Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 28, 2025

Assessment as of December 28: 8:45 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:15pm ET on December 28, except for reports about the December 28 US-Ukrainian meeting in Florida. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 29 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US and Ukrainian delegations met in Florida on December 28 to discuss the latest US-Ukrainian-European 20-point peace plan and other documents related to a potential peace settlement. US Donald Trump stated that he and Zelensky spoke to European, NATO, and EU leaders after the US-Ukrainian meeting.[1] Trump stated that a few issues remain unresolved, including territorial issues related to Donbas and a possible ceasefire to allow Ukraine to hold a referendum on a future peace agreement. Trump stated that the meeting discussed the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) at length and that Ukraine and Russia are working together to open the plant. Zelensky stated that the parties have almost agreed on the 20-point peace plan and on a document between the United States, Ukraine, and Europe on security guarantees for Ukraine. Zelensky stated that the parties have "100 percent" finalized another document between Ukraine and the United States on security guarantees. Zelensky noted that discussions continue about a plan to ensure Ukraine's post-war economic prosperity. Zelensky stated that Ukrainian and European delegations will meet in the coming weeks to continue discussions, and Trump stated that Ukrainian, American, and Russian working groups will meet in January 2026. Trump called Russian President Vladimir Putin on December 28 before his meeting with Zelensky, and Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov reported that Trump and Putin also discussed the working groups, one of which will focus on security issues, while another will focus on economic issues.[2]

Recent Kremlin statements are at odds with several of the positions that Trump presented as the basis for ending the war. The Kremlin has repeatedly rejected European-led security guarantees for Ukraine.[3] Kremlin officials have also called for any future peace agreement to address Russia's demands that NATO cease expansion and roll back its borders.[4] Ushakov reported that Putin used his call with Trump to make "very detailed arguments" about the importance of adhering to the agreements the United States and Russia allegedly made at the August 2025 Alaska Summit.[5] Kremlin officials have claimed that the Alaska Summit agreed to principles based on Putin’s June 2024 speech to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), in which Putin demanded the capitulation to Russia’s original war demands of both Ukraine and NATO.[6] Putin also referenced his 2024 MFA speech during a meeting with Russian military commanders on December 27.[7] ISW continues to assess that Kremlin statements demonstrate that Russia’s goals in Ukraine exceed territorial demands such as the seizure of Donetsk Oblast and that a peace deal that does not address Russian demands of NATO and the West outside of Ukraine will not satisfy Russia, nor lead to a lasting peace that can normalize Russian-European or US-Russian relations.[8]

 Russian President Vladimir Putin and high-ranking Russian military commanders continue to aggrandize tactical details to create the false impression that Ukrainian defenses across the frontline are on the verge of collapse. Putin met on December 27 with the leadership of the Russian General Staff and grouping of forces (GoFs) commanders - the latest in a string of performative, publicized meetings between Putin and his commanders in recent weeks.[9] The Kremlin likely timed the meeting to fall on the eve of the December 28 meeting between US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Florida in order to influence the US-Ukrainian meeting. Putin, Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov, and the GoF commanders made a series of likely exaggerated claims about Russian successes across the battlefield. Russian Central GoF Commander Colonel General Valery Solodchuk claimed that Russian forces seized Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk), and Vilne (east of Dobropillya), and Eastern GoF Commander Colonel General Andrei Ivanaev claimed that Russian forces seized Hulyaipole. Gerasimov briefly mentioned Kupyansk during his report to Putin, claiming that the Russian Western GoF is eliminating the Ukrainian forces blocked on the east (left) bank of the Oskil River in Kupyansk. Gerasimov likely limited his remarks about the Western GoF given the widespread backlash the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has received in recent days from Russian milbloggers concerning the exaggerations and lies the MoD has platformed about the alleged seizure of Kupyansk and Ukrainian successes to liberate a significant portion of the town.[10]

Gerasimov reported to Putin that Russian forces will continue to conduct combat missions to seize all of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts.[11] ISW assesses that Russian forces have advanced at an average rate of 14.4 square kilometers per day in 2025, meaning it would take Russian forces until April 1, 2029 (1,190 days) to seize the rest of the four oblasts should the current tempo persist. This calculation, however, does not take into account the many obstacles Russian forces would face along the way, such as crossing the Dnipro River, overcoming other water features throughout the oblasts, and seizing the major cities of Zaporizhzhia City (with a pre-war population of about 710,000 people) and Kherson City (with a pre-war population of about 280,000). Russian advances are not likely to be linear, and it will likely take Russian forces longer than 1,190 days to seize all four oblasts.

Putin and the commanders continue to falsely portray future Russian efforts to seize the Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast as a quick and easy endeavor. The Fortress Belt consists of four heavily fortified major population centers - Kostyantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, and Slovyansk - that make up the backbone of Ukraine's defense in Donetsk Oblast.[12] Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces control more than half of the buildings within Kostyantynivka and are "rapidly" advancing toward Slovyansk following the recent seizure of Siversk.[13] Solodchuk claimed that Russian forces seized Sofiivka, which Solodchuk called an "important" settlement and "key" for further Russian offensive operations northward toward the Fortress Belt cities. ISW has only observed evidence indicating a Russian presence (either through infiltration missions or assaults) in five percent of Kostyantynivka. Putin and the commanders are presenting claimed subtactical- or tactical-level Russian successes, such as the seizure of the small settlement of Sofiivka, as having operational- or even strategic-level significance. Ukraine's Fortress Belt is much larger and more populous than any of the settlements or towns Russian forces have seized in recent years, and Russian forces have shown no ability to rapidly envelop, penetrate, or otherwise seize cities of this size since 2022. ISW assessed in late November 2025 that Russian forces would finalize the seizure of the remainder of Donetsk Oblast only in August 2027, assuming Russian forces will be able to maintain their rate of advance at that time.[14]

ISW has observed recent open-source evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence in Rodynske and that Russian forces have operated within less than half of Myrnohrad. Geolocated footage published on December 28 shows Ukrainian forces operating in northern Rodynske, indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain the ability to operate in the settlement.[15] Geolocated footage published on December 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Myrnohrad.[16] Additional geolocated footage published on December 27 shows Russian forces raising flags at multiple locations in northern Myrnohrad and central Rodynske during what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA).[17] ISW has only observed evidence indicating a Russian presence (either through infiltration missions or assaults) within only 49 percent of Myrnohrad. The Ukrainian General Staff on December 27 refuted the Russian claims of the seizure of Myrnohrad and noted that Russian forces have yet to seize Pokrovsk – even as Russian forces have notably been fighting within Pokrovsk itself for almost 150 days.[18] The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces also reported on December 28 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions within northern Pokrovsk.[19]

ISW has only observed open-source evidence to assess that Russian forces have operated in roughly 55 percent of Hulyaipole. Geolocated footage published on December 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern, central, southern, and southeastern Hulyaipole.[20] Additional geolocated footage published on December 27 shows Russian servicemembers raising flags at multiple locations in western and southwestern Hulyaipole during what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[21] The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukraine’s Southern Defense Forces refuted on December 27 the Russian claims of the seizure of Hulyaipole and stated that Ukrainian forces continue defensive operations within the town, though the situation is “difficult.”[22] The Southern Defense Forces acknowledged that Russian forces control part of the town but reported that Ukrainian forces continue to hold a significant part of Hulyaipole.[23] The Southern Defense Forces reported that Russian forces possess significant numerical superiority in personnel and equipment in Hulyaipole – in line with ISW’s ongoing assessment that Russian forces are able to make gains when they concentrate forces on a specific sector, but often at the expense of other areas.[24]

Russia appears to be increasing the sophistication of its cognitive warfare effort that uses flag raisings to achieve informational impacts. Geolocated footage published on December 27 and 28 shows small groups of two to three Russian servicemembers raising flags throughout Myrnohrad and Hulyaipole, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published the footage to coincide with the Russian military commanders' reports to Putin that Russian forces had seized the settlements.[25] These flag raising videos are notably more complex and higher-production edited montages of several clips and Russian forces scattered throughout numerous locations in both Myrnohrad and Hulyaipole. Previous flag raising videos, in contrast, were shorter one-off videos in one or a few locations throughout a settlement. The increased sophistication and use of montage videos to assert territorial gains suggests that the Kremlin is engaging in a coordinated campaign to support the higher Russian military command’s informational efforts. The Kremlin in Fall 2025 began relying on footage showing small groups of Russian infiltrators raising flags in order to claim broad advances or seizures as part of an informational effort to portray Russian successes as more expansive than the battlefield reality.[26] ISW assessed at the time that the Kremlin was trying to exploit mapping methodologies that have become widespread throughout the war, including from open-source intelligence (OSINT) sources.[27] Russia is likely increasing the level of sophistication of its flag-raising videos as it has since become clear that a flag raising does not necessarily signify control. Russian forces notably engaged in similar flag raising tactics throughout Kupyansk to support the Russian MoD’s false claim that Russian forces had seized the town.[28] These flag raisings aim to support Putin’s aggrandized claims of Russian advances and the false narrative that Ukrainian defenses are collapsing across the theater.

Putin's meeting with military commanders platformed on-the-ground tactical commanders in an effort to lend credence to the Russian military command's aggrandized claims. The meeting prominently featured reports from frontline company and brigade commanders purportedly calling in from the field near Myrnohrad and Hulyaipole.[29] The commanders described Russian offensive operations over the past months in both sectors of the front in granular detail, essentially describing how Russian forces advanced roughly three kilometers toward Myrnohrad over four months and roughly seven kilometers toward Hulyaipole over 23 days. One brigade commander near Myrnohrad reported on Russian advances as minutely as “up to one kilometer” over the course of 24 days in September. Russian milbloggers have long complained about the widespread practice of false reports in the entire Russian chain of command and exaggerated advances, and false claims about the alleged seizure of Kupyansk recently reignited these milblogger complaints.[30] The inclusion of lower-echelon commanders in the December 27 meeting among Russian General Staff leaders and Russian Grouping of Forces commanders likely aims to bring credibility to Putin’s and other high-ranking senior Russian military officials' exaggerated claims of sweeping Russian advances.[31]

Putin and Russian military commanders continue to discuss the need to form "buffer zones" in areas of Ukraine outside of the four oblasts Russia illegally annexed in 2022. Putin stated that Russian forces’ efforts to establish a buffer zone in the border areas of the Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts and in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast are proceeding at a "good pace."[32] Solodchuk noted that Russian offensive operations in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast aim to implement Putin's instructions to create a buffer zone to protect occupied Donetsk Oblast. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov similarly claimed at the December 17 Russian MoD board meeting that the alleged seizure of Kupyansk was part of Russian efforts to expand the buffer zone in Kharkiv Oblast to reduce the threat of shelling against northern areas of occupied Luhansk Oblast.[33] Sumy, Kharkiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts are not any of the regions that Russia illegally annexed, and recent peace negotiations have not discussed ceding this territory to Russia but have rather called for Russia to withdraw from these territories.[34]

ISW has not observed evidence of commensurate offensive activity in northern Ukraine to support Putin’s claim that Russian offensive operations in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts are advancing at a "good pace." Russian forces recently conducted limited cross-border attacks across a broad part of previously dormant areas in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts on December 20 and 21, but these attacks have since stalled, supporting ISW's assessment at the time that Russia was conducting the assaults as part of a cognitive warfare effort to convince the West that the frontlines in Ukraine are collapsing.[35] Russian activity in other areas of northern Sumy Oblast has been low, with the Ukrainian General Staff consistently reporting only a small number of Russian attacks in the area.[36] Russian forces have slightly increased their activity in the Vovchansk direction in recent weeks, but Russian forces have only advanced about nine kilometers deep from the Russian border since beginning the offensive in northern Kharkiv Oblast in May 2024.[37] Ukrainian forces have also retaken significant swaths of land in Kupyansk, significantly slowing Russian efforts to create a buffer zone in Kharkiv Oblast.[38]

Key Takeaways:

• US and Ukrainian delegations met in Florida on December 28 to discuss the latest US-Ukrainian-European 20-point peace plan and other documents related to a potential peace settlement.
• Recent Kremlin statements are at odds with several of the positions that Trump presented as the basis for ending the war.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin and high-ranking Russian military commanders continue to aggrandize tactical details to create the false impression that Ukrainian defenses across the frontline are on the verge of collapse.
• Putin and the commanders continue to falsely portray future Russian efforts to seize the Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast as a quick and easy endeavor.
• ISW has observed recent open-source evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence in Rodynske and that Russian forces have operated within less than half of Myrnohrad.
• ISW has only observed open-source evidence to assess that Russian forces have operated in roughly 55 percent of Hulyaipole.
• Russia appears to be increasing the sophistication of its cognitive warfare effort that uses flag raisings to achieve informational impacts.
• Putin's meeting with military commanders platformed on-the-ground tactical commanders in an effort to lend credence to the Russian military command's aggrandized claims.
• Putin and Russian military commanders continue to discuss the need to form "buffer zones" in areas of Ukraine outside of the four oblasts Russia illegally annexed in 2022.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure on the night of December 27 to 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Syzran Oil Refinery in Samara Oblast, causing a fire.[39] Geolocated footage published on December 28 confirms the strike.[40] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the refinery has an annual processing volume of seven to 8.9 million tons of oil.[41] Ukrainian broadcaster Suspline reported, citing local sources, that the strike hit the ELOU-AVT-5 unit primary crude oil processing system.[42] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that a recent Ukrainian strike on an unspecified date against the Volgograd Oil Refinery in Volgograd Oblast damaged the oil product pipeline and production process plant.[43]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on December 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including north of Sumy City near Andriivka and Varachyne, on December 27 and 28.[44] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces counterattacked near Varachyne and Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[45]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on December 28 but did not advance

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Prylipka, Vovchanski Khutory, Starytsia, Vilcha, Vovchansk, Izbytske, and Lyman and toward Symynivka on December 27 and 28.[46] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vilcha.[47]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Kharkiv Oblast.[48] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 245th and 347th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Sosnivka (northwest of Kharkiv City).[49]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on December 27 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Dvorichanske (southeast of Velykyi Burluk).[50]

Russian forces attacked east of Velykyi Burluk toward Hryhorivka on December 26 and 27.[51]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on December 28 but did not advance.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Footage published on December 27 and geolocated by ISW on December 28 shows Russian forces operating in eastern Kupyansk during what ISW assesses were infiltration missions that did not change the control of terrain or forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[52]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northwest of Kupyansk toward Mala Shapkivka; east of Kupyansk toward Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk toward Pishchane on December 27 and 28.[53]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continued to post footage and statements on December 27 and 28 supporting official Russian claims of advance in the Kupyansk direction, likely as part of its ongoing efforts to cover up recent Russian failures in the area amid ongoing widespread criticism.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed on December 28 that Kupyansk was a “sore point” for Russian forces in the last week (between roughly December 21 and 28), noting that the Russian military command continued to make large preemptive claims about Russian advances in Kupyansk for informational and psychological purposes that were later proven to be false.[55]

Order of Battle: Reconnaissance elements of the Russian 26th Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Hlushkivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[56] Drone operators and other elements of the 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD), including its 122nd Motorized Rifle Regiment, are reportedly operating in and around Kupyansk.[57]

Russian forces continued offensive operations southeast of Borova toward Druzhelyubivka on December 26 and 27 but did not advance.[58]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction on December 28 but did not advance.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on December 27 that Russian forces are operating in eastern and southeastern Lyman.[59]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Novoselivka, Serednie, and Drobysheve and toward Oleksandrivka; north of Lyman toward Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Myrne; and east of Lyman near Zarichne on December 27 and 28.[60]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Luhansk Oblast on the night of December 27 to 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian 1435th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely comprised of mobilized personnel) (reportedly of the 2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) repair unit in occupied Antratsyt (southwest of Luhansk City, roughly 100 kilometers from the frontline).[61]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on December 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on December 27 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in central Zakitne (northwest of Siversk) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[62]  Available video evidence and reports from Ukrainian military sources indicate that Russian forces likely infiltrated forested areas on the south bank of the Siverskyi Donets River northeast of Zakitne.[63]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in central Zakitne.[64]

Russian forces attacked near Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Ozerne, Zakitne, Yampil, and Dibrova; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; south of Siversk near Svyato-Pokrovske; and southwest of Siversk near Vasyukivka and Riznykivka and toward Bondarne on December 27 and 28.[65]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 169th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating near Yampil.[66] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov credited elements of the 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) with the claimed seizure of Svyato-Pokrovske.[67] Elements of the BARS-16 Kuban Detachment (Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly operating in the Siversk direction.[68]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on December 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

See topline text for more information on unconfirmed claims in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Minkivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Predtechyne and Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Kleban-Byk, and Shcherbynivka; south of Kostyantynivka toward Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka and toward Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka on December 27 and 28.[69]

A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian military command has not provided Russian forces operating in the Kostyantynivka direction with sufficient resources or drones in favor of equipping units in the neighboring Pokrovsk direction, leading to even high casualty rates in the Kostyantynivka direction.[70]

Order of Battle: First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 174th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) near Torske (southwest of Druzhkivka).[71] Drone operators and artillery elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Mykolaypillya (south of Druzhkivka).[72] FPV drone operators of the Russian 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment) (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Kostyantynivka.[73]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on December 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

See topline text for unconfirmed claims of Russian advances in the Dobropillya direction.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar; east of Dobropillya near Shakhove, Nove Shakhove, and Novyi Donbas; and southeast of Dobropillya near Dorozhnie on December 27 and 28.[74]

The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 28 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian pontoon crossing near Zapovidne (southeast of Dobropillya).[75]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 174th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly operating in the Dobropillya direction.[76]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

See topline text for additional assessed Russian advances and unconfirmed claims of Russian advances in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: ISW has not observed evidence in the past few weeks that would indicate that Ukrainian forces continue to maintain defensive positions south of and in southern Myrnohrad, and available visual evidence and combat footage collected in December 2025 suggests that the FEBA is north of the railway between Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, indicating that Russian forces advanced south of and in southern Myrnohrad. This change did not occur in the past 24 hours but is a reflection of ISW’s updated assessment.

Russian forces attacked within and near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Sukhetske, Bilytske, and Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Novopidhorodne, and Molodetske; and west of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka on December 27 and 28.[77]

The commander of a Ukrainian mortar battery operating in the Pokrovsk direction stated on December 28 that Russian forces continue to take advantage of poor weather conditions that hinder Ukrainian drone reconnaissance to conduct infiltration missions in small infantry groups.[78] The commander stated that Ukrainian and Russian positions are often intermixed on the same streets within Pokrovsk and that Russian forces can move relatively unnoticed between buildings because Ukrainian forces are struggling to create full-fledged "kill zones" in the dense urban environment. The commander stated that Russian forces have increased their number of first-person view (FPV) drones in the area to cut off Ukrainian logistics and have pulled mortars up to the northern areas of Pokrovsk. The commander reported that Ukrainian forces continue to supply forward positions, however.

Order of Battle: Russian officials claimed that elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA, SMD) and of the 1435th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely comprised of mobilized personnel) (reportedly of the 2nd CAA, CMD) seized Myrnohrad.[79] Russian officials claimed that elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st CAA) seized Rodynske.[80] Drone operator and artillery elements of the 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Motorized Rifle Division, 2nd CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Myrnohrad.[81] Elements of the 86th Rifle Regiment (under the operational control of the 1st Slovyansk Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st CAA) are reportedly operating west of Myrnohrad.[82]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on December 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself and south of Novopavlivka near Filiya and Dachne on December 27 and 28.[83]

Order of Battle: Russian Central GoF Commander Colonel General Valery Solodchuk claimed that elements of the Russian 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, CMD) are operating in Novopavlivka.[84]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on December 28 but did not advance.

 Russian forces attacked northeast of Oleksandrivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove, Yalta, and Ivanivka and southeast of Oleksandrivka near Oleksandrohrad, Verbove, Vyshneve, and Khoroshe on December 27 and 28.[85]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military targets in occupied Donetsk Oblast overnight on December 27 to 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on December 28 that Ukrainian forces struck a Shahed drone depot in occupied Makiivka (just north of Donetsk City, roughly 47 kilometers from the frontline) overnight.[86] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on December 28 that Ukraine’s December 26 strikes against a base of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) in occupied Berdyanske (east of Mariupol, roughly 125 kilometers from the frontline) killed 51 Russian servicemembers and injured another 74.[87]

 Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

 See topline text for assessed Russian advances, infiltrations, and additional unconfirmed claims of Russian advances in the Hulyaipole direction.

 Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Hulyaipole.[88]

Russian forces attacked near and within Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole toward Ternuvate and Kosivtseve; north of Hulyaipole near Dobropillya and Nove Zaporizhzhia; northeast of Hulyaipole near Solodke, Pryvilne, and Rybne; and south of Hulyaipole near Dorozhnyanka on December 27 and 28.[89]

Order of Battle: Russian officials claimed that elements of the Russian 57th and 60th motorized rifle brigades (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]), the 114th Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA), and of the 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) seized Hulyaipole.[90] A Russian milblogger also credited elements of the 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA) and the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) with providing fire support to Russian forces during ground operations against Hulyaipole.[91] reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Verkhnya Tersa (northwest of Hulyaipole) and Hirke (west of Hulyaipole).[92]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on December 28 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces seized Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[93] Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov credited elements of the Russian 247th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) with the claimed seizure of Stepnohirsk.[94] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Lukyanivske (northwest of Orikhiv) and along the E-105 Vasylivka-Kamyanske highway northwest of Stepnohirsk.[95]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka and Bilohirya; west of Orikhiv near Shcherbaky, Stepove, Novoandriivka, Stepnohirsk, and Prymorske; and northwest of Orikhiv near Lukyanivske on December 27 and 28.[96] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Prymorske.[97]

Ukraine’s Southern Defense Forces acknowledged on December 27 that Russian forces are attempting to infiltrate into Stepnohirsk and that heavy fighting is ongoing for the settlement, but noted that Ukrainian forces control part of Stepnohirsk, contrary to Russian claims.[98]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th VDV Division are reportedly operating near Prymorske and toward Novoyakovlivka and Novoboikivske (both northwest of Orikhiv).[99] Drone operators and other elements of the 108th VDV Regiment and 162nd Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (both of the 7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction, including near Prymorske.[100] Drone operators of the 4th Military Base (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones in the Orikhiv direction.[101] Drone operators and other elements of the Nemets group of the 3rd Assault Company of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction, including near Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv).[102]

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi reported on December 28 that the IAEA brokered a local multi-day ceasefire agreement with both Ukraine and Russia to restore power transmission between the switchyards of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and the Zaporizhzhia Thermal Power Plant (ZTPP).[103] The IAEA previously brokered temporary ceasefires near ZNPP to conduct similar repairs in October and November 2025.[104]

 Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on December 28 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Bridge on December 27 and 28.[105]

Order of Battle: Drone operator elements of the Russian 98th VDV Division are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones and demining roads on the west (left) bank of the Dnipro River.[106]

Ukraine continued its mid-range strike campaign against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Crimea on the night of December 27 to 28.  The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian storage and maintenance site for naval drones near occupied Chornomorske, Crimea.[107] Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi posted footage that was later geolocated, and reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Valdai radar station, the control point of the radar reconnaissance system, and the base for storing and launching unmanned naval drones near occupied Chornomorske.[108]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of long-range drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 27 to 28. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 48 Shahed-type, Geran-type, and other drones, of which about 30 were Shahed-type drones, from the directions of Oryol and Kursk cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske and Cape Chauda Crimea.[109] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 30 drones and that 18 drones struck 9 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck energy infrastructure in Kyiv and Chernihiv oblasts.[110] The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy reported that Russian overnight strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure left 39,000 subscribers without electricity in Kyiv and Chernihiv oblasts.[111]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on December 28 that Russian forces launched over 2,100 drones, roughly 800 guided aerial bombs, and 94 missiles against Ukraine during the week of December 28 (between December 21 and 28).[112]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

 Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.