Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 8, 2026

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

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Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

Russian forces are continuing their cognitive warfare campaign that uses small-scale cross-border attacks in previously dormant frontline areas in northern Ukraine to try to convince the West that the frontlines in Ukraine are collapsing. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on February 8 that Russian forces seized Sydorivka (northwest of Sumy City on the international border).[1] A Russian milblogger claimed that the seizure is part of efforts to establish a “buffer zone” in northern Sumy Oblast and credited elements of the Russian 80th Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) with allegedly seizing the settlement.[2] ISW has not observed visual evidence to confirm the Russian MoD’s claim. Sydorivka is just east of Komarivka, a previously dormant area of the front where Russian forces launched cross-border attacks in December 2025.[3] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that the Russian military command plans to create more than 20 assault groups from elements of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (Russian Strategic Missile Forces [RVSN] and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces) to attack deeper into Sumy Oblast from Bila Bereza (northwest of Sydorivka on the international border) and Komarivka.[4] The milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 104th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (76th VDV Division) and 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD) will follow the RVSN troops to consolidate positions. ISW has previously observed reports that the Russian military command is misusing specialist RVSN personnel as assault troops in the Sumy direction.[5]

The Kremlin began in late December 2025 a cognitive warfare campaign using cross-border attacks in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts to try to generate informational effects and influence ongoing negotiations to end the war.[6] The Russian seizure of Hrabovske (southeast of Sumy City); alleged seizures of Komarivka, Bila Bereza, and Popivka (north of Hrabovske); and advances into Sotnytskyi Kozachok (northwest of Kharkiv City) are likely part of this effort.[7] ISW has not observed any evidence to suggest that Russian forces have made significant advances toward any operationally significant objective since the alleged seizures of these small border villages or indicators of Russian preparations for a significant offensive into Ukraine from the north.[8] Russian forces have not conducted a sustained and intense battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign to degrade Ukrainian logistics to defensive positions and to prepare the battlefield for ground assaults along the international border in northern Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts, as Russian forces did in the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions.[9] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin likely aims to portray these limited cross-border attacks as a broad new Russian offensive that reinforces the Kremlin’s narrative that a Russian military victory in Ukraine is inevitable in order to push the West and Ukraine to capitulate to Russia's demands now out of fear of intensified Russian offensive operations in the future.[10]

Russian milbloggers continue to claim that SpaceX’s recent block of unregistered Starlink terminals in Ukraine is hindering Russian combat operations in Ukraine. A Russian milblogger claimed on February 8 that Russian units at various, unspecified sectors of the front are experiencing communication issues after the block and need radio and satellite equipment donations.[11] Another Russian milblogger claimed that the block was "extremely unfortunate."[12] The milblogger claimed that "wise" commanders long ago understood the dangers of Russian forces' reliance on Starlinks and created alternative communication means, but that the block is still negatively impacting combat operations, as Russian forces so far have no equivalent to fully replace Starlink. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are conducting all communications "on the ground." Russian milbloggers have been complaining about issues with Russian ground operations and tactical strikes since SpaceX worked with Ukrainian officials to shut down Russian troops' access to Starlink within Ukraine on February 5.[13] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces will struggle to maintain their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign at the previously high intensity levels in the near-term unless Russian forces are able to find workarounds to the blocks or adapt new technological solutions to replace Starlink.[14]

Russian forces continue to integrate air-to-air capabilities onto their Shahed-type drones to ensure the drones evade Ukrainian air defenders and to undermine Ukraine's air defense. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported on February 8 that a Ukrainian interceptor drone shot down a Russian Shahed-type drone equipped with R-60 air-to-air missiles that were facing backwards.[15] Russian forces previously equipped Shaheds with forward-facing R-60 missiles in order to destroy Ukrainian helicopters and tactical aircraft that hunt Shaheds.[16] The shift from forward- to backward-facing R-60s suggests that the intended purpose of the modified drone may have shifted. Russian forces were likely first using the drones with forward-facing R-60 missiles specifically to search for and then strike Ukrainian aircraft. Russian forces now appear to be using backward-facing missiles in order to defend the drone if it encounters a Ukrainian aircraft, but then allow the drone to threaten Ukrainian aircraft involved in air defense operations and to continue toward its original target.

Parts of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) have achieved self-sufficiency such that Ukraine can start exports to the West. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 8 that Ukraine is opening its military exports and will open 10 export centers in northern European states and the Baltic states in 2026.[17] Zelensky did not specify which weapons Ukraine will export, but stated that Ukraine will start to jointly produce Ukrainian drones in Germany in mid-February 2025 and that Ukraine and the United Kingdom (UK) have opened joint production lines in the UK.  Ukraine began in 2023 to pursue its long-term objective of ensuring the self-sufficiency of its DIB such that Ukraine could be less reliant on foreign military provisions in the future.[18] Western security and financial aid to Ukraine in the past years helped the Ukrainian DIB in these endeavors, and ISW assessed in early 2024 that Ukraine would require considerable Western military assistance for several years before Ukraine achieved self-sufficiency. Ukrainian exports, as well as joint European-Ukrainian and US-Ukrainian production, are mutually beneficial, as the West can use Ukraine's experience fighting a 21st-century war with an accelerated offense-defense technological cycle to bolster its defenses and own DIBs.

The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that Ukrainian missile strikes in January 2026 damaged parts of Russia's Kapustin Yar launch site. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 8 that previous Ukrainian strikes against the Kapustin Yar launch site in Astrakhan Oblast damaged a technical facility that serviced intermediate-range ballistic missiles, an assembly building, and a logistics warehouse.[19] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 5 that Ukrainian forces conducted a series of strikes against the Kapustin Yar site with Ukrainian-produced long-range weapons, including FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles, in January 2026.[20] Russian forces launched their November 2024 and January 2026 Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) strikes against Ukraine from Kapustin Yar.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces are continuing their cognitive warfare campaign that uses small-scale cross-border attacks in previously dormant frontline areas in northern Ukraine to try to convince the West that the frontlines in Ukraine are collapsing.
• Russian milbloggers continue to claim that SpaceX’s recent block of unregistered Starlink terminals in Ukraine is hindering Russian combat operations in Ukraine.
• Russian forces continue to integrate air-to-air capabilities onto their Shahed-type drones to ensure the drones evade Ukrainian air defenders and to undermine Ukraine's air defense.
• Parts of Ukraine's defense industrial base (DIB) have achieved self-sufficiency such that Ukraine can start exports to the West.
• The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that Ukrainian missile strikes in January 2026 damaged parts of Russia's Kapustin Yar launch site.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Hulyaipole.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text for reports of the results of recent Ukrainian strikes against Astrakhan Oblast.

Ukrainian forces continue to strike energy infrastructure in Russian border regions. Russian opposition outlet Astra geolocated footage, which indicates that Ukrainian forces struck the Luch Thermal Power Plant (TPP) in Belgorod City on the evening of February 7.[21] Astra reported that the strike caused power outages in the city and nearby areas. Bryansk Oblast Governor Alexander Bogomaz claimed on February 7 that Ukrainian forces launched HIMARS rocket artillery and Neptune missile strikes against the oblast, causing heat and power outages.[22]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on February 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

See topline text for unconfirmed claims of Russian advances in northern Sumy Oblast.

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including northwest of Sumy City near Studenok, north of Sumy City near Oleksiivka and toward Nova Sich and Korchakivka, northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka and Loknya and toward Myropillya, and southeast of Sumy City near Pokrovka, Hrabovske, and Vysoke, on February 7 and 8.[23]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian military police elements conducted raids near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo, Kursk Oblast) to search for deserters from the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), the 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th AC, LMD), and an unspecified Spetsnaz (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) unit during the past week (presumably February 1 to 8).[24] The milblogger claimed that many elements of the Storm Assault Company of the 1st Battalion of the 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment deserted before arriving in Tetkino  (southwest of Glushkovo) from Rylsk, Kursk Oblast, on February 7.[25]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1431st Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[26]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on February 8 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Starytsya, Prylipka, Lyman, Vovchanski Khutory, and Zelene on February 7 and 8.[27]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 20th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Defense Brigade (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Vovchanski Khutory.[28] Multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) artillery elements of the 244th Artillery Brigade (11th Army Corps [AC], LMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces west of Lyptsi (north of Kharkiv City).[29] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 1431st Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th AC) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment near Velyki Prokhody (north of Kharkiv City).[30] Drone operators of the 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD) reportedly continue to operate in Kharkiv Oblast.[31]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Chuhunivka and east of Velykyi Burluk toward Hryhorivka on February 7 and 8.[32]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued infiltration missions north of Kupyansk on February 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on February 7 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember in southeastern Kutkivka (north of Kupyansk) in what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[33]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on February 8 that Russian forces seized Hlushkivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[34]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane, Kurylivka, and Hlushkivka and toward Novoosynove on February 7 and 8.[35]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on February 8 that under 50 Russian servicemembers remain encircled in Kupyansk, almost without logistical support.[36] Trehubov noted that the Russian forces in the Kupyansk direction include poorly trained mercenaries and contract soldiers. The Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force reported on February 7 that Russian forces continue assaults on the northern outskirts of Kupyansk, but are unable to advance.[37] The commander of a Ukrainian drone company operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on February 8 that Russian forces are attempting small group infiltrations from different directions almost daily and rarely use armored fighting vehicles (AFVs).[38]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 26th Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions in southwestern Hlushkivka.[39]

Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Borova near Novoplatonivka; northeast of Borova near Bohuslavka and Nova Kruhlyakivka; southeast of Borova near Shyikivka and Druzhelyubivka; and south of Borova near Korovii Yar and Oleksandrivka on February 7 and 8 but did not advance.[40]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in the Slovyansk direction.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on February 7 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions in central Nykyforivka (southeast of Slovyansk), indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in central Nykyforivka — an area in which Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces maintained positions.[41]

Russian forces attacked near and within Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka, Serednie, and Sosnove; north of Lyman near Drobysheve and Stavky; east of Lyman near Zarichne and Yampil; northeast of Slovyansk near Zakitne and Platonivka; east of Slovyansk near Riznykivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Vasyukivka and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka on February 7 and 8.[42]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on February 8 that Russian forces are failing to break through toward Lyman but continue to attempt to advance in small assault groups.[43] Trehubov reported that Russian forces have accumulated sufficient manpower to sustain consistent waves of attacks and that Russian forces will likely maintain a higher-intensity effort to seize Lyman. A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on February 8 that unpredictable weather is complicating Russian operations in the Slovyansk direction.[44] The spokesperson reported that Starlink disruptions are degrading Russian command and control and drone operations, but Russian forces continue to conduct small-group assaults and may be preparing for a larger offensive as they are accumulating heavy equipment.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Zakitne and Siversk (east of Slovyansk).[45] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly continue to operate in the Lyman direction.[46]

Russian forces continued infiltration missions southwest of Kostyantynivka on February 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage posted on February 7 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions east of Stepanivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka) in what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[47]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka near Pryvillya and Markove; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Minkivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka and Ivanopillya; south of Kostyantynivka near Illinivka and Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka; east of Druzhkivka near Maiske; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and toward Mykolaipillya; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Novopavlivka on February 7 and 8.[48]

The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on February 7 that Russian forces are taking advantage of poor weather conditions to attack near Kostyantynivka.[49]

Order of Battle: Lancet loitering munition operators of the Russian 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kindrativka (south of Druzhkivka).[50] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Toretske and Novomykolaivka (both southwest of Druzhkivka).[51] Drone operators of the Grachi Detachment of the 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) and of the 13th Rusichi Assault Detachment of the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Kostyantynivka direction.[52]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on February 8 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar and east of Dobropillya near Ivanivka, Toretske, Vilne, and Novyi Donbas on February 7 and 8.[53]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Baikal Group (40th Naval Infantry Brigade, Pacific Fleet) are striking Ukrainian positions in southern Krasnoyarske (south of Dobropillya).[54] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) credited elements of the 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) with the claimed seizure of Toretske.[55] Drone operators and artillery elements of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Dobropillya direction.[56]

Russian forces continued infiltration missions north of Pokrovsk on February 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on February 8 shows Russian forces operating southeast of Bilytske (north of Pokrovsk) in what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the FEBA.[57]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Novooleksandrivka and Shevchenko; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and toward Bilytske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Molodetske, and Novopidhorodne; and west of Pokrovsk near Serhiivka on February 7 and 8.[58]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on February 8 that Russian forces conducted their last motorized assault attempt in the brigade’s area of responsibility (AoR)  in December 2025 and have exclusively attacked on foot since that time.[59] The spokesperson noted that Russian forces sometimes use unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) to deliver supplies and conduct logistics and that Russian forces sometimes attempt to conceal light vehicles in forested areas.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 8 that Ukrainian forces struck a drone control point near Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk).[60]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 76th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating toward Hryshyne.[61] Drone operators of the Baikal Group are striking Ukrainian forces west of Bilytske.[62] Drone operators of the 61st Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Pokrovsk direction.[63]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself, northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka, and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on February 7 and 8 but did not advance.[64]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Tovste and Piddubne and toward Ivanivka, and east of Oleksandrivka near Oleksandrohrad on February 7 and 8.[65]

Order of Battle: Bombers of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Orly (northeast of Oleksandrivka).[66]

Geolocated footage published on February 7 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian Uragan multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) near occupied Novomayorske (roughly 40 kilometers from the frontline) on an unspecified date between February 5 and 7.[67]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in eastern Ternuvate, northwestern Pryluky, and northern Prydorozhnie (all northwest of Hulyaipole).[68]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Tsvitkove (northwest of Hulyaipole).[69]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Pryluky, Svyatopetrivka, Ternuvate, and Olenokostyantynivka and toward Tsvitkove; north of Hulyaipole near Zelene and Dobropillya; northeast of Hulyaipole near Pryvillya, Rivnopillya, and Solodke; south of Hulyaipole near Dorozhnyanka; and west of Hulyaipole near Staroukrainka and Zaliznychne on February 7 and 8.[70] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Bratske (northwest of Hulyaipole) and Ternuvate.[71]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Dolynka (northwest of Hulyaipole).[72] Artillery elements of the Russian 305th Artillery Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[73]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 8 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Mali Shcherbaky, Shcherbaky, Stepnohirsk, Kamyanske, and Prymorske and northwest of Orikhiv near Pavlivka and Lukyanivske on February 7 and 8.[74]

Order of Battle: Fiber optic first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Nemets group of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in Orikhiv.[75] Elements of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[76]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline and mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast on the night of February 7 to 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian logistics depot in occupied Rozivka (roughly 66 kilometers from the frontline) and a Russian manpower concentration near Krasnohirske (roughly 15 kilometers from the frontline).[77]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on February 8 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Kherson Oblast on February 7 and 8.[78]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and artillery elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Prydniprovske (east of Kherson City).[79]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 7 to 8. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 101 Shahed-, Gerbera-, Italmas-, and other drones – of which roughly 70 were Shaheds - from the directions of Kursk, Oryol, and Bryansk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast.[80] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 69 drones, that 32 drones hit 13 locations, and that drone debris fell at one location. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck energy, industrial, religious, residential, and transport infrastructure in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, and Odesa oblasts.[81]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 8 that Russian forces launched over 2,000 strike drones, 1,200 guided glide bombs, and 116 missiles against Ukraine in the past week (since roughly February 1) and that Russian forces struck energy, logistical, and residential infrastructure almost daily in the past week.[82]

Winter weather conditions are reportedly affecting Ukraine's ability to deploy all aspects of its air defense umbrella. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on February 8 that snowy weather conditions caused low visibility and prevented Ukrainian forces from scrambling F-16 and Mirage fighter jets to intercept Russian missiles during the large-scale Russian strike series on the night of February 6 to 7.[83] Ihnat stated that poor visibility also hindered Ukrainian forces' ability to guide interceptor drones to their targets during the overnight strikes. Ihnat stated that Russian forces are increasingly using ballistic missiles and that it is difficult for Ukraine to protect all areas of the country because Ukraine's limited number of Patriot air defense systems have an interception radius of only roughly 25 kilometers. Ihnat noted that Ukraine previously used Soviet-era air defense systems and missiles but is now relying exclusively on Western air defense systems, further limiting the quantity of air defense systems available to Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are trying to exploit Ukraine's insufficient air defense umbrella, forcing Ukraine to spread its limited systems across a geographically pervasive threat at the front and in the rear.[84]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.