Assessment as of December 8: 7:15 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 11:15am ET on December 8. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 9 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is trying to portray the Russian economy as able to support a protracted war in Ukraine — likely to buttress the ongoing Russian cognitive warfare effort falsely claiming that a Russian victory is inevitable. Putin stated on December 8 at the Council for Strategic Development and National Projects that Russia is working to overcome demographic issues and increase the birth rate, and highlighted numerous support measures the Kremlin is offering families with children.[1] Putin stated that the birth rate continues to decline, including due to unspecified "external challenges" - likely in part referring to the demographic impacts of the war in Ukraine. Putin stated that the Kremlin will include birth rate indicators in performance evaluations of regional governors. Putin claimed that sociological indicators about people's readiness to have children have most significantly improved in occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts — where Russian occupation authorities have been pushing pro-natalist policies as part of wider efforts to exploit occupied Ukraine as an economic and demographic resource.[2] Putin claimed that Russia's GDP growth will be about one percent by the end of 2025 and that inflation will be near or below six percent, with the Central Bank forecasting four to five percent inflation in 2026. Putin claimed that Russia can now gradually increase "economic momentum" while maintaining low unemployment and moderate inflation. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin claimed that Russian GDP growth in the past three years is roughly 10 percent despite "unprecedented" sanctions pressure and that the Russian economy can "move forward" despite "attempts to restrain [Russia's] development."

The Kremlin’s recent economic policies indicate that the Russian economy is doing markedly worse than Putin’s statements seek to suggest, however.[3] Putin intensified his efforts to portray the Russian economy as resilient and able to support protracted hostilities in Ukraine in the lead-up to the December 2 US-Russia meeting in Moscow, and Putin's December 8 remarks are likely similarly aimed at influencing the ongoing peace negotiations.[4] Putin is likely attempting to convince the United States that increased sanctions pressure will not have its intended effect on the Russian economy and will not push Putin to make compromises to end his war against Ukraine. Putin is also notably not discussing the ongoing war in Ukraine in his speeches on the Russian economy, likely in order to obscure the connections between Russia's battlefield losses and economic problems.[5] The Kremlin appears to be trying to dovetail its claims about the Russian economy with the false narrative that a Russian victory on the battlefield is inevitable. Both narratives aim to push the West and Ukraine into capitulating to Russia's demands now out of fear of intensified, protracted Russian military operations in the future. ISW continues to assess that the West and Ukraine can leverage several key Russian battlefield and economic weaknesses to force the Kremlin to negotiate and make real concessions and that a Russian victory is not inevitable.[6]

Kremlin officials continue to demonstrate Russia's unwillingness to compromise to end Russia's war against Ukraine. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlev stated on December 8 that Russia does not care who signs the "capitulation" to end the war but that the "main thing" is that the terms in the settlement "satisfy Russia."[7] Zhuravlev claimed that the issues that led to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine stemmed from deteriorating US-Russia relations such that Russia should sign a peace agreement only with the United States — not Ukraine. Zhuravlev's statements reiterate how the Kremlin has consistently made demands not only of Ukraine, but of NATO as well, and that the Kremlin continues to refuse a settlement to the war that amounts to anything less than Ukrainian capitulation.[8] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on December 8 that negotiations to end the war must be "done in silence" — repeating recent Kremlin calls for parties to withhold details about the ongoing negotiations from the public, likely to obfuscate Russia's rejection of proposed peace plans.[9]

Russia is reportedly planning to foment protests in Ukraine, likely to support the longstanding Kremlin narrative that the Ukrainian government is illegitimate. Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets stated on December 8 that Russian special services are planning to destabilize the domestic situation in Ukraine by staging allegedly "peaceful protests" in large cities throughout southern and eastern Ukraine.[10] Lubinets stated that the Russian special services plan to recruit women, especially mothers of Ukrainian military personnel who are prisoners of war (POW)s or missing in action (MIA) for such protests. Lubinets stated that the Kremlin aims to use the protests to pressure Ukraine's military-political leadership amidst ongoing peace negotiations. The Kremlin, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, have long used deliberate misinterpretations of Ukrainian law and the Ukrainian constitution to allege that Zelensky is illegitimate.[11] Ukrainian intelligence notably identified the Russian "Maidan-3" information campaign in 2024 that aimed to spread doubt about Zelensky's legitimacy.[12] The reported Russian attempt to foment protests in Ukraine is likely similarly aimed at reinforcing the false narrative that the current Ukrainian government does not have the support of the Ukrainian people. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin may use its false claims about Zelensky's illegitimacy to renege on any future peace agreement it signs with Ukraine at a time of Russia's choosing.[13]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin is trying to portray the Russian economy as able to support a protracted war in Ukraine — likely to buttress the ongoing Russian cognitive warfare effort falsely claiming that a Russian victory is inevitable.
• Kremlin officials continue to demonstrate Russia's unwillingness to compromise to end Russia's war against Ukraine.
• Russia is reportedly planning to foment protests in Ukraine, likely to support the longstanding Kremlin narrative that the Ukrainian government is illegitimate.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Borova and Pokrovsk.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukraine's long-range strike campaign continues to degrade Russia's oil refining capabilities. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 8 that the December 5 Ukrainian drone strike against the Temyruk Sea Port, Krasnodar Krai, destroyed 70 percent of the port's total operational capacity.[14] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces used the port as a logistics hub to resupply frontline positions and to transfer liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Russian forces in Ukraine.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on December 8 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in unspecified areas of Sumy Oblast on December 7 and 8.[15] 

Russian milbloggers continued to claim on December 8 that there is decreased kinetic activity in the Sumy direction, although Russian forces are still conducting artillery and airstrikes along the frontline.[16] ISW has observed reports that poor weather conditions, a lack of necessary manpower, and continued Ukrainian drone strikes are contributing to the slower pace of Russian attacks in the Sumy direction.[17]    

Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 1st Battalion of the 217th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) and of the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Sumy direction.[18]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on December 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on December 8 shows a Russian servicemember operating in northern Vilcha (northeast of Kharkiv City) during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA).[19]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Vovchanski Khutory, Tykhe, Synelnykove, Vilcha, and Lyman on December 7 and 8.[20] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vilcha.[21]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on December 8 that Russian forces are likely unable to concentrate sufficient forces to conduct massed assaults and generate a rapid breakthrough toward Staryi Saltiv (east of Kharkiv City and roughly 16 kilometers from the frontline).[22] Trehubov stated that the proximity of the Lyptsi area (north of Kharkiv City) to the Russian border facilitates frequent Russian attacks that aim to fix Ukrainian forces in the border area and seize dominant heights near Lytpsi. Trehubov added that Russian forces are exploiting the proximity between Vovchansk and the Russian border to facilitate logistics. Trehubov reported that Ukrainian drone strikes are preventing Russian attempts to establish crossings over the Vovcha River or to use small boats to cross the river. A Russian milblogger claimed on December 8 that Ukrainian forces quickly restored access to the crossing at Bazaliivka and will likely soon reopen traffic at Pechenihy (both southeast of Kharkiv City) and Staryi Saltiv, which Russian forces struck on December 7.[23]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on December 8 that Russian forces near Starytsia (northeast of Kharkiv City) and Vovchansk have insufficient supplies, including water.[24] The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command does not plan to conduct rotations in the near future despite Russian forces’ heavy losses.  The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command is deploying specialist Russian Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN) personnel to the frontline with the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment (RVSN and reportedly under the operational control of the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces). The milblogger complained that inadequate reconnaissance, artillery support, and casualty evacuation have led to high casualties within the battalion.

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Khatnie and toward Dovhenke, east of Velykyi Burluk near Odradne, and southwest of Velykyi Burluk near Dvorichanske on December 7 and 8 but did not advance.[25]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on December 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Pishchane (southeast of Kupyansk) and advanced north, east, and west of Pishchane; along the P-07 Kupyansk-Shevchenkove highway west of Kupyansk; and west and south of Kupyansk.[26]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on December 7 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian forces in northern Kupyansk – an area where Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces maintained a presence.[27]

Russian forces attacked west of Kupyansk near Sobolivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka and Kucherivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane on December 7 and 8.[28] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of and within Kupyansk, west of Pishchane, and near Sobolivka.[29]

The Kharkiv Oblast Police reported that Russian forces conducted a guided glide bomb strike against Podoly (east of Kupyansk) on December 7, killing one civilian and injuring another.[30]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and of the 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA, Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kupyansk direction.[31]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Borova direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Novovodyane (southeast of Borova).[32]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Novovodyane.[33]

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Bohuslavka; northeast of Borova near Borivska Andriivka; and southeast of Borova near Novovodyane, Druzhelyubivka, and Hrekivka on December 7 and 8.[34]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], MMD) are operating west of Novovodyane.[35]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction on December 8 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Derylove, Drobysheve, Yarova, Shandryholove, and Serednie and toward Oleksandrivka; north of Lyman near Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; and east of Lyman near Zarichne and Torske on December 7 and 8.[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked on the southern outskirts of Lyman.[37]

A Russian milblogger claimed on December 8 that Russian forces have an "advantage in the air" (likely referring to localized lower-altitude drone superiority) in the Shchurove-Donetske sector (west of Lyman) and have also established fire control over Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Lyman in the area.[38] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces conducted an unspecified strike against a Ukrainian training facility in Izyum (northwest of Lyman) on December 7, killing and wounding Ukrainian servicemembers.[39] The type of munition that Russian forces used in the reported strike is unclear, but ISW continues to assess that Russia’s ongoing battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign includes targeting Ukrainian training grounds in the near rear with precise missile strikes enabled by improved reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).[40]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment in the Lyman direction.[41] Fiber-optic drone operators of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Lyman direction.[42]

Ukrainian forces reportedly continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Luhansk Oblast on the night of December 7 to 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition depot in occupied Chmyrivka (about 65km from the frontline) and a fuel depot in occupied Simeykyne (about 115km from the frontline).[43]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on December 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on December 8 shows Russian servicemembers operating in central Siversk during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change the control of terrain or forward edge of battle area (FEBA).[44]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Siversk and in central Svyato-Pokrovske (southwest of Siversk).[45]

Russian forces attacked within and near Siversk; northwest of Siversk near Zakitne, Yampil, Dibrova, and Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; and southwest of Siversk near Svyato-Pokrovske and Fedorivka on December 7 and 8.[46]

A servicemember of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction reported on December 8 that Russian forces are using small group tactics to advance in the brigade's area of responsibility (AoR).[47]   The servicemember stated that Russian and Ukrainian drones have created a 10-15 kilometer “kill zone” (an area immediately near the frontline where a mass of tactical strike and reconnaissance drones pose an elevated risk to any equipment or personnel that enters the area) in the Siversk direction. The servicemember reported that foggy weather is complicating Ukrainian logistics and facilitating Russian advances in the area. ISW has previously observed reports from Ukrainian personnel indicating that poor weather conditions hinder Ukrainian drone operations.[48]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 169th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in Yampil.[49] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 1st Volki Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kramatorsk-Slovyansk direction.[50]

[51]

Russian forces continued to operate in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on December 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on December 8 that Russian forces seized Chervone (east of Kostyantynivka).[52] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern Kostyantynivka, near Virolyubivka and Mykolaivka (both north of Kostyantynivka), west of Stepanivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka), north and northeast of Rusyn Yar (south of Druzhkivka), and in northern Sofiivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[53]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on December 8 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions north of Markove (north of Kostyantynivka) — an area in which Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces maintained a presence.[54]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar; east of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Shcherbynivka, Ivanopillya, and Kleban-Byk; south of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and toward Novopavlivka on December 7 and 8.[55]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction refuted Russian claims on December 7 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a dam near Pryvillya (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[56] The spokesperson stated that a Russian-operated Telegram channel impersonated the Ukrainian unit in the footage and that a Russian KAB guided glide bomb strike destroyed the dam on November 27.

The Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Prosecutor’s Office reported on December 8 that a Russian FPV drone strike wounded four civilians, including two children, in Kostyantynivka.[57]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Sever-V Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are striking Ukrainian positions northeast of Markove.[58] FPV drone operators of the 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment) (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kostyantynivka direction.[59]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on December 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Shakhove, Nove Shakhove, Toretske, and toward Novyi Donbas; and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne on December 7 and 8.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zapovidne.[61]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 174th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Dobropillya direction.[62]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 7 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northwestern Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), although ISW assesses that Rodynske remains a contested settlement subject to rapid changes in control of terrain and the FEBA.[63] Additional geolocated footage published on December 7 indicates that Russian forces advanced along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad highway in southwestern Rivne (northeast of Pokrovsk).[64] Ukrainian outlet Ukrainska Pravda reported on December 8 that Russian forces seized Lysivka and Sukhyi Yar (both southeast of Pokrovsk) after Ukrainian forces withdrew from the settlements on a prior unspecified date.[65]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on December 7 shows Russian servicemembers operating in southern Myrnohrad and northern Pokrovsk during what ISW assesses were infiltration missions that did not change the control of terrain or the FEBA.[66]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD claimed that elements of the Russian 1435th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely comprised of mobilized personnel and reportedly of the 2nd CAA, CMD) seized Rivne.[67] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Rodynske, in northeastern Myrnohrad, and in northern Svitle (northeast of Pokrovsk).[68]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Krasnyi (Chervonyi) Lyman, Fedorivka, Svitle, and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Zvirove, and Molodetske on December 7 and 8.[69] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Pokrovsk and west of Zatyshok (northeast of Pokrovsk).[70]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on December 7 that Ukrainian forces continue to rotate and deliver ammunition to forward units in Myrnohrad despite the complicated logistics situation.[71] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are attempting to infiltrate through Ukrainian defensive lines into Myrnohrad. The spokesperson noted that Ukrainian forces are adapting to increasingly poor weather conditions by using drones with night vision and thermal imaging capabilities that are able to strike Russian forces. The spokesperson also noted that Ukrainian drones are able to strike Russian forces with greater ease due to the lack of foliage, which Russian forces have previously been able to use for concealment. The spokesperson stated that Russian forces are continuously incurring high casualty rates. The deputy commander of a Ukrainian regiment operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on December 8 that Ukrainian forces are still fighting in Pokrovsk itself and that the situation is more stable than it was in mid-November 2025, albeit still difficult.[72] The deputy commander noted that Russian forces are using infiltration tactics and moving in fire teams of two to three on foot to infiltrate into the town.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA, CMD) are reportedly operating in Pokrovsk.[73] FPV drone operators of the 56th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Myrnohrad.[74] Sniper elements of the 1st Krasnodar Battery of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian drones in the Pokrovsk direction.[75]

Russian forces continue offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on December 8 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Novopavlivka near Novoserhiivka and south of Novopavlivka near Dachne, Filiya, and Yalta on December 7 and 8.[76]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 239th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, CMD) are striking Ukrainian positions south of Novopavlivka.[77]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on December 8 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Zelenyi Hai; east of Oleksandrivka near Tykhe; and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Sosnivka, Vorone, Sichneve, Vyshneve, Verbove, and Krasnohirske on December 7 and 8.[78] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hai (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[79]

A Russian servicemember operating in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast claimed on December 8 that rainy and foggy weather conditions and muddy terrain are forcing Russian forces to employ all-terrain vehicles instead of motorcycles.[80]

Order of Battle: Assault elements of the Russian 139th Regiment (likely the 139th Assault Battalion of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 29th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[81] Assault, armor, and reconnaissance elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade and of the 5th Tank Brigade (both of the 36th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue to operate in the south Dnipropetrovsk Oblast direction.[82]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Donetsk Oblast on the night of December 7 to 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 8 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone depot near occupied Donetsk City (roughly 53 kilometers from the frontline) and a mobile fire group and Pantsir-S1 air defense system in an unspecified area of occupied Donetsk Oblast.[83]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on December 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of and on the eastern outskirts of Hulyaipole.[84]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; north of Hulyaipole near Radisne and toward Dobropillya, Pryluky, Zelene, and Varvarivka; and northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke, Pryvilne, Zlahoda, and Rybne on December 7 and 8.[85] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Dobropillya.[86]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 57th and 60th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces and vehicles near Hulyaipole.[87] Multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) elements of the 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA) are reportedly firing propaganda pamphlets in artillery tubes at Ukrainian forces near Hulyaipole.[88] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones over Hulyaipilskyi Raion.[89]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on December 8 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized Novodanylivka (southeast of Orikhiv).[90] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Lukyanivkse and east of Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[91]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; southwest of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka; and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk, Prymorske, and Stepove on December 7 and 8.[92]

Ukrainian National Police and Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Ivan Fedorov reported on December 8 that Russian forces conducted three guided glide bomb strikes against the industrial zone of Zaporizhzhia City and Vilnyansk (northeast of Zaporizhzhia City), injuring 15 people.[93]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 4th Military Base (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Orikhiv direction.[94] Elements of the 11th Separate Airborne (VDV) Brigade are reportedly using unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) equipped with explosive devices to strike Ukrainian positions near Orikhiv.[95] Elements of the 108th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Zaporizhia direction.[96]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on December 8 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge on December 7 and 8.[97]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 217th VDV Regiment and 215th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (both of the 98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian equipment and positions in the Kherson direction, including in Kherson City.[98]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 7 to 8. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 149 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — of which roughly 90 were Shahed-type drones — from the directions of Bryansk, Oryol, and Kursk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Kai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[99] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 131 drones; that 16 drones struck 11 locations; and that downed debris fell on four locations. The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy reported on December 8 that Russian strikes against energy infrastructure caused power outages in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Sumy, and Chernihiv oblasts.[100] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian and residential infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv, and Sumy oblasts.[101]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.