Iran Update Special Report, July 12, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.  

Note: CTP-ISW will publish abbreviated updates covering developments in Iran on July 11 and 12. CTP-ISW will continue to publish full updates on weekdays.

Key Takeaways:

• Iran is refusing any arrangement that undermines Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz and is using force to maintain its control. Iran views control over the Strait of Hormuz as a major strategic objective, and its leaders believe that if Iran ends the war without control of the strait, it would be a serious strategic defeat.
• Recent US strikes have attempted to degrade Iran’s ability to attack commercial shipping, but it remains unclear when Iran’s ability to attack commercial shipping will be degraded sufficiently to prevent individual attacks that disrupt shipping.
• Iran is likely attacking Persian Gulf littoral states to deter them from supporting US- or Gulf-led efforts to limit Iranian control over the strait. Iran fired missiles and drones at US facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Qatar, and Oman on July 12 in retaliation for the US strikes in Iran on July 11.

Toplines

Iran is refusing any arrangement that undermines Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz and is using force to maintain its control. Iranian and Omani officials held a meeting in Muscat, Oman, on July 11 to discuss safe passage through the strait.[i] Clause five of the US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU) requires Iran to discuss the “future administration and maritime services” of the strait with Oman and other Persian Gulf littoral states in line with “applicable international law.”[ii] CNN reported on July 11 that Oman proposed two fully operational corridors: a southern route through Omani territorial waters that would allow unrestricted navigation under pre-war conditions and a northern route through Iranian territorial waters that would require prior Iranian approval but would not include tolls.[iii] Iran has repeatedly rejected efforts to establish alternative transit arrangements outside Iranian control, including the International Maritime Organization-Omani safe-route initiative on June 25, because such routes would weaken Iran’s ability to manage maritime traffic and use the strait as leverage.[iv] Iran's English-language media outlet argued on July 12 that attempts to establish a parallel maritime route or escort vessels through the southern corridor undermine “Iran’s security arrangements” and warned that Iran will not tolerate vessels that bypass Iranian authority.[v] Iran rejected the Omani proposal on July 12, and Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi could not secure approval for the proposal during the meeting with Omani officials and returned it to Tehran for further internal discussions.[vi]

Iran views control over the Strait of Hormuz as a major strategic objective, and its leaders believe that if Iran ends the war without control of the strait, the war would end in a serious strategic defeat. Two senior Iranian sources told Reuters on July 8 that the Iranian regime considers its control over the strait to be “important leverage” and that giving up such control would be tantamount to “surrender.”[vii] Senior Iranian officials continue to frame the strait as a matter of sovereignty and regime survival rather than a maritime issue.[viii] Supreme Leader Military Adviser and former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Mohsen Rezaei described the strait as “more important than dozens of atomic bombs,” on July 12.[ix] 

Recent US strikes have attempted to degrade Iran’s ability to attack commercial shipping, but it remains unclear when Iran’s ability to attack commercial shipping will be degraded sufficiently to prevent individual attacks that disrupt shipping. The strikes have also not yet changed Iran’s willingness to use force. The IRGC Navy struck the Cyprus-flagged GFS Galaxy on July 11 with an anti-ship cruise missile and claimed that it struck a second unspecified vessel on July 12, demonstrating that the IRGC Navy remains capable of conducting individual attacks.[x] Even individual attacks can prevent the passage of vessels because the ability to transit the strait is contingent entirely upon the risk calculations of ship captains, owners, and the shipping industry, which are all risk-averse. US Central Command (CENTCOM) struck approximately 140 Iranian military targets, including missile and drone sites, naval capabilities, air and surface-surveillance radars, and surface-to-air missile launchers on July 11 in response to IRGC attacks against commercial vessels.[xi] CENTCOM stated that it struck more than 300 targets over three nights to degrade Iran’s ability to attack commercial shipping.[xii]  A US official told Axios on July 12 that the US military also conducted several strikes targeting missile and air defense systems and IRGC fast attack craft at multiple locations around the strait.[xiii] The July 11 US strikes also targeted central Iran, including Kerman, Lorestan, Markazi, and Kohgiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad provinces.[xiv] This is a geographic expansion, but only the strikes along the coast will have an immediate tactical effect on Iranian operations. The strikes further inland have not yet affected Iranian willingness to continue attacks into the Strait of Hormuz, though that could change, especially if the strikes are coupled with other efforts.

Iran is likely attacking Persian Gulf littoral states to deter them from supporting US- or Gulf-led efforts to limit Iranian control over the strait. Iran fired missiles and drones at US facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Qatar, and Oman on July 12 in retaliation for the US strikes in Iran on July 11.[xv] Iran has repeatedly targeted Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan since signing the MOU on June 15 as a means to deter the United States from undermining Iranian control of the strait.[xvi] Iran has not attacked Qatar since April 8 and only occasionally struck Oman during the war, however.[xvii] Qatar and Oman are acting as mediators in the ongoing US-Iran talks.[xviii] Iran claimed to target Al Udeid Airbase in Qatar and US aircraft carrier support and refueling platforms in the Port of Duqm, Oman.^[xix]

Iran likely attacked Qatar and Oman on July 12 because the regime views their mediation to be aligned with US-led efforts to reopen the strait in the wake of Qatari, Omani, and Iranian talks in Muscat on July 11.[xx] Iranian regime-affiliated Nour News blamed Qatar, Oman, and other unspecified Gulf States on July 12 for opening the “southern corridor” through the strait and ignoring “Iran’s arrangements.”[xxi] Iranian officials and media framed Oman in particular as giving in to ”US pressure” in proposing this plan on July 11.^[xxii]  This perception is likely intensified by Iran’s failure to secure diplomatic recognition of its control over the strait from other Persian Gulf states in recent weeks.[xxiii] Iran is now resorting to using force against Gulf states, likely to deter them from supporting efforts that undermine Iranian efforts to secure recognition of Iran’s control over the strait. These attacks presumably also aim to coerce the Gulf states into acquiescing to Iranian control. Iranian officials have explicitly stated that Oman and other Gulf states cannot prevent Iran from asserting control over the strait in recent weeks.[xxiv]

Maritime Activity in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf

See topline.

US-Israeli Air Campaign

See topline.

Iranian Domestic Affairs

See topline.

Iran’s Axis of Resistance

Lebanese Hezbollah and the Israeli Campaign in Lebanon

Nothing significant to report.

Other Axis of Resistance Activity

Nothing significant to report.