April 04, 2026

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 4, 2026

Data Cutoff: 12:30 PM ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

 

The Kremlin continues to face harsher backlash from Russia's domestic populace about its intensified censorship efforts in recent weeks than Moscow likely expected or was prepared for. Polling from the Kremlin-linked Public Opinion Forum (FOM) from March 27 to 29 found that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s trust rating fell by five percentage points from 76 percent to 71 percent since March 22 - the highest decrease since 2019.[1] Weekly FOM polling shows Putin's trust rating consistently falling since February 8, 2026, just before the Kremlin significantly throttled Telegram on February 9 and 10. Russian opposition source Vazhnye Istorii noted on April 3 that several pro-Kremlin Russian propagandists and pro-war milbloggers are increasingly expressing frustration with Kremlin efforts to block Telegram, including by complaining that the Kremlin is wasting money on the censorship efforts despite rising prices and is leaving Russian forces without battlefield communication systems.[2] Russian officials have struggled to manage backlash from the Russian information space over intensified censorship efforts, especially from the ultranationalist milblogger community.[3] Russian officials have made contradictory statements concerning the Kremlin’s policy toward Telegram in recent weeks, suggesting that the Kremlin lacked a cohesive management strategy regarding the implementation of censorship measures and indicating that Russian officials are facing backlash potentially far greater than they originally estimated.[4]

Telegram founder Pavel Durov responded on April 3 to recent Kremlin efforts to ban Telegram and virtual private networks (VPNs), stating that 65 million Russians still use VPNs daily to access Telegram.[5] Durov stated that these Kremlin efforts triggered a massive banking failure, referring to massive outages of multiple Russian banks' payment and transfer services on April 3.[6] Several Russian sources linked the April 3 outages to Kremlin efforts to block IP addresses that the banking system used, but the sources removed these reports, allegedly after Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor demanded their removal.[7]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against military assets in Russia and occupied Ukraine on April 3 to 4. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck two Russian Shahed drone preparation points and hubs at the Khalino Air Base near Kursk City (roughly 100 kilometers from the frontline) and in Navlya, Bryansk Oblast (roughly 70 kilometers from the frontline) on April 4.[8] Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck multiple targets in occupied Luhansk Oblast, including deployment points of elements of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) near Shulhynka (roughly 75 kilometers from the frontline) and Bilovodsk (roughly 120 kilometers from the frontline); command posts and troop concentrations near Shulhynka and Bilovodsk; a ZU-23-2 towed anti-aircraft gun near occupied Lozivskyi (roughly 75 kilometers from the frontline); and a fuel tanker near Novosimeikine (roughly 135 kilometers from the frontline).[9] Geolocated footage published on April 4 confirms strikes near Shchotove, Lozivskyi, and Novosimeikine.[10] Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported on April 4 that Ukrainian drones struck the Alchevsk Metallurgical Plant in occupied Alchevsk, Luhansk Oblast (roughly 65 kilometers from the frontline) for the second time in a month, forcing the plant to halt operations.[11] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian railway trains carrying fuel near Shchotove (roughly 100 kilometers from the frontline) and Stanytsya Luhanska (roughly 110 kilometers from the frontline) in occupied Luhansk Oblast on April 3 and overnight on April 3 to 4.[12]

Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces also struck Russian assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast, including command posts and troop concentrations near Holubytske (roughly 75 kilometers from the frontline) and Velyka Novosilka (roughly 23 kilometers from the frontline) and a Tor-M2 air defense system near Zachativka (roughly 60 kilometers from the frontline).[13] Geolocated footage published on April 4 confirms the strike near Zachativka.[14] Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast, including: a logistics hub of the 5th CAA (Eastern Military District [EMD]) near Novopoltavka (roughly 35 kilometers from the frontline); a logistics hub of the 35th CAA (EMD) near occupied Chervone Pole (roughly 90 kilometers from the frontline); and a command post and troop concentration near occupied Samiilivka (roughly 30 kilometers from the frontline).[15] Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck a radar of an S-400 air defense system near occupied Feodosia, Crimea (roughly 240 kilometers from the frontline).[16] Geolocated footage published on April 4 confirms the strike against Feodosia.[17]

Key Takeaways:

  • The Kremlin continues to face harsher backlash from Russia's domestic populace about its intensified censorship efforts in recent weeks than Moscow likely expected or was prepared for.
  • Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against military assets in Russia and occupied Ukraine on April 3 to 4.
  • Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and in the Kupyansk and Oleksandrivka directions.
  • Ukrainian forces struck at least one Russian chemical plant in Samara Oblast. Russian forces launched 286 drones against Ukraine.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text for more reports of Ukrainian operations in Russia.

Ukrainian forces struck at least one Russian chemical plant in Samara Oblast on the night of April 3 to 4. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike against the KuibyshevAzot chemical plant in Tolyatti, Samara Oblast.[18] Geolocated footage published on April 4 shows explosions and fires in Tolyatti.[19] Russian opposition source Astra also reported that geolocated footage shows a fire near the Tolyattikauchuk and KuibyshevAzot chemical plants, which are located near each other in Tolyatti.[20] Tolyattikauchuk produces synthetic rubber and chemical components, and KuibyshevAzot produces nitrogen fertilizers and raw materials such as polyamides and caprolactam.[21] Samara Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Fedorishchev acknowledged on April 4 that Ukrainian drones struck an industrial enterprise in Tolyatti.[22]

Reuters reported on April 3, citing three industry sources, that Ukrainian strikes against the Bashneft-Novoil Oil Refinery in Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan, on the night of April 1 to 2 caused the refinery to shut down one of its largest crude distillation units.[23] Reuters' sources reported that the strikes caused a fire at one of the distillation units that accounts for over 28 percent of the refinery's total capacity.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast, including southeast of Sumy City near Hrabovske, on April 3 and 4 but did not advance.[24]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) reportedly continue to operate in the Sumy direction.[25]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 3 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in southwestern Vovchansk (northeast of Kharkiv City).[26]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vilcha, Starytsya, Tsehelne, Okhrimivka, Izbytske, Vovchanski Khutory, Hrafske, Lyptsi, and Vovchansk and toward Verkhnya Pysarivka on April 3 and 4.[27]

Order of Battle: Elements of the 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Regiment (71st Guards Motorized Rifle Division, 14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Zybyne (northeast of Kharkiv City).[28] Molniya-2 fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Kornet Group (204th Akhmat Spetsnaz Regiment) reportedly continue to operate in the Kharkiv direction.[29]

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Velykyi Burluk near Ambarne and Shevyakivka and southeast of Velykyi Burluk near Chuhunivka and Kolodyazne on April 3 and 4 but did not advance.[30]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 4 shows drone operators of the Russian 121st Motorized Rifle Regiment (68th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) striking a Ukrainian position in northern Kupyansk, indicating that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the area.[31]

Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe; and southeast of Kupyansk near Kivsharivka and Novoosynove on April 3 and 4.[32]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are striking Ukrainian positions in central Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[33] Elements of the 153rd Tank Regiment (47th Tank Division, 1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Kupyansk direction.[34]

Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Borova near Novoplatonivka and Borivska Andriivka and east of Borova near Novoserhiivka on April 3 and 4.[35]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 423rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (4th Tank Division, 1st GTA), including its 2nd Battalion, and the 15th Motorized Rifle Regiment (2nd Motorized Rifle Division, 1st GTA) reportedly continue to operate toward Borova.[36]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on April 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked toward Lyman itself; south of Lyman near Dibrova; east of Slovyansk near Platonivka; and southeast of Slovyansk near Zvanivka, Nykyforivka, Lypivka, and Kalenyky and toward Rai-Oleksandrivka on April 3 and April 4.[37]

Russian forces recently conducted infiltration missions in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on April 3 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in southeastern Kostyantynivka and on the eastern outskirts of the city after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of battle area (FEBA).[38]

Assessed Ukrainian advances and refinement of areas under Russian claims: Geolocated footage published on April 3 shows elements of the Russian 1465th Motorized Rifle Regiment  (4th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, 3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) conducting artillery strikes against Ukrainian positions east of Berestok (south of Kostyantynivka) - an area in which Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces maintained positions.[39] ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along the T-0504 Pokrovsk-Kostyantynivka highway north of Berestok, as the geolocated footage indicates that there are likely no Russian positions near the Ukrainian positions east of the settlement.

Russian forces attacked near Kostyantynivka itself; south of Kostyantynivka near Pleshchiivka, Kleban-Byk, and Ivanopillya; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Illinivka and Stepanivka; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Novopavlivka and Sofiivka on April 3 and 4.[40]

Order of Battle: Fiber optic first-person view (FPV) drone operators of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, SMD) are striking Ukrainian positions south of Illinivka.[41] Fiber optic FPV drone operators of the 136th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (58th CAA, SMD) are striking Ukrainian armored vehicles in Kostyantynivka.[42] FPV drone operators of the 242nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly intercepting Ukrainian drones and striking Ukrainian antennas and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) near Mykolaipillya (west of Kostyantynivka) and Novopavlivka.[43] FPV drone operators of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles near Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka (northwest of Kostyantynivka).[44] FPV drone operators of the 1442nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC, under operational control of the Southern Grouping of Forces) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Kostyantynivka direction.[45] Elements of the 255th Motorized Rifle Regiment (20th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[46]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations east of Dobropillya near Novyi Donbas and northeast of Dobropillya toward Kucheriv Yar on April 3 and 4 but did not advance.[47]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on April 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; northwest of Pokrovsk near Hryshyne and toward Serhiivka and Novooleksandrivka; north of Pokrovsk near Bilytske and Rodynske and toward Shevchenko; east of Pokrovsk near Myrnohrad; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Udachne, Novopidhorodne, and Molodetske on April 3 and 4.[48]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on April 3 and 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Novopavlivka itself and northeast of Novopavlivka near Novomykolaivka and Muravka on April 3 and 4.[49]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 80th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, 41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Dnipropetrovsk direction.[50]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on April 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northwestern Boikove (southwest of Oleksandrivka).[51]

Assessed Russian infiltrations: Geolocated footage published on April 3 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian servicemembers west of Pryvillya (south of Oleksandrivka) after what ISW assesses was a Russian infiltration mission that did not change control of terrain or the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).[52]

Russian forces attacked toward Oleksandrivka itself; east of Oleksandrivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove; southeast of Oleksandrivka near Sichneve and Novohryhorivka and toward Verbove and Stepove; and south of Oleksandrivka near Zlahoda and Krasnohirske on April 3 and 4.[53]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 64th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are intercepting Ukrainian drones over Zlahoda and striking Ukrainian positions northwest of Zlahoda.[54] Drone operators of the 36th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are intercepting Ukrainian drones in Novohryhorivka itself and near the settlement.[55]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on April 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked near Hulyaipole itself; northwest of Hulyaipole near Varvarivka, Pryluky, Olenokostyantynivka, Zelene, and Dobropillya, and toward Verkhnya Tersa and Vozdvyzhivka; west of Hulyaipole near Zaliznychne, Hirke, and Tsvitkove; and southwest of Hulyaipole near Hulyaipilske, Myrne, and Charivne on April 3 and 4.[56] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Hulyaipilske and Vozdvyzhivka.[57]

Ukrainian forces continue to expand the "kill zone" in the Hulyaipole direction. The head of unmanned systems of a Ukrainian regiment operating in the Hulyaipole direction reported that Ukrainian forces are able to reconnoiter Russian forces 20 to 30 kilometers from the frontline.[58] The unmanned systems head stated that Russian forces continue to conduct small infantry group attacks and are using motorcycles as weather conditions improve.

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Separate Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff's Main Directorate [GRU]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian armored vehicles near Rizdvyanka.[59] Drone operators of the 57th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast (likely in the Hulyaipole direction).[60]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked west of Orikhiv near Stepove, Stepnohirsk, and Prymorske on April 3 and 4.[61]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 38th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Chervona Krynytsya (east of Orikhiv).[62] Elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in Zaporizhia Oblast.[63]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on April 4 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northeast of Kherson City toward the Antonivskyi Bridge and southwest of Kherson City near Bilohrudyi Island and Hola Prystan on April 3 and 4.[64]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in the Kherson direction.[65]

The Ukrainian General Staff provided additional battle damage assessments (BDA) for the April 1 to 2 Ukrainian strike against the Kirovske Air Base in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 4 that a recent Ukrainian strike on a Russian drone storage site at the Kirovske Air Base (northwest of occupied Feodosia and roughly 225 kilometers from the frontline) destroyed one and damaged three Inokhodets ("Orion") strike-reconnaissance drones.[66] ISW previously reported on this strike on April 2.[67]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine overnight on April 3 to 4. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 286 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones, of which about 200 were Shaheds, from the directions of Bryansk, Kursk, and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[68] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 260 drones, that 11 drones struck 10 locations, and that drone debris fell at six locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the strikes were continuing and that there were about 20 drones in Ukrainian airspace as of 0700 local time, April 4. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes damaged commercial infrastructure in Kyiv City, critical infrastructure in Chernihiv Oblast, and residential infrastructure in Sumy Oblast.[69] Ukrainian officials also reported that a Russian drone strike against a market in Nikopol, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, on the morning of April 4 killed five civilians and wounded 25 others.[70]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Belarus continues to support the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and Russian sanctions evasion schemes. Belarusian opposition organization BELPOL published in February 2026 a list of 120 Belarusian organizations and defense industrial enterprises that are supporting the Russian DIB.[71] BELPOL noted that Belarusian defense industrial companies are supplying components to Russian producers of 152-millimeter artillery shells and 122-millimeter rockets for Grad multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). BELPOL reported that Belarusian organizations are also helping Russia evade sanctions by providing components, logistics, and financial support to Russian weapons manufacturers.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.


[1] https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/8568543; https://fom dot ru/Dominanty/15320; https://media dot fom.ru/fom-bd/d13pi2026.pdf

[2] https://t.me/istories_media/11795; https://t.me/sskarnaukhov/92133; https://t.me/dontstopwar/25977 ; https://t.me/soldat_prav/16102 ; https://t.me/voenkor_evtushenko/10731 ; https://t.me/ekaterina_mizulina/18668 ; https://t.me/delyagin/38955;  https://t.me/shturmmotherfucker/1855 ; https://t.me/Love_Russia_Beauty/23427 ;https://t.me/leib_hussar/2795 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/27498; https://t.me/mardanaka/38862  

[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-11-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-19-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-15-2026/

[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-2-… https://tass dot ru/politika/26977109; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-15… 

[5] https://t.me/durov/477

[6] https://t.me/tass_agency/369350; https://meduza dot io/news/2026/04/03/v-rabote-prilozheniy-sbera-vtb-i-t-banka-proizoshel-sboy-polzovateli-ne-mogut-perevesti-dengi-i-snyat-ih-v-bankomatah; https://t.me/ostorozhno_novosti/48084; https://t.me/sberbank/5340; https://t.me/tass_agency/369326; https://t.me/tass_agency/369336 ; https://t.me/astrapress/108796; https://t.me/bazabazon/45093; https://t.me/sotaproject/111249

[7] https://meduza dot io/news/2026/04/04/roskomnadzor-potreboval-ot-zhurnalistov-udalit-novost-o-tom-chto-sboy-v-rabote-bankov-byl-svyazan-s-blokirovkami-rkn; https://t.me/ru2ch/167486; https://t.me/istories_media/11793; https://t.me/ostorozhno_novosti/48110; https://t.me/idelrealii/44708 ; https://t.me/radiosvoboda/95830 ; https://t.me/astrapress/108901; https://t.me/astrapress/108914

[8] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2170

[9] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2170

[10] https://x.com/klinger66/status/2040366102945898519; https://x.com/414magyarbirds/status/2040334115438809298; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/34696; https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2039829906327007533; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2040068143431987622; https://x.com/klinger66/status/2040017413710746074 

[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31… ; https://t.me/SBUkr/17252 

[12] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36894  

[13] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2170

[14] https://x.com/klinger66/status/2040362484628922403; https://x.com/414magyarbirds/status/2040334115438809298; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/34696 

[15] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2170; 

[16] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2170

[17] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2170

[18] https://t.me/robert_magyar/2171

[19] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/12747; https://t.me/exilenova_plus/18375; https://t.me/supernova_plus/50256; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2040237473201271008; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2040240892855066935; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2040300234438582379; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2040282311548391593; https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/2040311244822065648;

[20] https://t.me/astrapress/108872; https://t.me/astrapress/108884

[21] https://t.me/astrapress/108872

[22] https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/26999593

[23] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-2-2026/

[24] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36865; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36863; https://t.me/dva_majors/90704; https://t.me/wargonzo/33314

[25] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41507

[26] https://x.com/giK1893/status/2040163081729269844; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/34687; https://www.facebook.com/reel/2211685999580204

[27] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36901 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36865; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36863; https://t.me/wargonzo/33314; https://t.me/dva_majors/90704; https://t.me/severnnyi/7410; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/15379

[28] https://t.me/otukharkiv/7436

[29] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/6474

[30] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36901; https://t.me/wargonzo/33314; https://t.me/gvZapad/18220

[31] https://t.me/hishinikiki/769; https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/2040402595068412165

[32] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36901; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36865; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36863; https://t.me/wargonzo/33314    

[33] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2040278461915492837; https://t.me/taran_Z_war/559

[34] https://t.me/gvZapad/18222

[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36865; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36863  

[36] https://t.me/gvZapad/18223

[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36901; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36865; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36863; https://t.me/tass_agency/369456; https://t.me/dva_majors/90704; https://t.me/wargonzo/33314;

[38] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2040373127260045643; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2040373152526499973; https://www.instagram.com/vartovi.36obrmp/reel/DWrLOGyKuvB/

[39] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2040368861439054141; https://t.me/aukrop/751

[40] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36901 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36865 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36863

 

[41] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2040082135952806120; https://t.me/SouthernRepublic/32172

[42] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2040088074332291075;  https://t.me/Otryad_vetra/798

[43] https://t.me/nm_dnr/15201

[44] https://t.me/nm_dnr/15202

[45] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/112415

[46] https://t.me/atesh_ua/9652

[47] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36865; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36863

[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36901; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36865; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36863; https://t.me/wargonzo/33314 

[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36901; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36863; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36865   

[50] https://t.me/mod_russia/62416

[51] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11608;

https://t.me/assaultregiment33/2700; https://x.com/MaxximOSINT/status/2040352776849428687;  https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2040344585004802110; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/34698  

[52] https://x.com/ne_kotletka/status/2040100673572766038; https://t.me/ombr_110/2413?t=0; 

[53] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36901; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36865; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36863;

[54] https://t.me/voin_dv/19172; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2040291999195218409; https://x.com/Playfra0/status/2040441782907924740

[55] https://t.me/voin_dv/19178; https://x.com/juss_men/status/2040371390772043825

[56] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36901  ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36865; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36863; https://t.me/dva_majors/90704 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/19177

[57] https://t.me/dva_majors/90704

[58] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SIRlElzXDTk; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/03/letyt-vse-shho-mayemo-v-arsenali-na-zaporizkomu-napryamku-pislya-zymy-zyavylysya-pershi-motoczykly/

[59] https://t.me/voin_dv/19180

[60] https://t.me/voin_dv/19174  

[61] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36901; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36865; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36863

[62] https://t.me/voin_dv/19182

[63] https://t.me/dva_majors/90748

[64] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36901; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36865; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36863

[65] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/41507

[66] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/36894  

[67] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-2-2026/

[68] https://t.me/kpszsu/59486

[69] https://t.me/chernihivrada/3489; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/61093; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/61103

[70] https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/28573; https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/36231; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2026/04/04/pyatero-lyudej-zagynulo-19-poraneno-naslidky-vorozhogo-udaru-po-nikopolyu/

[71] https://militarnyi dot com/uk/news/opozytsiya-vykryla-zavody-snaryady-dlya-rf/; https://belpol dot pro/kto-v-belarusi-pomogaet-rossijskoj-agressii/

 

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