Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 10, 2026

Assessment as of: 8:20 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 12:45 PM ET

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Russian forces are reprioritizing the production of their long-range strike systems to those that can more reliably penetrate Ukrainian air defenses and accurately strike their targets. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Head Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated on August 10 that Russia has been reprioritizing the production of ballistic and cruise missiles since April 2026 in an effort to exploit Ukrainian shortages of Patriot interceptor missiles.[1] Skibitskyi stated that Russian forces are also increasingly using ballistic missiles to strike Ukrainian defense-industrial base (DIB) facilities in order to prevent Ukraine from producing its own ballistic missiles. Skibitskyi reported that Russian forces have more than tripled the monthly launches of ballistic missiles against Ukraine from April to July 2026.

Skibitskyi stated that Russia had already fulfilled its annual production plan for Zirkon and Onyx anti-ship cruise missiles as of August 3.

Skibitsky stated that Russia is currently exceeding its monthly production plan for key types of missiles by 10 to 20 percent.

Skibitskyi stated that Russia has been able to ramp up its production of ballistic missiles in part by suspending the production of Kinzhal air-launched ballistic and Kh-32 cruise missiles which are less accurate. Skibitskyi stated that Russia uses S-400 air defense system launchers to fire specially developed RM-48U surface-to-surface missiles that fly on a ballistic trajectory to strike ground targets.

Skibitskyi stated that Russian forces are not drawing from their missile stockpiles to conduct missile strikes but rather are firing newly produced missiles. Skibitskyi’s report suggests that Russian forces are trying to increase their missile production capacity to support larger and more frequent ballistic missile strike packages without drawing on their stockpiles. That approach would allow Russian forces to pull from stockpiles for individual very large strike packages, assuming launchers and other necessary capabilities are available. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported on August 10 that Russian forces currently have the capability to fire a simultaneous salvo of 77 missiles of various types and that Russia is working to increase the maximum size of a single salvo to 200 missiles of various kinds.[2] Brovdi emphasized that he was speaking about salvoes containing missiles of all types, not just ballistics. Skibitskyi stated that Russian forces are stockpiling the Kalibr ship-launched cruise missile rather than using it, delivering Kalibrs to its fleets outside of the Black Sea. The Ukrainian interception rate of Kalibr missiles had reached nearly 100 percent, and Ukrainian forces have degraded and continue to hold at risk the Black Sea Fleet‘s (BSF) missile launch platforms. Ukrainian forces have repeatedly struck Kalibr-capable vessels in the Black Sea and the infrastructure that supports them, degrading the combat capability of the BSF and forcing it to retreat to the port of Novorossiysk.[3]

Russia is refocusing its drone production toward faster jet-powered Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones that are harder to intercept as Ukrainian forces have increasingly fielded effective defenses against Russia's piston engine-driven strike drones, such as earlier versions of the Geran in recent months. Skibitskyi stated that Russia is planning to produce 11,000 Geran-1, Geran-2, Geran-3, Geran-4, Geran-5, Garpiya, and Gerbera drones in August 2026, including both the strike and Seeker variants of the Gerbera drones.[4] Skibitskyi added that Russia slightly decreased its production of these strike drones in July 2026 as it refocused its production on jet-powered Geran-4 and Geran-5 strike drones. Ukrainian forces maintain a high interception rate of slower flying piston engine-driven drones, decreasing the overall effectiveness of these drones.[5] The use of jet engines allows the Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones to reach and sustain higher flight speeds, shortening Ukraine's interception window and making it harder for Ukrainian interceptor drones to catch up to the jet-powered drones.

Russia will increasingly target Ukrainian energy infrastructure in winter 2025/2026. Former Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) advisor on defense technology and drone and electronic warfare (EW) expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov warned on August 10 that Russian forces will increase their strikes on the Ukrainian energy sector in the upcoming winter.[6] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on August 5 urged local Ukrainian administrations to implement resilience plans ahead of the winter and stated that protection of critical infrastructure, ensuring the necessary number and quality of shelters, and increasing anti-ballistic capabilities are among three Ukrainian priorities to make it through winter.[7] Zelensky stated on August 8 that Ukraine has effectively no undamaged power plants left, and Russian strikes have also destroyed many railway stations, hospitals, universities, and civilian businesses.[8] The Kremlin is reportedly planning to launch a large-scale strike campaign against energy infrastructure in Kyiv City over the coming weeks with the aim of disrupting Ukrainian efforts to strengthen the energy facilities and to take advantage of Ukraine’s ongoing shortages of ballistic missile interceptors.[9]

Russia's reprioritization of production efforts toward ballistic missiles will support Russian efforts to use the upcoming winter to break Ukraine's will to fight. The Kremlin believes that it can exploit Ukraine's shortage of interceptor missiles to avoid having to enter meaningful negotiations or make concessions on its maximalist demands. The recent dramatic reduction in the supply of Patriot anti-missile interceptors will therefore contribute to the protraction of the war into 2027. Ukraine’s Patriot air defense systems remain its only systems capable of intercepting Russian ballistic missiles. The Russian reprioritization of production towards ballistic missiles likely reflects Russian President Vladimir Putin's belief that Russia can take advantage of the ongoing Patriot missile interceptor shortage to pressure Ukraine into submitting to his maximalist demands. Putin's theory of victory rests on the premise that Russia can win a war of attrition by having Russian forces maintain the initiative and advance across the entire theater indefinitely while pummeling Ukrainian cities and infrastructure, outlasting both Ukraine’s ability to defend and Western support for Ukraine.[10] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin reiterated on August 9 the view that Russia does not support freezing the war in Ukraine and that any settlement must address the war's "root causes," the Kremlin's shorthand for its original maximalist demands.[11] The Kremlin will not enter serious negotiations or make meaningful compromises on its demands as long as Putin believes that he has a viable military path to achieving his full objectives. Ukraine’s Patriot shortages offer Russian an opportunity to cause very serious damage to Ukraine over the coming winter and will therefore contribute to delaying meaningful negotiations and protracting the war.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces are reprioritizing the production of their long-range strike systems to those that can more reliably penetrate Ukrainian air defenses and accurately strike their targets.
• Russia is refocusing its drone production toward faster jet-powered Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones that are harder to intercept as Ukrainian forces have increasingly fielded effective defenses against Russia's piston engine-driven strike drones, such as earlier versions of the Geran in recent months.
• Russia will increasingly target Ukrainian energy infrastructure in winter 2025/2026.
• Russia's reprioritization of production efforts toward ballistic missiles will support Russian efforts to use the upcoming winter to break Ukraine's will to fight. The Kremlin believes that it can exploit Ukraine's shortage of interceptor missiles to avoid having to enter meaningful negotiations or make concessions on its maximalist demands. The recent dramatic reduction in the supply of Patriot anti-missile interceptors will therefore contribute to the protraction of the war into 2027.
• Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets on August 10.
• Russia launched one Kh-59/69 cruise missile, three Banderol-type loitering munitions, and 126 drones against Ukraine overnight.
• Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces advanced on August 10.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets on August 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck one of the largest petrochemical enterprises in Russia, the Tobolskneftekhim petrochemical plant in Tobolsk, Tyumen Oblast (roughly 2,200 kilometers from the international border), damaging its central gas fractionation unit that has an annual capacity of about 6.6 million tons of raw materials.[12] Footage published on August 10 reportedly shows a fire at the facility.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also struck the Taneko oil refinery in Nizhnekamsk, Republic of Tatarstan, causing a fire.[14] Ukraine's Unmanned System Forces (USF) reported that the refinery produces more than 20 types of fuel products and has refining capacity of about 13 million tons of oil per year.[15] The Republic of Tatarstan administration acknowledged the strike on the refinery.[16] Footage published on August 9 reportedly shows smoke rising from the refinery.[17]

Ukrainian sources provided an updated battle damage assessment (BDA) on recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian oil refineries. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 10 that the August 8 Ukrainian strike on the Ilsky Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai damaged its AVT-6 primary oil processing column and that the August 3 Ukrainian strike on the Hvardiiske Airfield in occupied Crimea destroyed nine horizontal tanks with aviation fuel and two hangars for aviation equipment.[18]  Geolocated footage published on August 10 shows the aftermath of the Ukrainian strike on the Hvardiiske Airfield.[19] Satellite imagery captured on August 9 shows the aftermath of a recent Ukrainian strike on a Russian S-400 air defense system launcher in Gelendzhik, Krasnodar Krai, that destroyed four launchers.[20]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces recently conducted an infiltration mission in northern Sumy Oblast. Geolocated footage published on August 6 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in northern Ryasne (southeast of Sumy City) after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[21]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian milbloggers continue to repeat recent Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claims that Russian forces are on the verge of encircling Ukrainian troops operating between the Velykyi Burluk and Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City) sectors, which remains highly unlikely at this time. Russian milbloggers continued to claim on August 10 that Russian forces are encircling Ukrainian forces between the Vovchansk and Velykyi Burluk sectors.[22] Such an encirclement remains extremely unlikely if by that is meant actually surrounding Ukrainian troops with Russian forces, however. ISW has only observed evidence to assess that Russian forces operating in the Velykyi Burluk and Vovchansk directions are roughly 45 kilometers apart from each other. This is a significant distance that will be very difficult for Russian forces to close given Russian forces’ inability to break out of positional warfare in northern Kharkiv Oblast. ISW has not observed sufficient reporting to assess the possibility that Russian forces will be able to force a Ukrainian withdrawal from this sector by establishing fire control over critical lines of communication, but such an eventuality also seems unlikely in the short term given the distances involved.

Russian drone strikes continue to target Ukrainian police cars in frontline areas. Kupyansk Raion Military Administration Head Andrii Kanashevych reported that a Russian fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drone struck police vehicles in Velykyi Burluk on August 10 as police officers were conducting evacuation measures.[23]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on August 9 and 10 but did not advance.[24] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces reported on August 10 that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Petropavlivka (east of Kupyansk).[25]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 9 and 10 but did not advance.[26] A source reporting on the Russian Western Grouping of Forces claimed on August 10 that Ukrainian forces are trying to advance south of Ridkodub and Nove (both southeast of Borova) and that Russian forces are increasingly attempting to infiltrate in the area.[27]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and energy infrastructure in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian repair unit in occupied Khrustalne (roughly 87 kilometers from the frontline) on the night of August 9 to 10.[28] Geolocated footage posted on August 7 shows Ukrainian drones striking substations in Holubivka (either roughly 30 or 55 kilometers from the frontline) and Donetskyi (roughly 53 kilometers from the frontline).[29]  

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

A Russian milblogger acknowledged the deteriorating situation for Russian forces in the Lyman direction. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger assessed that the situation in Lyman and on its flanks is concerning and developing negatively for Russian troops.[30] The milblogger acknowledged that there are conflicting reports about Russian advances in the Lyman direction and that full Russian control over the forests south of Lyman is unlikely given the Ukrainian presence in Yampil (southeast of Lyman).[31] The milblogger noted that small groups of Ukrainian forces have reached Dibrova and Ozerne (both south of Lyman). The milblogger added that the status of Staryi Karavan and Brusivka (both south of Lyman) is currently unclear, noting that the settlements are located quite far west from where small Ukrainian groups are operating. The milblogger stated that there has been no information about a Russian presence in Tetyanivka and Pryshyb (both northwest of Lyman) for some time.

The milblogger also acknowledged conflicting reports about Russian successes in the Slovyansk direction. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces seized Rai-Oleksandrivka (east of Slovyansk) and consolidated positions in Psykunivka (north of Rai-Oleksandrivka) but acknowledged that Ukraine's frequent counterattacks have slowed Russian advances in the area.[32] The milblogger claimed that reports that Russian forces are attacking Mykolaivka (northwest of Rai-Oleksandrivka) are premature.

Ukrainian forces recently cleared Russian infiltrators from parts of Kostyantynivka. Geolocated footage published on August 10 shows Ukrainian forces operating in western Kostyantynivka - an area in which ISW previously observed a Russian infiltrator presence.[33] Additional geolocated footage published on August 10 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position in southern Rozkishne (southwest of Kostyantynivka) — an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[34] A Russian milblogger claimed on August 10 that Russian forces advanced east of Virolyubivka, northwest of Molocharivka (both north of Kostyantynivka), and east of Chervone (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[35] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger refuted recent claims that Russian forces seized Vasyutinske (east of Kramatorsk and north of Kostyantynivka) as premature since Ukrainian forces maintain control over strongholds north of the settlement and Russian forces are struggling to advance on Vasyutinske's southern approaches.[36] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are counterattacking from Pershomarivka (northwest of Vasyutinske) on foot and with support from artillery and armored vehicles.

Military analyst Rob Lee stated on August 10 that Russia's rate of advance toward Dobropillya and Druzhkivka has increased in recent weeks.[37] Lee reported that small infiltration groups of the Russian 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) have reached southeastern Dobropillya and that other Russian infiltration groups have moved from Novyi Donbas (east of Dobropillya) to the area north and northeast of Hannivka (just east of Dobropillya and northwest of Novyi Donbas) along the T-0514 Dobropillya-Kramatorsk highway. Lee reported that elements of the Russian 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic Army Corps, Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet) are attempting to encircle Dobropillya from the east and northeast by taking advantage of Russia's control of nearby tactical heights, including one south of Stepy (east of Dobropillya). Lee further reported that elements of the Russian 177th Separate Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) are approaching Dobropillya from the east along the T-0515 Dobropillya-Pokrovsk highway. Lee assessed that Russian forces will use the waste heaps at the mine they seized east of Chernihivka (south of Dobropillya) as a hub for drone crews and infiltration groups as Russian forces build up their presence in nearby Bilytske (just east of Chernihivka) and Matyasheve (just west of Chernihivka). Lee added that Russian forces advanced in Kucheriv Yar and Torske (both northeast of Dobropillya) after Russian forces in the area received reinforcements from the 228th and 239th motorized rifle regiments (both of the 90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]).

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk on August 10. A Russian milblogger claimed on August 10 that Russian forces seized Krasnopodillya (north of Pokrovsk and south of Dobropillya) and advanced southeast of Novohryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk and southwest of Dobropillya) and southwest of Novyi Donbas.[38] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on August 10 that Russian forces control Novyi Donbas but that Ukrainian forces maintain a presence between Shevchenko, Bilytske, and Rodynske (all south of Chernihivka).[39] The milblogger added that Russian forces are having difficulty clearing the area south of Chernihivka due to the number of Ukrainian drones in the sky and drone-dropped mines.[40]

Russian forces continue to use drone and glide bomb strikes in their battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign that aims to disrupt Ukrainian logistics in the Dobropillya area. Lee noted that Russian forces are using 15-inch fiber-optic cable first-person view (FPV) drones with a 50-kilometer range to strike Novodonetske (north of Dobropillya).[41] Lee added that Russian forces are conducting one to two Geran drone strikes against Novodonetske and Oleksandrivka (likely referring to the settlement northwest of Dobropillya) per day and five to 10 Geran strikes against Dobropillya per day. Lee stated that Russian forces are also conducting glide bomb strikes against both of these areas. Lee assessed that Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign has complicated Russian logistics but that Russian forces still have a rough parity in FPVs in this area while also receiving sufficient artillery ammunition supplies.

A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Dobropillya area stated on August 10 that Russian forces are using foliage and buildings to conduct infiltration missions.[42] The NCO noted that Russian forces are using guided glide bombs to destroy Ukrainian drone pilot positions in order to force the pilots to move further from the frontline, decrease their ability to accurately observe targets, and lengthen the time it takes for the drones to reach their targets. ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are conducting a BAI campaign to prepare for offensive operations against the Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast, including by relying on glide bomb strikes to turn villages and cities into ruins that Russian infiltrators can exploit for concealment.[43]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on August 9 and 10 but did not make confirmed advances.[44] Russian milbloggers claimed on August 10 that Russian forces advanced north and west of Myrne (northwest of Pokrovsk) and southwest of Novopidhorodne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[45]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on August 9 and 10 but did not advance.[46]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Oleksandrivka direction on August 9 and 10 but did not advance.[47] A Russian milblogger acknowledged on August 10 that Ukrainian forces recently regained 26.7 square kilometers in the Komar direction (east of Oleksandrivka).[48]

Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range and frontline strike campaign against Russian military assets and electrical and transport infrastructure in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian material and technical equipment depot in Novoselydivka (roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline) and a field artillery depot in Svyato-Pokrovske (roughly five kilometers from the frontline) overnight from August 9 to 10.[49] Geolocated footage published on August 7 shows Ukrainian forces striking three substations in Mariupol (roughly 110 kilometers from the frontline), one in Horlivka (roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline), and one in Dokuchayevsk (roughly 72 kilometers from the frontline).[50] Ukrainian Center for the Study of Occupation Head and former Mariupol official Petro Andryushchenko stated on August 10 that Ukrainian forces struck a diesel locomotive on the Volnovakha-Karan railway and a truck on the M-14 Berdyansk-Melitopol highway in  Komyshuvate (roughly 95 kilometers from the front).[51] Mariupol occupation head Anton Koltsov claimed on August 10 that authorities are struggling to fully restore electricity in several raions of the city.[52]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on August 9 and 10 but did not advance.[53]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 9 and 10 but did not make confirmed advances.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of Pavlivka (west of Orikhiv).[55] Another milblogger claimed that fighting for Orikhiv has not started, despite recent claims from other Russian sources that Russian forces advanced into southern Orikhiv and Preobrazhenka (just north of Orikhiv).[56]

Ukrainian forces continue their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian energy and military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian Center for the Study of Occupation Head and former Mariupol official Petro Andryushchenko reported on August 10 that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against a substation in Prymorsk (roughly 130 kilometers from the front) overnight on August 9 to 10, causing a fire.[57] Geolocated footage published on August 6 and 10 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian vehicles and mobile fire groups along the M-18 Melitopol-Berdyansk highway north of Vovchanske (about 130 kilometers from the front).[58]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on August 10.

Ukrainian forces continue their strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on August 10 that Ukrainian forces struck two S-400 air defense system launchers and an Orion drone control antenna in occupied Crimea.[59] Geolocated footage published on August 10 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian radar dome near Vityne (roughly 150 kilometers from the front).[60] Geolocated footage published on August 7 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian temporary deployment point in Novoozerne (roughly 140 kilometers from the front) and a Russian military repair unit in Abrykosove (roughly 130 kilometers from the front).[61]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces launched a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of August 9 to 10. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Kh-59/69 cruise missile and three Banderol loitering munitions from the airspace over the Black Sea and 126 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and Parodiya-type drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[62] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 92 drones and all three Banderols; that 31 strike drones hit 22 locations; and that debris fell at two locations. The Kh-59/69 missile reportedly did not reach its intended target. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, business, and agricultural infrastructure and gas stations in Poltava, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kharkiv oblasts.^[63] Poltava Oblast officials stated that there are no working gas stations left in the region's Opishnyanska Hromada after Russian drones struck four stations overnight.[64] Poltava Oblast Military Administration head Vitaliy Dyakivnych reported that authorities are working to ensure gasoline deliveries to the region.[65]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces conducted missile and drone strikes against the Odesa Combined Heat and Power Plant (CHPP) and seven electrical substations in Odesa Oblast on August 9.[66]

Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO) Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus reported that Russian forces struck and destroyed a WHO humanitarian warehouse in Dnipro City on August 7.[67] Ghebreyesus stated that the warehouse held humanitarian medical supplies for frontline health facilities.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarusian forces will likely be able to share lessons learned from Russian forces fighting in Ukraine in upcoming Belarusian-Chinese exercises in the People's Republic of China (PRC). The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on August 10 that Belarusian Special Operations Forces personnel departed Belarus to participate in the joint Belarusian-Chinese tactical exercise "Swift Eagle – 2026" at the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force Airborne Corps training ground in Hubei Province.[68] The exercise will include training on drone piloting, counter-drone tactics, and drone assembly.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.