Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 2, 2025

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Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1:30 PM ET on December 2, except for reports about the December 2 US-Russia meeting in Moscow. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected the US-Ukrainian peace proposal during his meeting with a US delegation in Moscow on December 2 and remains highly unlikely to accept any compromises short of his original war goals. Putin, Russian Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov, and Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) CEO Kirill Dmitriev met on December 2 with US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and former Senior Advisor to the US President Jared Kushner.[1] Ushakov stated after the meeting that the US and Russian delegations discussed "several options" for a peace settlement but that they did not agree on a "compromise plan."[2] Ushakov stated that some of the US proposals were acceptable to Russia but that Putin "made no secret" of Russia's critical or negative attitude about others. Ushakov stated that the parties did not discuss "specific wording or specific proposals" but discussed the "essence" of the documents that the United States "submitted to Moscow some time ago." Ushakov stated that the delegations discussed territorial issues and the "enormous prospects" for US-Russian economic cooperation. Ushakov stated that the US and Russian delegations agreed not to disclose the substance of the talks - in line with ISW's December 1 forecast that the Kremlin was planning to refrain from publicly discussing the outcomes of the meeting to obfuscate Russia's rejection of the US-Ukrainian peace proposal.[3] High-ranking Kremlin officials, including Putin, have been consistently rejecting the 28-point peace plan and its subsequent iterations since it was first reported in mid-November 2025 because the proposed plans did not concede to all of Russia’s maximalist war demands.[4]

NBC reported on December 2, before the US-Russian meeting, that a Russian official stated that Russia will not compromise on territory in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, limits on Ukraine's military, and US and European recognition of Russia's occupation of Ukrainian territory.[5] The source reportedly stated that Russia is prepared to be flexible on "secondary issues," such as frozen Russian assets in Europe. Kremlin insider sources may have leaked information into the US information space about Russia's stance to frame Russia as willing to compromise on some "secondary issues" in return for Ukrainian and Western concessions on other issues. Russia's original war aims include the annexation of all of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts and limits on the Ukrainian military such that Ukraine cannot defend itself, while issues related to frozen Russian assets are notably not part of Russia's original war aims. Kremlin insider reports likely also aim to obfuscate Putin's actual, more extreme objective of taking control of not only all of Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts, but of all of Ukraine.

The Kremlin intensified its cognitive warfare effort that aims to portray a Russian victory in Ukraine as imminent in the lead up to the December 2 US-Russia meeting, likely to coerce the West into accepting Russia's absolutist demands. Putin held a meeting with Russian military commanders on the evening of November 30 and answered journalists' questions on December 2, during which Putin flaunted Russia's alleged successes across the battlefield.[6] The Kremlin notably did not publish the readout of Putin's meeting with the commanders until late in the evening on December 1, suggesting that the Kremlin was trying to create informational efforts ahead of Putin's December 2 meeting with the US delegation. Putin and Russian military commanders claimed that Russian forces seized Pokrovsk, southern Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk), Vovchansk, and Kupyansk. Ukrainian officials and Russian milbloggers continued to refute these Kremlin claims, however. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on December 2 that Ukrainian forces are clearing Russian forces from Kupyansk and blocking Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups' infiltration routes into the town.[7] Ukraine's Joint Forces Task Force reported that Ukrainian forces control most of Kupyansk and that Russian groups only maintain a presence in the northern part.[8] Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces maintain positions within Vovchansk and Pokrovsk, and a Russian milblogger acknowledged that Ukrainian forces remain in northern Pokrovsk.[9]

Putin and the Russian military commanders amplified Russian successes in the Lyman, Siversk, Kostyantynivka, Hulyaipole, and Orikhiv directions, and Putin noted that Russian forces "entirely" maintain the initiative across the front.[10] Putin stated that the Russian military command must provide Russian troops with "everything they need" for winter operations – implying that Russia is prepared to continue hostilities to achieve its goals militarily. Putin's long held theory of victory is predicated on the assumption that Russian forces will be able to indefinitely continue gradual advances, prevent Ukraine from regaining any territory, outlast Western support for Ukraine and Ukrainian ability to resist Russian aggression, and ultimately win a war of attrition.[11] Putin's aggrandized battlefield claims are part of his wider efforts to convince the West that Russia can outlast Ukraine, such that Ukraine and the West should acquiesce to Russian demands now during negotiations.

Putin exaggerated Russia's claimed seizure of Pokrovsk as strategically important for large scale breakthroughs. ISW has not observed evidence to confirm the complete Russian seizure of Pokrovsk, but Russia's seizure of the town in the near future is unlikely to produce rapid Russian advances. Putin claimed on December 2 that Pokrovsk is a “good base” for achieving all the objectives that Putin set at the beginning of the war.[12] Putin claimed that Pokrovsk offers Russian forces the ability to advance in "any direction" that the Russian General Staff “deems most promising.” Putin’s statements overestimate the ease with which Russian forces will be able to conduct large-scale breakthroughs from Pokrovsk. Russian forces will likely face several challenges when advancing from Pokrovsk. Ukrainian forces have a series of effective field fortifications to the west, north, and northeast of Pokrovsk that will complicate Russian advances from Pokrovsk.[13] Russian forces have also recently exploited periods of foggy and rainy weather that hinder the operability of Ukrainian drones to advance in various areas of the front line, but these weather conditions will not persist indefinitely.[14] Russian forces will additionally face terrain and water features that complicate Russia’s ability to rapidly maneuver. Russian forces notably previously failed to make operationally significant advances in the Dobropillya direction as they struggled to widen the deep but narrow penetration and maintain supplies to Russian forces in the area.[15] Elements of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA, former 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) also notably struggled to close the northern shoulder of the Russian encirclement of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket while also defending against Ukrainian counterattacks in the Dobropillya direction, and Russia will likely face similar problems advancing from Pokrovsk.[16] Russian forces operating in the Pokrovsk direction are also likely severely degraded, having suffered significant losses in recent months.[17] ISW previously assessed that the Russian seizure of Pokrovsk would achieve an operationally significant effect of depriving Ukraine of its use of Pokrovsk as a logistics hub, but that Russia had already achieved this objective by July 2025.[18] The further operational significance of a Russian seizure of Pokrovsk will depend on the nature of Ukrainian withdrawal, Ukrainian defenses beyond Pokrovsk, and the availability of necessary combat power to exploit the collapse of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad pocket. A Russian seizure of Pokrovsk will not significantly alter Russia's ability to achieve Putin's objective of imminently seizing all of Donetsk Oblast, as Russian forces have yet to seize the Fortress Belt, Ukraine’s main defensive line in Donetsk Oblast that consists of large population centers the size of which Russia has not seized since 2022.

Putin also intensified efforts to portray the Russian economy as resilient and able to support protracted hostilities in Ukraine in the lead up to the December 2 meeting. Putin spoke at the VTB "Russia Calling!" investment forum on December 2, before he met with the US delegation, and attempted to portray the Russian economy as unaffected by Western sanctions.[19] Putin acknowledged that external pressure has impacted Russia but claimed that the Russian economy is "successfully coping" with these challenges. Putin claimed that Russia's unemployment rate is 2.2 percent and that Russia has made significant progress in reducing inflation to seven percent year on year. Putin acknowledged that Russian economic growth slowed in the first nine months of 2025 but claimed that the Russian government expected this when the Russian Central Bank raised the interest rate to 21 percent in October 2024 to combat rising inflation rates. Putin attempted to posture medium-term stability by claiming that the Kremlin designed the federal budget for 2026-2028 to mitigate external risks and increase the share of non-oil and gas revenues. Putin noted that Russia has significantly increased trade with countries like the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and India.

The Kremlin's recent economic policies indicate that the Russian economy is doing markedly worse than Putin's portrayal, however. Russian inflation is estimated at around 20 percent, and the Russian Ministry of Finance stated on September 29 that it expects Russia's oil and gas revenues to be down 50 percent in 2026 as compared to 2025.[20] The Russian Central Bank began selling its physical gold reserves in late November 2025 for the first time as part of the Russian Ministry of Finance's operations to fund the state budget.[21] Russia has steadily depleted its sovereign wealth fund's liquid reserves funding its war in Ukraine and has had to resort to selling its gold reserves due to unsustainable spending.[22] Putin also signed a law on November 27 increasing the Value Added Tax (VAT) from 20 to 22 percent, likely to buttress federal budget deficits.[23] Russia's extremely low unemployment rate indicates that Russia is experiencing labor shortages and is likely causing wage inflation in the civilian and defense sectors, contributing to inflation. Russia has also likely had to resort to importing labor from North Korea to compensate for labor shortages, and Putin's recent executive order temporarily waiving visa requirements for Chinese nationals suggests that Russia could be preparing to import labor from the PRC as well.[24] Russia recently began compulsory recruitment of active reservists, likely to prepare to deploy them to combat in Ukraine, as Russian regional authorities continue to reduce one-time recruitment payments in the face of mounting economic strain.[25] These policies demonstrate that the Russian economy is not as resilient to Western sanctions, monetary constraints, and the cost of the war effort as Putin is claiming. Putin is likely attempting to convince the United States that increased sanctions pressure will not have its intended effect on the Russian economy and will not push Putin to make compromises to end his war against Ukraine.

Putin attempted to preemptively deflect blame onto Europe for Russia's rejection of any peace plan iterations ahead of the December 2 US-Russian meeting. Putin answered journalists' questions on December 2 ahead of the meeting and claimed that Europe is hindering US President Donald Trump's peace efforts.[26] Putin stated that Europe created peace proposals with points that are "completely unacceptable" to Russia and that Russia will only "allow" Europe to return to the negotiation process if Europe accepts the "realities on the ground," a phrase the Kremlin often uses to refer to Russian advances on the battlefield. Ushakov similarly stated on December 2, following the US-Russia meeting, that European leaders are engaged in "destructive actions" in the peace process.[27] High ranking Kremlin officials repeatedly indicated in recent weeks that the Kremlin was not going to accept any peace agreement that did not meet Russia's maximalist demands, including the US-proposed original 28-point peace plan.[28] The Kremlin is likely setting conditions to blame Europe's insertion of non-starters into any peace plan as the reason for Russia's rejection, essentially using Europe as a scapegoat for Russia's own obstruction of the peace process.

Putin threatened Europe to prevent Europe from engaging in the peace process. Putin claimed that Russia has no intention of going to war with Europe but would be "ready right now" should Europe suddenly want to fight Russia.[29] Putin issued a thinly veiled nuclear threat, stating that a situation would "quickly arise" should Europe start a war with Russia, in which Russia will "have no one to negotiate with." Putin also threatened that a future Russia-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) war would not be like Russia's war in Ukraine, which Putin claimed Russia is conducting "surgically" and "carefully." Putin claimed that the war in Ukraine is not a war "in the literal, modern sense of the word," threateningly implying that Russia could fully mobilize its military, economy, and society in a war against NATO. Russian State Duma deputies echoed Putin's threats on December 2. Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed that there is a "dangerous trend" in Europe toward militarization and threatened that "the more you play with fire, the higher the risk of a conflagration in Europe and around the world."[30] State Duma Defense Committee member Lieutenant General Viktor Sobolev claimed that Europe is trying to protract the war in Ukraine until a war between Russia and Europe erupts.[31] Kremlin threats against Europe likely aim to deter Europe's involvement in the peace process as well as undermine the strengthening of Europe's defenses out of fear of allegedly provoking Russian aggression.

Russia may be trying to set information conditions to justify Russian strikes against Ukrainian ports to impose a de facto blockade of Ukraine. The Turkish Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure stated on December 2 that the MIDVOLGA-2 tanker reported that unspecified actors attacked it 80 miles off the coast of Turkey while it was transporting sunflower oil from Russia to Georgia.[32] Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Heorhii Tykhyi stated that Ukraine was not involved in the incident and that Russia may have staged it, questioning why the ship was sailing from Russia to Georgia via Turkey's exclusive economic zone.[33] Russian milbloggers widely blamed Ukrainian forces for conducting a strike against the Russian-flagged vessel with an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).[34] Sources in Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) notably told Ukrainian media on November 29 that Ukraine was responsible for unmanned surface vehicle (USV) strikes against two oil tankers in Russia's shadow fleet on November 28.[35] The reported use of UAVs against a ship that is not part of Russia's shadow fleet as well as the Ukrainian MFA's public denial about the December 2 strike, are markedly different from the SBU sources' acknowledgement and the use of USVs in the November 28 strikes. The MIDVOLGA-2 notably changed its destination from Rostov-on-Don, Russia, to Mersin, Turkey, on November 28 and turned off its Automatic Identification System (AIS) near occupied Kerch, Crimea, on November 29.[36]

Russian President Vladimir Putin responded on December 2 to a journalist's question about the incident, stating that Russia will take retaliatory measures.[37] Putin threatened that Russia would expand its strikes against Ukrainian ports and ships travelling to Ukrainian ports or would strike vessels belonging to states that are allegedly helping Ukraine conduct strikes against Russian vessels. Russia notably aimed to impose a de facto blockade on Ukrainian ports by withdrawing from the 2022-2023 Black Sea Grain Initiative, which allowed cargo ships to sail between ports in Odesa Oblast and the Bosphorus Strait without fear of Russian strikes.[38] Russia aimed to use the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) to deter Ukrainian and international maritime activity in the Black Sea without having to enforce an actual blockade. Ukraine's missile and drone strike campaign starting in June 2023, however, largely inhibited Russia's ability to use the BSF. Russia may be attempting to use threats of retaliatory strikes to prevent Ukraine's Black Sea activity, as the BSF is no longer an effective deterrent. Russia may also aim to use the threat of strikes to discourage international vessels from transporting Ukrainian grain due to high insurance costs and ultimately to accuse Ukraine of causing global food insecurity.[39]

Putin may also be setting information conditions to justify Russian attempts to seize Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts, although Russia's seizure of these regions remains unlikely at this time. Putin stated that Russia's "most radical" response to the December 2 strike on the tanker would be to cut Ukraine off from the Black Sea – possibly threatening to try to seize territory on Ukraine's Black Sea coast in Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts.[40] Ukrainian Presidential Office Deputy Head Colonel Pavlo Palisa told reporters on June 5 that Russia likely seeks to occupy the entirety of Ukraine on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River and seize Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts by the end of 2026, depriving Ukraine of access to the Black Sea.[41] A Russian milblogger responded to Putin's threat, noting that it is "currently impossible" for Russian forces to seize Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts.[42] ISW continues to assess that Russia is not in a position to cross the Dnipro River, make significant advances westward, and seize Odesa City.[43]

Russian forces are modifying their Shahed-type drones to target Ukrainian air defenders. Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on December 2 that Russian forces have begun striking Ukrainian mobile fire teams operating in moving vehicles with Shahed-type drones.[44] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger noted on December 2 that recent Russian technological adaptations - such as cameras - allow Russian drone operators to directly control Shahed drones (as opposed to Shahed drones with preplanned routes and targets that Russian forces have historically used in strikes against Ukraine’s rear areas), making it easier for Russian forces to hunt Ukrainian air defense systems, especially in rear areas.[45] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister for Innovation Lieutenant Colonel Yurii Myronenko recently stated that Russian forces started using operator-controlled Shahed drones to engage Ukrainian fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters, which Ukrainian forces have been using to shoot down Russian drones.[46] Beskrestnov also reported on December 1 that Russian forces have equipped Shahed drones with R-60 air-to-air missiles to try to destroy Ukrainian helicopters and aircraft that hunt Shaheds.[47] Recent Russian adaptations to the Shahed drone will likely degrade Ukraine's air defenses and ability to down Shaheds in the rear, and Russia has been exploiting drone adaptations to strike moving targets like trains to generate battlefield air interdiction (BAI) effects.[48]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin rejected the US-Ukrainian peace proposal during his meeting with a US delegation in Moscow on December 2 and remains highly unlikely to accept any compromises short of his original war goals.
• The Kremlin intensified its cognitive warfare effort that aims to portray a Russian victory in Ukraine as imminent in the lead up to the December 2 US-Russia meeting, likely to coerce the West into accepting Russia's absolutist demands.
• Putin exaggerated Russia's claimed seizure of Pokrovsk as strategically important for large scale breakthroughs. ISW has not observed evidence to confirm the complete Russian seizure of Pokrovsk, but Russia's seizure of the town in the near future is unlikely to produce rapid Russian advances.
• Putin also intensified efforts to portray the Russian economy as resilient and able to support protracted hostilities in Ukraine in the lead up to the December 2 meeting.
• The Kremlin's recent economic policies indicate that the Russian economy is doing markedly worse than Putin's portrayal, however.
• Putin attempted to preemptively deflect blame onto Europe for Russia's rejection of any peace plan iterations ahead of the December 2 US-Russian meeting.
• Putin threatened Europe to prevent Europe from engaging in the peace process.
• Russia may be trying to set information conditions to justify Russian strikes against Ukrainian ports to impose a de facto blockade of Ukraine.
• Putin may also be setting information conditions to justify Russian attempts to seize Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts, although Russia's seizure of these regions remains unlikely at this time.
• Russian forces are modifying their Shahed-type drones to target Ukrainian air defenders.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast and near Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, and Hulyaipole.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces likely continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian energy and military infrastructure on the night of December 1 to 2. Russian opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Orelnefteprodukt Oil Depot and PhosAgro phosphate fertilizer production facility in Livny, Oryol Oblast, and footage shows explosions and fires at a fuel depot in Oryol Oblast.[49] Oryol Oblast Governor Andrey Klychkov acknowledged that Ukrainian drones struck a fuel and energy facility in Livensky raion, Oryol Oblast.[50] Astra also reported and geolocated footage confirms that likely Ukrainian drones struck an FSB building in Achkoy-Martan, Chechnya, causing explosions.[51]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast.

Assessed Russian advances: Footage published on November 28 and geolocated on December 2 indicates that Russian forces advanced east of Kindrativka (north of Sumy City).[52]

Russian forces attacked in unspecified parts of Kursk and Sumy oblasts on December 1 and 2.[53] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Oleksiivka, Andriivka (both north of Sumy City), and Kindrativka.[54]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on December 2 that the Russian military command appointed a new commander to the 3rd Battalion of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) and noted that the new commander is very popular among the servicemembers of the battalion.[55] The milblogger added that the recent arrivals to the 3rd Battalion are incredibly old and not healthy, but that the new commander will likely be able to do something with these lower quality personnel. The milblogger also claimed that the Russian military command is sending Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) elements to dig tunnels in the Sumy direction, as Russian forces have run out of pipes to try and infiltrate through.[56] ISW observed reports in early November that Russian forces attempted to infiltrate into Varachyne (northeast of Sumy City) via a gas pipeline.[57] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces have dug over 10 tunnels near Tetkino (southwest of Glushkovo) and have given up on seizing Ryzhyvka (south of Tetkino and northwest of Sumy City) through traditional assaults, so they are resorting to digging tunnels. The milblogger criticized Russian forces’ apparent inability to conceal such attempts to infiltrate into Ukrainian near rear positions and noted that the only benefit of digging tunnels is that Ukrainian forces don't know the exact location where Russian forces will emerge from these tunnels.

Order of Battle: First person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 106th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones near Sadky (northeast of Sumy City).[58]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on December 2 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov, Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian the 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]); the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division (44th AC)including its 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment; and the 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD), including its 82nd and 1009th motorized rifle regiments seized Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) on December 1.[59] A Russian milblogger also claimed that elements of the Chechen Zapad-Akhmat Battalion (reportedly of the Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 116th Rosgvardia Special Purpose Brigade participated in the claimed seizure of Vovchansk.[60] The Ukrainian 16th Army Corps refuted the Russian MoD's claim on December 2 that Russian forces fully seized Vovchansk and reported that Russian forces infiltrated into Vovchansk and raised flags to falsely claim that Russia seized the settlement for informational purposes.[61] The 16th Army Corps warned that Russia will continue to fabricate claims to posture Russian advances on the battlefield while negotiations with the United States are ongoing. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Vovchansk, in central Vilcha (east of Vovchansk), in western Lyman (southeast of Vovchansk), and along the T-2104 Vovchansk-Chuhunivka Highway in eastern Lyman.[62]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near and within Vovchansk, near Vilcha, Prylipka, Lyman, and Synelnykove, and toward Izbytske on December 1 and 2.[63]

A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction stated on December 2 that Russian forces are taking advantage of fog and wearing camouflage to conceal positions and infiltrate Ukrainian positions.[64] The NCO stated that Russian forces are releasing animals to distract Ukrainian forces.

Russian President Vladimir Putin tasked the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces operating in the Kharkiv direction with creating a buffer zone.[65]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kharkiv direction.[66]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on December 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Milove and Ambarne; east of Velykyi Burluk toward Obukhivka; southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Dvorichanske and toward Kolodyazne on December 1 and 2.[67]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Russian forces launched an offensive in the Khatnie (northeast of Velykyi Burluk) direction.[68]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently maintained positions or advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Refinement of area under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on December 1 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently maintained positions or advanced along the H-26 Kupyansk-Kharkiv City highway in southwestern Kupyansk – an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[69]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Novovasylivka and Synkivka, east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka, and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Hlushkivka on December 1 and 2.[70]

The commander of the Ukrainian drone regiment operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on December 2 that the Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces from the northern outskirts of Kupyansk to the Oskil River and cleared the northwestern outskirts of Kupyansk.[71] The commander stated that Ukrainian forces maintain ground line of communication (GLOCs) to the east (left) bank Oskil River despite Russian glide bomb, fiberoptic drone, and missile strikes, but noted that logistics are complicated in the area.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions in southern Kupyansk.[72] Elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA] (Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly operating south of Kupyansk.[73]  

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on December 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Novoplatonivka and toward Bohuslavka; and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka and toward Shykivka, Druzhelyubivka, Tverdokhlibove, and Novoyehorivka on December 1 and 2.[74]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction on December 2 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on December 1 that Russian forces entered Lyman.[75] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces have only conducted limited small group infiltrations into Lyman and continues to assess that Russian forces do not maintain an enduring presence in Lyman.[76]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Karpivka, Serednie, Oleksandrivka, Shandryholove, Novoselivka, Yarova, Drobysheve, Korovii Yar, and toward Sosnove; north of Lyman near Novomykhailivka, Stavky, and toward Stepove; east of Lyman near Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil and Vasyukivka on December 1 and 2.[77] 

The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction reported on December 2 that Russian forces took advantage of poor weather conditions to conduct a mechanized assault in the Lyman direction.[78] The spokesperson stated that Ukrainian forces repelled the assault by relying on infantry instead of drones due to the weather conditions. ISW has previously observed reports that Russian forces continue to exploit poor weather conditions to advance with mechanized and dismounted infantry.[79]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 164th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th CAA, Central Military District) are reportedly striking Ukrainian infrastructure near the Slovyansk Power Plant.[80] Drone operators of the 169th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Lyman direction.[81]

Ukrainian forces continue their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in the occupied Luhansk Oblast on the night of December 1 to 2. Geolocated footage published on December 2 shows Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) drone operators striking a Russian 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) fuel depot along the H-21 Starobilsk-Novoaidar highway south of occupied Denezhnykove (northwest of Luhansk City, roughly 62 kilometers from the front line).[82]   

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on December 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near and within Siversk itself; northwest of Siversk near Dronivka, Platonivka, and Zakitne; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; south of Siversk near Fedorivka; and southwest of Siversk near Svyato-Pokrovske and Pazeno on December 1 and 2.[83] Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on November 30 that elements of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army ([CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk’s People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are engaged in street battles within Siversk.[84]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 88th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are striking Ukrainian forces in Svyato-Pokrovske.[85]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 1 indicates that Russian forces advanced in southeast and southern Kostyantynivka.[86] The Ukrainian General Staff posted maps on December 1 indicating that Russian forces seized Shcherbynivka, Kleban-Byk (both southeast of Kostyantynivka), and Katerynivka (south of Kostyantynivka), and advanced to the southern bank of the Kleban-Byk Reservoir, although ISW does not assess that these changes occurred in the past 24 hours.[87]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of and within southeastern Kostyantynivka along the T-0504 Kostyantynivka-Myrnohrad highway, south of Kostyantynivka, north of Mykolaivka (northeast of Kostyantynivka), east of Virolyubivka (north of Kostyantynivka), and west of Pleshchiivka (southeast of Kostyantynivka).[88] Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces control roughly 30 percent of Kostyantynivka and seized Ivanopillya.[89]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: The Ukrainian 11th Army Corps refuted on December 1 that the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) December 1 claim that Russian forces seized Klynove (north of Kostyantynivka).[90] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger similarly stated that the claimed seizure of Klynove was false.[91] The Ukrainian 11th Army Corps noted that the claim was part of a Russian effort to falsely portray Russian advances on the battlefield.[92] ISW has observed Russian forces using similar tactics, such as raising flags during infiltration missions that do not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of battle (FEBA), to posture false advances for informational effects.[93]

Russian forces attacked in and near and within Kostyantynivka itself; north of Kostyantynivka toward Virolyubivka; northeast of Kostyantynivka near Mykolaivka; east of Kostyantynivka near Oleksandro-Shultyne and Stupochky; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka and Shcherbynivka; south of Kostyantynivka toward Berestok; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Yablunivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and Mykolaypillya; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka, Novopavlivka, and Volodymyrivka on December 1 and 2.[94]

Order of Battle: FPV operators of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian antennas for drone control and signal near Rusyn Yar.[95] FPV operators of the 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment) (51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) reportedly targeted a Ukrainian drone launch point in the Kostyantynivka direction.[96] Geolocated footage published on December 1, but likely filmed on an earlier date, indicates that elements of the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA, LNR AC, SMD) were striking Ukrainian unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) in Ivanopillya at an unidentified previous date.[97]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on December 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Nove Shakhove and Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Dorozhnie, Zapovidne, Ivanivka, and Mayak on December 1 and 2.[98] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Toretske (northeast of Dobropillya).[99]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian ammunition, equipment, and positions in the Dobropillya direction.[100]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 1 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northeastern Pokrovsk.[101]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Pokrovsk; east of Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk); in northeastern and central Myrnohrad; in southern Svitle (both east of Pokrovsk); north of Kotlyne; and northwest of Udachne (both southwest of Pokrovsk).[102]

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near and within Myrnohrad and Rivne; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Zvirove, Udachne, and Molodetske and toward Novopidhorodne on December 1 and 2.[103] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked north of Pokrovsk.[104]

Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces Spokesperson Serhiy Okishev reported on December 2 that the situation in Pokrovsk remains difficult, but that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.[105] Okishev reported that Russian forces are attempting to infiltrate in small groups from southern to northern Pokrovsk. Okishev added that drone operators of the Russian Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, the elements that have been largely responsible for successes in Russia’s battlefield air interdiction (BAI) efforts, continue to target Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) but noted that Ukrainian forces have developed alternative methods to supplying logistics to Ukrainian positions and troop rotations between Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.

The Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO) posted footage on December 2 and reported that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a concentration of Russian 51st CAA (SMD) personnel in Pokrovsk.[106] Geolocation of the SSO footage shows that Ukrainian forces struck northern Pokrovsk.[107]

Order of Battle: Russian Central Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Valery Solodchuk credited elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Division (2nd CAA, Central Military District [CMD]), including its 439th Motorized Rifle Regiment (under the operational control of the 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade), 506th Motorized Rifle Regiment, 1435th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely comprised of mobilized personnel), and 30th Motorized Rifle Brigade with claimed seizure of Pokrovsk.[108] FPV drone operators of the 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian drone control points near Myrnohrad.[109] Elements of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) reportedly conducted an unsuccessful mechanized assault near Pokrovsk.[110]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on December 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself, south of Novopavlivka near Dachne and Filiya, and southwest of Novopavlivka near Yalta and Zelenyi Hai on December 1 and 2.[111]

Solodchuk claimed that Russian forces are developing an offensive on the left flank of the Novopavlivka direction and enveloping Ukrainian forces in the area from the northwest, east, southwest, and west in attempt to encircle Novopavlivka.[112]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on December 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Vyshneve, Verbove, and Yehorivka on December 1 and 2.[113]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[114]

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck Russian military objects in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian 9A83 launcher from an S-300V defense system and two 1L125 Niobium-SV radar stations in an unspecified area of occupied Donbas (Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts) on November 29.[115] The Ukrainian SSO reported that Ukrainian forces struck an ammunition depot of the Russian 51st CAA (SMD) in occupied Biloyarivka (southeast of Donetsk City, roughly 110 kilometers from the front line) on the night of November 30 to December 1.[116]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 2 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in northern Dobropillya (north of Hulyaipole) along the T-0401 Pokrovske-Hulyaipole highway and that Russian forces seized Nove Zaporizhzhia (north of Dobropillya) on a prior date.[117]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on December 2 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember in eastern Hulyaipole during what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) at this time.[118]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Eastern Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Andrei Ivanaev claimed that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th Combined Arms Army [CAA] Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized Dobropillya.[119] Ivanaev claimed that elements of the 5th CAA (EMD) are fighting within Hulyaipole.[120] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west and south of Dobropillya, east of Pryluky, and east of Varvarivka (both northwest of Hulyaipole).[121]

Russian forces attacked near and within Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole toward Varvarivka; north of Hulyaipole near Nove Zaporizhzhia and Danylivka and toward Andriivka, Herasymivka, and Ostapivske; northeast of Hulyaipole near Rybne, Pryvilne, Pavlivka, and Krasnohirske; and east of Hulyaipole near Zelenyi Hai and Zatyshshya on December 1 and 2.[122]

A Russian milblogger claimed that part of Hulyaipole is a contested "gray zone."[123]

Order of Battle: The Russian MoD credited elements of the Russian 38th Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) with seizing Zelenyi Hai.[124] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (EMD and Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Hulyaipole.[125] Elements of the 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA, EMD) reportedly continue to operate in Zaporizhia Oblast.[126]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on December 2 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 7th Airborne (VDV) Division advanced east and north of Prymorske (west of Orikhiv), within central Prymorske, and to the outskirts of Lukyanivske (northwest of Orikhiv).[127] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces exploited foggy weather when Ukrainian drones were less effective to advance near and within Prymorske.[128] Russian forces have widely been leveraging foggy and rainy weather conditions across the front to enable Russian advances.[129]

Russian forces attacked south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka and west of Orikhiv near Prymorske and Stepnohirsk on December 1 and 2.[130]

Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on November 30 that Russian forces have surrounded Stepnohirsk.[131] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are using mass drone strikes and mines to clear Ukrainian infantry from Stepnohirsk, like tactics Russian forces used to clear Toretsk.[132]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 108th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Zaporizhia direction.[133]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on December 2 but did not advance.

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction, including east of Kherson City toward Antonivka and the Antonivskyi Bridge, on December 1 and 2.[134]

Ukraine’s State Emergency Service reported on December 1 that Russian forces conducted a double-tap drone strike against emergency workers responding to a fire at a gas station in Kherson City after a Russian drone strike.[135]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 217th VDV Regiment (98th VDV Division) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Kherson direction.[136] First-person view (FPV) drone operators of the 126th Coastal Defense Brigade (22nd Army Corps [AC], Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian critical infrastructure in Kherson City.[137]

Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Russian drone launch site in occupied Crimea. Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces (SSO) reported that it struck a Russian Shahed drone storage facility and launch site near occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea, on the night of November 28 to 29.[138] Geolocated footage published on November 28 shows Ukrainian drones striking a Russian Shahed launch site northeast of occupied Yuzhne, Crimea.[139]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of December 1 to 2. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 62 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones, of which more than 35 were Shahed-type drones, from the directions of Oryol and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Donetsk City and Cape Chauda, Crimea.[140] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 39 drones, that 20 drones struck eight locations, and that the strikes were ongoing as of 0830 local time.[141] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential and energy infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Mykolaiv, and Odesa oblasts.[142] Ukraine’s largest private energy company, DTEK, reported that Russian strikes against Odesa Oblast left 36,300 users without power.[143]

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Russian forces launched more than 3,500 guided glide bombs in November 2025.[144] The Ukrainian MoD reported that Russian forces launched almost 44,000 glide bombs between January and November 2025, an average of 130 per day, up from almost 40,000 in all of 2024, an average of 109 per day.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.