Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 1, 2025

Assessment as of: 8:45 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30 pm ET on December 1. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the December 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

US-Ukrainian talks reportedly continued in Florida on December 1 ahead of US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff's meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on December 2 to present the US-Ukrainian peace proposal. US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff and Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov reportedly held more meetings in Florida on December 1.[1] US President Donald Trump stated on November 30 that he does not have a deadline for a peace settlement between Russia and Ukraine.[2] US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on November 30 that the US goal is to end the war while "help[ing] Ukraine be safe forever" and preventing another invasion.[3] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov stated that Witkoff will meet with Putin in Moscow on the afternoon of December 2.[4]

The Kremlin is setting conditions to refrain from publicly discussing the outcomes of the December 2 US-Russian meeting, possibly in order to obfuscate Russia's likely rejection of the US-Ukrainian peace proposal. Peskov responded to a question about points in the latest US-Ukrainian peace proposal, stating that Russia does not intend to conduct negotiations through a "megaphone" or "through the media."[5] Peskov stated that the Kremlin will release footage from the start of the Putin-Witkoff meeting on December 2, but that it is too early to talk about any public statements afterwards.[6] Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa stated on December 1 that he would like the US delegation to "reaffirm the fundamental nature" of the positions that the United States and Russia allegedly reached during the US-Russia Alaska summit in August 2025.[7] Duma Defense Committee Deputy Chairperson Alexei Zhuravlev claimed on December 1 that the "right" negotiations are between Russia and the United States, who will present a "fait accompli" to Europe and Ukraine such that they will have "no choice but to...sign whatever [the United States and Russia] say."[8] High-ranking Kremlin officials and Russian milbloggers have been consistently rejecting the 28-point peace plan and its subsequent iterations since it was first reported in mid-November 2025 because the proposed plans did not concede to all of Russia's maximalist war demands.[9] The Kremlin has been exploiting the lack of clarity about the Alaska summit to conceal the way the Kremlin — not Ukraine — is impeding the negotiations process by sticking to its original war demands.[10] The Kremlin will likely try to replicate this approach with the upcoming US-Russia meeting on December 2 and is setting conditions to conceal the details of the talks from the public, likely because Russia will reject the terms of the plan.[11] The Kremlin likely seeks to avoid framing Russia as an impediment to ending the war in Ukraine if Moscow rejects the peace deal that the United States will present to Russia, and that Ukraine agreed to. Russia previously rejected several US-proposed ceasefires that Ukraine agreed to.[12]

Prominent Russian milbloggers continue to undermine the Kremlin’s effort to portray a Russian victory in Ukraine as imminent or inevitable. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger responded to the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD) December 1 claim that Russian forces seized Klynove (north of Kostyantynivka, about 10 kilometers from the current Russian frontline) by criticizing the MoD's repeated exaggerations about battlefield successes.[13] The milblogger claimed that the Russian MoD is making premature claims that Russian forces seized settlements without offering any supporting evidence and is even claiming Russian success in settlements several kilometers away from confirmed Russian positions. The milblogger noted that the Russian MoD has made clearly false claims over five settlements in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area in 2025 alone — Orikhovo-Vasylivka in February 2025, Novomarkove in March 2025, Markove and Mayske in September 2025, and Fedorivka in October 2025. The milblogger added that recent developments on the battlefield are strengthening the current Russian negotiating position and insinuated that the Russian MoD is actually hurting its negotiating position by making false claims that could easily "backfire" with the emergence of evidence to the contrary. The Kremlin has repeatedly made exaggerated claims about the battlefield as part of its ongoing cognitive warfare effort to falsely portray a Russian victory as inevitable, such that Ukraine and the West should concede to Russia’s demands now.[14] ISW continues to assess that while the situation in some specific sectors of the front line is serious, particularly in the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions, the Kremlin’s efforts to present Russia’s victory in Ukraine as inevitable do not correspond to battlefield realities.[15] It is notable that the Kremlin’s misrepresentation of the situation on the ground continues to be so far from reality that prominent pro-war milbloggers continue to feel compelled to issue their own corrective statements.

Russian forces are not yet confirmed to have seized all of Pokrovsk despite operating within the town for over 120 days. The Russian Ministry of Defense announced on December 1 that Russian forces seized Pokrovsk, though it remains unclear whether Ukrainian forces may occupy limited scattered positions in northern Pokrovsk. The Ukrainian 7th Rapid Reaction Corps of the Air Assault Forces reported on December 1 that Russian forces have become bogged down in urban warfare within Pokrovsk, contrary to previous claims from Russian military and political leadership that Russian forces encircled Ukrainian forces in Pokrovsk.[16] The corps reported that Ukrainian forces killed 1,221 Russian servicemembers and wounded 545 in the Pokrovsk agglomeration in November 2025, including 519 killed and 131 wounded within Pokrovsk alone. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces have incurred significant casualties in their monthslong campaign to seize Pokrovsk.[17] The corps reported that Ukrainian forces retain main and alternate rotation routes in Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk) and recently rotated troops in the town. The corps’ statements indicate that Ukrainian forces likely retain the ability to resupply forces within Myrnohrad, despite Russian interdiction of Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) between Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad.[18] ISW has not yet observed evidence to confirm that Russian forces have completed the seizure of Pokrovsk as of this writing. The Kremlin may have announced the seizure of Pokrovsk prematurely on December 1 — as it has for numerous other settlements in Ukraine — as part of a cognitive warfare effort in order to shape the US-Russian negotiations in Moscow on December 2.

Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide military aid and support to Ukraine’s growing defense industrial base (DIB). Dutch Defense Minister Ruben Brekelmans announced on December 1 that the Netherlands will contribute 250 million euros (roughly $290 million) to Ukraine through the Prioritized Ukrainian Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which funds NATO states' purchases of US-made weapons for Ukraine.[19] Ukrainian Defense Minister Denis Shmyhal and Brekelmans also signed an agreement to jointly produce Ukrainian drones in both the Netherlands and Ukraine, which the Netherlands will purchase and then transfer to the Ukrainian military.[20]

The Russian military continues implementing longstanding plans to form new Russian divisions as part of the Russian military's transition back towards a force structure based on maneuver divisions, likely in preparation for a possible future war with NATO. The Russian Pacific Fleet announced on December 1 the reorganization of its 155th Naval Infantry Brigade into the 55th Naval Infantry Division.[21] Former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced in December 2022 that the Russian military command intended to form 17 new maneuver divisions, including by expanding five existing naval infantry brigades into five divisions.[22] The new 55th Naval Infantry Division is very likely not staffed at its full doctrinal end strength, given that the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade participated in combat operations, including in the Pokrovsk direction and previously in Kursk Oblast, which likely have significantly degraded the brigade.[23] ISW has observed evidence to support the formation and combat deployment of at least eight new Russian divisions since December 2022.[24] The Russian military command has formed the 104th Airborne (VDV) Division and the 27th, 68th, 69th, and 71st motorized rifle divisions from previously existing brigades, and the new 67th, 70th, and 72nd motorized rifle divisions since December 2022.[25] These divisions also likely have not yet reached their doctrinal end strength, as they have all been committed to active combat operations. The Russian military will likely be able to bring them up to their full end strength rapidly after the end of fighting in Ukraine.[26] ISW continues to assess that the expansion of Russian conventional forces and the Russian military’s larger force structure reform back to maneuver divisions is in line with Russia’s preparation for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future, as the Russian military command likely assesses that the Russian military will require more mass and higher echelon formations to wage effective combat operations.[27]

Balloon incursions in NATO airspace continue to shut down Lithuanian airports. Lithuanian authorities temporarily suspended operations at the Vilnius International Airport on the evening of November 30 into the early morning on December 1 due to balloons flying towards the airport.[28] Lithuanian air navigation company Oro Navigacija Director Saulius Batavicius stated that authorities detected roughly 60 balloons in Lithuanian airspace and that an unidentified actor launched the balloons continuously at varying altitudes and in small groups.[29] Lithuanian authorities have not attributed the balloon flights to any specific actor as of this writing, though Lithuanian officials previously attributed similar balloon incursions to Belarus.[30] The overnight balloon sightings come against the backdrop of repeated similar incursions from Belarusian airspace - the most recent of which occurred on the night of November 28 to 29 — that have closed the Vilnius Airport.[31] ISW continues to assess that Russia is increasingly engaging in covert and overt attacks against Europe and that ongoing Russian airspace violations are likely part of Russia’s ”Phase Zero” effort — Russia’s broader informational and psychological condition-setting effort that aims to prepare for a possible NATO-Russia war in the future.[32] ISW continues to assess that Belarus is Russia’s de facto cobelligerent in the war in Ukraine, such that suspected and confirmed incursions into NATO airspace from Belarusian airspace are very likely part of Russia’s broader Phase Zero effort.[33]

Key Takeaways:

• US-Ukrainian talks reportedly continued in Florida on December 1 ahead of US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff's meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on December 2 to present the US-Ukrainian peace proposal.
• The Kremlin is setting conditions to refrain from publicly discussing the outcomes of the December 2 US-Russian meeting, possibly in order to obfuscate Russia's likely rejection of the US-Ukrainian peace proposal.
• Prominent Russian milbloggers continue to undermine the Kremlin’s effort to portray a Russian victory in Ukraine as imminent or inevitable.
• Russian forces are not yet confirmed to have seized all of Pokrovsk despite operating within the town for over 120 days.
• Ukraine’s European allies continue to provide military aid and support to Ukraine’s growing defense industrial base (DIB).
• The Russian military continues implementing longstanding plans to form new Russian divisions as part of the Russian military's transition back towards a force structure based on maneuver divisions, likely in preparation for a possible future war with NATO.
• Balloon incursions in NATO airspace continue to shut down Lithuanian airports.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.  

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Nothing significant to report.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on December 1 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked in Kursk and Sumy oblasts, including northwest of Sumy City toward Pavlivka, north of Sumy City toward Khotyn, and northeast of Sumy City near Sadky and toward Khrapivshchyna, on November 30 and December 1.[34]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 137th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division), the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, and the 20th Radiation, Chemical, and Biological, and Chemical Defense Brigade (Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating in Sumy Oblast.[35]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on December 1 but did not make confirmed advances.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on November 30 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian servicemember in southern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) in what ISW assesses was an infiltration event that did not change the control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[36] A Russian civilian who raises funds for Russian forces posted footage taken by a Russian drone on November 30 that shows Ukrainian forces striking the Russian servicemember, and acknowledged that Ukrainian forces killed the servicemember during a flag-raising mission.[37] ISW continues to assess that the Russian military command is using ostentatious flag raisings across the frontline to support its exaggerated claims of Russian advances as part of a cognitive warfare effort to portray Russian battlefield victory as inevitable.[38]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in northern and western Vilcha (south of Vovchansk), east of Lyman (southeast of Vovchansk), near Tsehelne (south of Vovchansk), and within Vovchansk itself.[39]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Lyman, Synelnykove, Vilcha, and Vovchansk and toward Izbytske on November 30 and December 1.[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vovchanski Khutory (northeast of Kharkiv City and east of Vovchansk).[41]

The chief of staff of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Kharkiv direction reported on December 1 that Russian forces are regrouping and pulling up reserves to forward positions in preparation for future attacks in the Lyptsi direction (north of Kharkiv City).[42] The chief of staff reported that Russian forces are using conventional and fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) for ambushes – likely against Ukrainian vehicles along ground lines of communication (GLOCs).

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed on December 1 that the Russian military command is replacing elements of the 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) in the Vovchansk direction with elements of the understrength 127th Motorized Rifle Regiment (71st Motorized Rifle Division, reportedly under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces and formerly the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade).[43] The milblogger claimed that the command of the 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade is strictly monitoring personnel to prevent desertions, including by installing cameras along the unit’s perimeter, and is sending deserters on assaults. The milblogger also claimed that the command of the 41st Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) sent severely wounded personnel on assaults in the Vovchansk direction.[44]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Veterynarne (northwest of Kharkiv City near the international border).[45] Knyaz Vandal Novgorodsky fiber optic drone operators of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) and assault elements of the Storm Detachment of the 7th Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th AC, LMD) are reportedly operating in Kharkiv Oblast.[46]

Russian forces continued offensive operations east of Velykyi Burluk toward Obukhivka on December 1 but did not advance.[47]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on December 1 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain positions or recently advanced in northern Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk), an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[48]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kupyansk near Novovasylivka; east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka; and southeast of Kupyansk near Pishchane and Hlushkivka on November 30 and December 1.[49]

Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated that Russian forces in the Kupyansk direction continue to use small group infiltration tactics.[50] Trehubov refuted Kremlin claims that Russian forces had seized Kupyansk as of October 2025. A Russian servicemember reportedly of the Russian 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) complained on December 1 that Ukrainian first-person view (FPV) drones are hindering Russian movement in Kupyansk.[51]

Ukrainian forces maintained positions or recently advanced in the Borova direction.

[Borova-Lyman map]

Refinement of areas under Russian claims: A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger implied on November 30 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Bohuslavka (north of Borova), an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained a presence.[52]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Borivska Andriivka (northeast of Borova).[53]

Russian forces attacked north of Borova near Novoplatonivka; east of Borova toward Shyikivka and Novoyehorivka; and southeast of Borova near Druzhelyubivka and Tverdokhlibove and toward Cherneshchyna on November 30 and December 1.[54]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk-Lyman direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on December 1 shows a Ukrainian servicemember raising a Ukrainian flag in northern Stavky, indicating that Ukrainian forces recently liberated Stavky (north of Lyman).[55]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Lyman and north and east of Dibrova (south of Lyman).[56] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces physically cut the railway lines to Yarova (northwest of Lyman) and reached the banks of the Siverskyi Donets River (south of Yarova).[57] Another milblogger claimed, however, that Russian forces have not cut the C051018 Drobysheve-Yarova-Svyatohirsk road that runs just south of the Yarova railway.[58]

Russian forces attacked near Lyman itself; northwest of Lyman near Karpivka, Serednie, Shandryholove, Novoselivka, Drobysheve, and Korovii Yar; north of Lyman near Stavky; east of Lyman near Zarichne and Torske; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil on November 30 and December 1.[59] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Lyman and near Stavky.[60]

Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps (AC) refuted on December 1 claims from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the military command of the Russian 20th CAA (Moscow Military District [MMD]) that Russian forces seized Stavky and Novoselivka.[61] The corps noted that small Russian groups are infiltrating into settlements that Russian forces do not control in order to film staged videos with Russian flags to falsely claim that Russian forces advanced. The 3rd Army Corps reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed these small Russian groups and that Russian forces are unable to consolidate their positions. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction stated that Russian forces continue small group infiltration tactics and are trying to expand the contested "gray zone."[62] The spokesperson stated that Russian forces have a numerical manpower advantage over Ukrainian forces, with a ratio of one to six or one to ten. The spokesperson noted that many Russian personnel are poorly trained, but those operating in sabotage and reconnaissance groups are well-trained.

Slovyansk City Military Administration Head Vadym Lyakh reported that Russian forces struck Slovyansk with a guided glide bomb and three Geran-2 drones on the night of November 30 to December 1 and on the morning of December 1.[63]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 164th Motorized Rifle Brigade (25th CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Slovyansk.[64] Drone operators of the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) and 144th Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA, MMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Lyman direction.[65]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on December 1 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near and within Siversk; northwest of Siversk near Zakitne, Platonivka, and Dronivka; northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka; south of Siversk near Svyato-Pokrovske; and southwest of Siversk near Mykolaivka and Pazeno on November 30 and December 1.[66]

Ukrainian 11th Army Corps (AC) Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets reported on December 1 that Russian forces are attempting to bypass Siversk from the north and south.[67] Zaporozhets stated that Russian forces are conducting infantry assaults in groups of two to 10 personnel without armored vehicles. Zaporozhets stated that Russian forces are moving drone operators to be as close to the frontline as possible to strike Ukrainian positions and logistics.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 123rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] AC, Southern Military District [SMD]) are striking Ukrainian forces in Siversk.[68] Drone operators and artillery elements of the 6th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd CAA) are striking reported Ukrainian drone control points and communications infrastructure in Siversk.[69] Artillery elements of the 2nd Artillery Brigade (3rd CAA) are striking reported Ukrainian drone control points in Siversk.[70] 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on December 1 but did not make confirmed advance

See topline text for additional reports of unconfirmed claims of Russian advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Mayske (north of Kostyantynivka) and advanced east of Sofiivka (southwest of Druzhkivka).[71] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger refuted Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claims that Russian forces seized Orikhovo-Vasylivka as of February 9, Novomarkove (both northeast of Kostyantynivka) as of March 12, Markove (north of Kostyantynivka) as of September 5, Mayske as of September 27, and Fedorivka (north of Kostyantynivka) as of October 7.[72]

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; east of Kostyantynivka near Stupochky, Predtechyne, and Oleksandro-Shultyne; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Ivanopillya, Pleshchiivka, and Shcherbynivka; south of Kostyantynivka toward Berestok; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and toward Mykolaipillya; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka on November 30 and December 1.[73]

Order of Battle: Loitering munition and first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA, SMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Sofiivka.[74] Drone operators of the Chechen 78th Sever-Akhmat Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, SMD), the 1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 3rd CAA), and the 58th Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (unofficially designated as the Okhotnik [Hunter] Spetsnaz Detachment, 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) reportedly continue to operate in the Kostyantynivka direction.[75] Military police elements of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are reportedly operating near occupied Bakhmut (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[76]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on December 1 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into southern Toretske (northeast of Dobropillya) and north of Shakhove (east of Dobropillya).[77]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Dobropillya toward Toretske, east of Dobropillya near Nove Shakhove and Shakhove, and southeast of Dobropillya near Ivanivka, Dorozhnie, and Zapovidne on November 30 and December 1.[78]

Order of Battle: FPV drone operators of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 68th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (both of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Zapovidne.[79]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on December 1 but did not advance.

See topline text for reports of unconfirmed claims of Russian advances.

Russian forces attacked near and within Pokrovsk; west of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske and Bilytske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Zatyshok, Chervonyi (Krasnyi) Lyman, and Novoekonomichne; east of Pokrovsk near and within Myrnohrad, Balahan, and Rivne; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Molodetske and toward Novopidhorodne on November 30 and December 1.[80]

Russian milbloggers published footage on December 1 reportedly showing Russian forces conducting an FAB-1500 guided glide bomb strike against an apartment building in Myrnohrad.[81]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 86th Rifle Regiment (under the operational control of the 1st Slovyansk Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st CAA) are reportedly operating within Myrnohrad.[82] Loitering munition operators of the 80th Sparta Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles in the Pokrovsk direction.[83]

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself, south of Novopavlivka near Filiya, and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai and Tovste on November 30 and December 1 but did not advance.[84]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Velykomykhailivka direction on December 1 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad; southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Sosnivka; south of Velykomykhailivka near Stepove; and southwest of Velykomykhailivka near Vyshneve, Verbove, Zlahoda, and Yehorivka on November 30 and December 1.[85]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.

Assessed Russian advances: The Ukrainian General Staff posted maps on December 1 showing that Russian forces seized Zelenyi Hai and Vysoke (both east of Hulyaipole) and advanced to the western outskirts of Solodke, north and west of Rivnopillya (both northeast of Hulyaipole), south and southwest of Yablukove (north of Hulyaipole), and west of Vysoke.[86]

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole toward Varvarivka, Dobropillya, and Pryluky; north of Hulyaipole near Nove Zaporizhzhia; northeast of Hulyaipole near Rybne, Pryvilne, and Solodke; and east of Hulyaipole near Zatyshshya on November 30 and December 1.[87]

Order of Battle: Drone operators and other elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]), including its 218th Tank Regiment and 143^rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, reportedly continue to operate in the Hulyaipole direction.[88]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on December 1 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced southwest of Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv) and into northern Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[89]

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka; south of Orikhiv near Novodanylivka; and west of Orikhiv near Stepove, Stepnohirsk, and Prymorske on November 30 and December 1.[90]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 4th Military Base (58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones near Orikhiv.[91] Elements of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division, including its 108th and 247th VDV regiments, reportedly continue to operate near Stepnohirsk and Prymorske.[92] Elements of the 328th VDV Regiment (104th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Stepove (west of Orikhiv).[93]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on December 1 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge on November 30 and December 1.[94]

Russian forces continue to strike critical infrastructure and civilians in Kherson City. A Russian milblogger claimed on November 30 that Russian forces are using fiber optic drones to strike critical infrastructure in Kherson City and are conducting "double-tap" artillery strikes on civilian repair crews responding to Russian strikes.[95] The milblogger reiterated on December 1 that Russian forces will continue to target critical infrastructure, vehicles, electronic warfare (EW) systems, and civilian infrastructure in Kherson City without regard for Ukrainian civilians.[96] Drone operators of the Russian 98th VDV Division are reportedly striking civilian vehicles in Kherson City.[97]   

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 126th Coastal Defense Brigade (22nd Army Corps [AC], Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[98]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)=

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 30 to December 1. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 89 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones — of which roughly 55 were Shahed-type drones — from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[99] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 63 drones and that 26 drones struck nine locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck energy, industrial, civilian, religious, and residential infrastructure in Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, and Kharkiv oblasts.[100]

Russian forces continue to adapt their Shahed-type drones to act against Ukrainian counter-drone measures. Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov reported on December 1 that Ukrainian forces downed a Russian Shahed drone equipped with an R-60 air-to-air missile for the first time.[101] Beskrestnov stated that Russian forces are using such modified drones in an attempt to destroy Ukrainian helicopters and tactical aircraft that hunt Shaheds. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister for Innovation Lieutenant Colonel Yuriy Myronenko told Business Insider in an article published on November 27 that Russian forces recently started using operator-controlled Shahed drones, which communicate via antennas in occupied Ukraine, in strikes near the frontlines.[102] Myronenko stated that it is more challenging for Ukrainian forces to counter these Shaheds because Russian drone operators can quickly react and engage with Ukrainian fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters, which Ukrainian forces have been using to shoot down Russian drones.

The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defense forces destroyed 9,707 air targets in November 2025.[103] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defense forces downed 11 Kh-47 M2 Kinzhal ballistic missiles; 15 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles; 51 Kh-101 cruise missiles; 20 Kalibr cruise missiles; three Kh-59/69 cruise missiles; 19 Iskander-K cruise missiles; 2,939 Shahed-type drones; 361 reconnaissance drones; and 6,288 other drones.[104] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian airstrikes destroyed about 400 Russian military assets in November 2025, including command posts, logistics facilities, and equipment and personnel concentrations.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.