Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 10, 2026

Assessment as of January 10: 7:00 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on January 10. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the January 11 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Available visual evidence indicates that the Russian Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) strike on the night of January 8 to 9 struck a Ukrainian defense industrial enterprise in Lviv City. Geolocated footage published on January 9 of the Oreshnik strike indicates that Russian forces struck in the vicinity of southwestern Lviv City.[1] OSINT analysts on X (formerly Twitter) and Russian milbloggers assessed that the geolocated footage indicates that Russian forces were targeting the Lviv State Aircraft Repair Plant in southwestern Lviv City.[2] Reuters reported on January 9 that a senior Ukrainian official stated that the Oreshnik struck an unspecified state enterprise in Lviv City, and a Ukrainian source reported on the night of January 8 to 9 that the strike hit the southwestern outskirts of the city.[3] A local Ukrainian Telegram channel and some Russian milbloggers had claimed on January 9 that the missile may have targeted the underground gas storage facility in Stryi, Lviv Oblast, but the sources did not provide evidence of a strike on Stryi, and Ukrainian officials and expert sources denied the claims at the time.[4] Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Member Serhiy Nahornyak also stated on January 9 that gas infrastructure in Lviv Oblast was not the target of the strike and that Russian forces struck an unspecified facility that is not connected to gas supplies.[5] A pro-Russian Ukrainian Telegram channel, whose website Ukrainian authorities banned in 2019, was among the first to report that Russian forces may have struck gas infrastructure in Stryi, but amplified on January 10 the geolocated footage indicating that Russian forces had struck southwestern Lviv City.[6] Russian media have notably been amplifying the various reports from the pro-Russian Ukrainian channel about the Oreshnik strike.[7]

Russian officials are explicitly using the recent Oreshnik strike to deter Western states from deploying troops to post-war Ukraine, in line with ISW's assessment about the purpose of the strike. Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev, on January 10, on his English-language X account, threatened that Russia could use Oreshnik missiles to strike European or NATO troops that deploy to post-war Ukraine as part of security guarantees.[8] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee Chairperson Leonid Slutsky stated on January 9 that Russian retaliation against future "blatant violations of red lines" is "inevitable."[9] ISW recently assessed that the Kremlin likely targeted the westernmost part of Ukraine with an Oreshnik missile to deter Europe and the United States from providing security guarantees to Ukraine, particularly the deployment of a multinational assurance force, as the Coalition of the Willing is currently discussing.[10]

The United Kingdom (UK) is preparing for the possible deployment of troops to Ukraine as part of security guarantees in a future peace agreement. The UK government announced on January 9 the allocation of £200 million (about $268 million) to prepare British forces to deploy as part of a multinational force to post-war Ukraine.[11] The funding will go toward upgrading vehicles, communications systems, counter-drone protections, and force-protection equipment. The Kremlin has repeatedly stated that Western security guarantees would be “unacceptable” for Russia and that foreign troops would be “legitimate” targets for the Russian military.[12]

Ukraine continues to collaborate with its Western partners to expand the production of the interceptor drones that are crucial to Ukraine's ability to down Russian long-range drones on the front and in the rear. UK Defense Minister John Healey announced on January 9 that the UK will begin production of the Ukrainian-designed "Octopus" interceptor drones, which can intercept Russian Shahed-type drones, in January 2025.[13] Healey stated that the UK aims to make thousands of these Octopus drones per month for Ukraine and noted that the production cost of each Octopus drone is less than 10 percent of the cost of the Russian Shahed-type drone. Healey stated that the UK will update the design every six weeks in order to stay ahead of Russian technological adaptations. Russian forces have been increasingly adapting and modifying their Shahed-type drones, including by adding integrated cameras and radio control capabilities that have allowed Russian forces to strike moving targets such as locomotives and by equipping Shaheds with thermobaric warheads and man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS).[14] Ukrainian and Russian forces have been engaged in an offense-defense race to develop new technologies throughout the full-scale invasion, as Russian forces have escalated their long-range strike campaign and Ukrainian forces have responded by innovating new air defense countermeasures. Russia’s continued efforts to degrade Ukrainian air defenses through constant innovation and adaptation underscore the need for a flexible, well-rounded, and well-provisioned Ukrainian air defense umbrella, including an arsenal of interceptor drones. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine's ability to field technological adaptations at scale ahead of Russian adaptations is crucial for Ukraine's ability to offset Russia's quantitative materiel advantages.[15] ISW continues to assess that Western support for Ukraine’s interceptor drone program is vital not only for Ukraine’s defense against Russian strikes against the frontline and the rear but also for the defense of Europe.[16]

Key Takeaways:

• Available visual evidence indicates that the Russian Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) strike on the night of January 8 to 9 struck a Ukrainian defense industrial enterprise in Lviv City.
• Russian officials are explicitly using the recent Oreshnik strike to deter Western states from deploying troops to post-war Ukraine, in line with ISW's assessment about the purpose of the strike.
• The United Kingdom (UK) is preparing for the possible deployment of troops to Ukraine as part of security guarantees in a future peace agreement.
• Ukraine continues to collaborate with its Western partners to expand the production of the interceptor drones that are crucial to Ukraine's ability to down Russian long-range drones on the front and in the rear.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure overnight on January 9 to 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Zhutovskaya oil depot in Oktyabrsky Raion, Volgograd Oblast, which supplies fuel to Russian forces.[17] Geolocated imagery published on January 10 shows a fire in Oktyabrsky, and NASA Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) data shows heat anomalies in Oktyabrsky.[18] Volgograd Oblast Governor Andrei Bocharov claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian drone strike on the oblast and that drone debris caused a fire at an oil depot in Oktyabrsky Raion.[19]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on January 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces advanced near Hrabovske (southeast of Sumy City).[20]

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City toward Mala Korchakivka, northeast of Sumy City toward Myropillya, and southeast of Sumy City near Hrabovske, on January 9 and 10.[21]

The Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on January 10 that the commander of the 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly responsible for territorial control tasks) (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces) plans to send the regiment’s 7th and 8th companies to a highly dangerous 3.5 kilometer forested area with interspersed Russian and Ukrainian positions along the international border after previous Russian units were unable to seize the area after several months of intense fighting.[22] The milblogger stated that the Russian servicemembers on the ground in this area are in complete disarray without food or water. The milblogger claimed that the 5th and 6th companies of the 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment will replace the 7th and 8th companies' current positions.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 34th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate in and around Hrabovske.[23] Elements of the 810th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating in Andriivka (north of Sumy City).[24] Elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly attacking toward Mala Korchakivka.[25] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th CAA, LMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Sumy Oblast.[26]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on January 10 but did not advance.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 9 and 10 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian-occupied buildings in southern and southeastern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) during what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA) at this time.[27]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Prylipka, Starytsya, Vovchansk, Zelene, Vovchanski Khutory, Vilcha, Lyman, and toward Hrafske on January 9 and 10.[28]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Khatnie and Milove on January 9 and 10 but did not advance.[29]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on January 10 but did not advance.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 9 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember operating along the P-79 Kupyansk-Chuhuiv highway in northern Kupyansk during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA) at this time.[30]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northwest of Kupyansk near Tyshchenkivka; north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; southeast of Kupyansk near Kurylivka, Stepova Novoselivka, and Pishchane; south of Kupyansk near Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi; and west of Kupyansk toward Myrove on January 9 and 10.[31]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on January 10 that command elements of the Russian 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA] (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are sending wounded servicemembers of its 122nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th CAA), (reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction as of January 1), to participate offensive operations.[32] The milblogger claimed that 6th CAA command elements will replenish losses within the 122nd Motorized Rifle Regiment with poorly disciplined and injured servicemembers.

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 375th Separate Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion of the 47th Tank Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) continue to strike Ukrainian positions in Kupyansk.[33] Elements of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Kupyansk.[34] FPV drone operators of the 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], LMD) are striking Ukrainian positions in northern Kurylivka.[35]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on January 10 but did not advance.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 9 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian servicemembers operating in eastern Oleksandrivka (south of Borova) during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA) at this time.[36] ISW initially assessed on January 9 that the Russian infiltrators entered Oleksandrivka from the east, however, further video evidence published on January 9 shows two Russian servicemembers operating in central Yarova (south of Oleksandrivka), indicating that the Russian servicemembers likely infiltrated into eastern Oleksandrivka from the south.[37]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova toward Bohuslavka and Nova Kruhlyakivka and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka, Novovodyane, Serednie, Ridkodub, and Karpivka and toward Olhivka; south of Borova near Korovii Yar, Oleksandrivka, and Sosnove on January 9 and 10.[38]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on January 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 9 shows two Russian servicemembers operating in eastern and western Yarova (northwest of Lyman) during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at the time.[39]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in eastern Svyatohirsk, south of Yarova (both northwest of Lyman), in central Ozerne (southeast of Lyman), and north of Pazeno (southeast of Slovyansk).[40]

Russian forces attacked near and within Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka, Yarova, Svyatohirsk, and Drobysheve; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; east of Slovyansk near Dronivka, Platonivka, Riznykivka, Ozerne, and Zakitne on January 9 and 10.[41]

Ukraine's National Police reported on January 10 that Russian forces conducted a FAB-250 glide bomb strike against Slovyansk, injuring seven and damaging residential infrastructure.[42]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are operating in Svyato-Pokrovske (east of Slovyansk).[43] Elements of the 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[44] Elements of the 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) reportedly continue to operate near Siversk and Zakitne.[45]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 10 shows elements of the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, SMD) striking Ukrainian forces in the southern outskirts of Kostyantynivka, indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[46]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on January 9 and 10 shows elements of the Russian 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) striking Ukrainian positions northwest of Stupochky (east of Kostyantynivka) and in eastern Kostyantynivka and elements of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) striking Ukrainian forces in northwestern Pleshchiivka - areas in which Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[47]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Virolyubivka (north of Kostyantynivka).[48] One of the milbloggers later claimed, however, that Russian forces could not consolidate their positions in Virolyubivka and that Ukrainian forces retook the settlement.[49] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in Novodmytrivka (north of Kostyantynivka), while another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain control over Novodmytrivka and Predtechyne (east of Kostyantynivka).[50] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Berestok (south of Kostyantynivka), east and south of Berestok, and on the northern outskirts of Illinivka (northwest of Berestok).[51] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that reports of Russian attacks on Berestok and Illinivka are premature, however.[52] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced in eastern Kostyantynivka, south of Podilske (northeast of Kostyantynivka), south of Stinky (just northwest of Podilske), east of Stepanivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka), and north of Rusyn Yar (south of Druzhkivka).[53]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka near Virolyubivka; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Minkivka, Novomarkove, Mykolaivka, and Mayske; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Kleban-Byk, and Ivanopillya; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and toward Torske on January 9 and 10.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Minkivka.[55]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kramatorsk direction reported on January 10 that Russian forces increase the intensity of their attacks during worsening weather conditions that hinder Ukrainian drone operations and mostly attack in groups of up to five servicemembers at dusk and nighttime.[56] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are camouflaging their artillery guns well, making it difficult for Ukrainian forces to identify the type of artillery they struck during counterbattery fire.[57] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces only recently seized Mayske (northeast of Kostyantynivka), despite the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) claim about seizing the settlement in late September 2025.[58] Russian milbloggers claimed that there are false reports about the alleged Russian seizures of several other unspecified settlements in the Kostyantynivka direction.[59]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 163rd Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) reportedly continue to operate near Sofiivka.[60] Drone operators of the 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment) (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles in the Kostyantynivka direction.[61] Drone operators of the Smuglyanka Detachment and Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly coordinating Russian glide bomb strikes in the Kramatorsk direction.[62]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on January 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Toretske, east of Vilne (both east of Dobropillya), and west of Ivanivka (southeast of Dobropillya).[63]

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on January 9 and 10.[64]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian artillery in the Dobropillya direction.[65]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on January 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk toward Novooleksandrivka; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Razine, Sukhetske, Zatyshok, and Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman and toward Bilytske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske on January 9 and 10.[66]

The deputy commander of a Ukrainian artillery brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on January 10 that Russian forces continue to exploit poor weather conditions to infiltrate into settlements north of Pokrovsk using groups of one to three servicemembers.[67] The deputy commander stated that Russian forces also use poor weather conditions to conduct mechanized and motorized assaults using armored vehicles, light automobiles, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and motorcycles in attempts to seize Rodynske and Bilytske and continue offensive operations towards Dobropillya (northwest of Pokrovsk). The deputy commander stated that Russian forces are conducting 20-30 guided aerial glide bombs (KABs) against Ukrainian positions daily in the Pokrovsk direction to destroy infrastructure and prevent Ukrainian servicemembers from taking effective defensive positions.[68] The deputy commander stated that Russian forces are primarily using KAB strikes for fire support in addition to rocket artillery and traditional 152mm. The deputy commander stated that Russian forces launch between 20-30 KAB bombs in his brigade’s area of responsibility daily.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, SMD) reportedly continue to operate near Rodynske.[69] FPV drone operators of the 39th Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th AC, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are striking Ukrainian equipment on the northern outskirts of Bilytske.[70] FPV drone operators of the 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Shevchenko (northwest of Pokrovsk).[71]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on January 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on January 10 that Russian forces advanced in northeastern and western Novopavlivka.[72]

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself, northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka, and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on January 9 and 10.[73]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on January 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Piddubne; southeast of Oleksandrivka near Sosnivka, Vyshneve, Verbove, Oleksiivka, and Krasnohirske; and south of Oleksandrivka near Vidradne on January 9 and 10.[74]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 433rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Dnipropetrovsk direction.[75]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian energy and military infrastructure in occupied Donetsk Oblast on the night of January 9 to 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Divisions personnel concentration in occupied Kurakhivka (roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline); a command and observation post in occupied Hirnyk (roughly 25 kilometers from the frontline) of a tank battalion of the 76th VDV Division; and a control point for a unit of the 41st CAA (CMD) in occupied Hirnyk.[76] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on January 10 and published geolocated footage showing Ukrainian forces striking an electrical substation in occupied Zorya (roughly 103 kilometers from the frontline) and an electrical substation and railway traction station in occupied Volnovakha (roughly 70 kilometers from the frontline).[77] Magyar reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Pivdenna 330 kilovolt substation in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[78]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on January 10 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Dobropillya (north of Hulyaipole) and Svyatopetrivka (northwest of Hulyaipole) and advanced southwest of Hulyaipole, west of Dobropillya, north of Pryluky (northwest of Hulyaipole), and northwest of Dorozhnyanka (south of Hulyaipole).[79]

Russian forces attacked near and within Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Pryluky and Ternuvate and toward Svyatopetrivka; north of Hulyaipole near Zelene, Yehorivka, Varvarivka, Dobropillya, and Andriivka; and northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke, Zlahoda, and Rybne on January 9 and 10.[80] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hulyaipole, Bratske (northwest of Hulyaipole), and Andriivka.[81]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on January 10 that Russian forces are attacking Hulyaipole with all available means, including drones, aviation, and artillery, and that street fighting is ongoing for each building in the city.[82] Voloshyn stated that Russian forces are using infiltration tactics in Hulyaipole in attempts to sever Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs). The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Hulyaipole direction stated on January 10 that Russian forces are actively striking Hulyaipole with KAB glide bombs and up to 100 drones operating simultaneously, including first-person view (FPV) drones, "waiter" drones, and fiber optics.[83] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are attacking Ukrainian positions with groups of five to six servicemembers equipped with electronic warfare (EW) equipment and anti-drone small arms.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions near Staroukrainka and Verkhnya Tersa (both west of Hulyaipole).[84]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on January 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Stepove and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske and Lukyanivske and toward Novoyakovlivka on January 9 and 10.[85]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 4th Military Base (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Orikhiv.[86] Drone operators of the 328th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (104th VDV Division) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces near Lukyanivske.[87] Drone operators of the Viking Drone Detachment of the 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue to strike Zaporizhzhia City.[88] Drone operators and other elements of the 11th Separate VDV Brigade and of the 108th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[89]

Ukrainian forces continue their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on January 10 that Ukrainian forces struck a drone storage facility of the Russian 19th Motorized Rifle Division (58th CAA, SMD) in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[90]

Russian forces continued limited ground assaults in the Kherson direction on January 10 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge, on January 9 and 10.[91]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 98th VDV Division reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in the Kherson direction.[92]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of January 9 to 10. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from Kursk Oblast and 121 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones – of which roughly 80 were Shahed – from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[93] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 94 drones, that the missile and 27 drones hit 15 locations, and that drone debris fell at one location. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck agricultural, energy, industrial, and port infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Odesa oblasts.[94]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.