykolaipillya (south of Druzhkivka), respectively.[78] Lancet loitering munition operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kramatorsk.[79] Drone operators of the Gorynych Anti-Terrorist Detachment (Federal Security Service [FSB] Presidential Regiment), alongside elements of the 4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) and artillery elements of the Dikaya Division of Donbas (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kostyantynivka.[80]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on January 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and Toretske and toward Vilne and Novyi Donbas and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on January 15 and 16.[81]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Dobropillya direction.[82]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on January 16 but did not advance.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 16 indicates that Russian forces advanced east of Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[83] ISW assesses that this event did not occur in the previous 48 hours, given the lack of recent snow in the footage.

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhetske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on January 15 and 16.[84]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on January 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on January 15 and 16 but did not advance.[85]

The acting commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported on January 16 that poor weather conditions, including snow, wind, and cold temperatures, are preventing Russian forces from advancing in the Novopavlivka direction.[86] The acting commander stated that Russian forces continue attempts to infiltrate in small groups, but Ukrainian drone operators quickly detect and repel them as Russian servicemembers' uniforms stand out in the snow.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on January 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Ivanivka, Oleksandrohrad, Zelenyi Hai, and Andriivka-Klevtsove, and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Sichneve, Oleksiivka, Stepove, Krasnohirske, and Vyshneve on January 15 and 16.[87]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 16 indicates that Russian forces recently seized Dobropillya (northwest of Hulyaipole).[88] Geolocated footage published on January 10 and 16 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions northwest of Pryluky and north of Svyatopetrivka (both northwest of Hulyaipole), indicating that Russian forces likely seized Varvarivka (east of Pryluky and Svyatopetrivka) at a prior date.[89] ISW assesses that the Russian forces operating north of Svyatopetrivka were conducting infiltration missions that did not change the control of terrain or the FEBA.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Olenokostyantynivka (northwest of Hulyaipole).[90]

Russian forces attacked near and within Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Nove Zaporizhzhia, Dobropillya, Pryluky, Varvarivka, Olenokostyantynivka, and Zlahoda and toward Tsvitkove and Ternuvate; north of Hulyaipole near Zelene and Bratske; northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke, Rybne, and Yehorivka; and west of Hulyaipole toward Zaliznychne on January 15 and 16.[91] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hulyaipole and Ternuvate.[92]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 60th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast, including near Hulyaipole.[93]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 16 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Pavlivka (west of Orikhiv) and advanced to central Novoyakovlivka (northwest of Orikhiv).[94]

Refinement of areas under assessed Russian infiltrations: A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger indicated on January 15 that Ukrainian forces maintain control over most of Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) and Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv) — areas near where ISW previously assessed that Russian forces conducted infiltration operations.[95]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk, Stepove, and Kamyanske and toward Pavlivka; and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske and Lukyanivske and toward Veselyanka, Novoyakovlivka, Novoboikivske, and Mahdalynivka on January 15 and 16.[96]

Order of Battle: Loitering munition operators of the Russian 417th Reconnaissance Battalion (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) systems near Stepnohirsk.[97] Drone operators and other elements of the 7th and 104th airborne (VDV) divisions reportedly continue to operate in Zaporizhia Oblast.[98]

Russian forces are reportedly staging military equipment at the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on January 16 that circulating footage indicated that Russian forces are staging military equipment near nuclear reactors at the occupied ZNPP.[99] Voloshyn stated that Ukrainian reconnaissance identified several firing points on the roofs of reactor buildings, as well as several hidden antennas.

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 16 that Ukrainian forces struck an ammunition depot of the Russian 76th VDV Division in occupied Prymorsk, Zaporizhia Oblast (roughly 92 kilometers behind the frontline).[100]

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on January 16 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge and in unspecified areas of Kherson Oblast on January 15 and 16.[101]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th VDV Division are striking alleged Ukrainian forces in Kherson City.[102] Artillery elements of the 299th VDV Regiment and 1065th VDV Artillery Regiment (both 98th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in Kherson Oblast.[103]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 15 to 16. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 76 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones – of which 50 were Shahed-type drones, including jet powered Shaheds – from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and an unspecified area of occupied Donetsk Oblast.[104] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 53 drones, that 19 drones struck nine locations, and that drone debris impacted one location.

Ukrainian Energy Minister Denys Shmyhal reported on January 16 that Russian forces have struck every power plant in Ukraine since February 2022 and have inflicted 612 total strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.[105]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

The Belarusian military continues to incorporate battlefield lessons from Russia's war in Ukraine. Belarusian Security Council Secretary Lieutenant General Alexander Volfovich claimed on January 16 that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko ordered snap readiness checks of the Belarusian Armed Forces, focusing on incorporating lessons learned from Russia’s war in Ukraine, especially anti-drone countermeasures.[106]

Volfovich responded to reports that Russia did not, in fact, deploy Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) systems to Belarus on January 16 by claiming that Belarus and Russia have fulfilled all aspects of the agreements that Lukashenko and Russian President Vladimir Putin made, regardless of Belarus’s “opponents’” statements.[107]

Belarusian and Russian security services continue to deepen their cooperation. Chairman of the National Security Committee of the Belarusian National Assembly Gennady Lepeshko stated on January 16 that the Belarusian and Russian ministries of internal affairs (MVDs) are working to synchronize their databases to create a unified register of “extremists” and “extremist web resources.”[108] Belarusian state news agency Belta claimed on January 15 that Belarusian Investigative Committee (IC) head Konstantin Bychek met with Russian IC head Alexander Bastrykin to discuss “increasing the effectiveness of criminal investigations and strengthening of security in the Union State.”[109]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.