Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 5, 2026

Data cutoff: 11:30 am on February 5

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US, Ukrainian, and Russian delegations continued trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi on February 5. Ukrainian Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov noted that US, Ukrainian, and Russian delegations met in trilateral consultations and working groups — the same format as the February 4 talks.[1] Ukrainian Presidential Office Head Kyrylo Budanov stated that the talks were "constructive."[2] ISW will continue to monitor reports of the outcomes of the February 4-5 negotiations in Abu Dhabi.

The Kremlin is looking for new narratives to try to convince the United States and Europe to not agree to security guarantees for Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov used a February 4 interview with Russian state media outlet Russia Today (RT) to once again reject Western security guarantees for Ukraine.[3] Lavrov referenced a recent report from the Financial Times (FT) outlining the reported multi-layered security guarantees agreement that the United States, Europe, and Ukraine have been discussing to respond to a possible Russian invasion of post-war Ukraine.[4] Lavrov claimed that the reported security guarantees document is “practically an ultimatum” to Russia and that Ukraine would stage a false flag attack and blame Russia in order to receive a “carte blanche” from the West to renew fighting. Lavrov rejected a ceasefire that precedes a final peace resolution, claiming that the West will use such a ceasefire to supply Ukraine with weapons. Kremlin officials have repeated the same rhetoric about Western security guarantees in recent months, consistently calling such guarantees “unacceptable” for Russia and labelling foreign troop deployments to Ukraine as “legitimate" Russian targets.[5] The Kremlin, however, appears to now be trying to find new narratives to reject Western security guarantees and to convince the United States and Europe to not agree to them, likely as the United States, Ukraine, and Europe move closer to finalizing the agreement. Kremlin officials started to use new narratives on February 2 and 3, claiming that the presence of foreign troops in Ukraine could lead to a third world war and direct military conflict between nuclear powers.[6] Lavrov's February 4 claim about an alleged Ukrainian false flag attack is likely yet another attempt to find new ways to convince the United States and Europe to not provide security guarantees to Ukraine. RT is a Russian state media outlet with an extensive global reach in various languages, and the Kremlin is likely using Lavrov's interview to disseminate these narratives to international audiences, including those in the United States.

Lavrov implied that Russia's demand for Ukrainian "neutrality" aims to turn Ukraine into a pro-Russian proxy state. Lavrov claimed to RT that the only kind of Ukraine that Russia is "prepared to see as a long-term, eternal neighbor" is a "friendly" Ukraine that is "not necessarily an ally" but is "neutral" and "benevolent."[7] Lavrov's statement offers insight into the additional demands embedded in Russia's original war demand for Ukrainian "neutrality" and indicates that Russia seeks to turn Ukraine into a proxy state even if Russia does not physically control all of Ukraine's territory. Lavrov's insistence that post-war Ukraine be "friendly" and "benevolent" implies that Russia will only be satisfied with a Ukraine led by a pro-Russian government that makes pro-Russian policies. Russia likely aims to turn Ukraine into another Belarus, which ISW assesses Russia has de facto annexed, even as Belarus maintains its borders and government.[8]

The Kremlin continues to reject the parts of the initial US-proposed 28-point peace plan as well as the latest US-Ukrainian-European 20-point peace plan as insufficient to address Russia's demands about minority rights in Ukraine. Lavrov claimed that Russia received a peace plan proposal from the United States before the August 2025 US-Russian Alaska Summit that allegedly included provisions about rights for national minorities and religious freedoms in post-war Ukraine that addressed Russia's concerns.[9] Lavrov claimed, however, that the "latest version" of the 20-point peace plan appears to not include this provision. The draft of the 20-point plan that Ukraine released in December 2025 called for Ukraine to abide by EU regulations on religious and linguistic minorities, however.[10] Lavrov previously effectively rejected the November 2025 28-point peace plan that called for Ukraine to accept EU regulations protecting religious and linguistic minorities, claiming that the provisions were insufficient for Russia.[11] The Kremlin has been exploiting the lack of publicly available documents from the Alaska Summit to claim that Russia and the United States came to an understanding to end the war during the meeting.[12] Kremlin claims that the Alaska Summit provided the only satisfactory resolution to the minorities issue likely aim to create justifications for Russia to reject the latest 20-point peace plan, as well as any subsequent peace plans that do not satisfy Russia's demands. ISW continues to assess that longstanding Russian claims that the Ukrainian government is discriminating against ethnic Russians, Russian-speakers, and Russian Orthodoxy aim to justify the Kremlin's original war demand for the removal of the current government for a pro-Russian puppet government and destruction of Ukraine’s sovereignty.[13] Lavrov's comments to RT about Ukrainian neutrality and minority rights further highlight how Russia is unwilling to compromise and is demanding that any future peace settlement give in to Russia's original war demands from 2022.

Lavrov attempted to portray Russia's adherence to the short-term energy strike ceasefire as an indicator of Russia's interest in good-faith negotiations, even as the Kremlin has routinely used such ceasefires to stockpile weapons for subsequent large-scale strikes. Lavrov responded in the RT interview to a question about damage to Ukraine's energy grid, claiming that "everyone forgets" previous examples of Russia's alleged "goodwill."[14] Lavrov claimed that one example of this goodwill was Russian President Vladimir Putin's support for and Russia's claimed subsequent adherence to the US- and Ukrainian-proposed longer-term energy strikes ceasefire in March and April 2025. Ukraine and the United States proposed the moratorium in late March 2025, but the exact parameters of the ceasefire, including agreements on the list of objects covered or the types of strikes prohibited, were never publicly clear or finalized.[15] Russian forces exploited the lack of clarity to continue to strike Ukrainian energy infrastructure during the ceasefire.[16]

The Kremlin has used its support for short-term ceasefires to try to portray Russia as acting in good faith while consistently rejecting US and Ukrainian calls for a longer or permanent moratorium on long-range strikes against civilian infrastructure.[17] ISW continues to assess that these shorter-term ceasefires, such as the recent energy strikes ceasefire in late January and early February, do not represent a significant Kremlin concession, as Russian forces have often used these ceasefires to stockpile missiles to maximize damage in subsequent strike packages shortly after the ceasefire's expiration.[18] The March-April 2025 temporary ceasefire ended on April 18, 2025, and Russian forces launched a strike package containing 70 missiles on the night of April 23 to 24, 2025 — the highest number of missiles in one strike package in all of 2025.[19] Russian forces similarly conducted a strike with 71 missiles on the night of February 2-3 after the latest temporary ceasefire ended.[20] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is trying to portray its adherence to the recent short-term energy strikes moratorium as a significant concession to gain leverage in the peace talks in Abu Dhabi.[21]

US and Russian officials on the sidelines of the Abu Dhabi peace talks have reportedly discussed bilateral military relations, including measures to informally extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) that expired on February 5. US European Command (EUCOM) reported that the United States and Russia agreed on February 5 to reestablish high-level military-to-military dialogue following meetings in Abu Dhabi between EUCOM Commander General Alexus Grynkewich and senior Russian and Ukrainian military officials.[22] Russia has notably used backchannels in the past to spread its information operations and influence Western leaders.[23] Three sources told Axios on February 5 that the American and Russian delegations in Abu Dhabi have been discussing a deal to continue New START after its expiration but that the deal still needs presidential approval on both sides.[24]  A US official reported that the United States and Russia cannot legally formalize an extension to the treaty but that both parties would continue to operate ”in good faith.“ A source reported that the United States and Russia are discussing plans to observe the terms of the treaty for another six months, during which Russia and the United States would negotiate a new deal. A White House official told Bloomberg that US President Donald Trump will decide the US path forward and will announce this path on his own timeline.[25]

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Russian officials are using threats of escalation likely to push the United States to renew New START on terms that benefit not only Russia but also the People's Republic of China (PRC). The Russian MFA claimed on February 4 that the United States "deliberately ignored" Russia's earlier proposal to extend New START for one year upon its expiration and that the US approach is "misguided and regrettable.”[26] The Russian MFA claimed that Russia assumes that the parties are no longer bound by any obligations or declarations within the context of the treaty and are "free to choose their next steps." The Russian MFA claimed that Russia intends to act responsibly but remains prepared to take "decisive" countermeasures against additional threats to Russia's national security. Russian Security Council Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev responded to the treaty's expiration, stating that “winter is coming” — issuing an implicit threat in reference to a "nuclear winter" after large-scale nuclear war.[27] Russian State Duma Defense Committee Member Andrei Kolesnik also issued threats, claiming that Russia has all the retaliatory weapons it needs and that the situation will escalate the longer the United States and Russia do not sign a new treaty.[28] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee Chairperson Leonid Slutsky urged the United States to extend the treaty, claiming that “the ball is in the [United States’] court.”[29]  

Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on February 5 that Russian President Vladimir Putin and PRC President Xi Jinping discussed the “negative consequences” of the end of New START during their February 4 video call.[30] Peskov stated that Russia ”respects” the PRC’s position that Chinese nuclear potential is incomparable to that of the United States and Russia such that the PRC does not want to participate in strategic arms control talks.[31] The Kremlin is backing the PRC's rejection to enter strategic arms talks with the United States, possibly in exchange for the PRC's ongoing support for Russia's war effort in Ukraine.[32] Russia is likely attempting to use New START's February 5 expiration to divert US attention away from ongoing negotiations about Ukraine. The Kremlin has also been using New START's expiration to push the United States to give in to Russia's demands on Ukraine in exchange for renewed strategic arms talks.[33]

 Ukrainian forces recently conducted FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile strikes against the Kapustin Yar launch site in Astrakhan Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 5 that Ukrainian forces conducted a series of strikes against the Kapustin Yar site (approximately 430 kilometers from the Ukrainian-Russian international border) with Ukrainian-produced long-range weapons, including Flamingo missiles, in January 2026.[34] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck hangar-type buildings, where Russian forces prepare intercontinental and medium-range ballistic missile launches. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the strike caused various degrees of damage to some buildings at the site but significantly damaged one hangar. Denys Shtilierman, the co-owner and chief designer of Ukraine’s Fire Point defense industrial company that produces the Flamingo missiles, posted footage on February 5 reportedly showing recent Flamingo missile launches, including against Kapustin Yar.[35] Russian forces launched their November 2024 and January 2026 Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) strikes against Ukraine from Kapustin Yar.[36]

Ukraine’s efforts to register Starlink terminals will likely impact Russian battlefield air interdiction (BAI) efforts. Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov reported on February 5 that the first group of officially authorized Starlink terminals are operational within the Ukrainian military and that Russian Starlinks cannot operate within Ukraine.[37] Fedorov noted the process to verify Ukrainian Starlinks is ongoing. Several Russian milbloggers complained that Russian forces no longer could use terminals and voiced concerns about the effects that the loss of Starlink capabilities could have on the battlefield.[38] The commander of a Ukrainian unmanned systems brigade reported on February 5 that Russian forces had accumulated a significant number of Starlinks recently and that the terminals provided Russian forces with stable interunit communications.[39] The commander stated that Russian forces began integrating Starlinks to control drones but that efforts to block Russian Starlinks will deny Russian forces the ability to conduct reconnaissance and strike missions and communication between groups and complicate Russian offensive operations. The commander noted that the recent blocks on Russian terminals have not “brought down” Russian forces but have caused Russian forces significant losses.

Russian forces may not be able to conduct their BAI campaign at the same tempo and depth as in recent weeks without Starlink terminals. Russian forces have recently used Starlink-enabled drones to conduct real time targeting and extend the ranges on drones for strikes against moving targets like trains and against Ukrainian vehicles along the E-50 Pokrovsk-Pavlohrad highway in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[40] Russian forces will likely struggle to maintain this BAI campaign at the same intensity levels in the near-term unless Russian forces are able to find workarounds to the blocks or adapt new technological solutions to replace Starlink.

Russia and Ukraine conducted a civilian prisoner and prisoner of war (POW) exchange on February 5 following trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian negotiations in Abu Dhabi. US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff announced on February 5 that the Russian and Ukrainian delegations in Abu Dhabi agreed to exchange a total of 314 personnel.[41] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that Ukraine returned 157 Russian POWs and three civilians from Kursk Oblast, and Ukrainian officials reported that Russia returned 157 Ukrainian POWs and civilians.[42] The United States and United Arab Emirates (UAE) mediated the exchange.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is using the 2026 Year of the Unity of the Peoples of Russia to frame Russia as a multiethnic and multireligious state united around the ongoing war effort. Putin attended a ceremony on February 5 officially opening 2026 as the Year of the Unity of the Peoples of Russia and stated that it is important to remember how Russian ethnic groups emerged.[43] Putin specifically highlighted the emergence of ethnic Russians as a “nation” and a “people” and the historic unification of “various Slavic groups.” Putin noted, however, that a multinational Russia gradually took shape with different cultures but united by “common values.” Putin claimed that Russians are united in their commitment to preserving their land, families, culture, and traditions and claimed that Russian forces fighting in Ukraine are also united despite their differences. Putin’s special emphasis on the centrality of ethnic Russians in Russia’s history but overarching message about Russia’s acceptance of other groups demonstrates how Putin has to balance the multiethnic and multireligious nature of the Russian Federation while placating the pro-war ultranationalist and xenophobic community.[44] ISW continues to assess that Putin is leaning into a concept of civic nationalism more consistent with the Soviet ideal than the Christian nationalism of Russian ultranationalists.[45]

Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov appointed Taras Chmut to represent the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) on the supervisory board of the Ukrainian Defense Procurement Agency (DPA).[46] Fedorov reported on February 5 that he met with Chmut, who heads the Come Back Alive foundation that provides support to Ukrainian servicemembers, to discuss the MoD’s plans to support the DPA, identify the needs of the frontline, and ensure maximum transparency. Fedorov highlighted the need to ensure quality control and timely deliveries of supplies, to create a procurement system that can quickly respond to changes in the innovation cycle and reduce corruption.

Key Takeaways:

• US, Ukrainian, and Russian delegations continued trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi on February 5.
• The Kremlin is looking for new narratives to try to convince the United States and Europe to not agree to security guarantees for Ukraine.
• Lavrov implied that Russia's demand for Ukrainian "neutrality" aims to turn Ukraine into a pro-Russian proxy state.
• The Kremlin continues to reject the parts of the initial US-proposed 28-point peace plan as well as the latest US-Ukrainian-European 20-point peace plan as insufficient to address Russia's demands about minority rights in Ukraine.
• Lavrov attempted to portray Russia's adherence to the short-term energy strike ceasefire as an indicator of Russia's interest in good-faith negotiations, even as the Kremlin has routinely used such ceasefires to stockpile weapons for subsequent large-scale strikes.
• US and Russian officials on the sidelines of the Abu Dhabi peace talks have reportedly discussed bilateral military relations, including measures to informally extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) that expired on February 5.
• The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Russian officials are using threats of escalation likely to push the United States to renew New START on terms that benefit not only Russia but also the People's Republic of China (PRC).
• Ukrainian forces recently conducted FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile strikes against the Kapustin Yar launch site in Astrakhan Oblast.
• Ukraine’s efforts to register Starlink terminals will likely impact Russian battlefield air interdiction (BAI) efforts.
• Russia and Ukraine conducted a civilian prisoner and prisoner of war (POW) exchange on February 5 following trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian negotiations in Abu Dhabi.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin is using the 2026 Year of the Unity of the Peoples of Russia to frame Russia as a multiethnic and multireligious state united around the ongoing war effort.
• Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov appointed Taras Chmut to represent the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) on the supervisory board of the Ukrainian Defense Procurement Agency (DPA).
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against military assets in Russia on February 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 5 that Ukrainian forces struck a drone control point of an unspecified Russian Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment (likely the 204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) near Kucherov, Kursk Oblast (just across the international border northeast of Sumy City), an electronic warfare (EW) station near Kistyor, Bryansk Oblast (approximately three kilometers from the international border northwest of Sumy City), and an S-400 anti-aircraft missile system radar station near Krasnoye, Belgorod Oblast (approximately 25 kilometers from the international border near Belgorod City).[47]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on February 5 but did not advance. 

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Kostyantynivka and Kindrativka and northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, on February 5.[48]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Sumy Oblast reported on February 5 that Russian servicemembers continue to use anti-thermal imaging and camouflage cloaks while attempting to advance.[49]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces reported on February 5 that Russian military police elements are conducting raids near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo, Kursk Oblast) to search for deserters from the Russian 22nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), the 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th AC, LMD), and an unspecified Spetsnaz (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) unit.[50] The milblogger claimed that the servicemembers in question refused to participate in attacks against Ryzhivka (just south of Tetkino on the international border and northwest of Sumy City).

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate in Sumy Oblast.[51]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on February 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Hrafske, Prylipka, Vovchansk, Starytsya, and Vovchanski Khutory and toward Symynivka on February 4 and 5.[52]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on February 5 that ice has enabled Russian forces to more easily cross water obstacles in Kharkiv Oblast but freezing temperatures make it difficult for Russian forces to advance more than one or two kilometers. [53] Trehubov noted that subzero temperatures impede drone operations by causing drone blades and fiber-optic cables to freeze.

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 5 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Tornado-S Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) in an unspecified location in the Kharkiv direction on February 4.[54]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 288th Artillery Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) and first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[55]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Khatnie on February 4, but ISW does not assess that Russian forces made any advances.[56]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on February 4 and 5 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into eastern Kurylivka, northwest of Pishchane, and east of Novoosynove (all southeast of Kupyansk).[57]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk toward Kindrashivka; east of Kupyansk toward Petropavlivka and Podoly; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and toward Novoosynove on February 4 and 5.[58]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked south of Borova near Oleksandrivka on February 5.[59]

A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on February 4 that Russian forces consider the Borova direction a secondary priority compared to the neighboring Lyman and Kupyansk directions.[60] The milblogger claimed that Russian media coverage of the Borova direction remains limited and increased only after the fallout from false reporting about developments in the Kupyansk direction. The milblogger criticized the Russian military command for publishing misleading footage to claim the seizure of Novoplatonivka (north of Borova) and prioritizing generating informational effects instead of focusing on correcting tactical errors that exaggerated reports cause.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are shelling Ukrainian positions in Zahryzove (northeast of Borova).[61]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on February 5 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Zakitne (northeast of Lyman).[62]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka; north of Lyman near Stavky and Drobysheve; east of Lyman near Zarichne, Zakitne, and Dronivka; northeast of Slovyansk near Zakitne, Dronivka, and Platonivka; and east of Slovyansktoward Riznykivka, Kryva Luka, and Mykolaivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Nykyforivka and Fedorivka Druha and toward Dibrova, Vasyukivka, and Rai-Oleksandrivka on February 4 and 5.[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking near Riznykivka.[64]

The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) reported that Russian forces are suffering heavy losses while attempting to infiltrate in small groups in the Lyman direction.[65] A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk direction reported on February 5 that Russian forces are operating at night and taking advantage of cold weather to advance across the frozen Siverskyi Donets river.[66]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Siversk (east of Slovyansk) and Zakitne.[67] Drone operators of the Sever-V Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly operating in the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk direction.[68]

Both Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 3 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in central Ivanopillya (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[69]

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 5 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Ivanopillya.[70]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Illinivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka).[71]

Russian forces attacked near and within Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Pryvillya and Minkivka; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka and Ivanopillya; south of Kostyantynivka near Kleban-Byk; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Illinivka and Yablunivka and toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Novopavlivka and toward Pavlivka on February 4 and 5.[72]

The commander of a Ukrainian unmanned systems battalion operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on February 5 that Russian forces are attempting to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) with drones and taking advantage of poor weather to attempt infiltrations behind Ukrainian lines.[73] The commander reported that Ukrainian forces are identifying and attacking infiltrating Russian servicemembers and maintain control over Kostyantynivka. The commander noted that Russian forces are primarily infiltrating from Oleksandro-Shultyne (east of Kostyantynivka).

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion of the Baltic Fleet (consolidated motorized rifle regiment of the Navy, under operational control of the Central Grouping of Forces) are striking Ukrainian positions north of Yablunivka.[74] Drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion and the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment near Raiske and Torske (both southwest of Druzhkivka).[75] Drone operators of the Grachi Detachment of the 346th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[76]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on February 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Novyi Donbas, Vilne, and Toretske on February 4 and 5.[77]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators, artillery, and other elements of the Russian 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) and of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Dobropillya direction.[78]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on February 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Molodetske, Udachne, and Novopidhorodne; and west of Pokrovsk near Serhiivka on February 4 and 5.[79]

The chief of staff of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on February 5 that Russian infiltrators are carrying two radios in an attempt to counter Ukrainian signals intelligence.[80] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on February 5 that Russian forces intensified airstrikes in the Pokrovsk direction during January 2026, dropping 1,034 aerial bombs - a 65 percent increase from December 2025.[81]

Order of Battle: Multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) artillery, drone operator, and armored elements of the Russian 55th Naval Infantry Division (Pacific Fleet) (newly formed from the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade), the 35th Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st CAA), and the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[82]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on February 5 but did not advance. 

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on February 4 and 5.[83]

A spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported on February 5 that Russian forces are employing tanks with anti-drone cages, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), unarmored civilian cars, and all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) to conduct mechanized and motorized assaults almost weekly in the Novopavlivka direction.[84] The spokesperson stated that Ukrainian forces repelled four Russian mechanized and motorized assaults in the area during the previous month (presumably since January 5) and eliminated nearly all involved Russian servicemembers. The spokesperson added that Russian forces continue to conduct small group infiltration attempts near Novopavlivka.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on February 5 but did not advance. 

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Zelenyi Hai; east of Oleksandrivka near Oleksandrohrad; and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Sosnivka on February 4 and 5.[85]

Order of Battle: Bombers of the Russian 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Pokrovske (north of Oleksandrivka).[86]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast on the night of February 4 to 5. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 5 that Ukrainian forces struck a logistics hub in occupied Makiivka, Donetsk Oblast (roughly 60 kilometers from the frontline).[87]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on February 5 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Staroukrainka (west of Hulyaipole).[88]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Pryluky; north of Hulyaipole near Dobropillya and Nove Zaporizhzhia; northeast of Hulyaipole near Zlahoda and Solodke; southwest of Hulyaipole near Myrne; and west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne on February 4 and 5.[89]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are striking Ukrainian positions in Vozdvyzhivka (northwest of Hulyaipole).[90] Anti-aircraft elements of the 218th Tank Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are intercepting Ukrainian drones south of Dobropillya.[91] Bombers of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Verhknya Tersa (northwest of Hulyaipole).[92] Drone operators of the 57th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast.[93]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and Prymorske and northwest of Orikhiv toward Richne and Mahdalynivka on February 4 and 5.[94]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 4th Military Base (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) anorth of Kamyanske (west of Orikhiv).[95] Drone operators of the Russian 1455th Motorized Rifle Regiment (operationally subordinated to the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are striking Ukrainian positions in Mahdalynivka.[96] Drone operators of the 1429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (operationally subordinated to the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division) are striking Ukrainian positions east of Nesteryanka (southwest of Orikhiv).[97] Elements of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction. Assault groups of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.[98]

Ukrainian forces continue their medium-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 5 that Ukrainian forces struck the Russian Prymorskyi Posad training ground near occupied Prymorskyi Posad (approximately 117 kilometers from the frontline in Zaporizhia Oblast).[99]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on February 5 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in the Kherson direction on February 4 and 5.[100]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 331st VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment in Kherson Oblast.[101]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on February 4 to February 5. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from occupied Crimea and 183 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — of which about 110 were Shaheds — from the directions of Oryol, Kursk, and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Donetsk City.[102] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 156 strike drones and that one ballistic missile and 22 drones struck 16 locations, and that drone debris fell at seven locations as of 0800 local time. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential and civilian infrastructure in Kharkiv and Mykolaiv oblasts and in Kyiv City.[103]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarusian manufacturers continue to support the Kremlin’s war efforts by evading sanctions and procuring parts from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and North Korea for the Belarusian and Russian defense industrial bases (DIBs). A Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) source reported on February 5 that MAZ, a Belarusian state-owned maker of heavy-duty trucks and military vehicles, developed commercial ties with a North Korean company to assist major Russian manufacturers such as the Ural Automotive Plant (UralAZ) in sanctions evasion and to support the Kremlin’s war effort.[104] The source stated that MAZ ordered large batches of North Korean and Chinese components, including drive shafts, steering systems, and electronic control modules via a Chinese intermediary company. The source stated that UralAZ’s manufacturing capacity remains critically dependent on foreign-sourced components, particularly from Chinese suppliers.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.