Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 19, 2026

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Western sources continue to indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s objectives are not limited to control of Ukrainian territory — in line with ISW’s longstanding assessment based on repeated Kremlin public statements. Five anonymous European intelligence agency heads told Reuters in an article published on February 19 that Putin does not want to end the war in Ukraine quickly.[i] The head of one European intelligence agency stated that the Kremlin’s strategic goals remain unchanged and include the removal of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the imposition of Ukrainian neutrality. Reuters’ intelligence sources added that Ukraine’s cession of the remainder of Donetsk Oblast would not satisfy Putin’s desire to overthrow Ukraine’s democratically-elected government and would not in and of itself lead to a final peace agreement, as Putin would then make further demands. The European intelligence heads’ statements are consistent with ISW’s longstanding assessment that Putin is committed to achieving his original war aims.[ii] Putin has repeatedly indicated that his war aims extend beyond territory in eastern Ukraine and include changes to the NATO alliance that amount to a total restructuring of the European security architecture, Ukraine’s abandonment of its NATO membership aspirations, severe limitations on the Ukrainian military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself, and the replacement of the current Ukrainian government with a pro-Russian puppet government.[iii]   

Senior Kremlin officials continued on February 18 to reject any resolution to Russia’s war that does not capitulate to all of Putin’s maximalist demands, supporting ISW's assessment and the assessments laid out to Reuters by senior European intelligence officials. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov gave an interview to Saudi Arabian state-owned television channel Al-Arabiya — the latest in a string of interviews Lavrov has given to media sources targeting international audiences.[iv] Lavrov claimed that Russian and US delegations discussed their alleged “Alaska understanding” during recent talks in Geneva, alluding to alleged agreements that the Kremlin claims the United States and Russia reached at the August 2025 Alaska Summit based on Putin’s public demands for Ukrainian and NATO capitulation.[v] Lavrov claimed that this “understanding” addresses the alleged “root causes” of Russia‘s war in Ukraine, which Lavrov again claimed include Ukraine’s NATO aspirations and the Ukrainian government‘s alleged discrimination of ethnic Russians and the Kremlin-backed Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP). Lavrov called for recognition of Russia’s illegal 2022 annexation of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. Lavrov further claimed that Ukraine has been the “main obstacle” to peace since 2014 and blamed the European Union (EU) for the failure of the Minsk Agreements, obfuscating Russia‘s own role in violating the Minsk Agreements and delaying ongoing peace talks.[vi] Lavrov further denounced Western security guarantees for Ukraine as posing a threat to Russia.

Kremlin officials continue to indicate that Russia’s aims extend beyond simply removing Zelensky to the installation of a pro-Russian puppet government in postwar Ukraine, further undermining the Russian narrative the demands are only tied to questions of territorial control. Lavrov claimed that former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko and Zelensky both discriminated against ethnic Russians living in eastern Ukraine.[vii] Lavrov recently explicitly demanded that any future Ukrainian government be “friendly” toward Russia and “benevolent,” demonstrating that the Kremlin’s demands extend beyond the removal of Zelensky.[viii] The Kremlin will not be satisfied with another democratically elected Ukrainian government that rejects Kremlin rule even if Ukraine gives in to Russia’s demand that it hold elections.

Western sources tied Putin's unwillingness to compromise in negotiations to his belief that the Russian economy can continue to support a protracted war, which is consistent with ISW’s longstanding assessment of Putin’s theory of victory. Reuters reported that one intelligence chief assessed that the "main issue" is that Putin neither wants nor needs a quick peace as the Russian economy is not on the verge of collapse.[ix] Another Reuters source stated that Russia will face "very high" financial risks in the second half of 2026, however, as Western sanctions and Russia's high borrowing costs have limited Russia's access to capital markets. Putin has grossly mismanaged Russia’s economy, which is suffering due to unsustainably high spending on the Russian military and the Russian defense industrial base (DIB), significant labor shortages, and reductions in Russia’s sovereign wealth fund.[x] Russian oil and gas industries continue to suffer, with Bloomberg reporting on February 18 that Russian oil producers drilled 3.4 percent fewer production wells in 2025 compared to 2024 as Western sanctions and a strong ruble have reduced revenue.[xi] Russian oil and gas revenues dropped in 2025 to a five-year low, and Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov acknowledged in September 2025 that Russian authorities expect the share of Russia’s revenues from oil and gas sales to fall by roughly 30 percent in 2026.[xii] The Kremlin appears to currently believe that it can absorb and deal with these economic friction points in the immediate term. ISW assessed in February 2025, however, that Putin's ability to manage these friction points is not indefinite. Putin will have to balance his theory of victory, which posits that the Russian economy can continue to support Russian battlefield advances longer than Ukraine is able to defend itself and the West is willing to support Ukraine, with the need to reckon with the increasingly difficult economic situation in Russia in 2026.[xiii] Putin is likely pushing for Ukraine and the West to capitulate now to Russia’s demands in negotiations before Putin must face these difficult economic decisions.[xiv]

The Kremlin is attempting to distract the United States with bilateral economic deals in order to secure concessions during US-led peace negotiations on Ukraine. Reuters reported that four of its European intelligence chief sources assessed that the Kremlin has been using talks with the United States over the past year to push for sanctions relief and bilateral business deals.[xv] Two of the sources noted that Russia is trying to separate ongoing talks between those focused on the war in Ukraine and those focused on bilateral US-Russian deals. ISW has assessed since the Trump administration took office in early 2025 that the Kremlin has been trying to entice the United States with carrots unrelated to the war in Ukraine, such as bilateral economic deals, to push the United States to agree to Russia's demands related to the war.[xvi]

Kremlin officials continued on February 18 to try to push the United States to focus on improving US-Russian economic relations. Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev claimed that US sanctions on Russia are costly for US businesses and that a US decision to lift its sanctions against Russia would therefore be in the United States' best interest.[xvii] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that "illegal" US sanctions are hindering the development of US-Russian trade and economic cooperation.[xviii] Peskov called on Russia and the United States to "revive" their relations in order to benefit from such cooperation. Lavrov noted to Al-Arabiya that Russia and the United States are engaging in bilateral economic working groups in addition to the ongoing trilateral US-Ukrainian-Russian talks that aim to resolve the war in Ukraine.[xix]

The Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) continues to move toward self-sufficiency, but Western support remains critical to this endeavor. Advisor to the Ukrainian Defense Minister Hanna Gvozdiar reported on February 19 that the Ukrainian DIB has increased production fiftyfold since the start of the full-scale invasion, reaching an estimated $50 billion worth of production.[xx] Gvozdiar stated that the Ukrainian DIB provides over 50 percent of the Ukrainian military’s needs and is expanding its joint production facilities with European states. Sweden announced on February 19 a new military aid package worth almost 12.9 billion Swedish kronor (about $1.4 billion), which includes short-range air defense systems and ammunition.[xxi] The package will also support projects expanding cooperation projects with Ukraine to procure and develop long-range drones and provide Ukraine with unmanned surface vehicles. Ukraine began in 2023 to pursue its long-term objective of ensuring the self-sufficiency of its DIB, and Western security and financial aid has helped Ukraine in past work towards this goal.[xxii] Ukraine's partners stands to benefit from continuing to aid the Ukrainian DIB in this endeavor, as Western states can use Ukraine’s experience fighting a 21st-century war with an accelerated offense-defense technological cycle to bolster their defenses and domestic DIBs. The provision of air defenses to Ukraine is particularly necessary to not only defend Ukrainian cities in the rear and on the front but to defend Ukraine's own defense industrial enterprises. The establishment of joint Ukrainian-European production facilities outside of Ukraine throughout Europe will also ensure Ukraine‘s continued production in the face of intensified Rusisan long-range strikes across the country.

Russian forces have reportedly adapted their Geran-2 drones to be “mothership” drones that carry first-person view (FPV) drones deeper into the Ukrainian rear. A Russian milblogger posted footage on February 17 allegedly showing a Russian Geran-2 mothership drone releasing an FPV drone while flying over Sumy Oblast.[xxiii] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are using Geran drones as signal repeaters for FPV drones, which separate from the mothership drone as they near the intended target. Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces’ use of Geran-2 drones as aerial relays is particularly important after they lost access to Starlink terminals.[xxiv] Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov previously reported on February 3 that Russian forces began using Gerbera drones (which are the much cheaper decoy version of Russia’s Shahed/Geran drone) as mothership drones to carry strike or reconnaissance FPV drones, and Russian forces have used Molniya fixed-wing FPV drones in a similar capacity.[xxv] Geran motherships drones are likely able to continue toward their own targets after releasing their FPV drones to conduct significant strikes. Gerbera drones, in contrast, carry either very small or no explosive payloads so would either crash or result in a small explosion. Geran mothership drones carrying reconnaissance FPV drones would also be able to use the FPV drones to confirm or adjust the Geran’s own strike.

Key Takeaways:

• Western sources continue to indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s objectives are not limited to control of Ukrainian territory — in line with ISW’s longstanding assessment based on repeated Kremlin public statements.
• Western sources tied Putin's unwillingness to compromise in negotiations to his belief that the Russian economy can continue to support a protracted war, which is consistent with ISW’s longstanding assessment of Putin’s theory of victory.
• The Kremlin is attempting to distract the United States with bilateral economic deals in order to secure concessions during US-led peace negotiations on Ukraine.
• The Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB) continues to move toward self-sufficiency, but Western support remains critical to this endeavor.
• Russian forces have reportedly adapted their Geran-2 drones to be “mothership” drones that carry first-person view (FPV) drones deeper into the Ukrainian rear.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk. Russian forces recently advanced near Slovyansk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces struck Russian oil infrastructure in Pskov Oblast on the night of February 18 to 19. Ukrainian intelligence sources told Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on February 19 that Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) units conducted a drone strike against the Velikolukskaya oil depot in Pskov Oblast overnight.[xxvi] Geolocated footage published on February 18 and 19 shows a fire burning at the oil depot.[xxvii] An open-source intelligence (OSINT) source stated on February 18 that Russian forces had placed anti-drone netting at the oil depot prior to the Ukrainian strike.[xxviii] Pskov Oblast Governor Mikhail Vedernikov acknowledged on February 19 that a Ukrainian drone strike set fire to an oil tank at an oil depot in Velikiye Luki, Pskov Oblast.[xxix]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on February 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified locations of Kursk and Sumy oblasts on February 18 and 19.[xxx]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on February 19 that Russian forces have not achieved significant tactical success in the Sumy direction despite their attempts to break through Ukrainian defensive lines near Pysarivka (north of Sumy City) and Marine (northeast of Sumy City).[xxxi]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 1443rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly under the operational control of the Northern Grouping of Forces and formed during 2022 partial reserve call up) and of the 83rd Airborne (VDV) Brigade are operating near Andriivka and toward Pysarivka (both north of Sumy City), near Marine, Yunakivka, and Varachyne, and toward Korchakivka and Khrapivshchyna (all northeast of Sumy City).[xxxii] Drone operators of the 106th VDV Division, including its 137th VDV Regiment, and of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly continue to operate in Sumy Oblast.[xxxiii] 

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on February 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Veterynarne and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Starytsya, Zelene, Synelnykove, Tsehelne, Lyman, Hrafske, Symynivka, Vovchanski Khutory, and Vilcha on February 18 and 19.[xxxiv] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vovchanski Khutory.[xxxv]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on February 19 that Russian forces are attempting to advance towards Velykyi Burluk along the T-2104 Vovchansk-Bilyi Kolodyaz highway but are bogged down fighting on the southern outskirts of the Vovchansk and are unable to achieve a tactical breakthrough.[xxxvi] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on February 19 that Russian forces have not launched any serious offensive operations due to Ukrainian drone observation up to 20 kilometers in the Russian near rear that limits Russian forces to accumulating manpower deeper in the rear.[xxxvii] Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on February 19 that Russian forces continue striking Vovchansk, but Ukrainian forces maintain control of neighboring settlements and are preventing Russian forces from advancing past Vovchansk.[xxxviii]

Order of Battle: Multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) artillery elements of the Russian 288th Artillery Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[xxxix]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on February 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Chuhunivka and toward Zarubynka on February 18 and 19.[xl]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on February 19 that elements of the Russian 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) have failed to envelop Ukrainian forces near Kolodyazne (southeast of Velykyi Burluk) through attacks toward Ambarne (east of Velykyi Burluk), Novovasylivka, and Ridkodub (both southeast of Velykyi Burluk).[xli]

Order of Battle: Reconnaissance elements of the Russian Grom-Kaskad drone brigade (reportedly of the 4th Air Force and Air Defense Army, Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment near Serednii Burluk (southwest of Velykyi Burluk).[xlii] Drone operators of the 18th Motorized Rifle Division (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Velykoburlutskyi Raion.[xliii]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 19 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently marginally advanced in central Kupyansk.[xliv]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Kurylivka and Novoosynove on February 18 and 19.[xlv]

Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on February 19 that Ukrainian forces are repelling individual Russian assault groups infiltrating into eastern Kupyansk and that Ukrainian troops physically control the Holubivka-Kupyansk road (north of Kupyansk) and neighborhoods in northeastern Kupyansk.[xlvi] Mashovets stated that Russian forces are trying to amass forces in eastern Kurylivka and near Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk) to continue the offensive on Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk) from the east and sever the Ukrainian bridgehead east of Kupyansk.

A Ukrainian officer operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on February 19 that Starlink blocking has decreased the number of Russian drone attacks and that warmer weather has flooded Russian positions and made the Oskil River impassable.[xlvii]

The commander of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on February 19 that Russian forces have limited remaining equipment and are reluctant to deploy it because Ukrainian “kill zones” (areas of elevated drone strike risk) extend several dozen kilometers into Russian rear positions.[xlviii] The commander stated that Ukrainian forces are expanding these kill zones by integrating reconnaissance assets, fiber-optic drones that bypass Russian electronic warfare (EW) jamming, and bomber drones that strike Russian shelters. The commander reported that Ukrainian forces are also targeting and destroying Russian artillery, including moving artillery systems, despite Russian camouflage efforts.

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on February 19 that Russian forces had about 30 to 40 personnel remaining in Kupyansk as of February 18.[xlix] Trehubov stated that the remaining Russian troops are unable to conduct effective offensive operations and lack the combat power necessary to defend their positions.

A Russian milblogger criticized Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov for lying about Russian advances in the Kupyansk direction.[l]

Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and the 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are operating in eastern Kupyansk, and near Zapadne, Holubivka (both north of Kupyansk), and Lyman Pershyi (northeast of Kupyansk).[li] Mashovets stated that elements of the 47th Tank Division (1st GTA), including its 153rd Tank Regiment, are operating near Kurylivka, Vilshana (northeast of Kupyansk),  Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk), and Kivsharivka (south of Kupyansk).[lii] Mashovets reported that elements of the 26th Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st GTA) and the 121st and 122nd motorized rifle regiments (both of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th CAA) are operating in the Kupyansk direction.[liii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Borova near Shandryholove, Tverdokhlibove, and Ridkodub on February 18 and 19.[liv]

Mashovets reported on February 19 that Russian forces are trying to isolate Ukrainian defenses near Zahryzove (northeast of Borova) along the P-79 Izyum-Kupyansk highway and break through to the northern and northeastern outskirts of Borova.[lv] Mashovets assessed that the Russian military command will expand Russian forces’ presence near Zahryzove before increasing pressure on the flanks of Ukrainian forces near Borova. Mashovets further assessed that Russian forces are unlikely to attempt a breakthrough to seize Borova, as such operations would require a significant reinforcement of the Russian 1st GTA elements operating in the area.

Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 2nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division (1st GTA) and the 4th Tank Division (1st GTA) are operating toward Borova; near Novoplatonivka (north of Borova); and near Kruhlyakivka, Zahryzove, and Borivska Andriivka (all northeast of Borova).[lvi]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on February 18 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in central Nykyforivka (southeast of Slovyansk).[lvii]

Russian forces attacked near and within Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Yarova; north of Lyman near Stavky and Drobysheve; east of Lyman near Zarichne; northeast of Slovyansk near Zakitne and Dibrova and toward Staryi Karavan and Brusivka; east of Slovyansk near Ozerne, Platonivka, and Riznykivka and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka and Kryva Luka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Bondarne and Pazeno and toward Fedorivka Druha on February 18 and 19.[lviii]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on February 19 that Russian forces are unable to reach Lyman itself and are thus conducting highly attritional assaults against adjacent villages in the contested “gray zone.”[lix]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the reconnaissance battalion of the Russian 85th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Nykyforivka and Riznykivka (east of Slovyansk).[lx] Drone operators of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies reportedly continue to operate in the Lyman direction.[lxi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka near Fedorivka; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Minkivka, Orikhovo-Vasylivka, and Chasiv Yar; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Illinivka, Berestok, Ivanopillya, and Shcherbynivka;  southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Novopavlivka and Sofiivka on February 18 and 19.[lxii]

A commander of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area reported on February 19 that Russian forces continue to conduct mechanized assaults, but that poor weather conditions are causing Russian vehicles to become stuck in the mud.[lxiii] The commander reported that Russian forces are relying on alternative communications systems, including WiFi bridges and directional dishes mounted in trees, which makes them detectable to Ukrainian forces.

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) reportedly struck Ukrainian equipment near Poltavka and Ukrainian ground-lines-of-communication (GLOCs) near Mykolaipillya (both south of Druzhkivka).[lxiv] FPV drone operators of an anti-tank artillery battalion of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) and the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[lxv]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Dobropillya direction on February 18 and 19.

Order of Battle: Engineer elements of the Russian 177th Separate Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are reportedly operating in the Dobropillya direction.[lxvi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on February 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Novooleksandrivka and Shevchenko; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Zatyshok; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Molodetske, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Novopidhorodne on February 18 and 19.[lxvii]

A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on February 19 that significant numbers of Russian servicemembers operating in the direction have received only about two months of training.[lxviii] The spokesperson stated that Russian units face internal conflicts and include foreign mercenaries who do not speak Russian, complicating command and control and contributing to disorganized actions and occasional friendly fire incidents. The spokesperson reported that Russian forces frequently lose terrain orientation due to unstable communications and continue to face systemic problems with training, coordination, and overall command and control.

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment in Vodyanske (northwest of Pokrovsk).[lxix]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka; and south of Novopavlivka near Dachne and Filiya on February 18 and 19, but did not advance.[lxx]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on February 19 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Ivanivka and Andriivka-Klevtsove; southeast of Oleksandrivka near Ternove, Orestopil, Novooleksandrivka, and Oleksiivka and toward Vyshneve and Sosnivka; south of Oleksandrivka toward Vidradne; and southwest of Oleksandrivka toward Pysantsi on February 18 and 19.[lxxi] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Sosnivka, Ternove, Hai, Khoroshe, Berezove, Stepove, and Orestopil (all southeast of Oleksandrivka), and Vidradne.[lxxii]

Ukrainian Southern Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn reported on February 19 that Russian forces continue attempts to advance toward Pokrovske (north of Oleksandrivka) and to infiltrate Ukrainian positions in the area.[lxxiii]

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on February 17 shows Ukrainian forces conducting an FPV drone strike against a temporary deployment point of an unspecified unit of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) in occupied Yurivka (roughly 100km from the front line).[lxxiv]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on February 19 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Ternuvate (northwest of Hulyaipole).[lxxv]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Pryluky, Tsvitkove, and Svyatopetrivka and toward Verkhnya Tersa, Vozdvyzhivka, Rizdvyanka, and Ternuvate; north of Hulyaipole near Dobropillya, Danylivka, and Nove Zaporizhzhia; northeast of Hulyaipole near Zelene and Zlahoda; and west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne and Staroukrainka and toward Hirke on February 18 and 19.[lxxvi] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hirke, Staroukrainka, and Zaliznychne.[lxxvii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on February 19 but did not advance. 

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; west of Orikhiv near Stepove, Mali Shcherbaky, Stepnohirsk, and Prymorske; and northwest of Orikhiv near Mahdalynivka on February 18 and 19.[lxxviii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Orikhiv.[lxxix] Assault elements of 11th Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly operating near Zapasne (northwest of Orikhiv).[lxxx] Elements of the 7th VDV Division are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[lxxxi]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kherson direction on February 19 but did not advance.

Order of Battle: Drone operators and artillery elements of the Russian 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Kherson direction.[lxxxii]

A Russian Telegram channel, which claims to have insider information on damage from Ukrainian strikes against Russian targets, published images on February 19 confirming that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Project 02510 BK-16 transport and landing boat on February 12 near Novoozerne, occupied Crimea (approximately 134 kilometers from the frontline).[lxxxiii]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a small series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of February 18 to 19. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 37 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones, of which roughly 20 were Shahed-type drones, from the directions of Bryansk and Kursk cities; and occupied Donetsk Oblast.[lxxxiv] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 29 drones as of 0830 local time and that Russian drones struck four locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck transport and energy infrastructure in Chernihiv and Kharkiv oblasts.[lxxxv]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable framework)

The Belarusian Ministry of Defense continues to issue summons en masse to eligible men as part of an unscheduled inspection of the Belarusian armed forces. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MOD) announced on February 17 that Belarusian men from western oblasts are receiving summons for unscheduled military training as part of a comprehensive inspection of the Belarusian armed forces which Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko announced on January 16.[lxxxvi] Ukrainian outlet Suspilne reported on February 19 that the conscripts’ wives posted messages on social media regarding the training.[lxxxvii] Belarusian International Military Cooperation Department Head Major General Valery Revenko claimed on February 19 that the training measures are in preparation for repelling alleged hostile Western actions.[lxxxviii] Exiled Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya stated that the exercises are routine and do not pose a threat to Poland or Lithuania.[lxxxix]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.