Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 15, 2026

Assessment as of: 6:15pm ET

Data cutoff: 12:30pm on January 15

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

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Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to demonstrate that he will not be satisfied with a peace settlement that only pertains to Ukraine and does not radically restructure NATO. Putin claimed on January 15 that Russia’s war in Ukraine is a "direct response" to the West ignoring Russia’s interests by expanding NATO, despite alleged public promises to Russia not to do so.[1] Russia issued ultimatums in late 2021 to NATO that amounted to the destruction of the alliance and required an overhaul of the European security architecture, including demands that NATO roll back to its 1997 borders.[2] Putin has repeatedly demonstrated that his demands are greater than those encapsulated in the US-proposed 28-point plan and subsequent peace plans.[3] Putin remains committed to his original war goals from 2021 and 2022, which extend beyond territory and are not limited to Ukraine.

The Kremlin continues to forward the false narrative that Ukraine’s defenses are on the verge of collapse, but data on Russian gains since the start of the full-scale invasion demonstrates otherwise. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on January 15 that the situation is deteriorating for Ukraine every day and that Ukraine's "corridor for decision-making" is "narrowing," implying that Ukraine should give in to Russia's demands now before Ukraine is unable to defend itself and must capitulate in the future.[4] Ukrainian defenses are not on the verge of collapse, however, and Ukrainian forces have been able to prevent Russian forces from militarily achieving Russian President Vladimir Putin's goal of subjugating all of Ukraine. At the height of Russian gains in Ukraine in March 2022, Russian forces had seized 26.16 percent of Ukraine. The subsequent Ukrainian counteroffensive to push Russian forces back from Kyiv City and northern Ukraine, however, reduced this to 20.21 percent by the end of April 2022. Russia's territorial control continued to decrease to 17.84 percent by the end of 2022 following Ukraine's Kharkiv and Kherson counteroffensives. The extent of Russia's control over Ukraine stayed relatively constant in 2023, 2024, and 2025. Russian forces controlled between 17.9 and 18.52 percent of Ukraine in 2023 and 2024, and this figure rose to 19.32 percent by the end of 2025. Russian forces have thus occupied an additional 1.5 percent of Ukraine's territory in the last three years. Russian gains have been marginal and reduced to a foot pace as Russian forces have had to resort to highly attritional infantry-led assaults and have been unable to restore mechanized maneuver to the battlefield. Russian gains will likely continue to be slow and grinding and are unlikely to lead to a quick collapse of the frontline.

Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov continues to offer demonstrable lies and exaggerations about Russian battlefield gains to forward the Kremlin's false narrative that a Russian military victory is inevitable. Gerasimov claimed on January 15 that Russian forces are advancing in virtually all directions on the front and that Ukrainian attempts to stop Russian advances have been unsuccessful.[5] Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces seized more than 300 square kilometers of territory in the first two weeks of January 2026.[6] ISW has observed evidence indicating that Russian forces increased their presence (either through infiltration missions or assaults) in only 73.82 square kilometers between December 31 and January 13 — about one-quarter of the gains that Gerasimov claimed.  

Gerasimov boasted about the seizure of two small, rural border villages in northern Ukraine as alleged evidence of extensive Russian successes on the battlefield. Gerasimov stated that Russian forces are expanding the buffer zone in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts and specifically highlighted the recent seizure of Hrabovske (southwest of Sumy City) and claimed seizure of Komarivka (northwest of Sumy City).[7] The frontline in these areas has been largely dormant for years, and the recent limited Russian cross-border attacks into these small villages in late December 2025 and mid-January 2026 likely aimed to generate informational effects.[8] The Kremlin is trying to portray these small-scale attacks as the opening of a new sector of the front and evidence that Ukrainian defenses are collapsing across the theater. ISW continues to assess, however, that there are no indications that Russian forces are launching a major ground offensive in these areas.[9]

The Russian military command remains committed to its false claims that Russian forces have seized Kupyansk, despite ample visual evidence and Ukrainian and Russian reporting to the contrary. Gerasimov claimed that elements of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces continue to eliminate the surrounded Ukrainian forces on the east back of the Oskil River in the Kupyansk direction.[10] Gerasimov claimed that Ukrainian forces have tried to "demonstrate their presence" within Kupyansk, including through flag raisings, since the Russian military command claimed to have seized the town in November 2025.[11] Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces are engaged in street fighting in Kupyansk-Vuzhlovyi (south of Kupyansk) and are completing the seizure of the settlement.[12] Ukrainian forces have largely liberated most of Kupyansk and the surrounding area, however, despite Russian Western Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Sergei Kuzovlev claiming on December 29 that Russian forces will complete the encirclement of Ukrainian forces in Kupyansk in January to February 2026.[13] Ukrainian forces are currently clearing the remaining Russian forces in the town, and President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on December 22 that only about 80 to 100 Russian servicemembers remained in the settlement.[14] Ukrainian forces have also largely eliminated the Russian presence near Kupyansk-Vuzhlovyi, demonstrating the extent of Gerasimov's exaggerations. ISW only observed evidence on January 8 of Russian forces conducting an infiltration mission into eastern Podoly (just northeast of Kupyansk-Vuzhlovyi) and has not observed evidence of a Russian presence in or near Kupyansk-Vuzhlovyi since then.[15] Russian milbloggers, including many within the pro-war ultranationalist community, have acknowledged that the Russian military command's repeated claims about Kupyansk are false.[16] Gerasimov's January 15 claims are part of a demonstrated Kremlin pattern of publicly presenting false information about the battlefield. These Kremlin efforts aim to spread the false narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable and to convince Ukraine and the West that Ukraine should accept Russia's demands now out of fear of future Russian offensives.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to demonstrate that he will not be satisfied with a peace settlement that only pertains to Ukraine and does not radically restructure NATO.
• The Kremlin continues to forward the false narrative that Ukraine’s defenses are on the verge of collapse, but data on Russian gains since the start of the full-scale invasion demonstrate otherwise.
• Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov continues to offer demonstrable lies and exaggerations about Russian battlefield gains to forward the Kremlin's false narrative that a Russian military victory is inevitable.
• The Russian military command remains committed to its false claims that Russian forces have seized Kupyansk, despite ample visual evidence and Ukrainian and Russian reporting to the contrary.
• Gerasimov's January 15 claims are part of a demonstrated Kremlin pattern of publicly presenting false information about the battlefield. These Kremlin efforts aim to spread the false narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable and to convince Ukraine and the West that Ukraine should accept Russia's demands now out of fear of future Russian offensives.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Slovyansk, and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian industrial infrastructure on the night of January 14 and 15. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that likely Ukrainian drones struck the Nevinnomyssk Azot plant in Stavropol Krai, causing fires.[17] Astra reported that the Nevinnomyssk Azot plant produces acetic and nitric acids, which are crucial to Russia’s artillery shell production supply chain. Geolocated footage published on January 14 shows smoke and flames near the plant.[18]

Ukrainian Navy Spokesperson Captain Third Rank Dmytro Pletenchuk reported on January 15 that Ukraine's overnight January 12 to 13 missile strike against the Atlant Aero drone production facility in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast, severely damaged the facility disrupting Russian Molniya drone production.[19]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on January 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka, Oleksiivka, and Andriivka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on January 14 and 15.[20] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Yunakivka and Andriivka.[21]

A Russian milblogger claimed on January 15 that the alleged Russian seizure of Komarivka (northwest of Sumy City) is "not just" the seizure of a settlement but represents the opening of a "new active sector of the front."[22] ISW continues to assess that Russian attacks in previously dormant areas of Sumy Oblast, such as in Komarivka, are part of a wider cognitive warfare effort to falsely paint Russian forces as opening a new front in northern Ukraine as Ukrainian defenses are collapsing.[23] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on January 15 that Russian forces are unable to conduct systematic evacuations of wounded servicemembers from Oleksiivka and Yunakivka and instead only recover bodies when battlefield conditions permit.[24] The milblogger noted that it took Russian forces over a week to evacuate a mortally wounded servicemember of the Russian 119th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) from Yunakivka.

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Sumy City.[25]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on January 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Vovchanski Khutory and to the northern outskirts of Symynkivka (all northeast of Kharkiv City).[26]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Starytsya, Tykhe, Zelene, Vovchanski Khutory, Lyman, Symynkivka, and Prylipka and toward Izbytske, Kruhle, and Hrafske on January 14 and 15.[27]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 83rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[28]

Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Dvorichanske on January 15 but did not advance.[29]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 15 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Kupyansk.[30]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; east of Kupyansk near Podoly and toward Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk toward Pishchane and Kurylivka; and south of Kupyansk near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi on January 14 and 15.[31]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on January 15 that Russian forces are attempting to break through along the eastern bank of the Oskil River toward eastern Kupyansk from Lyman Pershyi (northeast of Kupyansk).[32] Mashovets reported that Russian forces maintain positions in central Kupyansk near the Kupyansk medical college, central market, and Tsyurupy Street. Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), and likely one regiment of the 47th Tank Division (1st GTA) regrouped forces in the Kupyansk direction and are attempting to advance to the bridge over the Oskil River east of the central market, where a large group of encircled Russian forces are operating. Mashovets stated that small Russian infiltration groups occasionally attempt to penetrate through Holubivka (north of Kupyansk) along the Oskil River to Kupyansk, but that Ukrainian forces prevent such infiltrations.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 782nd Battalion of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are striking Ukrainian positions north of Kupyansk.[33]

Russian forces continued offensive operations toward Borova itself and southeast of Borova near Karpivka on January 14 and 15 but did not advance.[34]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 15 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Svyato-Pokrovske (east of Slovyansk).[35]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 15 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in central Dibrova after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[36] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on January 15 that Russian forces are infiltrating from Derylove to the outskirts of Drobysheve (northwest of Lyman).[37]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on January 15 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions on the eastern outskirts of Lyman – an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[38]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Tetyanivka, east of Pryshyb (both northwest of Lyman), west and south of Dibrova (southeast of Lyman), and into southern Ozerne (east of Slovyansk).[39]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka and Drobysheve and toward Svyatohirsk; north of Lyman near Stavky; east of Lyman near Zarichne and Torske; southeast of Lyman near Dibrova; east of Slovyansk near Siversk, Zakitne, Ozerne, and Svyato-Pokrovske and toward Riznykivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Vasyukivka, Nykyforivka, and Fedorivka on January 14 and 15.[40]

Mashovets reported on January 15 that the Russian military command appears to be intensifying efforts to break through to the Oleksandrivka-Yarova line (northwest of Lyman) in order to block the road running from Lyman to Izyum.[41] Mashovets stated that Russian forces have been unable to consolidate positions in Novoselivka and Drobysheve. Mashovets stated that forward Russian units effectively reached the Dibrova-Ozerne line and are attacking from Zarichne (northeast of Dibrova), attempting to outflank Ukrainian forces in Stavky (northwest of Zarichne). Mashovets noted that Russian forces appear to have no firm control over Dibrova or Ozerne, however. Mashovets stated that the Russian 20th Combined Arms Army's (CAA) (Moscow Military District [MMD]) immediate objective is to seize the Novoselivka-Drobysheve-Pryshyb-Yarova area northwest of Lyman while the 25th CAA (Central Military District [CMD]) is concentrating efforts north, east, and southeast of Lyman. Mashovets noted that the 25th CAA is trying to indirectly push Ukrainian forces out of Stavky from the south and southeast but risks pushing Ukrainian forces into the 20th CAA's main direction of attack northwest of Lyman, which would significantly complicate the 20th CAA's combat operations.

The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on January 15 that Russian forces continue to use small group infiltration tactics to attack Dronivka from several directions at once.[42] The commander stated that Russian forces are trying to cross the Siverskyi Donets River and consolidate positions on the outskirts of Platonivka (east of Slovyansk). The commander stated that Ukrainian forces have fire control over all roads leading to Dronivka, making it difficult for Russian forces to attack toward the settlement with heavy equipment.

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, reinforced with units from the 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], MMD) are operating from a bridgehead on the Zherebets River north and northwest of Lyman.[43] Drone operators of the 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions in Svyato-Pokrovske.[44] Elements of the 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) reportedly continue to operate near Zakitne.[45]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 14 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southwestern Predtechyne (east of Kostyantynivka).[46]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Berestok (south of Kostyantynivka).[47]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka toward Virolyubivka; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Minkivka and Markove and toward Pryvillya; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Ivanopillya, and  Shcherbynivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and toward Toretske and Novopavlivka on January 14 and 15.[48]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on January 15 that Russian forces have concentrated efforts in the Kostyantynivka direction on settlements southeast of the city, attacking  Berestok, Stepanivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka), Pleshchiivka, and Ivanopillya in groups of two or three soldiers without vehicles 10 to 12 times a day.[49] Mashovets reported that Russian forces have had some success with this tactic northeast of Kostyantynivka and advanced from Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka) toward Stinky (north of Kostyantynivka) up to one kilometer but have been unable to consolidate positions. Mashovets reported that Russian forces are attempting to encircle Kostyantynivka but cannot concentrate the number of forces required to increase the intensity of attacks to advance deeper. Mashovets reported that the Russian military command appears to be preparing for a mass infiltration and full-scale assault on Kostyantynivka but that Russian forces do not currently have the combat capabilities for such an assault.[50]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces), of the 89th Tank Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC), and of the 77th Motorized Rifle Regiment (7th Military Base, 49th CAA, SMD) are operating in southeastern and eastern Kostyantynivka.[51] Mashovets stated that likely elements of the 1436th Motorized Rifle Regiment (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) and of the 54th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC) attempted to infiltrate along the Yablunivka-Ilinivka and Yablunivka-Stepanivka lines (all southwest of Kostyantynivka). Mashovets reported that elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) and of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, SMD) are operating in the Dyliivka-Pleshchiivka, Oleksandro-Shultyne-Ivanopillya, and Shcherbynivka-Pleshchiivka directions. Mashovets reported that elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division (18th CAA, SMD) are operating between Chasiv Yar and Stinky. Drone operators of the 89th Tank Regiment are striking Ukrainian forces in western Predtechyne.[52] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian logistics in the Kostyantynivka direction.[53] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions near Novopavlivka and Torske (south of Druzhkivka).[54]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on January 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Toretske and Nove Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Dorozhnie on January 14 and 15.[55]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 61st Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) and drone operators of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Dobropillya direction.[56]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 14 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced along the Donetska railway northwest of Svitle (northeast of Pokrovsk).[57]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Sukhetske (northeast of Pokrovsk) and advanced west of the settlement.[58]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske; and northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne on January 14 and 15.[59]

A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported that Russian forces are infiltrating into Rodynske and that the Russian military command is rotating brigades, withdrawing those that have suffered heavy losses.[60] The NCO noted that Russian forces are carrying antennas and transmitters when they infiltrate in order to equip drone pilot positions. The NCO stated that better trained infantry groups carry portable electronic warfare (EW) systems. The head of intelligence of another Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on January 15 that Russian forces are using armored vehicles, civilian vehicles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and motorcycles to quickly reach the frontline and have increased their use of Molniya fixed-wing drones.[61] The head of intelligence reported that Russian forces' main aim is to advance to Hryshyne.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and Smuglyanka Detachment are reportedly directing Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) glide bomb strikes against Ukrainian forces near Serhiivka (northwest of Pokrovsk).[62] Drone operators of the Vega Spetsnaz Detachment (24th Guards Spetsnaz Brigade, Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Pokrovsk.[63] Elements of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[64]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on January 14 and 15 but did not advance.[65]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on January 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Ivanivka and Andriivka-Klevtsove, north of Oleksandrivka near Zlahoda, and southeast of Oleksandrivka and Sichneve near Vyshneve on January 14 and 15.[66] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Ivanivka.[67]

The head of a drone battalion operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on January 15 that Russian forces continue to use small group infiltration tactics to attack in the Oleksandrivka direction.[68]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly operating in the Oleksandrivka direction.[69]

Ukrainian forces continue their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on January 14 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian surface-to-air missile (SAM) Tor system and a VITYAZ 50N6E radar in occupied Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast, and a Buk M1 air defense system in occupied Volnovakha, Donetsk Oblast between January 13 to 15.[70]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on January 15 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near and within Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Nove Zaporizhzhia, Svyatopetrivka, and Dobropillya and toward Olenokostyantynivka, Zhovtneve, Tsvitkove, Rizdvyanka, and Ternuvate; north of Hulyaipole near Zelene; and northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke on January 14 and 15.[71] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hulyaipole, Kosivtseve (northwest of Hulyaipole), and Bratske (north of Hulyaipole).[72]

Order of Battle: Heavy bombers of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Hulyaipole, northwest of Nove Pole (northwest of Hulyaipole), and Hirke (west of Hulyaipole).[73] Artillery elements of the 305th Artillery Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], EMD) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[74]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 15 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced into western Novoyakovlivka and western Pavlivka (both northwest of Orikhiv), and east of Lukyanivkse (west of Orikhiv).[75]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk, Stepove, Pavlivka, Novodanylivka, and Novoandriivka; and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske and Lukyanivkse and toward Veselyanka, Richne, Novoyakolivka, Novoboikivske, and Mahdalynivka on January 14 and 15.[76] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Prymorske.[77]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in Stepnohirsk.[78] Drone operators of the 108th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[79]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on January 14 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Buk air defense system, a Strela-10 surface-to-air missile (SAM), and a Tor-M2 SAM in occupied Polohiv Raion (roughly 15 kilometers from the frontline) between January 13 to 15.[80]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on January 15.

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division, including its 299th VDV Regiment and 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion, reportedly continue to operate in the Kherson direction.[81]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 14 to 15. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on January 15 that Russian forces launched 82 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones – of which about 60 were Shahed-type drones – from Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, occupied Crimea.[82] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 61 drones, that 21 drones struck 13 locations, and that drone debris fell on three locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, energy, and administrative infrastructure in Kyiv City and Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Zhytomyr oblasts.[83] Sumy Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Hryhorov reported that Russian forces struck residential infrastructure in Sumy oblast, injuring nine people and killing one.[84]

Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) stated on January 15 that Russian strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure since the start of the year qualify as a crime against humanity.[85] The SBU reported that Russian forces have conducted 256 air attacks on Ukrainian energy and heat facilities since the start of the year, including in Kyiv City and Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy, Mykolaiv, and Chernihiv oblasts, causing large-scale power and heating outages and water disruptions throughout Ukraine.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin spoke with Belarusian Prime Minister Alexander Turchin on January 14 and discussed Union State and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) integration, as well as expanded trade, economic, scientific, and technical cooperation through joint projects.[86]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.