Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 7, 2026

Assessment as of: 10:30 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 12:15 PM ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW’s map methodology, please view our statement here.

Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly had a phone call on August 6 with the commander of a Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) division, indicating that Russian forces are prioritizing advances in the Pokrovsk and Dobropillya directions with the intent of encircling Ukraine's Fortress Belt from the southwest. The Kremlin published a transcript of a phone conversation ostensibly between Putin and the commander of the Russian 76th Guards VDV Division in which the commander discussed the combat situation in the unit’s area of responsibility (AoR) in the Dobropillya direction.[1] The voice purporting to be the division commander identifies himself in the audio recording as Colonel Shikhabidov, who is reported by multiple Russian sources to have died in May 2025.[2] Russian sources report that the current commander of the division is Denis Shishov.[3] Putin does not name the commander during the conversation. The error calls into question the authenticity of the exchange. “Colonel Shikhabidov” claimed that elements of the 76th Guards VDV Division seized Pokrovsk, Hryshyne, Novooleksandrivka, Vasylivka, and Shevchenko in the Pokrovsk direction and continue to carry out combat tasks in the area. Putin asked “Shikhabidov” if the division would be able to accomplish its assigned tasks on time, and “Shikhabidov” responded that it would do so and that the timelines were realistic.

Putin’s alleged conversation with the commander of the unit operating in the Dobropillya direction likely indicates that Dobropillya direction is a priority sector for Russian forces. Russian forces often use “elite” VDV and naval infantry units in key frontline areas. Putin awarded the unit with the Guards title on August 6 – an additional indicator that the 76th Guards VDV Division will likely continue offensive operations in the Pokrovsk and Dobropillya direction.[4] ISW first observed evidence of the 76th Guards VDV Division operating in the Pokrovsk direction in September 2025.[5] Putin notably praised the division for advancing faster than any other Russian units in the area, and Russian forces will likely intensify offensive operations in the Dobropillya and Pokrovsk directions to envelop Ukraine’s Fortress Belt from the southwestern flank.

The Russian timelines for the completion of this wide envelopment are extremely unrealistic, however. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces lost 2.23 square kilometers in the Dobropillya tactical area in June 2026 and advanced 34.67 square kilometers in the area in July 2026. ISW has also observed evidence to assess that Russian forces lost 3.12 square kilometers in the Pokrovsk operational area in June 2026 and advanced 45.96 square kilometers in the area in July 2026, including Russian advances northeast of Dobropillya. The Russian monthly rate of advance in July 2026 is higher than the rate of advance in June 2026 but is still insufficient to seize the remainder of Donetsk Oblast by Putin’s newly set deadline of December 31, 2026.[6] It remains highly unlikely that Russian forces will be able to seize the Fortress Belt or the rest of Donbas any time soon, if at all.

Putin’s call with the 76th Guards VDV Division commander is likely also a response to emerging accusations that he is out of touch with the battlefield reality in Ukraine. Putin rarely meets with tactical-level commanders, usually receiving reports from higher-level officers instead. Putin most recently held a meeting with Russian unit commanders operating in Kostyantynivka on July 3 during which they and he falsely claimed that Russian forces had seized Kostyantynivka and advanced beyond it toward Druzhkivka.[7] Russian units are likely not providing Putin accurate reports on the frontline situation and are generating a fictional picture of Russian military success for higher-level military commanders and Putin.[8] The apparent misidentification of the commander who spoke with Putin raises additional questions about the veracity of internal Russian reports on the battlefield situation.

Ukraine's intermediate-range strike campaign against the Russian rear, along with Ukrainian tactical drone overmatch on the frontline, are slowing down Russian operational tempo across the frontline. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on August 7 that USF’s average daily rate of Russian manpower detection and elimination fell by 16.3 percent from 374 soldiers per day in July 2026 to 313 soldiers per day in August 2026. Brovdi stated that the drop is associated with Russian forces suffering “abnormal losses” during breakthrough attempts across the frontline since the end of July 2026 and the limited Russian logistics capabilities in southern occupied Ukraine.[9] The reported decrease in the operational tempo of Russian forces likely results from a combination of the intensification of Ukrainian intermediate-range strikes against Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) from Russia to occupied Ukraine and the expansion of the Ukrainian tactical kill zone along the frontline, both of which inhibit the movement of Russian reinforcements to the front line to conduct assaults. Ukrainian forces have reportedly achieved tactical drone overmatch and expanded the kill zone in some frontline areas in summer 2026, initially driving higher Russian casualties on the battlefield.[10] Ukraine’s intermediate strike campaign against Russian logistics, military equipment, and manpower has been impeding Russian advances across the theater and inhibiting Russian troop movement towards the frontline for some time, as ISW has previously reported.[11]

An improvised explosive device (IED) explosion in central Moscow City on August 1 reportedly killed Russian Major General Valery Plokhotnyuk. Russian insider source VChK-OGPU claimed on August 6 that Major General Valery Plokhotnyuk died as a result of the IED detonation in Moscow City on August 1, which likely targeted Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) Commander Colonel General Alexander Chayko.[12] Russian opposition outlets Mediazona and Agentsvo confirmed Plokhotnyuk’s death on August 6, using Russian state registries.[13] Plokhotnyuk previously served as the chief of staff of the Russian 49th Combined Arms Army (CAA) and was promoted to the rank of major general in 2021.[14]

The US Senate passed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia Act of 2026, which imposes 100% tariffs on US imports from the five largest importers of Russian crude oil and natural gas, among other provisions, on August 7.[15] The bill expands sanctions against a diverse set of Russian entities, including Russian individuals involved in Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB), Russian financial institutions, and foreign vessels transporting Russian crude oil and coal.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly had a phone call on August 6 with the commander of a Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) division, indicating that Russian forces are prioritizing advances in the Pokrovsk and Dobropillya directions with the intent of encircling Ukraine's Fortress Belt from the southwest.
• The Russian timelines for the completion of this wide envelopment are extremely unrealistic, however.
• Putin’s call with the 76th Guards VDV Division commander is likely also a response to emerging accusations that he is out of touch with the battlefield reality in Ukraine.
• Ukraine's intermediate-range strike campaign against the Russian rear, along with Ukrainian tactical drone overmatch on the frontline, are slowing down Russian operational tempo across the frontline.
• An improvised explosive device (IED) explosion in central Moscow City on August 1 reportedly killed Russian Major General Valery Plokhotnyuk.
• The US Senate passed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia Act of 2026, which imposes 100% tariffs on US imports from the five largest importers of Russian crude oil and natural gas, among other provisions, on August 7.
• Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions.
• Russia launched 147 drones against Ukraine overnight.  

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Continued Ukrainian strikes against Wildberries facilities in Russia are imposing growing operational and financial costs on the company and increasing pressure on Russian banks that are already facing structural challenges. Geolocated footage published on August 7 shows Ukrainian drones striking a Wildberries facility in southwestern Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast.[16] The Wildberries press service and Sverdlovsk Oblast Governor acknowledged that three Ukrainian drones struck the roof of a Wildberries logistics facility in Yekaterinburg, causing a fire.[17] Wildberries announced on August 7 that it had increased rates for product insurance, which covers damage or product loss due to drone strikes, by 40 percent, with rates now reaching up to 5.6 percent of product value.[18] Reuters reported on August 7, citing calculations based on satellite imagery, that Ukrainian strikes have destroyed at least 1.18 million square meters of warehouse space, representing one fifth of Wildberries’ total warehouse capacity.[19] A source close to the Kremlin told Reuters that Ukrainian strikes against Wildberries facilities will cause a wave of bankruptcies among small and medium-sized Russian retailers, which no entity in Russia has the capacity to prevent through financial support. The source stated that Kremlin officials are discussing possible support mechanisms for Wildberries, including through state-owned banks, tax breaks, and subsidies. Majority Russian state-owned bank VTB acquired a five percent stake in Wildberries Bank (the financial arm of Wildberries) in May 2026, but a Russian insider source confirmed on August 6 that VTB's stake does not obligate it to provide financial support to Wildberries.[20] The Ukrainian Center for Strategic Communications reported on August 7 that Wildberries retailers are increasingly requesting debt restructurings from Russian banks, adding pressure to Russian banks already facing deteriorating asset quality.[21]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in Sumy Oblast on August 6 and 7 but did not make confirmed advances.[22] Russian milbloggers claimed on August 7 that Russian forces advanced across the international border north of Hirky (northwest of Sumy City).[23]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission as Ukrainian forces maintained positions in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Geolocated footage published on August 6 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position east of Kozacha Lopan (north of Kharkiv City), after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[24] A Russian milblogger acknowledged on August 7 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions south and east of Vilcha and in western Lyman (both northeast of Kharkiv City) despite other Russian sources claiming that Russian forces seized both settlements.[25]

A Russian milblogger claimed on August 7 that Russian forces advanced east of and in southern Kozacha Lopan and westward into Kudiivka (both north of Kharkiv City).[26] A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast stated on August 7 that Russian forces are attempting to install repeaters in Veterynarne (north of Kharkiv City) to extend the range of Russian drones.[27] The spokesperson added that Russian unmanned systems units are actively developing their drone capabilities to offset Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities.

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 6 and 7 but did not make confirmed advances.[28] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 7 that Russian forces seized Anyskyne (northeast of Velykyi Burluk).[29]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 6 and 7 but did not advance.[30]

Ukrainian forces have reportedly expanded the “kill zone” in the Kupyansk direction by approximately 10 kilometers. A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated on August 7 that Ukrainian forces have expanded the kill zone — the area near the line of contact of elevated drone strike risk — in the brigade’s area of responsibility (AoR) from approximately 15 to 25 kilometers.[31] The spokesperson stated that Ukrainian fiber-optic drones provide clear visual details far from the frontline and allow Ukrainian drone operators to identify vulnerable targets.

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in the Borova direction. Geolocated footage published on August 6 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position north of Borivska Andriivka (northeast of Borova) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[32]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against electrical infrastructure in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainian USF Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on August 7 that Ukrainian forces struck electrical substations in occupied Donetsky and Berezivske (roughly 55 and 50 kilometers from the frontline, respectively).[33] A Telegram source affiliated with Ukrainian forces reported on August 6 that Ukrainian forces struck an electrical power station, a gas station, a logistics vehicle, and a communications tower near occupied Lysychansk (roughly 37 kilometers from the frontline).[34]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on August 6 and 7 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked.[35] Russian milbloggers claimed on August 7 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Vasyutynske (southeast of Slovyansk) and southwest of Lyman.[36]

Russian forces are reportedly employing infiltration tactics to bypass natural defenses in the Lyman direction. Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov stated on August 7 that the Seversky Donets River (south of Lyman) acts as a natural line of defense, leading Russian forces to attempt to bypass it and infiltrate towards Lyman through Zarichne (northeast of Lyman) and Yampil (southeast of Lyman), which Ukrainian forces continue to control.[37] Trehubov added that the saturation of drones in the Lyman direction is complicating both Ukrainian and Russian freedom of maneuver.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on August 6 and 7 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[38] A Russian milblogger acknowledged on August 7 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in and southeast of Osykove (northwest of Kostyantynivka) and are counterattacking from the settlement, contrary to claims by other Russian sources.[39]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya direction on August 6 and 7 but did not make confirmed advances.[40] Geolocated footage published on August 7 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position north of Bilytske (southeast of Dobropillya), indicating that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in the area despite Russian claims.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 7 that Russian forces advanced west of Novopidhorodne.[42]

See topline text for additional Russian activity in the Dobropillya direction.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on August 6 and 7 but did not advance.[43]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced as Russian forces conducted an infiltration mission northeast of Novopavlivka. Russian milbloggers acknowledged on August 7 that Ukrainian forces control part of central Muravka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[44] Geolocated footage published on August 6 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position north of Novomykolaivka (northeast of Novopavlivka), after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission.[45]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Oleksandrivka. Geolocated footage published on July 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced in Zirka and northeast of Novokhatske (both northeast of Oleksandrivka).[46] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 7 that Ukrainian forces liberated several settlements near Zirka, including Myrne (all northeast of Oleksandrivka).[47]

Ukrainian drone activity in the Oleksandrivka direction is likely forcing Russian forces to withdraw artillery equipment further into the Russian tactical depth and rely on longer-range rocket artillery systems. A spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on August 7 that Russian forces are withdrawing artillery systems farther into the Russian tactical depth, likely in response to the expanded “kill zone” and Ukrainian forces’ ability to strike Russian targets up to 25 kilometers from the line of contact.[48] The spokesperson reported that Russian forces are increasingly employing artillery and are becoming reliant on multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). The renewed Russian use of MLRS is likely a consequence of Ukrainian strikes forcing Russian tube artillery systems, including D-20 and D-30 howitzers, farther from the frontline and thereby reducing their effectiveness against Ukrainian frontline positions.

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against electrical infrastructure in occupied Donetsk Oblast. Ukrainian USF Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on August 7 that Ukrainian forces struck the 330 kV Zorya electrical substation in occupied Afiny (roughly 21 kilometers from the frontline); an electrical substation in occupied Shyroka Balka (roughly 27 kilometers from the frontline); an electrical substation in occupied Dokuchayevsk (roughly 72 kilometers from the frontline); and the 330 kV Myrna, the 110 kV Misto-4, and the 110 kV Misto-2 electrical substations in occupied Mariupol (roughly 110 kilometers from the frontline).[49]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on August 6 and 7 but did not advance.[50]

Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage posted on August 7 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian-occupied buildings in western Mala Tokmachka (southeast of Orikhiv) and a Russian position along the Prydniprovska Rai line south of Mala Tokmachka, after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[51] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 6 that Russian forces advanced in Novodanylivka (south of Orikhiv) and southeastern Orikhiv.[52]

Ukrainian forces recently conducted frontline and intermediate-range strikes against Russian military assets and logistical infrastructure in occupied southern Ukraine. Geolocated footage published on August 2 shows Ukrainian forces conducting a precision air strike on a Russian drone control point using a MiG-29 fighter jet near Kamyanske (west of Orikhiv).[53] Geolocated footage published on August 6 shows Ukrainian forces striking three Russian logistics trucks on the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway northeast of Prymorsk (roughly 90 kilometers from the frontline).^[54]

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on August 7.

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed on August 7 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ground-based repeater for controlling Geran- and Gerbera-type strike drones in occupied Zalizny Port (southwest of Kherson City and roughly 48 kilometers from the frontline).[55] Ukrainian USF Commander Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on August 7 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) deployment point in Shchaslyvtseve (southeast of Kherson City and roughly 130 kilometers from the frontline).[56] Open-source analyst Clement Molin posted satellite imagery on August 7 claiming that Ukrainian forces struck Russian pontoon bridges along the M-14 Rostov Oblast-Crimea highway and that Russian anti-access and area denial (A2AD) efforts are largely unsuccessful.[57] Molin claimed that Ukrainian forces have struck 1,623 Russian vehicles in eastern Kherson Oblast since the start of the Ukrainian intermediate-range strike campaign against occupied Luhansk Oblast and Crimea.

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and infrastructure in occupied Crimea. Ukrainian officials reported on August 7 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ground-based repeater for controlling Geran- and Gerbera-type strike drones in occupied Olenivka, Crimea (likely one of three settlements approximately 130 to 230 kilometers from the frontline and most likely the settlement on the western coast of Crimea 130 kilometers from the frontline), a Russian warehouse and military equipment repair base in occupied Nove Zhyttia (roughly 165 kilometers from the frontline), a parking lot in occupied Novoozerne (roughly 135 kilometers from the frontline), and the 243 ORVB 98 PDD repair and restoration base in occupied Abrykosove (roughly 145 kilometers from the frontline).[58] A Ukrainian source reported on August 7 that Ukrainian forces struck a fuel depot on the occupied Hvardiiske Airfield (roughly 195 kilometers from the frontline), causing a fire.[59]

Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) operated unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) off the coast of occupied Yalta, Crimea, on August 7. GUR reported on August 7 that its drone operators piloted Magura USVs off the coast of occupied Yalta.[60] Geolocated imagery published on August 7 shows a large plume of smoke near the beach in occupied Yalta.[61] Crimea-based Telegram channel Crimean Wind claimed on August 7, citing resident reports, that no explosion occurred in the area, indicating that Russian mobile air defense groups may have caused the fire.[62]

Ukrainian forces recently struck Russian naval assets in the Mediterranean Sea. Ukrainian USF Commander Robert "Magyar" Brovdi stated on August 7 that Ukrainian forces struck two Russian tankers and four dry cargo ships in the central and eastern Mediterranean Sea from August 5 to 7.[63]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces launched a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine targeting gasoline infrastructure on the night of August 6 to 7. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on August 7 that Russian forces launched 147 Shahed-, Gerbera-, and Italmas-type strike drones, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[64] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 114 drones, that 29 drones hit 15 locations, and that drone debris fell on four locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck commercial, residential, transportation, and agricultural infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[65] Ukrainian state energy operator Ukrenergo reported that Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure caused power outages in Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts.[66] Ukrainian oil company Ukrnafta reported on August 7 that Russian drones struck seven Ukrnafta facilities and four Ukrnafta gas stations overnight.[67] Acting Chairman of the Board of Naftogaz Serhiy Fedorenko stated on August 7 that Russian forces struck Naftogaz facilities 287 times so far in 2026, more than in all of 2025 and the first three years of the full-scale war combined.[68]

Russian forces conducted a double-tap strike against a civilian market in Sumy Oblast. Ukrainian state news agency Suspilne reported on August 7 that Russian forces conducted a double-tap strike against a market in Bilopillya, Sumy Oblast, striking a group of people who had assembled to help after a Russian drone struck a vehicle, injuring 10 people.[69]

The Russian strike campaign against Ukrainian port infrastructure is beginning to significantly impact key Ukrainian industries. The Ukrainian National Bank reported on August 7 that the Ukrainian economy may lose more than $2 billion due to the suspension of shipping because of Russian strikes in the second half of 2026.[70] The Ukrainian National Bank noted that maritime logistics have become 30 to 40 percent more expensive in Ukraine due to the threat of Russian strikes and halted shipping operations.

The rate of Russian missile production currently exceeds the rate of Ukrainian missile intake and domestic production. Former Defense Minister of Ukraine Mykhailo Fedorov stated on August 7 that Russian missile production currently exceeds Ukraine's missile procurement capability through both foreign aid and domestic production.[71] Fedorov reported that Russian missile production is outpacing American counterparts and noted that the Ukrainian command is urgently looking for external solutions to its air defense crisis.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[1] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/80490

[2] https://t.me/agentstvonews/10134 ; https://theins dot ru/news/281110?ysclid=msjmufob28741750524 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/08/07/putin-pogovoril-s-polkovnikom-vdv-kotorogo-v-proshlom-godu-pohoronili-z-blogery ; https://archive.ph/iiZho

[3] https://web dot archive.org/web/20220420160803/https://pravdapskov.ru/news/0026928.html

[4] http://publication dot pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202608060016 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/66312

[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-16-2026/

[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-30-2026/

[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-4-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-3-2026/

[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-26-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-22-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-9-2026/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_15-14/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_7/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-16-2026/

[9] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2709

[10] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/ukraines-intermediate-range-strike-campaign-and-new-mechanized-attacks-herald-the-start-of-a-new-phase-of-the-war/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-10-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-20-2026/

[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-13-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-11-2026/ https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-31-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-27-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-21-2026/

[12] https://t.me/rucriminalinfo_2/2123; https://t.me/rucriminalinfo_2/2128; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-2-2026/

[13] https://t.me/mediazzzona/32500; https://t.me/agentstvonews/16693

[14] https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Russian20General20Officer20Guide20ISW20May2011202022.pdf; https://www.pravda dot com.ua/eng/news/2026/08/06/8047595/; https://meduza dot io/amp/en/news/2026/08/07/russian-general-buried-in-moscow-identified-as-valery-plokhotnyuk-he-likely-died-in-explosion-at-aerospace-forces-chief-s-birthday-party

[15] https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/5025; https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/senate-passes-sanctions-bill-russia-iran-named-late-sen-lindsey-graham-rcna589949; https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/senate-passes-sweeping-russia-sanctions-bill-negotiated-by-the-late-sen-lindsey-graham

[16] https://t.me/exilenova_plus/28312 ; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2085592090159854036 ; https://x.com/zarGEOINT/status/2085592090159854036 ; https://x.com/Grimm_Intel/status/2085585045356486701

[17] https://t.me/rwb_press_service/1683 ; https://t.me/DVPasler/7621

[18] https://seller dot wildberries dot ru/instructions/ru/ru/material/sellers-insurance-service#bed14f4f-04d0-45bc-9f2c-0f47b9b7a3a9

[19] https://www.reuters.com/world/ukrainian-attacks-wildberries-strike-heart-russia-inc-2026-08-07/

[20] https://t.me/rucriminalinfo_2/2112 ; https://interfax dot com/newsroom/top-stories/117769/

[21] https://x.com/StratcomCentre/status/2085649147965608392

[22]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41789 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41787 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/97135 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/8947

[23] https://t.me/divgen/83013?single ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36074

[24] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12636; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1657215059385183

[25] https://t.me/motopatriot78/54842

[26] https://t.me/z_arhiv/33651

[27] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/07/vid-vyyavlennya-do-udaru-%e2%80%94-licheni-hvylyny-yak-58-brygada-nyshhyt-voroga-na-pivdenno-slobozhanskomu-napryamku/; https://youtu.be/f-oEnPSsxBY?t=2916

[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41789 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41787 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/97135

[29] https://t.me/mod_russia/66333 

[30]https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41789; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41787 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36074 ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19368  

[31] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/07/20-kilometriv-v-obydva-boky-kilzona-na-kupyanskomu-napryamku-znachno-zbilshylasya/; https://youtu.be/gfMBIaUgxOE

[32] https://x.com/jimmhelloman555/status/2085471644001132784

[33] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2711

[34] https://t.me/corps7DSHV/1696; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/06/na-luganshhyni-apachi-rozgromyly-logistyku-okupantiv-urazheno-elektrostancziyu-azs-i-transport/

[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41789; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41787

[36] https://t.me/wargonzo/36074; https://t.me/grvZapad/19368

[37] https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1373716-rosijski-diversijni-grupi-namagautsa-proniknuti-do-limana-cerez-ampil-i-zaricne/; https://youtu.be/9TAM-eohLW8

[38] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41789; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41787; https://t.me/motopatriot78/54837; https://t.me/motopatriot78/54846; https://t.me/wargonzo/36074 

[39] https://t.me/motopatriot78/54846

[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41789; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41787; https://t.me/rybar/82261; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/46193; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/46186

[41] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2085678396982317488; https://t [dot] me/Don_Guards_51st/1529

[42] https://t.me/divgen/83023

[43] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41789; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41787; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/120868

[44] https://t.me/divgen/83023 ; https://www.google.com/maps/d/u/0/viewer?mid=1xWP_FpuoVX_EiRpuUNF-8vjMKceydyA&ll=48.1781219698482%2C36.895502310610446&z=13

[45] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12637; https://t.me/armyUA59/320

[46] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12643 ; https://t.me/Ratibor_squad/57 ; https://x.com/moklasen/status/2085672898379833627?s=20

[47] https://t.me/motopatriot78/54843

[48] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/08/07/muly-ta-motoczykly-ne-dopomogly-yak-zsu-zlamaly-logistyku-rosiyan-na-oleksandrivskomu-napryamku/ ; https://youtu.be/f-oEnPSsxBY?t=2094

[49] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2711

[50] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41789 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41787 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/36074 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/20571

[51] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/12638 ; https://t.me/bolgarodessaanbu/282 ; https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2085676676927668432

[52] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/74010 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/74031

[53] https://t.me/soniah_hub/17462

[54] https://x.com/moklasen/status/2085385875194568926 ; https://x.com/meowqai/status/2085357663353774485?s=20 ; https://x.com/umftteam/status/2085288779724591588?s=20

[55] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41792 ;

[56] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2711

[57] https://x.com/clement_molin/status/2085433651253203390

[58] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2711 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/41792

[59] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/106564

[60] https://t.me/DIUkraine/9044

[61] https://t.me/DniproOfficial/8017 ; https://x.com/LayBay_ish/status/2085672060978696567

[62] https://t.me/Crimeanwind/106591

[63] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2711

[64] https://t.me/kpszsu/71821  

[65] https://t.me/Yevtushenko_E/42962; https://t.me/vilkul/17454; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/27955; https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/27956; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31238; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31239; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31258; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/31259; https://t.me/synegubov/24570; https://t.me/synegubov/24574; https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1373616-dva-civilni-avtomobili-atakuvali-fpv-droni-na-dorozi-dergaci-kozaca-lopan-34-ricnij-vodij-distav-poranenna/; https://t.me/odesaMVA/2955; https://t.me/odesacityofficial/61283; https://t.me/odesacityofficial/61290; https://t.me/odeskaODA/18373; https://t.me/odeskaODA/18374 ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/32053 ; https://suspilne dot media/odesa/1373992-rosia-atakuvala-odesu-poskodzen-zaznala-sportivna-infrastruktura-e-poraneni-2/; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/45614; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/65615; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/45616; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/65616; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/45613; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/65617; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/65619; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/45629; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/45639; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/45649; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/45650; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/65631; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/65632; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/45654; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/65635; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/45662; https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/65645

[66] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/5291

[67] https://www.ukrnafta dot com/vorog-vdaryv-po-semy-obektah-vydobutku-ukrnafty-e-zryjnovane-obladnannya

[68] https://www.naftogaz dot com/news/naftohaz-peredav-mzs-perelik-priorytetnykh-mizhnarodnykh-proyektiv-dlya-pidhotovky-do-opalyuvalnoho-sezonu; https://suspilne dot media/1374114-vid-pocatku-2026-roku-armia-rf-287-raziv-atakuvala-obekti-naftogazu/

[69] https://suspilne dot media/1373414-v-ukraini-zavitsa-nove-profesijne-svato-rosiani-rozstrilali-ukrainskogo-vijskovogo-1626-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1786084647&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[70] https://bank dot gov.ua/ua/news/all/inflyatsiya-prishvidshitsya-u-drugomu-pivrichchi-ale-povernetsya-do-znijennya-nastupnogo-roku--inflyatsiyniy-zvit ; https://suspilne dot media/1374084-ponad-2-mlrd-dolariv-nbu-ociniv-zbitki-vid-zupinki-morskogo-eksportu/

[71] https://suspilne dot media/1373416-rosia-vipuskae-bilse-raket-niz-mi-otrimuemo-fedorov/; https://suspilne dot media/1373420-fedorov-a-prodovzuu-peremovini-z-maskom-pro-vikoristanna-starlink-proti-rosian/; https://www.youtube.com/live/TE-HCK_45CQ