Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 1, 2026

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

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Russian drones struck a maternity hospital and a bus carrying miners on February 1, causing significant civilian casualties. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck a maternity hospital in Zaporizhzhia City with unspecified drones during the day on February 1, starting a fire in the gynecological department's reception area and injuring at least six people.[i] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces also struck mines belonging to Ukraine's largest private energy company, DTEK, in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on February 1.[ii] Ukrainian officials reported that four Shahed drones struck a DTEK bus carrying miners near Ternivka, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, killing at least 12 people and injuring at least 16.[iii] ISW continues to assess that Russia is prioritizing strikes against civilians to continue its long-standing campaign to demoralize the Ukrainian populace.[iv]

The Kremlin continues to use issues unrelated to its war in Ukraine to push the Trump administration to give in to Russia's demands regarding Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that US, Ukrainian, and Russian delegations would hold the next round of trilateral meetings in Abu Dhabi on February 4 and 5, not on February 1 as initially planned.[v] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov used an interview with Kremlin journalist Pavel Zarubin on February 1 to try to curry favor with the Trump administration ahead of the upcoming meetings and to convince the United States to only engage in negotiations with Russia, not Ukraine and Europe.[vi] Lavrov compared Russia to the United States as a fellow great power and claimed that the two countries need to implement bilateral economic and trade projects while being sure not to allow any differences to lead to a confrontation, especially a "heated one." Lavrov further claimed that Europe is trying to "drive wedges" between Russia and the United States. The Kremlin has been using a negotiation tactic that tries to frame Russia as a global power comparable to the United States and as an heir to the Soviet Union's "superpower status" since US President Donald Trump assumed office in early 2025.[vii] Lavrov's February 1 statements aim to use the prospects of economic deals or strategic arms talks to entice Trump into conceding to Russia's demands about Ukraine, including the Kremlin's demands that the United States not engage Europe in the peace process.

Insider reports continue to demonstrate that Russia is trying to portray itself to external audiences as a willing negotiator in order to gain control over all of Donetsk Oblast through diplomatic means. Bloomberg reported on January 31, citing unspecified knowledgeable sources, that Russia sees little chance of a breakthrough during ongoing peace talks.[viii] The sources noted that Russian and Ukrainian military delegations have been discussing the technical details of a possible ceasefire implementation agreement, but assessed that a resolution to territorial issues will require leadership-level decisions. The sources stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin considers Ukraine's cession of all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts to Russia and the freezing of the current frontline in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts to be a "concession," since Russia illegally annexed the entirety of the four oblasts in 2022, even though Russian forces have still not seized the territory of all four regions. Russian officials have made frequent statements demonstrating the Kremlin's maximalist demand that Ukraine cede the entirety of all four oblasts during negotiations.[ix] The initial US-proposed 28-point peace plan called for Ukraine's cessation of all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and the freezing of the frontline in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts, and subsequent US-Ukrainian proposals have called for the creation of a demilitarized zone or “free economic zone” in Donetsk Oblast.[x] The Kremlin explicitly rejected in December 2025 the Ukrainian proposal to establish a demilitarized zone in Donestk Oblast, and the Kremlin may be trying to present Russia as amenable to the so-called "concession" of freezing the line in southern Ukraine in order to prevent further US-Ukrainian discussions about a demilitarized or economic zone in unoccupied areas of Donetsk Oblast.[xi] Russian officials will likely continue efforts to present the demand that Ukraine give up all of Donetsk Oblast as a moderate position and a meaningful "concession" in order to extract concessions that would ultimately be strategically harmful to Ukraine. ISW continues to assess that ceding the rest of Donetsk Oblast to Russia would be a strategic mistake, as Russia is unlikely to seize this territory quickly or easily but would then be in a more advantageous position to renew attacks against Ukraine in the future.[xii]

SpaceX CEO Elon Musk restricted Starlink satellite terminals operating in Ukraine in order to counter Russia's use of Starlink on drones. Musk stated on X (formerly Twitter) on February 1 that SpaceX, at Ukraine's request, has taken "effective" steps to stop Russian forces’ use of Starlink and called on Ukrainian authorities to inform SpaceX about any necessary further measures.[xiii] Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov stated in response to Musk that SpaceX’s first steps have achieved ”real results” and that Ukraine and SpaceX are working on next steps.[xiv] Musk's and Fedorov's statements come after recent reports that Russian forces, including elements of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, are using Starlink terminals to extend the range of BM-35 strike drones and cheap Molniya-2 fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drones to conduct mid-range drone strikes against the Ukrainian rear starting in late December 2025.[xv] ISW continues to assess that these Russian strikes are an attempt to replicate prior Russian battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaigns against Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) that enabled recent Russian advances in the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions.[xvi] Russian milbloggers claimed on February 1 that Russian drone operators started to experience Starlink signal blocking when flying drones at speeds of over 75 to 90 kilometers per hour.[xvii] The milbloggers noted that the restrictions have impacted Shahed-type, Molniya, and BM-35 strike drones and caused significant disruptions to Russian Starlink-enabled drones.[xviii] Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on January 31 that the Ukrainian MoD will continue to work with SpaceX and will collect information on Ukrainian military Starlink users in order to prevent the restrictions from affecting Ukrainian forces.[xix]

Russia is building up military infrastructure near the Finnish border, likely as part of wider military expansion efforts that seek to prepare the Russian force for a potential future conflict with NATO. Finnish national broadcaster Yle published satellite images between June 2024 and October 2025 showing Russian construction at the Rybka military base in Petrozavodsk, Republic of Karelia (approximately 175 kilometers from the Finnish border).[xx] Yle reported that the Soviet-era garrison area has been mostly abandoned since the early 2000s but that the 44th Army Corps (AC, Leningrad Military District [LMD]) will use the base. Yle reported that the Rybka military base already contains a large air base and equipment depot. Yle reported that satellite imagery from May and August 2025 shows that Russia is also building a new military town in Kandalaksha, Murmansk Oblast (approximately 115 kilometers from the Finnish border) for the Luptsche-Savino garrison, which Russia started to build in Winter 2024-2025 for a new artillery brigade and an engineering brigade. ISW has previously reported on the expansion of other Russian military infrastructure along the border with Finland.[xxi] Russia restructured the Western Military District (WMD) into the LMD and Moscow Military District (MMD) in 2024, likely in order to improve Russia's strategic command along its northern border and to posture against NATO along the Finnish border.[xxii] The Russian military command also formed the 44th AC in the LMD in 2024 as part of these efforts.[xxiii] Russian officials, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have previously directly threatened Finland, including by applying language that Russia has used falsely justify its invasions of Ukraine to Finland.[xxiv]

Belarus appears to be increasing the quantity and frequency of Belarusian balloon incursions into Polish and Lithuanian airspace. The Polish Armed Forces Operational Command reported that Belarus launched "balloon-like" objects into Polish airspace on the night of January 31 to February 1 and noted that the balloons aimed to reconnoiter and test Polish air defense reactions.[xxv] Belarus has launched balloon-like objects into Polish airspace three times in the last four days (since January 7), and Lithuania reported a record high of 42 Belarusian balloons in its airspace on the night of January 27 to 28.[xxvi] ISW continues to assess that Russia has de facto annexed Belarus, and Russia is likely using Russia is using airspace incursions of Poland and Lithuania from Belarus as part of its “Phase Zero” effort — the informational and psychological condition-setting phase — to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[xxvii]

Several unidentified drones flew over German military infrastructure on February 1. German outlet Bild reported on February 1 that roughly 23 drones flew above the Immelmann military airfield in Lower Saxony, Germany on February 1.[xxviii] German authorities have not identified the actor responsible for the drone overflights as of this writing. German authorities previously identified Russia as a possible actor responsible for drone flights over Germany in 2025, however.[xxix]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian drones struck a maternity hospital and a bus carrying miners on February 1, causing significant civilian casualties.
• The Kremlin continues to use issues unrelated to its war in Ukraine to push the Trump administration to give in to Russia's demands regarding Ukraine.
• Insider reports continue to demonstrate that Russia is trying to portray itself to external audiences as a willing negotiator in order to gain control over all of Donetsk Oblast through diplomatic means.
• SpaceX CEO Elon Musk restricted Starlink satellite terminals operating in Ukraine in order to counter Russia's use of Starlink on drones.
• Russia is building up military infrastructure near the Finnish border, likely as part of wider military expansion efforts that seek to prepare the Russian force for a potential future conflict with NATO.
• Belarus appears to be increasing the quantity and frequency of Belarusian balloon incursions into Polish and Lithuanian airspace.
• Several unidentified drones flew over German military infrastructure on February 1.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Slovyansk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on February 1 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Bila Bereza and southwest of Komarivka (both northwest of Sumy City).[xxx]

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including northwest of Sumy City near Bila Bereza, north of Sumy City toward Nova Sich, and northeast of Sumy City near Yablunivka, on January 31 and February 1.[xxxi] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Varachyne (north of Sumy City) and south of Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[xxxii]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 1 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point near Nekislitsa and a troop concentration near Troyebortnoye (both in Bryansk Oblast near the international border northwest of Sumy City) overnight on January 31 to February 1.[xxxiii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian Chechen 1434th Akhmat-Chechnya Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue to operate in Sumy Oblast.[xxxiv]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on February 1 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed on February 1 that Russian forces seized Zelene (northeast of Kharkiv City).[xxxv] The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces credited elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment (18th Motorized Rifle Division, 11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) with the claimed seizure of Zelene.[xxxvi] A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that two Russian servicemembers have infiltrated into Zelene but that Russian forces have not seized the settlement, contrary to the Russian MoD’s claim.[xxxvii] Russian milbloggers first claimed the seizure of Zelene on May 10, 2024, and Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Ukrainian forces liberated Zelene as of May 15, 2024.[xxxviii]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Starytsya, Prylipka, Hrafske, Vilcha, Vovchanski Khutory, and Symynivka on January 31 and February 1.[xxxix]

The Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Regiment have suffered heavy casualties while attacking across open fields between Zelene and Sereda (just northeast of Zelene in Belgorod Oblast).[xl] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are unable to conduct casualty evacuations in the area and that high casualties are causing servicemembers to refuse to fight. The milblogger claimed that the regimental command is committing specialist technical and anti-aircraft personnel, drivers, and cooks to infantry assaults.[xli] The milblogger further claimed that the Russian military command is withdrawing elements of the Russian 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th AC, LMD) from positions near Starytsya due to heavy casualties.[xlii]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on January 31 that adverse weather conditions are hindering both Russian and Ukrainian drone operations and movements in the Vovchansk direction as Russian forces continue fireteam infiltration attempts near Lyman.[xliii]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykyi Burluk near Khatnie and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Dvorichanske and toward Kolodyazne on January 31 and February 1 but did not advance.[xliv]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on February 1 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; north of Kupyansk near Kutkivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Fyholivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Hlushkivka and toward Kurylivka and Novoosynove on January 31 and February 1.[xlv]

A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on January 31 that Ukrainian forces recently eliminated a sabotage and reconnaissance group of the Russian 153rd Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) attempting to infiltrate into Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk) to conduct a flag raising mission to generate informational effects.[xlvi]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on February 1 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Novoplatonivka; northeast of Borova near Bohuslavka; southeast of Borova near Novoserhiivka and Shyikivka, and toward Stepove; and south of Borova near Oleksandrivka on January 31 and February 1.[xlvii]

A Russian source published footage on January 31 purportedly showing elements of the Russian 1st GTA raising a flag in Novoplatonivka.[xlviii] A geolocator on X (formerly Twitter) geolocated the footage to occupied Kolomyichykha (northeast of Borova), located roughly eight kilometers behind the frontline.[xlix] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has previously published misleading footage to support exaggerated claims of Russian advances in the neighboring Kupyansk direction.[l]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on January 31 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in eastern Riznykivka (east of Slovyansk).[li]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Svyatohirsk and Novoselivka; north of Lyman near Drobysheve; northeast of Lyman near Zarichne and Stavky; southeast of Lyman near Yampil; northeast of Slovyansk near Zakitne and Dronivka; east of Slovyansk near Siversk, Platonivka, and Riznykivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Bondarne and Dibrova and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka and Nykyforivka on January 31 and February 1.[lii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Riznykivka, Drobysheve, and Yarova (northwest of Lyman).[liii]

Order of Battle: Drone and artillery elements of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces in eastern Riznykivka.[liv] Drone operators and other elements of the 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are striking Ukrainian forces south of Zakitne and reportedly continue to operate near Siversk.[lv] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[lvi]

Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on January 31 shows Ukrainian forces striking a house in eastern Minkivka (northeast of Kostyantynivka) that Russian forces occupied after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA).[lvii]

Russian forces attacked within and near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Pryvillya, Holubivka, Minkivka, Markove, Novomarkove, Chasiv Yar, and Orikhovo-Vasylivka; south of Kostyantynivka near Berestok, Pleshchiivka, Shcherbynivka, Kleban-Byk, and Ivanopillya; southwest of Kostyantynivka toward Illinivka and Stepanivka; west of Kostyantynivka toward Mykolaipillya; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Novopavlivka and Sofiivka and toward Raiske on January 31 and February 1.[lviii] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Pavlivka (southwest of Druzhkivka), Pryvillya, Maiske, and Virolyubivka (both north of Kostyantynivka).[lix]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction refuted Russian claims of the seizure of Kostyantynivka and reported that Ukrainian forces are eliminating individual Russian infiltration groups that entered Kostyantynivka.[lx]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian Chechen 78th Sever-Akhmat Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD) are striking Ukrainian positions west of Ivanopillya.[lxi] Artillery elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are striking Ukrainian forces in northern Illinivka.[lxii] FPV drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces and vehicles near Torske (southwest of Druzhkivka) and Varvarivka (west of Druzhkivka).[lxiii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on February 1 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar; east of Dobropillya near Toretske and Vilne; and southeast of Dobropillya near Ivanivka and Zapovidne on January 31 and February 1.[lxiv] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Novyi Donbas (east of Dobropillya).[lxv]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Novohryshyne (southwest of Dobropillya).[lxvi] FPV drone operators of the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) near Vesele (northeast of Dobropillya).[lxvii] Drone operators of the 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division) and of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (8th CAA) reportedly continue to operate in the Dobropillya direction.[lxviii]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on February 1 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD claimed on February 1 that Russian forces seized Sukhetske (northeast of Pokrovsk).[lxix]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Shevchenko; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Sukhetske; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Molodetske, and Novopidhorodne; and west of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka on January 31 and February 1.[lxx] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Rodynske and Hryshyne.[lxxi]

A non-commissioned officer of a Ukrainian drone battalion operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on February 1 that Russian forces mainly conduct motorized assaults in the battalion’s area of responsibility (AoR), but Russian forces did conduct mechanized assaults in the neighboring brigade’s AoR.[lxxii] The commander of a Ukrainian mortar battery operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on February 1 that Ukrainian and Russian positions are interspersed on the northern outskirts of Pokrovsk.[lxxiii] The commander added that dense fog and limited visibility are hindering both Russian and Ukrainian drone operations, which simultaneously allows Russian forces to increase infiltration attempts while enabling Ukrainian resupply, evacuation, and rotation missions.[lxxiv] The commander reported that Russian forces are infiltrating Ukrainian positions in fireteams of one to three servicemembers and occasionally use all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) to transport infantry closer to the front. The commander noted that Russian forces have not used large amounts of mechanized equipment since a mid-December mechanized assault toward Hryshyne (likely referring to a December 10 company-sized mechanized assault).[lxxv]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 1 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone control point, a company command and observation point, and a manpower concentration near Myrnohrad.[lxxvi]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Shevchenko and near Rodynske.[lxxvii]

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself; northeast of Novopavlivka near Muravka; and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya on January 31 and February 1, but did not advance.[lxxviii]

Russian forces attacked toward Oleksandrivka itself and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Verbove and Vyshneve on January 31 and February 1, but did not advance.[lxxix]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on February 1 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west and south of Svyatopetrivka (northwest of Hulyaipole).[lxxx]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Svyatopetrivka, Zelene, and Ternuvate; north of Hulyaipole near Nove Zaporizhzhia, Danylivka, Dobropillya, and Varvarivka; northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke; west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne and toward Staroukrainka; and southwest of Hulyaipole near Myrne on January 31 and February 1.[lxxxi]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian BARS-8 Khabarovsk Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserves) are striking Ukrainian vehicles in Verkhnya Tersa (northwest of Hulyaipole).[lxxxii] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones over Hulyaipole.[lxxxiii] Elements of the 218th Tank Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction, likely referring to eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.[lxxxiv]

Ukrainian forces continue their mid-range strike campaign against military assets in the Russian rear on the night of January 31 to February 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the repair base of an unspecified Russian engineer-sapper regiment near Rozivka, Zaporizhia Oblast (southeast of Hulyaipole, roughly 65 kilometers from the frontline).[lxxxv]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced or maintained positions in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on January 31 shows elements of the Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) striking Ukrainian forces on the southern outskirts of Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) and Ukrainian servicemembers detaining four Russian prisoners of war (POWs) on the southwestern outskirts of Novoyakovlivka (northwest of Orikhiv) — areas in which Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces maintained positions.[lxxxvi]

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk, Plavni, and Pavlivka and northwest of Orikhiv near Prymorske, Richne, Novoyakovlivka, and Novoboykivske on January 31 and February 1.[lxxxvii]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division) are striking Ukrainian forces in Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv).[lxxxviii] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 328th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (104th VDV Division) and elements of the 7th VDV Division are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[lxxxix]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported fighting in the Kherson direction on February 1.

The “Atesh” Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan group reported on February 1 that its agents disabled the transformer cabinet of a Russian communications tower near occupied Strelkove (on the Arabat Spit).[xc] Atesh reported that the tower housed electronic countermeasures antennas, which stopped functioning following the attack.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine overnight on January 31 to February 1. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 90 Shahed-, Gerbera-, Italmas-type, and other drones — of which about 60 were Shaheds — from the directions of Oryol, Bryansk, and Kursk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Donetsk City on the night of January 31 to February 1.[xci] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 76 drones, that 14 drones struck nine locations, and that drone fragments fell in two locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential and civilian infrastructure in Chernihiv, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[xcii]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi assessed on February 1 that Belarus may have received as few as one to two Su-30SM2 fighter jets from Russia in a January 29 delivery, given the size of previous deliveries.[xciii]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.