Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 24, 2026

Assessment as of: 6:45 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 11:30 AM ET

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The Russian Central Bank lowered its key interest rate for the third time in 2026 and eighth time in the last 12 months while continuing attempts to portray the Russian economy as stable. The Russian Central Bank announced on April 24 that it lowered its key interest rate from 15 to 14.5 percent.[1] The Russian Central Bank previously lowered the key interest rate on February 13 and March 20, 2026.[2] The Russian Central Bank claimed that Russian unemployment remains at historic lows and that wage growth continues to outpace productivity growth. The Russian Central Bank claimed that Russia's annual inflation as of April 20 was 5.7 percent. The Russian Central Bank acknowledged that the Russian economy slowed and that core inflation rose in the first quarter of 2026 but claimed that the rise in inflation was due to "one-off factors." Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina stated on April 24 that the Russian Central Bank slightly raised its average key rate forecast range for 2026 to 14 to 14.5 percent from 13.1 to 14.3 percent, as inflationary risks "significantly" increased due to the conflict in the Middle East and potential changes to Russia's fiscal policy.[3] The Russian Central Bank also adjusted its forecast for the price of oil per barrel in the medium term to $65 from $45 — likely in response to global oil price spikes throughout March and April 2026.[4] Elevated Russian oil revenues may enable the Kremlin to continue to finance its war against Ukraine in the medium term but are unlikely to reverse the years of poor economic policy.

The Russian economy continues to struggle under the strain of immense war spending, however. Russia’s extremely low unemployment rate reflects the fact that Russia is experiencing labor shortages and is likely causing wage inflation in the civilian and defense sectors, contributing to overall inflation.[5] Russia's inflation rate is also likely much higher than the Central Bank claims, with grocery prices rising in the early months of 2026.[6] Russia is incurring high levels of external debt and has gradually depleted its liquid reserves to fund its war in Ukraine, ignoring the long-term economic implications of the Kremlin’s economic policies.[7] Russian business newspaper Vedomosti reported on April 23 that the number of planned layoffs in Russia increased by 43 percent since June 2025, amounting to 105,147 as of April 1.[8] Oleg Sokolov, an official from the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia, told Vedomosti that insufficient funds caused by federal and regional deficits could be driving the layoffs. Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) reported on April 23 that Russia's federal deficit reached 4.6 trillion rubles (roughly $61 billion) in the first quarter of 2026 — significantly more than its planned 3.8 trillion rubles (roughly $50 billion) deficit for all of 2026.[9] Russia has steadily depleted its sovereign wealth fund’s liquid reserves in order to fund the war and had to resort to selling its physical gold reserves in November 2025 due to unsustainable spending.[10] Russia also raised its value-added tax (VAT) from 20 to 22 percent as of January 1, 2026, in an attempt to buttress federal budget deficits from unsustainably high defense spending, placing the burden of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s costly war in Ukraine directly on the Russian population.[11]

Polls from both Russian state-owned and independent institutions continue to acknowledge growing societal discontent with Russian President Vladimir Putin, likely due to the mounting war sacrifices for the Russian people and the Kremlin's intensified censorship campaign. Russian state-owned polling institution All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) published on April 24 the results from a poll for the week of April 13 to 19, indicating that Putin’s approval rating declined for the seventh week in a row from 66.7 percent during the week of April 6 to 12 to 65.6 percent during the week of April 13 to 19.[12] VTsIOM polling also indicates that trust in Putin fell to 71 percent during the week of April 13 to 19, down from 72 percent during the week of April 6 to 12.[13] A source from an unspecified government-associated media organization told Russian opposition outlet Meduza that the Russian Presidential Administration’s political bloc advised Russian state media to either cite Putin’s more favorable approval rating from the Kremlin-linked Public Opinion Forum (FOM) or omit reports with polling data entirely.[14] FOM’s most recent polling data found that Putin’s approval rating was around 76 percent during the week of April 17 to 19 — a difference of almost ten points compared to VTsIOM's polling in a similar time frame.[15] FOM data similarly indicates a medium-term decline in Putin’s approval rating, however, with FOM polls showing Putin's approval rating between 75 and 76 percent as of late April 2026, down from 78 to 80 percent in February 2026.[16]

The Kremlin likely maintains political influence over polling data from Russian state-owned polling organizations, and it is notable that state-controlled institutions are acknowledging a medium-term trend of growing domestic discontent with Putin after four years of war. Independent Russian polling organization Levada Center reported Putin’s March 2026 approval rating at 80 percent, a two-percentage point decline from February 2026 and the lowest approval rating that Levada has recorded since November 2022 — shortly after Russia's unpopular partial mobilization in Fall 2022.[17] The Levada Center's approval ratings for Putin began to decline in November 2025 to 85 percent and below, after holding consistently between 88 and 86 percent between January and September 2025.[18] The Levada Center has not yet published results for its April 2026 poll. The downturn in support for Putin comes amidst intensified Kremlin efforts to censor the Russian open internet and the population's mounting war sacrifices.[19] Elements of the Kremlin that are against the new censorship restrictions may be allowing or pushing state polling agencies to release declining polling numbers in order to pressure Putin to go against the pro-restriction factions.[20]

Ukraine and Russia conducted a prisoner of war (POW) exchange on April 24. Russia and Ukraine exchanged 193 POWs each.[21] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 24 that the exchange was a continuation of the Easter exchange launched on April 11.[22] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated that the Unites States and United Arab Emirates (UAE) mediated the exchange.[23]

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian Central Bank lowered its key interest rate for the third time in 2026 and eighth time in the last 12 months while continuing attempts to portray the Russian economy as stable.
• The Russian economy continues to struggle under the strain of immense war spending, however.
• Polls from both Russian state-owned and independent institutions continue to acknowledge growing societal discontent with Russian President Vladimir Putin, likely due to the mounting war sacrifices for the Russian people and the Kremlin's intensified censorship campaign.
• Ukraine and Russia conducted a prisoner of war (POW) exchange on April 24.
• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and in the Pokrovsk direction.
• Russia launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 107 drones against Ukraine overnight. Ukrainian forces recently struck Russian military and air defense assets in Russia.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

• Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
• Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
• Significant Activity in Belarus

Note: ISW has changed how it reports Russian order of battle (ORBAT) details in the Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment on April 20, 2026. ISW previously published all ORBAT information collected in a daily 24-hour reporting period in the daily assessment. Moving forward, ISW will only publish ORBAT information that is new or indicates a change in Russian units’ positions, deployments, redeployments, or command and control arrangements in order to focus the daily publication on inflections and new information. ISW continues collecting a large amount of repetitive ORBAT information and can make this unpublished data available to selected readers upon request. Please contact [email protected] for any request for information.

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

Ukrainian officials provided battle damage assessments (BDA) and additional information about recent Ukrainian strikes on Russian military and air defense assets in Russia. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 24 that Ukraine's April 19 strike against a Russian Atlant-Aero defense-industrial enterprise in Taganrog, Rostov Oblast destroyed two production facilities and damaged four additional production facilities.[24] Vantor and Sentinel-2 satellite imagery captured on April 24 shows at least three damaged and one destroyed building at the Atlant-Aero enterprise.[25] A Ukrainian National Guard group reported on April 24 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian 9A82 transporter erector launcher and radar (TELAR) of an S-300V air defense system in Belgorod Oblast in mid-April 2026.[26]

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border)

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are conducting offensive operations in the Taratutyne direction (southeast of Sumy City) and in other areas of Sumy Oblast.[27] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced into Taratutyne.[28] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have launched a new offensive southeast of Sumy City toward Novodmytrivka and Taratutyne after an almost two-month pause (since roughly February 2026).[29]

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kharkiv City on April 24 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[30]

Russian forces are attempting to advance along international border northeast of Kharkiv City. The Ukrainian 16th Army Corps operating in northern Kharkiv Oblast reported on April 24 that elements of the Russian 12th Rifle Battalion of the 69th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are attacking from Dehtyarne and Nesterne toward Zemlyanky (all northeast of Kharkiv City) with the goal of seizing Zemlyanky by April 30.[31] The 16th Army Corps reported that Russian forces are attempting to cross the border in small assault groups to advance toward the settlement.  

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Oskil River (Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces conducted infiltration missions in and around Kupyansk. Geolocated footage published on April 23 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions in northern Kupyansk and in eastern Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (east of Kupyansk) after what ISW assesses were both Russian infiltration missions.[32]

Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the Kupyansk direction and deny Ukrainian resupplying efforts. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 24 that Russian strikes against Oskil River crossings are disrupting Ukrainian GLOCs, which have caused resource shortages for Ukrainian forces operating on the left bank of the Oskil River.[33] Russian forces continue to strike Ukrainian GLOCS as part of its larger battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign attempting to pressure the Ukrainian rear and disrupt Ukrainian logistics to facilitate future offensive operations.[34] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that it dismissed a brigade commander and demoted the 10th Army Corps commander for failing to address the logistics issues in the Kupyansk direction.[35]

Russian forces continued offensive operations north of Borova on April 24th but did not advance.[36]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Slovyansk direction on April 24 as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[37]

Russian forces continue to target Ukrainian civilian infrastructure in Slovyansk. Ukrainian Head of Slovyansk Military Administration Vadym Lyakh reported on April 24 that Russian multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) fire, aerial bombs, and drone strikes has damaged 50 percent of high-rise buildings and 25 percent of private houses in Slovyansk.[38]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and Russian forces conducted an infiltration mission. Geolocated footage published on April 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces recently advanced east of Kostyantynivka.[39] Geolocated footage published on April 22 shows Ukrainian forces striking a Russian-occupied building in Kostyantynivka after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[40] Geolocated footage published on April 22 shows Russian forces striking a Ukrainian position in southern Kostyantynivka in an area where Russian sources previously claimed that Russian forces maintained positions.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Illinivka (southwest of Kostyantynivka).[42]

Russian forces have intensified the use of motorcycles in assault operations. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on April 22 that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian motorized assault near Chasiv Yar (northeast of Kostyantynivka).[43] The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade reported on April 24 that Russian forces continue conducting motorcycle assaults with armored vehicle support in the Kramatorsk direction.[44] A commander of a Ukrainian unit operating in the Kostyantynivka direction reported on April 24 that Russian forces are constantly conducting infantry and armored vehicle assaults and are prioritizing glide bomb strikes, which Russian forces use to destroy Ukrainian positions before attacking.[45]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are using Kostyantynivka's dense urban environment to conceal themselves from a high concentration of Ukrainian drones and noted that the situation in Kostyantynivka is starting to resemble that of Pokrovsk.[46]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on April 24 but did not advance.[47]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced and counterattacked in the Pokrovsk direction as Russian forces continued offensive operations.[48] Geolocated footage published on April 24 shows Ukrainian forces operating in western Rodynske (north of Pokrovsk).[49] A Russian milblogger claimed on April 24 that Ukrainian forces continue to operate in Rodynske in considerable numbers and that other Russian milbloggers do not report on Ukrainian forces operating in Rodynske due to lack of information.[50] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced south of Hryshyne (northwest of Pokrovsk).[51]

Russian forces continue conducting infiltration missions and assault operations in the Pokrovsk direction, notably attacking in larger motorized groups since mid-April. The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on April 24 that Russian forces conduct up to 20 assaults a day and “non-stop” infiltrations in groups of two or three people.[52] The spokesperson added that Russian forces have been attacking in larger groups in the past two weeks (since roughly April 10) and using all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and motorcycles. The intelligence head of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on April 24 that Russian forces prioritize motorcycle assault operations due to their maneuverability and because it is difficult for the Ukrainian forces to strike motorcycle assaults.[53]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on April 24 but did not advance.[54]

Russian forces recently infiltrated in the Oleksandrivka direction. Geolocated footage published on April 24 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions southeast of Novoselivka (east of Oleksandrivka) after what ISW assesses was an infiltration mission.[55]

Russian forces are increasingly targeting Ukrainian logistics in the Oleksandrivka direction. The commander of a Ukrainian battalion operating in the Oleksandrivka direction reported on April 24 that Russian forces are targeting Ukrainian logistics to complicate ammunition supplies and are introducing “long-range” first-person view (FPV) drones that are difficult to intercept even using electronic warfare (EW) systems.[56]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied southern Donetsk Oblast. Geolocated footage published on April 24 shows Ukrainian Special Operation Forces (SOF) striking a Russian repair base in occupied Klynkyne (approximately 144 kilometers from the frontline) and a Russian rear concentration point in eastern Manhush (approximately 102 kilometers from the frontline) between April 16 and April 24.[57]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces recently continued offensive operations northwest and southwest of Hulyaipole and  strikes that aim to disrupt Ukrainian logistics in the area.[58]

Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on April 24 but did not advance.[59] A Russian milblogger acknowledged that Ukrainian forces maintain control over northern Stepnohirsk (west of Orikhiv).[60] Geolocated footage published on April 23 shows Russian forces striking Ukrainian positions in northern Mahdanylivka (northwest of Orikhiv) in an area where Russian sources previously claimed Russian forces maintained positions.[61]

Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on April 24 shows Ukrainian Special Operation Forces (SOF) striking a Russian material and technical support warehouse in Smile (approximately 35 kilometers from the frontline) and an ammunition depot in Trudove (approximately 40 kilometers from the frontline) between April 16 and April 24.[62]

Russian forces continue to conduct limited ground attacks and their "human safari" drone strike campaign targeting civilians in the Kherson direction.[63]

The Ukrainian General Staff offered a battlefield damage assessment (BDA) of a recent strike against occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that a Ukrainian April 22 strike against a Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Border Service Project 22460 Rubin-class patrol ship in occupied Sevastopol damaged the conning tower.[64]

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of April 23 to 24 and struck a merchant vessel heading to load Ukrainian grain. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles from Rostov Oblast and 107 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, Italmas-type, and other drones — of which about 70 where Shaheds — from the directions of Bryansk and Oryol cities; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[65] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 96 drones, that the two ballistic missiles and 10 drones struck nine locations, and that downed debris fell on two locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential infrastructure in Odesa and Kharkiv oblasts, killing two civilians and injuring 14 others in Odesa Oblast.[66] Ukrainian officials reported that two Russian drones struck a merchant vessel flying a St. Kitts and Nevis flag en route to a port in Odesa City to load grain.[67]

Russian forces have been intensifying their strikes against Ukrainian rail infrastructure in 2026 as compared to 2025 in order to disrupt Ukrainian logistics. Ukrainian railway operator Ukrzaliznytsya reported that Russian strikes damaged nine locomotives, 46 passenger wagons, 91 freight wagons, two bridges, and 17 train stations in the first half of 2025; 119 locomotives, 153 passenger wagons, 135 freight wagons, 62 bridges, and 21 train station in the second half of 2025; and 81 locomotives, 40 passenger wagons, 145 freight wagons, 22 bridges, and 12 train stations in the first three months of 2026.[68] Ukrzaliznytsya's Strategy and Transformation Department Director Oleg Yakovenko stated that Russian strikes against railway infrastructure totaled about 1,200 in 2025 — more than 2023 and 2024 combined. Ukrzaliznytsya's Project Office Director Kostyantyn Doda stated that Russian forces conducted 352 strikes against railway infrastructure between March 1 and April 23, 2026, and have struck more than 20 depots since February 2022. Yakovenko stated that Russian forces have struck about 17,300 infrastructure facilities and railway rolling stock throughout the full-scale invasion, damaging about 7,300 facilities and destroying about 9,900. Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Community and Territorial Development Oleksiy Balesta added that Russian forces have struck more than 300 locomotives since the start of the full-scale invasion and that Ukrainian authorities are unable to return, restore, or modernize about 50 of these locomotives. ISW continues to assess that Russian strikes against Ukrainian railway infrastructure across the country is part of Russia's ongoing battlefield air interdiction (BAI) campaign that aims to degrade Ukrainian logistics.[69]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.