April 26, 2026

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 26, 2026

Assessment as of: 5:15 PM ET 

Data Cutoff: 1:15 PM ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

For more information on ISW's map methodology, please view our statement here.

Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign continues to exploit overstretched Russian air defenses to damage oil infrastructure and military assets in Russia and occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 26 that Ukrainian forces struck the Yaroslavl Oil Refinery in Yaroslavl City, Yaroslavl Oblast, on the night of April 25 to 26, causing a fire at the facility.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the refinery has a processing capacity of about 15 million tons of oil per year and produces gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. Geolocated footage published on April 26 shows fires at the refinery, and a Ukrainian open-source intelligence (OSINT) source assessed that Ukrainian forces may have struck the ELOU-AT-4 installation, a key unit for raw materials primary processing.[2] ISW has observed geolocated evidence that Ukrainian forces conducted at least 10 strikes against Russian oil and gas infrastructure across Russia in the last two weeks (since roughly April 12). Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported on April 26 that Ukrainian forces also struck Russia’s naval base and Belbek Airfield in occupied Sevastopol on the night of April 25 to 26, damaging the Yamal Ropucha-class project 775 and Filchenkov Tapir-class project 1171 large landing ships (both of the Black Sea Fleet [BSF]); the Ivan Khurs Yury Ivanov–class reconnaissance ship; the Lukomka BSF Training Center; a Russian Air Defense Forces radio technical intelligence headquarters; a MR-10M1 Mys-M1 coastal radar station; a MiG-31 interceptor aircraft; and Belbek Airfield's maintenance section.[3] Sevastopol occupation governor Mikhail Razvozhaev acknowledged the Ukrainian strikes and claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted one of the largest strike campaigns on Sevastopol, launching at least 71 drones overnight.[4] Ukrainian forces have been steadily increasing the range, volume, and intensity of their long-range strike campaigns against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets in Russia and occupied Ukraine’s territories since March 2026, including a recent strike in Chelyabinsk on April 25 over 1,800 kilometers from the international border.[5] Ukrainian forces will likely continue to exploit the large attack surface area of Russia’s deep rear and overstretched Russian air defenses to launch more frequent and larger strikes against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets, supported by increased Ukrainian domestic drone production.[6]

Key Takeaways:

  • Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign continues to exploit overstretched Russian air defenses to damage oil infrastructure and military assets in Russia and occupied Crimea.
  • Russian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.
  • Russian forces launched 144 drones toward Ukraine overnight.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

  • Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

Note: ISW has changed how it reports Russian order of battle (ORBAT) details in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment on April 20, 2026. ISW previously published all ORBAT information collected in a daily 24-hour reporting period in the daily assessment. Moving forward, ISW will only publish ORBAT information that is new or indicates a change in Russian units’ positions, deployments, redeployments, or command and control arrangements in order to focus the daily publication on inflections and new information. ISW continues collecting a large amount of repetitive ORBAT information and can make this unpublished data available to selected readers upon request. Please contact [email protected] for any request for information.

 

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian forces conducted an infiltration mission in Sumy Oblast. Geolocated footage posted on April 24 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian position in southeastern Kindrativka (north of Sumy City) after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[7] ISW assesses that this event did not occur within the last 24 hours.

Order of Battle: Elements of the 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) may have redeployed from the Kupyansk direction to the Sumy direction. Molniya-2 fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drone crews of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces in Sumy Oblast.[8] ISW last observed elements of the 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment operating in the Kupyansk direction as of April 9.[9]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations north and northeast of Kharkiv City on April 26 but did not make confirmed advances.[10]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on April 26.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued ground assaults north, east, and southeast of Kupyansk on April 26 but did not advance.[11]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Borova direction on April 26.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

 

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on April 26 but did not advance.[12]

Russian forces continue to conduct infiltration missions within and around Kostyantynivka. Geolocated footage published on April 25 and 26 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in northeastern and southwestern Kostyantynivka and on the southern outskirts of the town after what ISW assesses were Russian infiltration missions.[13] Additional geolocated footage published on April 25 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in eastern Dovha Balka and south of Stepanivka (both southwest of Kostyantynivka) after what ISW assesses were both infiltration missions.[14]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area and the Pokrovsk direction on April 26 but did not advance.[15]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on April 26 but did not make confirmed advances.[16] A Russian milblogger posted a map claiming that Russian forces advanced over northeastern Novopavlivka.[17]

Russian forces are consolidating positions in previously infiltrated areas in the Oleksandrivka direction as Ukrainian forces continue counterattacks. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on April 26 that Russian forces hold Berezove and southern Novohryhorivka (both southeast of Oleksandrivka) after the Russian military command reportedly moved reinforcements to the Berezove and Novohryhorivka areas to prevent further Ukrainian advances.[18]

Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces liberated Vorone (southeast of Oleksandrivka).[19] ISW assesses that Russian forces likely seized Vorone on a prior date.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

The frontlines in the Hulyaipole direction remain dynamic and fluid with interspersed Russian and Ukrainian positions west and northwest of Hulyaipole. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on April 26 that Russian small infantry groups are operating west of Hulyaipilske (southwest of Hulyaipole), between Hulyaipilske and Novoselivka (west of Hulyaipilske), west of Hirke (west of Hulyaipole), west of Dobropillya, and near Verkhnya Tersa and Vozdvyzhivka (all northwest of Hulyaipole) as Ukrainian forces simultaneously hold positions northwest of Solodke (northeast of Hulyaipole), east of Dobropillya, east and south of Zaliznychne (west of Hulyaipole), and on the northwestern outskirts of Hulyaipole itself.[20] Mashovets’ statements about the interspersed positions of both Russian and Ukrainian forces demonstrate the porous nature of the frontlines in the Hulyaipole direction and lack of contiguous lines, which has resulted in intermingled Ukrainian and Russian positions. These statements also indicate that Russian forces likely infiltrated around existing Ukrainian positions west and northwest of Hulyaipole, in central and eastern Svyatopetrivka, and east and south of Zaliznychne, rather than seizing them as ISW previously assessed. ISW has adjusted its control of terrain assessment for the fields west of Hulyaipole to reflect the area as being an assessed Russian infiltration area as opposed to Russian advances.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 26 but did not advance.[21]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kherson direction on April 26 but did not advance.[22]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 25 to 26 and struck a merchant vessel. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 144 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones, of which roughly 100 were Shaheds, including jet-propelled Shaheds, from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast, Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Donetsk City.[23] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 124 drones, that 19 drones struck 11 locations, and that downed debris fell on six locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck civilian, port, and residential infrastructure in Chernihiv and Dnipro cities and Odesa and Zhytomyr oblasts.[24] Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister and Development Minister Oleksiy Kuleba reported that Russian forces damaged a Palau-flagged loading cargo vessel in Odesa Oblast.[25]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.


[1] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37806

[2] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/12865

[3] https://t.me/SBUkr/17419

[4] https://t.me/razvozhaev/20082

[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-25-2026/; https://t.me/robert_magyar/2263

[6] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-17-2026/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2026/

[7] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11769; https://t.me/tenrai_bbs/103

[8] https://t.me/mod_russia/62919

[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-9-2026/

[10] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37815; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37797; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37784; https://t.me/severnnyi/7736; https://t.me/rybar/79770; https://t.me/wargonzo/33785

[11] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37815; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37797; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37784; https://t.me/gvZapad/18409

[12] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37815 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37797 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37784 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33785 ; https://t.me/rybar/79769 ; https://t.me/gvZapad/18409

[13] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2048371954634178752; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2048364380111118548; https://t.me/Gryphon501/108; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2048175581380882894; https://www.instagram.com/striga.17csp/reel/DXkUsK0gNjC/; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11772

[14] https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2048213878668919141; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/11773; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1644395266709280 ; https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/2048213867805700181; https://www.facebook.com/reel/1644395266709280

[15] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37815 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37797 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37784 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/33785

[16] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37797 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37784

[17] https://t.me/motopatriot78/51122

[18] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3368

[19] ttps://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3368

[20] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/3371

[21] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37815; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13841

[22] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37815; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/13841 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37797 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/37784

[23] https://t.me/kpszsu/60785

[24] https://www.facebook.com/dmytrobryzhynskyi/posts/pfbid06xkaHKVsVLwRVT33wDktz7w4i3RR8Pahsd5qtKxZHx2sV1Kr4ou5eMpuzALof8sel; https://t.me/chernihivrada/3630; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/29063; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/29055; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/29054; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/29042; https://t.me/odeskaODA/15673; https://t.me/OleksiiKuleba/8611; https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1JQMcZeg4N/

[25] https://t.me/OleksiiKuleba/8611

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