Iran Update Special Report, August 4, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute are publishing daily updates to provide analysis on the war with Iran. The updates cover events from the past 24-hour period.  

Key Takeaways:

• US officials and Iranian negotiators continue to present competing interpretations of the emerging arrangement on the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranians’ inconsistent messaging in these negotiations is likely a product of the competing Iranian regime factions’ approaches to control over the strait and negotiations with the United States writ large.
• Iran’s broader military establishment, which appears to currently be dominating regime decision-making, maintains its position against significant concessions over the Strait of Hormuz because they assess that Iran can outlast the United States in the war.
• Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and other pro-negotiations officials continue to advocate for diplomacy to settle the conflict and prioritize Iran’s economic challenges, while facing mounting pressure from the other regime factions that oppose compromise and seek more maximalist regional objectives. This intra-regime divide will likely impede Iran’s ability to concretely come to an arrangement over the strait.
• Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei appears to be downplaying these intra-regime divisions in an attempt to portray a unified front against the United States, however. The Supreme Leader's Public Relations Office on August 4 rejected reports claiming to describe Mojtaba's reaction to a letter from President Masoud Pezeshkian.
• The Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed that a Houthi drone struck a “sensitive target” at Najran Regional Airport, southern Saudi Arabia, on August 4. An informed regional source told AFP on August 4 that the Houthis struck the Najran Regional Airport’s main radar installation, which has affected airport operations.
• The Houthis likely sunk an Indian-flagged cargo vessel with a one-way naval attack drone near the Bab al Mandeb Strait. Indian Minister of Ports, Shipping, and Waterways Sarbananda Sonowal announced on August 4 that an unspecified projectile struck and sunk the Indian-flagged MSV FAIZE NOORE OLIYA “near Yemeni waters.”

Toplines

US officials and Iranian negotiators continue to present competing interpretations of the emerging arrangement on the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranians’ inconsistent messaging in these negotiations is likely a product of the competing Iranian regime factions’ approaches to control over the strait and negotiations with the United States writ large. US officials, including US President Donald Trump and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, continue to insist that the strait must remain open to international shipping and not be subject to Iranian control.[i] Western reporting on August 3 and 4, citing regional mediators, suggests that US and Qatari mediators have floated a compromise to return traffic through the strait to pre-war levels – a US objective – under which inbound traffic would transit through Iranian waters, while outbound traffic would pass through Omani waters.[ii] US and regional officials made it clear in these talks that this system would not involve tolls, according to these reports.[iii] Western media also reported on August 4, citing regional mediators and a senior Iranian source, that Iranian diplomats sought to retain maritime monitoring and intervention rights while demanding “service fees,” blockade relief, and sanctions relief, however.[iv] The Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry is concurrently framing talks over this arrangement as an issue to be managed between Iran and Oman rather than part of broader US-Iran negotiations.[v] Iran’s negotiating team may be framing these talks as such to avoid the appearance of agreeing to a US-brokered plan over the strait and of conceding to the United States to its domestic audience amid pressure from other negotiation-skeptical regime factions.

Iran’s broader military establishment, which appears to currently be dominating regime decision-making, maintains its position against significant concessions over the Strait of Hormuz because they assess that Iran can outlast the United States in the war. The supreme leader’s military adviser, Major General Mohsen Rezaei, told regime media on August 3 that Iran should not abandon its control over the strait, while claiming that Iran’s drone and missile attacks on US regional bases have compelled US commanders, forces, and equipment further out of the region.[vi] This implies that Rezaei believes that the United States is not willing to keep its forces close to Iran where they can be struck more easily. Rezaei’s stance is reflective of the broader continued confidence among the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) faction exemplified by Major General Ahmad Vahidi.[vii] This faction controls Iran’s current military operations, including the IRGC Navy’s continued coercive actions to disrupt shipping through the strait aimed at reinforcing Iranian claims over the strait and threatening the shipping companies, both of which impose costs on the United States.[viii] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported on August 4 that the IRGC Navy harassed a vessel on August 2, before an unknown projectile fell in the vessel’s vicinity, which suggests that the IRGC Navy conducted the subsequent failed attack on the vessel.[ix]

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and other pro-negotiation officials continue to advocate for diplomacy to settle the conflict and prioritize Iran’s economic challenges, while facing mounting pressure from the other regime factions that oppose compromise and seek more maximalist regional objectives. This intra-regime divide will likely impede Iran’s ability to concretely come to an arrangement over the strait.[x] Pezeshkian and former Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, who played a central role in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) negotiations, on August 3 and 4 publicly voiced their support for diplomatic engagement.[xi] Zarif recommended that Iran use the strait as a “bargaining chip” to extract further economic relief from the United States.[xii] Pezeshkian has publicly defended his pro-negotiation stance and indicated he will remain president despite speculation that Iranian officials are pressuring him to leave office.[xiii] This speculation escalated after senior cleric Mohammad Bagher Kharrazi, who has familial ties to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, claimed on August 3 that Mojtaba formally warned Pezeshkian in a written statement that he would accept Pezeshkian’s resignation if Pezeshkian tried to resign again.[xiv] Kharrazi claimed that a warning from Mojtaba caused President Pezeshkian to ”back down,“ hinting that Mojtaba sought to prevent Pezeshkian from using resignation threats to influence regime policy after Pezeshkian reportedly threatened to resign if Mojtaba rejected the US-Iran memorandum of understanding in May.[xv] The Supreme Leader's Public Relations Office on August 4 rejected reports claiming to describe Mojtaba's reaction to a letter from President Masoud Pezeshkian, almost certainly in response to Kharrazi’s August 3 statement, however.[xvi]

The report that Mojtaba warned Pezeshkian that he would accept any future resignation, if true, suggests that Mojtaba is strongly supportive of the IRGC faction’s current efforts to accomplish their maximalist objectives through force during negotiations. It would also demonstrate that Mojtaba is unwilling to let Iranian officials use resignation threats as a political tool to box in the supreme leader.

Ultrahardline parliamentarians have intensified public criticism of the government’s diplomatic approach and are increasingly portraying negotiations as a sign of weakness. Paydari (Stability) Front-affiliated Parliamentarian Hosseinali Hajideligani stated that lawmakers are preparing impeachment proceedings against Foreign Minister Araghchi because they believe he failed to force the United States to accept maximalist Iranian demands.[xvii] Hajidelgani suggested they could impeach Pezeshkian as well in response to a question about Pezeshkian’s pro-negotiations stance.[xviii] The demands cited by Hajideligani include preserving complete Iranian control over the strait, removing Israeli forces from Lebanon, and pushing the United States out of the region.[xix] Hajideligani is the deputy chairman of Parliament’s Article 90 Committee that investigates parliamentary complaints against executive, legislative, and judicial branches.[xx] It is possible that other negotiations-skeptic factions or individuals, including Mojtaba himself and Vahidi, are also putting political pressure on the negotiating team. Such pressure is likely a factor contributing to the slow progress of the strait negotiations, as Iranian negotiators seek to balance diplomatic objectives against intra-regime constraints.

Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei appears to be downplaying these intra-regime divisions in an attempt to portray a unified front against the United States, however. The Supreme Leader's Public Relations Office on August 4 rejected reports claiming to describe Mojtaba's reaction to a letter from President Masoud Pezeshkian.[xxi] The Public Relations Office emphasized that only the Office of the Supreme Leader and the Office for the Preservation and Publication of the Leader's Works are authorized to publish messages, statements, and positions attributed to Mojtaba.[xxii] The statement asserted that circulating social media quotations and reports fueled public concern and political division, and stressed that material published outside official channels lacked “authenticity and validity.”[xxiii] The office further highlighted that Mojtaba has consistently emphasized the importance of preserving national unity and maintaining the dignity of government officials, “especially the esteemed government.”[xxiv]

US and Partner Military Operations

The United States has continued to enforce its naval blockade against Iranian ports and vessels that it reimposed on July 14.[xxv] US Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed on August 4 that US forces have redirected 45 commercial vessels, disabled two and boarded two vessels to ensure compliance with its blockade on Iranian ports.[xxvi] The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that an unknown projectile struck the engine room of a cargo ship that was transiting northbound of the Strait of Hormuz in Omani territorial waters on August 3, causing fire and a power outage on the vessel.[xxvii] Iranian media reported on August 4 that an “unknown projectile” hit a Greek-owned cargo ship, MINOAN PIONEER, off the Omani coast near the strait's entrance.[xxviii] Another Iranian outlet reported on August 4 that the MINOAN PIONEER had previously transited the Iranian route safely on July 29.[xxix] Commercially available shipping data confirmed that the Greek-owned, Liberian-flagged MINOAN PIONEER had docked at the Iranian port of Mahshahr in the northern Persian Gulf.[xxx] The vessel then loitered near Sohar, Oman, from July 30 to August 2 before proceeding towards Fujairah, the United Arab Emirates.[xxxi] The vessel then turned off its automatic identification system transponder on August 3.[xxxii] CENTCOM has not confirmed that it struck the MINOAN PIONEER specifically at the time of this writing.

Iranian Strike Campaign

• Assessed Iranian War Aims:
  • Secure international recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz
  • Degrade the US ability and willingness to continue the war
  • Restore deterrence vis-à -vis the United States and its regional partners
  • Divide the United States and Israel from the Arab states

Nothing significant to report.

US-Iran Negotiations

See topline section.
Iranian Domestic Affairs

See topline section.
Lebanon

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) announced on August 4 that it seized a weapons shipment smuggled from Syria near Aarsal, Baalbek-Hermel Governorate, that was likely intended for Hezbollah.[xxxiii] The LAF stated that it seized at least a dozen Grad rockets.[xxxiv] Hezbollah has historically used Grad rockets to target Israel.[xxxv] The LAF seizure coincides with recent Lebanese government initiatives to curb Hezbollah smuggling efforts. Lebanese media reported on July 27 that the LAF is implementing a “broad security plan” to close land-based smuggling routes and tunnels along the Lebanon-Syria border, including several routes in Hermel District, Baalbek-Hermel Governorate, which is a Hezbollah stronghold.[xxxvi]  UK-based, Saudi-owned media reported on July 27 that Lebanon installed new scanners and security measures at Beirut Port, Rafic Hariri International Airport, and the Masnaa border crossing to curb Hezbollah weapons and money shipments.[xxxvii]

LAF efforts to disarm Hezbollah in the "pilot zones" in southern Lebanon will likely fail if the Lebanese government does not stipulate and ensure that military forces have authorization and the will to search private property to confiscate Hezbollah materiel. LAF sources told Saudi media on August 1 that the Lebanese judiciary has not yet authorized the LAF to search private homes and property pursuant to the government’s efforts to disarm Hezbollah.[xxxviii] The sources confirmed that LAF units have not searched for Hezbollah materiel on private property in the “pilot zones,” which include areas surrounding Zawtar el Gharbiyeh, Froun, and Ghandouriyeh in Nabatieh Governorate, as a result.[xxxix] Lebanese judicial officials previously told Saudi media on July 22 that the Lebanese judiciary was considering several possible means to authorize the LAF to search private property and confiscate Hezbollah materiel, including search warrants that would apply to individual properties or municipalities as a whole.[xl] Hezbollah frequently conceals its materiel in civilian homes and private property to prevent Lebanese authorities from seizing the group’s weapons and deter adversaries from striking assets in civilian-populated areas.[xli] Legal restrictions preventing the LAF from searching and clearing Hezbollah materiel on private property preclude the LAF from fulfilling its obligation under the June 26 Trilateral Framework Agreement to completely disarm Hezbollah.[xlii] Lebanese government leaders must also ensure that LAF units operating in the “pilot zones” implement government directives to search private property. LAF personnel may avoid searching private property in order to avert confrontation with Hezbollah, absent strong enforcement efforts by LAF leaders and international partners, including the United States.[xliii]

The LAF’s limited progress in searching private property comes amid resumed US-brokered Israel-Lebanon talks in Rome from August 4 to August 6.[xliv] Lebanese media reported on August 4 that the Israeli and Lebanese negotiating delegations discussed issues relevant to implementing and verifying LAF efforts to disarm Hezbollah in the pilot zones.[xlv]

Iraq

Unspecified security and political sources told Iraqi media on August 4 that the Iraqi federal government has begun taking measures to prevent Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks on neighboring countries.[xlvi] The sources said that these measures include imposing “severe penalties” on security officials proven to have conducted attacks from their area of responsibility and conducting ”close surveillance” on Iraqi desert areas bordering Saudi Arabia and Jordan.[xlvii] Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi also ordered the formation of a ”joint security committee” on August 1 to develop "deterrent measures” to prevent future militia attacks against regional countries.[xlviii] These security measures come after Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait reportedly warned the Iraqi government that they would strike Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in Iraq if the militias launch any new attacks against their countries, according to a senior Iraqi official speaking to US-funded Arabic-language media on July 31.[xlix]  Regional countries, including Saudi Arabia, had previously urged the Iraqi government to prevent Iranian-backed Iraqi militias from launching attacks on neighboring countries from Iraqi territory.[l] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have conducted several attacks against regional countries in recent weeks.[li]

These measures follow US and Saudi strikes on Iranian-backed Iraqi militia sites on July 28 in response to attacks on US interests in Iraq and Saudi oil infrastructure.[lii] Zaydi reportedly postponed his visit to Saudi Arabia following the strikes, but will visit the country next week, according to an informed source speaking to Iraqi media on August 3.[liii]

A member of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq’s political party claimed on August 4 that Popular Mobilization Commission (PMC) Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh had prior knowledge of the US and Saudi strikes targeting Iranian-backed Iraqi militia sites on July 28, which is likely an attempt to create a political scandal that will result in Zaydi firing Fayyadh.[liv] Unspecified political sources similarly told Iraqi media on August 3 that Zaydi had informed Fayyadh about the upcoming strikes.[lv] The PMC chairman is roughly equivalent to a US military service chief (though he reports directly to the prime minister, not the defense minister) and controls the Popular Mobilization Forces, which is an Iraqi security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[lvi] Only the Iraqi prime minister has the authority to fire the PMC chairman.[lvii] The US and Saudi strikes on July 28 killed at least 20 PMF members, which Asaib Ahl al Haq may use to pressure Zaydi to dismiss Fayyadh by accusing him of failing to evacuate PMF bases despite prior knowledge of the strikes.^[lviii] Iraqi media reported on August 3 that some Shia Coordination Framework parties doubted the political sources’ claims that Fayyadh had prior knowledge and viewed them as politically motivated, however.[lix] Asaib Ahl al Haq has called for Fayyadh’s removal from his position as PMC chairman since 2024.[lx]

The United States reportedly made its release of nearly $30 billion of Saddam Hussein-era Iraqi funds contingent on the Iraqi federal government’s disarmament of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[lxi]  An informed source told Iraqi Kurdish media on August 2 that the United States withheld funds expected during Zaydi’s Washington visit and conditioned their release on Iraqi efforts to restrict arms to the state and permit greater US investment.[lxii] This report follows several others from Iraqi and regional media in recent months about US efforts to pressure the Iraqi federal government to disarm the Iraqi militias, including through conditioning aid to Zaydi’s government.[lxiii]  The Iraqi government has set the end of September as the deadline for its disarmament campaign, coinciding with the planned US-led coalition withdrawal from Iraq.[lxiv] Multiple Iraqi militias, including those closest ideologically to Iran and most kinetically active in recent months, continue to refuse to disarm.[lxv] Iraqi and regional media have also detailed the various ways the militias attempted to circumvent the government’s campaign, including by handing over “scrap” missiles and inoperable drones.[lxvi]

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Ninewa Operations Command reportedly ordered the complete evacuation of its headquarters and formations in Ninewa Province in anticipation of further US strikes.[lxvii] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes multiple Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that answer to Iran instead of the Iraqi prime minister.[lxviii] A PMF source told Iraqi media on August 2 that the PMF Ninewa Operations Command’s directive ordered the redeployment of PMF forces to alternative headquarters while leaving “minimal security” at headquarters throughout the province.[lxix] Ninewa Operations Command Commander Khadhir al Matrohi is affiliated with the Badr Organization.[lxx] US-Israeli strikes in March and April, as well as US-Saudi strikes on July 28, targeted PMF positions in Ninewa Province.[lxxi] The US-Israeli combined force also reportedly struck the Ninewa Operations Command headquarters on March 19.[lxxii] Multiple PMF units based in Ninewa Province, particularly the Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba-affiliated 50th Brigade and the Badr-affiliated 30th Brigade, supported militia attacks on targets in Iraqi Kurdistan in March and April.^[lxxiii] A Kurdistan Democratic Party member also said on July 28 that an unspecified PMF brigade in the Ninewa Plains has been conducting attacks on Iraqi Kurdistan, likely in reference to the 30th and 50th PMF brigades.[lxxiv]

Arabian Peninsula

The United States has reportedly urged Saudi Arabia not to retaliate against the Houthi blockade and attacks on Saudi-flagged vessels amid reported indirect Saudi-Houthi de-escalation talks.[lxxv] Regional and Western diplomats told Bloomberg on August 4 that US officials have privately discouraged Saudi retaliatory strikes in response to Houthi attacks on Saudi shipping.[lxxvi] Saudi Arabia has not struck Houthi-controlled Yemeni territory since July 25, when Saudi-led coalition aircraft struck likely Houthi drone and missile launch sites in Jawf and Marib Governorates.[lxxvii] Sources familiar with the matter told Bloomberg on August 4 that Saudi Arabia has recently conducted indirect negotiations with the Houthis via Omani mediators in an attempt to deescalate Saudi-Houthi tensions.[lxxviii] The sources said that the Houthis have demanded that Saudi Arabia make unspecified economic concessions during the talks.[lxxix] Houthi National Negotiating Delegation member Abdulmalik Alejri stated on August 4 that the Houthis expect Saudi Arabia to “seriously respond” to Houthi demands, including paying Houthi officials’ salaries and lifting the ”blockade” on Yemeni ports and airports.[lxxx] The Houthis have repeatedly demanded that Saudi Arabia pay Houthi civil servant salaries since 2018.[lxxxi] Saudi Arabia is reportedly continuing to plan for potential military operations against the Houthis should these negotiations fail.[lxxxii] Saudi Arabia is reportedly concerned that expanded conflict between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition could hurt Saudi’s oil industry and economy, however.[lxxxiii] These concerns were one of the reasons that Saudi Arabia reached a ceasefire in 2022 with the Houthis. Saudi Arabia has increasingly relied on Yanbu and other Saudi Red Sea ports to export oil and circumvent Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz.[lxxxiv] Saudi oil exports via the Red Sea have increased to 3.5 million barrels per day, up from 120,000 barrels per day before the current war, according to The Economist on July 30.[lxxxv]

The Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Sarea claimed that a Houthi drone struck a “sensitive target” at Najran Regional Airport, southern Saudi Arabia, on August 4.[lxxxvi] An informed regional source told AFP on August 4 that the Houthis struck the Najran Regional Airport’s main radar installation, which has affected airport operations.[lxxxvii] Commercially available flight data indicates that the airport suspended inbound and outbound flights on August 4.[lxxxviii] Saudi officials have not confirmed the strike at the time of this writing, however. The Houthis claimed that the strikes were in response to recent Saudi “violations” of Yemeni airspace with drone overflights in the Saada and Hajjah governorates.[lxxxix] Sarea stated further Saudi “violations” would not go “unpunished.”[xc] The Houthis previously shot down two Saudi drones over Houthi-controlled territory on July 26 and 28.[xci]

The Houthis likely sunk an Indian-flagged cargo vessel with a one-way naval attack drone near the Bab al Mandeb Strait. Indian Minister of Ports, Shipping, and Waterways Sarbananda Sonowal announced on August 4 that an unspecified projectile struck and sunk the Indian-flagged MSV FAIZE NOORE OLIYA “near Yemeni waters.”[xcii] UK-based Saudi-owned media reported on August 4 that a water-borne improvised explosive device, possibly a one-way naval attack drone, struck the vessel 13 nautical miles south of Houthi-controlled Hudaydah City, Hudaydah Governorate.[xciii] The Houthis have utilized one-way naval attack drones to attack US Navy and civilian commercial vessels since 2024.[xciv] Yemeni military sources told Saudi media on August 3 that the IRGC helped the Houthis reinforce launch sites on high ground overlooking the Bab al Mandeb Strait and the Houthis’ main port at Hudaydah.[xcv]