Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 25, 2026

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ISW has not observed evidence of Ukrainian forces operating within Pokrovsk since late January 2025, indicating that Russian forces seized the entire town on a prior date. Russian forces have failed to capitalize on the seizure of Pokrovsk and make further operationally significant advances, demonstrating that the Russian seizure of the rest of Donetsk Oblast is not imminent or inevitable. ISW last observed Ukrainian forces operating on January 28, and therefore assesses that Russian forces likely completed the capture of the settlement sometime in the past few weeks.[i] The Russian campaign for Pokrovsk, a town with a pre-war population of 60,000, has been underway for almost two full years. Russian forces started their drive toward Pokrovsk in February 2024 after seizing Avdiivka (roughly 39 kilometers southeast of Pokrovsk) and began setting conditions to take Pokrovsk through direct frontal assaults in March 2024.[ii] Russian forces did not seize most of Pokrovsk until December 2025 — 21 months after starting frontal assaults on the town. Russian forces continued to fight to seize most of Myrnohrad (just east of Pokrovsk) for another month after that, with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claiming on December 28 that Russian forces seized the town.[iii] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces fully seized Pokrovsk in early December 2025 and heavily emphasized that Pokrovsk was a critical step in accomplishing Russia's strategic battlefield objectives.[iv] Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on December 9 that the seizure of Pokrovsk was "crucial" for Russian efforts to seize the rest of Donetsk Oblast, and Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed in his annual Direct Line address on December 19 that the seizure "opened up" multiple directions of advance for the Russian military.[v] Pokrovsk was operationally significant given its use as an important logistics hub, but Russian strikes denied Ukrainian forces the ability to fully leverage the town for logistics as early as July 2025.[vi] Pokrovsk had long ceased to be an operationally significant town by the time Russian forces intensified their push to capture the town in Winter 2025.

The seizure of Pokrovsk has also not "opened up" major Russian advances to take the rest of Donetsk Oblast as Kremlin officials previously alleged. Russian forces have not significantly advanced northwest or west from Pokrovsk since December 2025 and have yet to even seize Hryshyne (just two kilometers northwest of Pokrovsk). Russian gains past Pokrovsk have not yet set operational conditions to support future offensive efforts towards the Fortress Belt, which ISW assesses will be Russia's main operational effort in the coming months. Russia's slow and costly seizure of Pokrovsk does not portend Russian advances elsewhere in Donetsk Oblast — Pokrovsk is a much smaller town both in area and population than Kramatorsk and Slovyansk, which make up the northern tip of Ukraine's heavily fortified Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces' long and costly battle to take Pokrovsk and their subsequent inability to significantly advance beyond the town refute the Kremlin's repeated claims that Russian forces will be able to easily and swiftly seize the Fortress Belt.

The Kremlin appears to have been successful in enacting a reflexive control campaign aimed at influencing the decision-making of the British- and French-led Coalition of the Willing. Diplomatic and defense sources told The Telegraph on February 24 that some members of the Coalition of the Willing have privately stated that their contributions of troops to guarantee the security of post-war Ukraine are dependent on Russian President Vladimir Putin granting permission for such deployments.[vii] A senior diplomatic source stated that Kremlin statements about Russian forces specifically targeting foreign troop deployments in Ukraine mean that the coalition "need[s] to send a different kind of force." Another diplomatic source assessed that European states have "essentially handed Putin a veto" over the coalition's plans. Divisions within the Coalition of the Willing are likely the result of a monthslong coordinated Kremlin reflexive control campaign — a method by which Russia attempts to make an opponent freely arrive at a pre-determined decision — that aimed to prevent the West from agreeing on security guarantees for Ukraine. The Kremlin has repeatedly rejected Western security guarantees for Ukraine, stating that foreign troops in Ukraine would be "legitimate targets" for Russian forces.[viii] The Kremlin has also been using a baseless Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) claim that the United Kingdom (UK) and France were giving Ukraine a “dirty bomb” or nuclear weapon to disrupt the ongoing discussions about Western security guarantees for Ukraine.[ix] Kremlin officials continued on February 25 to reiterate the SVR's allegations, claiming that alleged nuclear weapons transfers to Ukraine would threaten Russian security and calling for retaliatory Russian responses that aim to invoke fear in the UK and France.[x] Meaningful security guarantees, including European deterrence forces, will be a vital part of any future agreement that ensures a lasting peace in Ukraine. Security guarantees without significant deterrence measures will not prevent Russia from renewing its aggression against Ukraine at a time of its choosing and are particularly important to justify any territorial concessions Ukraine may be forced to accept. Russia has been explicitly rejecting any meaningful security guarantees as they impede the Kremlin's ability to achieve its longstanding strategic goal of gaining control over all of Ukraine. Any sort of Russian veto would undermine the foundations upon which the current US-led negotiations are built to ensure a lasting peace.

Insider reports continue to indicate that Russia is uninterested in meaningful peace negotiations and is preparing for a protracted war. A source close to the Russian Foreign Ministry (MFA) told Russian opposition outlet Verstka on February 25 that Russia’s position in negotiations ”has not changed at all" and that Russia "must achieve" its war goals.[xi] A source in the Kremlin's domestic policy bloc stated that fundamental differences remain unresolved in negotiations, such as Ukraine's de jure recognition of Russia's illegal annexation of Ukrainian territories and prohibitions on NATO troops operating on Ukrainian territory. The source assessed that these issues "cannot be resolved." Two political strategists close to the United Russia party stated that the party is preparing a "military agenda" for its campaign in the September 2026 State Duma elections. The sources stated that no one in the party "seriously expects" the war to end, so the party is not making any plans to restructure their work should there be a radical shift in the future. ISW has observed similar reports about Kremlin efforts to incorporate the protracted war into its political agenda and its plans for the upcoming elections, including by endorsing candidates who strongly support the war.[xii] These insider statements suggest that the Kremlin is planning for the war to continue at a minimum until September, but likely much longer.

The Kremlin is also reportedly purposely delaying negotiations to shape the battlefield to Russia's benefit. A source in the Kremlin’s domestic policy bloc told Verstka that the Kremlin is feigning active negotiations but is in reality trying to drag out the process.[xiii] The sources stated that the Kremlin views the negotiations process as a “tool” to contain the conflict from escalating in a way that is unfavorable to Moscow. The source gave an example of what this Russian stall tactic has achieved, noting that Ukraine will not obtain Tomahawk missiles from the United States as long as Russia remains at the negotiating table. Verstka's report indicates that the Kremlin is not only uninterested in meaningful negotiations to end the war but is also actively trying to sabotage ongoing efforts to enable Russia to continue hostilities from a more advantageous battlefield position. This report coheres with ISW's longstanding assessment that Russia is protracting negotiations to make gains on the battlefield and achieve Russia's goals militarily.[xiv]

The Kremlin continues to manufacture justifications for a future Telegram ban. Deputy Chairperson of the Russian Duma Committee on Information Policy, Information Technology, and Communications Andrei Svintsov stated on February 24 that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) may propose recognizing Telegram as a "terrorist accomplice" in the next two to three months if Telegram continues to ignore Russian law.[xv] Svintsov claimed that the FSB has ”credible information” that Telegram is linked to over 150,000 crimes in Russia, many of which Svintsov claimed had some connection to terrorist threats. Telegram founder Pavel Durov stated on February 24 that Russian authorities opened a criminal case against him for aiding terrorism.[xvi] The Russian Government's official newspaper Rossiskaya Gazeta and Russian newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda claimed on February 24, citing FSB materials, that Russian authorities are investigating Durov for assisting terrorist activity.[xvii] The Kremlin has been setting conditions to justify intensified internet censorship measures, including a possible future ban on Telegram, by claiming that Telegram and other foreign messaging platforms have been violating Russian laws and are not sufficiently protecting Russian citizens.[xviii] Svintsov's statements suggest that this condition-setting effort will continue for multiple months before the Kremlin makes a final decision to ban Telegram. The Kremlin is setting conditions now to later deflect blame for a future ban onto Telegram itself, claiming that Telegram failed to take the offered opportunities to adjust its policies to comply with Russian law.

The Kremlin is also increasing its efforts to control the Russian population’s ability to access Western-origin content on the internet. A Russian court fined Google over 22 million rubles (roughly $288,000) on February 25 for distributing virtual private network (VPN) services to Russian citizens on the Google Play app store.[xix] The Kremlin has been targeting VPNs, which Russians have widely used to access the foreign platforms the Kremlin has banned in recent years.[xx] The Kremlin is not banning VPNs outright but has been disincentivizing their use and making them harder to access.[xxi] Russia, for example, passed laws in recent months that prohibit advertisements for VPNs and make the use of a VPN an aggravating circumstance in criminal cases.[xxii] ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin's intensified internet censorship efforts are aimed at strengthening control over the information space ahead of limited, rolling involuntary reserve callups that are likely to be domestically unpopular and could generate domestic backlash.[xxiii]

Ukraine continues to expand joint production in Europe with its Western partners. The Ukrainian Council of Defense Industry announced that four Ukrainian defense manufacturers signed joint production agreements on February 24 worth up to 800 million euros (about $945 million) to produce unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) with two Finnish companies, a Latvian company, and a Danish company under the Build with Ukraine initiative, which aims to co-produce weapons and military equipment in partner states.[xxiv] Ukrainian Ambassador to the United Kingdom (UK) Valerii Zaluzhnyi reported on February 24 that a Ukrainian company opened its first drone production facility in the UK.[xxv] Ukraine's defense platform Brave1 and the French Defense Innovation Agency signed a letter of intent on February 25 to create a joint grant program to support Ukrainian and French defense startups.[xxvi] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine’s partners stand to benefit from continuing to aid the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) with joint production, as Ukraine’s experience in an accelerated offense-defense technological cycle will allow its partners to bolster their own defenses and domestic DIBs.[xxvii] The establishment of joint Ukrainian-European production facilities outside of Ukraine throughout Europe will also ensure continued Ukrainian defense industrial production in the face of intensified Russian long-range strikes across Ukraine.[xxviii]

Ukraine’s Western partners continued to provide military aid to Ukraine on February 24. Lithuanian Minister for National Defense Robertas Kaunas announced that Lithuania will transfer 30 missiles for RBS-70 man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) to Ukraine.[xxix] Canadian Minister of National Defense David McGuinty announced that Canada will provide two billion Canadian dollars (about $1.4 billion) worth of military assistance to Ukraine in 2026 and 2027.[xxx] McGuinty also announced that Canada will donate over 400 armored vehicles to Ukraine, including 66 Light Armored Vehicle 6 (LAV 6) armored personnel carriers and 383 Senator armored cars. Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal announced that Estonia will contribute an additional 11 million euros (about $13 million) for Ukrainian air defense and ammunition needs through the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which funds NATO states’ purchases of US-made weapons for Ukraine.[xxxi]

Key Takeaways:

• ISW has not observed evidence of Ukrainian forces operating within Pokrovsk since late January 2025, indicating that Russian forces seized the entire town on a prior date. Russian forces have failed to capitalize on the seizure of Pokrovsk and to make further operationally significant advances, demonstrating that the Russian seizure of the rest of Donetsk Oblast is not imminent or inevitable.
• The Kremlin appears to have been successful in enacting a reflexive control campaign aimed at influencing the decision-making of the British- and French-led Coalition of the Willing.
• Insider reports continue to indicate that Russia is uninterested in meaningful peace negotiations and is preparing for a protracted war.
• The Kremlin is also reportedly purposely delaying negotiations to shape the battlefield to Russia's benefit.
• The Kremlin continues to manufacture justifications for a future Telegram ban.
• The Kremlin is also increasing its efforts to control the Russian population’s ability to access Western-origin content on the internet.
• Ukraine continues to expand joint production in Europe with its Western partners.
• Ukraine’s Western partners continued to provide military aid to Ukraine on February 24.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, Oleksandrivka, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, in the Dobropillya tactical area, near Pokrovsk, and near Hulyaipole.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian sources provided additional details on Ukrainian-produced FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on February 25 that Ukrainian forces have used Flamingo cruise missiles to strike unspecified targets within Russia 1,400 kilometers away from the launch site.[xxxii] Zelensky stated that Russian air defenses have intercepted Flamingos and that some missiles did not directly hit their targets, but that all missiles reached the intended objects. Zelensky reported that Ukraine has resumed its Flamingo production following Russian strikes against the production line and that Ukraine plans to increase the number of missiles it produces if it can secure the necessary funding and components. BBC’s Ukraine Service reported on February 25 that sources in the Ukrainian Air Force stated that the Flamingo strike against the Russian state-owned Votkinsk Machine Building Plant in Votkinsk, Udmurtia Republic on the night of February 20 to 21 travelled roughly 1,700 kilometers to the target.[xxxiii] A Ukrainian military source told the BBC that the Flamingo directly struck a galvanic and stamping shop and that falling debris caused a fire and damaged a neighboring shop. The source noted that unspecified modifications to the missile's warhead enabled the efficacy of the strike. Footage published on February 25 reportedly shows a Flamingo strike against the Votkinsk plant on February 20-21.[xxxiv]

Recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil infrastructure have reportedly caused Russian state-controlled petroleum company Transneft to cut its crude oil intake. Reuters reported on February 24, citing two unspecified sources, that Transneft cut its crude intake by about 250,000 barrels per day after a February 22 to 23 Ukrainian drone strike against the Kaleykino Oil Pumping Station near Almetyevsk, Republic of Tatarstan caused two 50,000 metric ton storage tanks to catch fire.[xxxv] One of the sources stated that Transneft's cuts mostly affected shipments from oil and gas company Tatneft in Tatarstan. The sources stated that the extent of the damage is unclear, but that severe damage could affect Russian oil exports, including volumes and quality.

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian defense industrial infrastructure on the night of February 24 to 25. BBC News reported that Ukrainian forces struck the PJSC Dorogobuzh, a chemical plant that manufactures mineral fertilizers and industrial products, in Dorogobuzh, Smolensk Oblast.[xxxvi] Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko, who frequently reports on Russian and Ukrainian strikes, previously reported that the Dorogbuzh chemical plant produces basic chemical components that support Russian defense industrial explosives production.[xxxvii] Footage published February 25 shows a fire at PJSC Dorogbuzh after the strike.[xxxviii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on February 25 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Sumy and Kursk oblasts,  including north of Sumy City near Kindrativka; northeast of Sumy City near Novomykolaivka, Nova Sich, Yunakivka, Lokyna, Mala Korchakivka, and Borky and toward Myropillya; and southeast of Sumy City near Pokrovka and Hrabovske on February 24 and 25.[xxxix] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Andriivka (northeast of Sumy City).[xl]

Ukrainian State Border Service Spokesperson Colonel Andriy Demchenko reported on February 25 that Russian forces have decreased the intensity of infantry attacks in the Sumy Oblast border area and parts of the Kharkiv Oblast border area and are instead increasingly relying on drone and artillery strikes.[xli] Demchenko noted that Russian forces often probe Ukrainian defenses along the border of Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts and are likely preparing to resume infantry assaults at an unspecified time.

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on February 25 that Russian Northern Grouping of Forces and Leningrad Military District (LMD) Commander Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov is trying to cut payments to Russian soldiers.[xlii] The milblogger cited a soldier of the 1427th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], LMD) who lost a leg after stepping on a landmine near Tetkino, Kursk Oblast near the end of December 2025. The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command refused to pay the soldier because Russian forces do not pay hospitalized soldiers who were in "counter-terrorist operations."

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts.[xliii] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies and artillery elements of the 106th VDV Division are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[xliv]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on February 25 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian 82nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) seized Hrafske (northeast of Kharkiv City roughly 10 kilometers from the international border).[xlv] A Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces seized Prylipka and Vilcha (both northeast of Kharkiv City).[xlvi]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Zelene, Lyman, Vilcha, Symynivka, Starytsya, Mala Vovcha, and Synelnykove on February 24 and 25.[xlvii]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on February 25.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on February 25 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near and within Kupyansk itself; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and Kucherivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane, Hlushkivka, and Kurylivka on February 24 and 25.[xlviii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Radkivka (north of Kupyansk) and Sobolivka (west of Kupyansk).[xlix]

A Russian milblogger reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on February 24 that the Russian military command lacks a clear picture of the front line to such an extent that it ordered half of the drone operators of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), including its entire 136th Reconnaissance Battalion, to surveil and clarify the division's frontline positions.[l]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are infiltrating in northern Kupyansk.[li]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 25 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Borivska Andriivka; east of Borova toward Shyikivka; south of Borova toward Oleksandrivka; and southeast of Borova near Novoyehorivka and toward Novoserhiivka on February 24 and 25.[lii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on February 25 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Yarova and Sosnove; north of Lyman near Drobysheve and Stavky; southeast of Lyman near Yampil; northeast of Slovyansk near Dronivka and Zakitne; east of Slovyansk near Kryva Luka, Kalenky, and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Lypivka and Bondarne and toward Fedorivka Druha on February 24 and 25.[liii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian forces in the Lyman direction.[liv]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced east of Kostyantynivka.[lv] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on February 25 that Russian forces advanced south of Illinivka (south of Kostyantynivka).[lvi]   

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Mashovets reported on February 25 that Russian forces are operating into central Illinivka but have not yet solidified their positions due to Ukrainian counterattacks and drone strikes.[lvii]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into western Kostyantynivka.[lviii]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka toward Novodmytrivka; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya; south of Kostyantynivka near Illinivka and Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka and Pleshchiivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and toward Novopavlivka on February 24 and 25.[lix]

Mashovets reported that Russian forces have failed to make significant advances in the Kostyantynivka direction during the last two weeks despite ambitious plans to achieve a double envelopment of Druzhkivka and Kostyantynivka to reach the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration from the south and southeast.[lx] Mashovets reported that Russian forces are concentrating their main efforts south, southeast and east of Kostyantynivka in the areas of responsibility (AoRs) of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 3rd Army Corps (AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces). Mashovets noted that Russian forces’ failure to seize Ukrainian positions between Kostyantynivka and the Kleban Byk Reservoir (south of Kostyantynivka) has stymied Russian efforts to break through into Kostyantynivka itself from Berestok (north of the Kleban Byk Reservoir). Mashovets reported that Russian forces have failed to dislodge Ukrainian forces from southwestern Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka) despite recent efforts in the area. Mashovets assessed that Russian forces have two to three months left in Spring 2026 to seize all of Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka if Russian forces are to set conditions for a summer offensive against Slovyansk and Kramatorsk. Mashovets noted that Russian forces have taken one-and-a-half months to only establish positions on the southeastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka, however. Mashovets added that Russian forces’ failure to reach Dobropillya and the T-0514 Dobropillya-Kramatorsk road will also hinder Russian forces’ ability to launch an offensive on the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk area.

The chief sergeant of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on February 25 that the blocking of Russian forces’ Starlink terminals has disorganized Russian forces’ command and control and forced Russian forces to reduce the intensity of their attacks.[lxi]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Division (18th CAA, SMD) are operating toward Novodmytrivka and Vyrolyubivka (north of Kostyantynivka) from Chasiv Yar (east of Virolyubivka).[lxii] Mashovets stated that elements of the 20th and 150th motorized rifle divisions (8th CAA) and the 120th Naval Infantry Division (Baltic Fleet, newly formed from the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade) are operating toward Novopavlivka and Pavlivka (southwest of Druzhkivka) from Sofiivka (southwest of Pavlivka) and Rusyn Yar (southeast of Pavlivka). Mashovets stated that elements of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] AC, SMD) and the 10th Tank Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) are likely operating near Illinivka and Berestok. Mashovets reported that elements of the 77th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment (7th Military Base, 49th CAA, SMD) are operating from near Stepanivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka) toward Dovha Balka (west of Kostyantynivka and north of Stepanivka). Mashovets added that elements of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd AC) are likely operating in southeastern Kostyantynivka. Mashovets reported that elements of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade are operating near Predtechyne and Stupochky (both east of Kostyantynivka). Molniya fixed-wing, Knyaz Vandal Novgorodsky (KVN) fiber optic, and other first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 1008th Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC) and the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Motorized Rifle Brigade) are striking Ukrainian positions in Kostyantynivka.[lxiii] FPV drone operators of the 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division) and the Chechen 78th Sever-Akhmat Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles and positions in and near Kostyantynivka.[lxiv]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Dobropillya tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced northeast of Zapovidne (southeast of Dobropillya).[lxv]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Dobropillya).[lxvi]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar and east of Dobropillya near Toretske on February 25.[lxvii]

Order of Battle: Artillery elements of the Russian 120th Naval Infantry Division (Baltic Fleet, newly formed from the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade) are reportedly destroying Ukrainian equipment in the Dobropillya direction.[lxviii] FPV drone operators and other elements of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Dobropillya direction and are striking Ukrainian forces near Toretske.[lxix]

Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

See topline text for additional details on ISW's assessment that Russian forces have seized all of Pokrovsk at a prior date.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 24 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southeastern Bilytske (north of Pokrovsk).[lxx]

Assessed Russian advances: ISW assesses that Russian forces seized Rivne (east of Pokrovsk) on a prior date given the lack of available video evidence of Ukrainian positions within the settlement over the past two months.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on February 24 shows Ukrainian forces assaulting a Russian position in southeastern Bilytske, indicating that Russian forces likely infiltrated east of Bilytske on a prior date in what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[lxxi]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Novooleksandrivka; north of Pokrovsk near Bilytske and Rodynske; southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Novopidhorodne and Molodetske; and west of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka on February 24 and 25.[lxxii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Berkut Group of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Serhiivka.[lxxiii] FPV drone operators of the 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Shevchenko (northwest of Pokrovsk).[lxxiv]

Ukrainian forces continued their frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets in the Russian near rear on the night of February 24 to 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian BM-21 Grad multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) near occupied Myrolyubivka (east of Pokrovsk and roughly 16 kilometers behind the frontline).[lxxv]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on February 25 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka; and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on February 24 and 25.[lxxvi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Novopavlivka.[lxxvii]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 25 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced south of Verbove (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[lxxviii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Zelenyi Hai and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Ternove and Kalynivske and toward Vyshneve on February 24 and 25.[lxxix]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on February 24 that Russian forces have stopped constant assaults in the Oleksandrivka direction and that the moral and psychological state of Russian forces in the area is low.[lxxx]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) and Molniya-2 fixed-wing FPV drone operators of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[lxxxi]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Donetsk Oblast overnight on February 24 to 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 25 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration in occupied Zuhres (roughly 60 kilometers behind the frontline).[lxxxii]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 21 indicates that Russian forces advanced west of Olenokostyantynivka (northwest of Hulyaipole).[lxxxiii] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hulyaipole.[lxxxiv]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole;  northwest of Hulyaipole near Rizdvyanka, Zlahoda, and Vozdvyzhivka; north of Hulyaipole near Dobropillya, Nove Zaporizhzhia, and Varvarivka; south of Hulyaipole near Zahirne; southwest of Hulyaipole near Bilohirya; and west of Hulyaipole near Verkhnya Tersa, Zaliznychne, Svyatopetrivka, and Krynychne and toward Hirke attacked on February 24 and 25.[lxxxv]

The commander of a Ukrainian regiment operating in the Hulyaipole direction reported on February 25 that Ukrainian forces have launched limited counterattacks in the Hulyaipole area.[lxxxvi]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian BARS-8 Khabarovsk Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Hulyaipole.[lxxxvii]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 25 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced in central Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[lxxxviii]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on February 24 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position north of Novoyakovlivka (northwest of Orikhiv) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[lxxxix]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on February 18 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position in Stepnohirsk — an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[xc]

Russian forces attacked east of Orikhiv toward Hulyaipilske; west of Orikhiv near Maly Shcherbaky, Prymorske, Stepove, Stepnohirsk, and Plavni, and northwest of Orikhiv near Novoyakovlivka and Mahdalynivka on February 24 and 25.[xci] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Prymorske and Novoyakovlivka.[xcii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Shaman detachment of the Russian 1455th Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces in Stepnohirsk.[xciii] Elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[xciv]

Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against Russian military assets in the Russian near rear in southern Ukraine on the night of February 24 to 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian manpower concentration near occupied Novohryhorivka, Zaporizhia Oblast (roughly six kilometers from the frontline).[xcv]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on February 25 but did not advance.[xcvi]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division, including its 217th VDV Regiment, are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction, including striking Ukrainian forces near Antonivka (east of Kherson City).[xcvii]

Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) posted geolocated footage on February 25 showing Ukrainian forces striking a Russian S-400 launcher and Pantsir air defense complex west of occupied Sofiivka, Crimea (roughly 200 kilometers from the frontline).[xcviii]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 24 to 25. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 115 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones — of which about 60 were Shaheds — from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and occupied Donetsk cities.[xcix] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 95 drones and that 18 drones hit 11 locations as of 0730 local time. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck transport, energy, and civilian infrastructure in Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv oblasts.[c]

Russian forces continue to adapt their strike tactics to maximize civilian harm. Mykolaiv Oblast Military Administration Head Vitaliy Kim stated that Russian forces are changing their tactics and launching Shahed drones during the day, increasing the risk that drone debris will fall on civilians.[ci]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.